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ABSTRACT 
 
 
With the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, EU law now contains explicit 
references to minority rights in Article 2 TEU and Article 21 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. Combined with other EU norms on non-discrimination on the 
grounds of race or ethnic origin, and policies on culture and education, these 
references may be regarded as providing the preconditions for an EU regime of 
minority protection. This thesis investigates whether the EU should take these 
developments any further, and play more prominent role in protecting minorities in its 
Member States. This research question is addressed through four case studies on 
various aspects of minority protection, i.e., (1) the right to political participation, (2) 
the freedom to manifest religion, (3) the right to mother-tongue education, and (4) the 
right to autonomy. The case studies, based on examples from EU Member States 
(namely Latvia, Belgium and the United Kingdom), highlight that the EU could 
undoubtedly play a greater role in minority protection. However, instead of enacting 
its own rules on their protection, a more practical way forward could be for the EU to 
support implementation of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities by Member States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1. Setting the scene: research questions 
 
 
In 1993, the New York Times reported a story of Reverend Zsigmond Csukas, the 75-
year-old pastor of the Hungarian Reformed Church in Samorin, a town with a large 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia: 
…. One Man, Five Nationalities.  
Mr. Csukas’s life story encapsulates the shifting fortunes of 
Hungarians living on the border of what was, before 1918, one of 
Europe’s bigger nations. He has been a citizen of five different 
countries, but has never left the narrow strip of rural villages along 
what is now the border between Hungary and Slovakia.  
He was born in 1918, during the reign of Charles, the last Emperor to 
rule over the territories of Austria-Hungary. A few months later he 
became a citizen of Czechoslovakia, when Hungary lost substantial 
territory as a penalty for siding with Germany in World War I. When 
the Nazis dismembered Czechoslovakia in 1938, they gave a piece to 
Hungary, and Mr. Csukas became a Hungarian again.  
‘We felt at home again,’ he recalled. ‘We could speak Hungarian.’ 
Once again, Hungary was on the losing side, and after World War II 
the territory was restored to Czechoslovakia. On Jan. 1 this year 
[1993], that country broke up, and Mr. Csukas took up his fifth 
citizenship, this time as a Slovak.1 
 
The story of one man, five nationalities neatly captures the challenges faced by many 
minority groups in Europe.2 Do minorities, i.e., groups with a language, culture 
and/or religion distinct from that of the majority, have to give up their language, 
                                                 
1 S Engelberg and J Ingram, ‘Now Hungary Adds Its Voice to the Ethnic Tumult’ New York Times 
(New York 25 January 1993) World <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/25/world/now-hungary-adds-
its-voice-to-the-ethnic-tumult.html?pagewanted=all> accessed 12 January 2010. 
 
2 There are 300 different ethnic and national minorities in Europe. More than 90 languages are spoken 
in Europe: only 37 of these languages are recognised as official State languages: European Parliament, 
‘Minority Protection in Europe: “A Great Paradox”’, 04 February 2009  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/public/story_page/019-47956-033-02-06-902-20090202STO479 
35-2009-02-02-2009/default_en.htm>  accessed 24 February 2009. 
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religious practices or cultural traditions every time that the upheavals of European 
history3 shift the borders in Europe? If such a group constituted a former, sometimes a 
dominant, majority, are its members allowed to have a say in the way they are 
governed by their new home State? If a group compactly inhabits certain territory in a 
State, can it require autonomous powers to self-govern matters of particular concern 
to its members, such as education in a mother-tongue? These are some questions that 
this thesis addresses in the context of the European Union (EU).  
                                                
 
Originally, the European Community (the EU’s predecessor) did not concern itself 
with minority rights. In 1993, in the context of the processes of democratisation in the 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union,4 the EU made its membership conditional on respect for and protection of 
minorities based on the Copenhagen accession criteria.5 However, EU law contained 
no corresponding obligation for ‘old’ Member States.6 As a result, in its monitoring of 
 
3 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities CETS No 157 (FCNM), Preamble 
(Recital 5). 
 
4 Council (EC) ‘Declaration on the Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union’ (1991) EC Bulletin 1991/12, 119. 
 
5 The accession criteria, or Copenhagen criteria, were set at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 
and further clarified at the Madrid European Council in 1995. See, Copenhagen European Council, 
Presidency Conclusions of 21-22 June 1993 and Madrid European Council, Presidency Conclusions of 
15-16 December 1995 <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/index 
en.htm> accessed 1 September 2008. 
 
6 These double standards in minority protection towards candidate countries and EU Member States 
have been consistently criticised by commentators: Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Beyond the Charter: How 
Enlargement has Enlarged the Human Rights Policy of the European Union’ (2004) Fordham 
International Law Journal 679-714, 699-702; Rainer Hofmann and Erik Friberg, ‘The Enlarged EU and 
the Council of Europe: Transfer of Standards and the Quest for Future Cooperation in Minority 
Protection’ in G Toggenburg (ed) Minority Protection and the Enlarged European Union: The Way 
Forward (LGI Books, Budapest 2004) 125-147, 144; Gabriel Toggenburg, ‘Minority Protection in a 
Supranational Context: Limits and Opportunities’ in G Toggenburg (ed) Minority Protection and the 
Enlarged European Union: The Way Forward (OSI/LGI, Budapest 2004) 1-36, 4; Alexandra Xanthaki, 
‘Hope Dies Last: An EU Directive on Roma Integration’ (2005) 11(4) European Public Law 515-526, 
525; Gaetano Pentassuglia, ‘The EU and the Protection of Minorities: The Case of Eastern Europe’ 
(2001) 12 EJIL 3-38, 38; Gwendolyn Sasse, ‘Gone with the Wind? Minority Rights in Central and 
Eastern Europe before and after EU Enlargement’, Paper presented at the workshop on ‘Ethnic 
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the twelve new Member States’ compliance with these criteria, the European 
Commission (Comission) relied on the standards developed by the United Nations 
(UN), the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE). Nevertheless, external minority conditionality led the 
EU to create “a higher standard for itself and growing consciousness of and 
commitment to the need for self-transformation in order to better exemplify the union 
of values it aspires to become.”7  
 
The necessity of internal minority protection in the EU has finally been addressed 
with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty.8 Article 2 (ex-Article 6(1)) TEU now 
asserts that the EU is founded on inter alia respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. In addition, Article 21(1) of the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights (CFR)9 provides for equality and non-discrimination based on 
a long list of grounds, including membership of a national minority.  
                                                                                                                                            
Mobilization in the New Europe’, Brussels, 21-22 April 2006; Gwendolyn Sasse, ‘The Politics of EU 
Conditionality: the Norm of Minority Protection during and beyond EU accession’ (2008) 15(6) 
Journal of European Public Policy 842-860, 843-844; Kyriaki Topidi, ‘The Limits of EU 
Conditionality: Minority Rights in Slovakia’ (2003) 1 Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in 
Europe 1-35, 29; Peter Vermeersch, ‘EU Enlargement and Minority Rights Policies in Central Europe: 
Explaining Policy Shifts in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland’ (2003) 1 Journal on 
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 1-30, 25; Andrew Williams, ‘EU Human Rights Policy 
and the Convention on the Future of Europe: A Failure of Design (2003) 28(6) European Law Review 
794-813, 795. 
 
7 Rachel Guglielmo, ‘Human Rights in the Accession Process: Roma and Muslims in an Enlarging EU’ 
in G Toggenburg (ed) Minority protection and the enlarged European Union: the way forward 
(OSI/LGI, Budapest 2004) 57 (emphasis in original). 
 
8 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union [2010] C 83/01. For an extensive analysis of the Lisbon Treaty see, P Craig, The 
Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform (OUP, Oxford 2010); see also, J-C Piris, The Lisbon 
Treaty: A Legal and Political Analysis (CUP, Cambridge 2010). 
 
9 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2010] C 83/391. Article 6(1) TEU now 
accords the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding force. Even before the CFR entered into 
force, the EU institutions extensively relied on the Charter both in their legislative (Council (EC) 
Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L251/12; Council (EC) Directive 
2003/109 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents [2004] OJ 
L16/44; European Parliament, ‘Resolution on regional and lesser-used European languages’ [2002] OJ 
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 Regrettably, despite their symbolic significance, on their own these provisions are 
unlikely to offer a meaningful protection of minorities. Thus there are no explicit EU 
competences and policies to support the good intentions in Article 2 TEU. As to the 
CFR, its usefulness is limited by its legal effects. First, Article 51(1) specifies that the 
provisions of the CFR are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of 
the EU with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only 
when they are implementing EU law. As a result, the legal effects of the CFR are 
limited to serving as a tool in interpreting EU legislation and Member States’ 
implementing measures and as a ground for challenging such acts. Second, Article 
51(2) CFR explicitly excludes its application beyond EU powers, establishment of 
any new power or task for the EU, or modification of powers and tasks as defined in 
the Treaties. This limitation is reiterated in Article 6(1) TEU. As if these safeguard 
clauses were not enough, Article 52(2) emphasises that rights recognised by the CFR 
‘shall be exercised under the conditions and within the limits defined by those 
Treaties.’ All these provisions10 reflect Member States’ fears of creeping EU 
competences into areas where Member States may wish to retain their powers.11  
                                                                                                                                            
C177E 334) and judicial practice (T-177/01 Jego-Quere [2002] ECR II-2365; C-263/02 Commission v 
Jego-Quere et Cie SA [2004] ECR I-3425; [2004] 2 CMLR 12; C-50/00 Unión de Pequeños 
Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677; [2002] 3 CMLR 1; Opinion of General Advocate Léger of 
25 November 2005 in C-317/04 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-4721; [2006] 3 CMLR 9; C-
540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769; [2006] 3 CMLR 28). For a detailed discussion of the 
CFR’s influential role before it became legally binding see Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, ‘The EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, Not Binding but Influential: the Example of Good Administration’ in 
A Arnull, P Eeckout and T Tridimas (eds) Continuity and Change in EU law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2008) 158–159. 
 
10 The application of the CFR is further limited through Protocol (No 30) on the Application of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United Kingdom. See also 
Declaration (No 53) by the Czech Republic on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union and Declaration (No 61) by the Republic of Poland on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.   
 
11 See generally Mark Pollack, ‘The End of Creeping Competence? EU Policy-Making Since 
Maastricht’ (2000) 38 Journal of Common Market Studies 519.  
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 Given the Member States’ concerns regarding EU encroachment upon their powers, 
as well as the controversy surrounding minority rights in some Member States, we 
will need to wait and see whether and how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) may 
use the above-discussed provisions to define the role and place of minority rights in 
EU law. Certainly, a combined reading of those provisions with other (indirectly 
relevant) EU rules12 could lay a foundation for an EU internal regime of minority 
protection. The question then is how far can EU action reach to protect minority 
rights? 
 
It is noteworthy from the outset that the protection of minorities has two aspects: first, 
non-discrimination and equality with majorities and, second, special rights to protect 
the elements of their distinct identity such as language, culture and religion. These 
additional features do not constitute separate rights under human rights law: “their 
purpose is merely to effectively guarantee the equal enjoyment of all human rights 
and to eliminate discrimination in both law and practice”.13 For example, if the 
official language of the State is German, all children of the ‘constituent’ people are 
entitled to mother-tongue education. To be in the same position as majorities, i.e., 
with access to education in their mother-tongue, speakers of other languages, such as 
                                                 
 
12 Although not explicitly targeted at protection of minorities, there is a range of EU action with effects 
on minorities, such as non-discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnic origin and religion and 
cultural diversity, to be respected by the EU and Member States. See for example, Article 19 TFEU 
(ex-Article 13 EC), Council (EC) Directive 2000/43 on equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin [2000] OJ L180/22 (Race Directive); Council (EC) Directive 2000/78 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation [2000] OJ 
L303/16 (Employment Directive); see also, Article 165 TFEU (ex-Article 149 EC) and Article 167 
TFEU (ex-Article 151 EC), which confer on the EU limited powers in the fields of education and 
culture.    
 
13 Gudmundur Alfredsson, ‘A Frame an Incomplete Painting: Comparison of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities with International Standards and Monitoring 
Procedures’ (2000) 7 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 291, 293. 
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Slovene, Croat or Hungarian, seem to need a special ‘privilege’.14 This seemingly 
‘additional’ right, however, only aims to guarantee substantive equality, by putting 
majorities and minorities on an equal footing.  
 
Theoretically, the CFR incorporates both aspects of minority protection. Article 21(1) 
CFR deals with equality and non-discrimination, while Article 22 CFR stipulates that 
the EU will ‘respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity’. Some commentators 
argue that Article 22 CFR reflects the second dimension of minority protection.15 For 
example, Arzoz claims that, “Article 22 accords to persons belonging to minorities a 
level of protection equivalent to the one recognised by international human rights 
law”,16 in particular the one provided by Article 27 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on the rights of minorities.17 Conversely, De Witte 
argues that Article 22 is too vague and does not “translate easily into concrete 
                                                 
14 Joseph Marko, ‘Constitutional Recognition of Ethnic Difference – Towards an Emerging European 
Minimum Standard?’ in A Verstichel et al (eds) The Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities: A Useful Pan-European Instrument? (Intersentia, Oxford 2008) 22. 
 
15 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, ‘Thematic Comment No 3: The 
Protection of Minorities in the European Union’ 25 April 2005 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_ 
cdf/doc/thematic_comments_2005_en.pdf> accessed 12 September 2008. 
 
16 Xabier Arzoz, ‘Article 22 of the EU Charter’ in X Arzoz (ed) Respecting Linguistic Diversity in the 
European Union (John Benjamins Publishing Co, Amsterdam 2008) 164. 
 
17 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted and opened for signature, ratification 
and accession 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR). 
Article 27 of the ICCPR provides:  
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their 
own religion, or to use their own language.  
For analysis see Martin Scheinin, ‘The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Article 27 and Other Provisions’ in K Henrard and R Dunbar (eds) Synergies in Minority 
Protection: European and International Law Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2008). 
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minority protection standards”.18 Indeed, based on the respect for diversity in Article 
22 CFR, it might be difficult to reconcile differences in approaches to minority 
protection in the constitutional traditions of Member States.19 The term ‘respect’ 
entails negative duties, i.e., States must refrain from direct or indirect interference 
with the enjoyment of a right.20 Therefore, the CFR is likely to entail only negative 
obligations. In the exercise of its competences, a minimum duty of the EU is, for 
example, not to interfere with the use of minority languages or jeopardise cultural 
diversity in the Member States.21  
 
Yet the fact that EU law now contains some preconditions for a coherent system of 
minority protection is a significant development. Should the EU take these 
developments any further, and can it play more prominent role in protecting 
minorities in its Member States? This thesis investigates these questions through four 
case studies on various aspects of minority protection based on examples from EU 
Member States. In particular, the case studies focus on the following two questions: 
 
1. To what extent do existing EU laws contribute to minority protection?  
                                                 
18 Bruno de Witte, ‘The Constitutional Resources for an EU Minority Protection Policy’ in G 
Toggenburg (ed) Minority protection and the enlarged European Union: the way forward (OSI/LGI, 
Budapest 2004) 115. 
 
19 Marko, ‘Constitutional Recognition of Ethnic Difference…’ (n 14); see also Julie Ringelheim, 
‘Minority Protection and Constitutional Recognition of Difference: Reflections on the Diversity of 
European Approaches’ in A Verstichel et al (eds) The Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities: A Useful Pan-European Instrument? (Intersentia, Oxford 2008) 33-49. 
 
20 Tawhida Ahmed, ‘A Critical Appraisal of EU Governance for the Protection of National Minorities’ 
in G Guliyeva & G Pentassuglia (eds) ‘Minority Groups Across Legal Settings: Global and Regional 
Dimensions’ (Special Issue) (2010) 17(2) International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 265-285, 
267. 
 
21 Arzoz, ‘Article 22 of the EU Charter’ (n 16) 160; see also Evangelia Psychogiopoulou, ‘Accessing 
Culture at the EU Level: An Indirect Contribution to Cultural Rights Protection?’ in F Francioni and M 
Scheinin, Cultural Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston 2008) 228.  
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This question is addressed through ‘testing’ relevant EU rules on issues analysed in 
the case-studies, i.e., the right to political participation (Chapter II), freedom to 
manifest religion (Chapter III), the right to mother-tongue education (Chapter IV) and 
the right to autonomy (Chapter V). 
 
2. Why should the EU be involved in minority protection in its Member States? 
One of the arguments supporting EU involvement is it would create consistency in 
EU action internally and externally. Therefore, where relevant the case studies 
address discrepancies between the EU’s approach to minority rights internally and 
externally. 
 
The conclusions to the thesis address the final research question: 
3. If findings of the case studies in Chapters II-V suggest that the EU’s 
involvement in minority protection is desirable, does the EU have the potential 
to construct a coherent system of minority protection? If not, what may be an 
alternative course of action? 
Accordingly, the conclusions to the thesis evaluate the current contribution of the EU 
to the protection of minorities in its Member States and suggest how EU rules could 
evolve further to graduate into a coherent system of minority protection. As noted, the 
thesis consists of five chapters grouped in two parts. Part I includes Chapter I and Part 
II contains four case studies in Chapters II to V. The thesis is concluded with 
conclusions and recommendations. The content of the thesis is briefly overviewed 
below.  
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2. The content of the thesis: a brief overview 
 
Part 1. Defining the Key Terms  
Chapter I. Defining the key terms: ‘Rights’ and ‘Minorities’ 
 
Chapter I deals with the key terms in the title of the thesis, i.e., ‘rights’ and 
‘minorities’. Due to the complexity of the issues surrounding these two notions, the 
scope of this chapter is inevitably broad. The reason these two key issues are covered 
in one chapter is mostly symbolic: Chapter I clarifies the key terms and lays a 
foundation for the issues to be considered in the case studies. By dealing with the key 
terms in one chapter, the author aims to emphasise that the focus of this thesis is about 
the EU’s approach to minority protection, and not minority protection per se. The key 
terms discussed in Chapter I are central to the thesis only insofar that they set the legal 
framework for discussion. The key research questions of the thesis are addressed in 
Chapters II-V. 
 
This Chapter consists of three large sections. Sections 1 and 2 are devoted to the 
‘rights’ of minorities.22 Rights are dealt with in two parts in order to reflect the duality 
of minority protection. The principle of non-discrimination, as an essential feature of 
minority protection, is investigated in Section 1, and special rights are examined in 
Section 2, such as those minorities may enjoy individually or in community with other 
members, i.e., the right to political participation, freedom to manifest religion, the 
                                                 
22 It could have been logical to deal with the identification of beneficiaries of rights first. However, 
bearing in mind that for the past fifty years, efforts to reach consensus on a definition of minorities 
have invariably failed (as discussed in Section 3 of Chapter I on page 128), the present author will not 
enter the quest to propose a definition which for various political and historical reasons States evade 
adopting. Instead, an existing pragmatic approach in international law is followed. Thus, the lack of the 
definition has not prevented the drafters of the FCNM (n 3), the first multilateral legally binding 
instrument on the rights of minorities in Europe, from elaborating on the rights of minorities. 
 12
right to access education, including education in a minority language and autonomy 
arrangements.  
 
The approach used in Sections 1 and 2 is to focus purely on standards, i.e., relevant 
provisions in international treaties, as well as case law and general guidelines issued 
by international courts and quasi-judicial bodies. This analysis is stripped of all 
academic commentary, so as to present the existing rules as they are and not as they 
should be. Academic views are extensively discussed and critiqued in the subsequent 
Chapters II-V. Furthermore, the discussion focuses on three key instruments, i.e., the 
ICCPR,23 the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)24 and the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM).25  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, the main goal of studying standards of minority 
protection in these instruments is to assess the level of minority protection globally 
and regionally; that is, were the EU to engage with minority rights, what would be the 
minimum expectations? Secondly, this analysis is relevant to the thesis because both 
the ICCPR and the ECHR comprise general principles of EU law, as established in 
                                                 
 
23 Article 27 ICCPR (n 17) is the global minimum standard on the protection of minorities. 
 
24 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention 
on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR) CETS No 005. 
The ECHR is the main instrument on the protection of human rights in Europe. Despite its overall 
significance, the ECHR has a number of limitations. First, it protects individual rights only, and not 
group rights. For example, where deportation of Russian-speaking non-citizens from Latvia is 
concerned, the ECtHR has limited its assessment to the facts of individual cases only (discussed in 
Chapter II) and abstained from commenting on the legitimacy of the country’s exclusionary practices. 
Furthermore, the ECHR contains only a prohibition on discrimination based on national minority status 
in Article 14 ECHR and Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol 12 to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, CETS No 177, and lacks special minority 
rights, such as political rights, education in a minority language, etc. Moreover, in politically sensitive 
matters, the ECtHR allows a wide margin of discretion to the Contracting Parties to decide on 
minority-related issues.  
 
25 FCNM (n 3).  
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the jurisprudence of the ECJ.26 As a result, jurisprudence and standards of minority 
protection as developed by, for example, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR)27 creep into EU law almost by default, as a part of the general principles of 
EU law under Article 6(3) TEU and by virtue of Article 6(1) TEU, which accords to 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights a legal status of EU primary law.28  
 
                                                 
 
26 The ECHR and the pronouncements of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) have special 
status in EU law; the European Court of Justice (ECJ) relies on them in applying the general principles 
of respect for fundamental rights. See Case 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419; Case 4/73 
Nold v Commission [1974] 291; Case 36/75 Rutili v Minister of the Interior [1975] ECR 1219; Case 
44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 3727; Case C-415/93 Bosman and others [1995] 
ECR I-4921; Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR 
I-6279. 
For references to the ICCPR see Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] ECR 3283; Joined Cases C-
297/88 and C-197/89 Dzodzi [1990] ECR I-3763; Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and 
Commission [2005] ECR II-3649; Case T-306/01 Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International 
Foundations v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-3533. 
 
27 The European Court of Justice’s reliance on the ECHR, however, does not imply that the EU has 
jurisdiction in human rights matters: Case C-299/95 Friedrich Kremzow v Republik Österreich [1997] 
ECR I-02629. The European Commission’s response to the petition of Tatjana Ždanoka, a Latvian 
Member of the European Parliament of Russian origin, is instructive in this respect. In 2005, she 
petitioned the European Parliament and complained that the Latvian authorities refused to grant 
citizenship to Yuri Petropavlovski, a well-known spokesman for the rights of the Russian minority in 
Latvia. The petitioner called on the European Parliament to ensure that Latvia complies with protection 
of ethnic minorities as other Member States do.  
The European Parliament requested a legal assessment from the Commission. In its response the 
Commission acknowledged that it is not empowered to deal with this issue, because it does not have 
competence on fundamental rights and can intervene only if the infringed rights are within the scope of 
EU law. The Commission, therefore, proposed that “should anybody consider their fundamental rights 
to have been infringed, they may appeal to the European Court of Human Rights…” (Petitions to the 
European Parliament, L-11/2004, 757/2004, 1000/2004 and 0021/2005, PE 362.796v01-00, 
CM\581172EN.doc, 16 September 2005).  
So, if a human rights complaint concerning, for example, deportation orders against Russian-speaking 
minorities from Latvia comes before the EU institutions, they would probably alert the complainant to 
the remedies available under the ECHR. However, if an infringement of fundamental rights of Russian-
speaking minorities takes place in the context of EU law, for example, when these individuals move to 
another Member State, it is likely that the ECJ may deal with these issues indirectly. This may take 
place through a preliminary ruling question of a national court of the competent Member State, based 
on a complaint of a Russian-speaking non-citizen. 
 
28 Relevant provisions of the CFR include Article 7 on respect for private life, Article 10 on freedom of 
religion, Article 11 on freedom of expression and Article 12 on freedom of association.  
De Witte convincingly argues that because fundamental rights both partake of the supreme legal status 
accorded to the treaties and remain part of the general principles of EU law, their legal status may be 
ambiguous: Bruno de Witte, ‘Legal Instruments and Law-Making in the Lisbon Treaty’ in S Griller and 
J Ziller (eds) The Lisbon Treaty: EU Constitutionalism without a Constitutional Treaty? (Springer 
Wien, New York 2008) 70-106, 80. 
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Admittedly, the ECHR does not include minority guarantees,29 and Article 27 ICCPR 
is only a minimum standard of minority protection. This is so because after World 
War II, the international community decided against including minority guarantees in 
international instruments. Instead, a strong emphasis was placed on individual rights 
and equal treatment: if everyone is treated without discrimination there should be no 
need for special minority rights. This decision was made based on the lessons learnt 
from the League of Nations’ experience in protecting the rights of minorities. Despite 
the strong minority guarantees in bilateral treaties under the auspices of the League, 
the system collapsed after Nazi Germany began World War II under the pretext of 
protecting its kin-minorities in the neighbouring States. Nevertheless, the approach to 
the protection of minorities has significantly changed since the mid-1950s. Thus, not 
only has minority protection evolved into an integral part of general human rights 
guarantees,30 but international courts have become a driving force behind developing 
standards on minority protection as well.31 This is mainly done through interpreting 
general human rights guarantees in the light of the special needs of minorities.32  
                                                 
 
29 Were a group to assert ‘minority rights’ before the ECtHR, the claim might be dismissed as 
manifestly ill-founded for reaching beyond the scope of the ECHR. Even when the ECtHR finds a 
violation of the ECHR, it is up to a respondent State to provide remedies beyond damages by amending 
a relevant piece of domestic legislation. The ECtHR’s role is limited to assessment of whether a State 
is in compliance with the ECHR, not whether it might have adopted better policies: ‘Minority Rights 
under the European Convention on Human Rights’, Pamphlet No 7, 7 <http://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/Publications/GuideMinorities7en.pdf> accessed 12 September 2009.   
 
30 ICCPR (n 17) Article 27; FCNM (n 3) Article 1. 
 
31 Chapman v UK (App no 27238/95) (2001) 33 EHRR 399 (the right to an own way of life); Lindsay 
and others v the United Kingdom (App no 8364/78) (1979) 15 DR 247 (legitimacy of having different 
election systems within one State to protect the participation right of minorities); Sidiropoulos and 
others v Greece (App no 26695/95) (1999) 27 EHRR 633 (the freedom of association to protect 
separate identity of a minority group); Cyprus v Turkey (App no 25781/94) (2002) 35 EHRR 30 
(educational rights of minorities). For discussion see, Gaetano Pentassuglia, ‘Minority Issues as a 
Challenge in the European Court of Human Rights: A Comparison with the Case Law of the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee’ (2003) 46 GYIL 1-52; see also, G Pentassuglia, Minority Groups 
and Judicial Discourse in International Law: A Comparative Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Brill 2009); Gaetano Pentassuglia, ‘Evolving Protection of Minority Groups: Global Challenges and 
the Role of International Jurisprudence’ (2009) 11 International Community Law Review 185-218, 
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 Significantly, the more recently adopted FCNM contains a catalogue of minority 
rights.33 So far, the FCNM has not been recognised as a general principle of EU law. 
Although the ECJ has occasionally acknowledged that protection of minorities is a 
legitimate aim of the State,34 these “judicial remarks remain, however, still very far 
from a clear commitment on minority protection as a ‘general principle’ of 
Community law.”35 Besides, not all Member States have ratified the FCNM, and, 
therefore, the likelihood of the ECJ relying on the FCNM is low.36 However, 
theoretically such a development is possible, if specific legislation was adopted and it 
referred to the FCNM, for example, in its preamble. Arguably, it is only a matter of 
time before the FCNM is recognised as a part of the general principles, considering 
                                                                                                                                            
195-215; Leto Cariolou, ‘Recent Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights Concerning the 
Protection of Minorities’ (2008) 7 European Yearbook of Minority Issues. 
  
32 For example, in Hopu and Bessert v France (Communication no 549/1993) (1997) 
CCPR/C/51/D/549/1993, the applicants claimed that by constructing a hotel complex at a fishing 
lagoon and on a burial ground, France violated the minority rights of an indigenous Polynesian 
community in Tahiti. Because of France’s reservation as to Article 27 ICCPR, the HRC resorted to 
general human rights provisions and dealt with the claims under Article 17 ICCPR (the right to 
privacy) and Article 23 ICCPR (the right to family life).  
Equally, the ECtHR itself has not hesitated to read the ECHR provisions broadly to accommodate 
minorities in other contexts (n 31). 
 
33 The FCNM has significant guarantees for national minorities: it remains one of the very few “legally 
binding instrument[s] at the regional or the universal level”: Marc Weller, ‘Article 15’ in M Weller (ed) 
The Rights of Minorities in Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005) 460. However, its 
framework nature establishes only programme-type provisions which allow States wide margins of 
discretion in implementation. The instrument also lacks judicial supervision. In addition, States may 
limit the scope of provisions through interpretative reservations: because the instrument does not define 
the term minorities, States tend to introduce their own definitions. 
 
34 Case C-274/96 Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-7637; Case C-281/98 Roman Angonese v Cassa di 
Risparmio di Bolzano SpA [2000] 2 CMLR 1120. 
 
35 Rainer Hofmann and Erik Friberg, ‘The Enlarged EU and the Council of Europe: Transfer of 
Standards and the Quest for Future Cooperation in Minority Protection’ in G Toggenburg (ed) Minority 
Protection and the Enlarged European Union: The Way Forward (LGI Books, Budapest 2004) 125-
147, 136. 
 
36 Gabriel Toggenburg, ‘The EU’s evolving policies vis-à-vis minorities: a play in four parts and an 
open end’, Report compiled in the frame of the FP6 project ‘Human and Minority Rights in the Life 
Cycle of Ethnic Conflicts’, 24. 
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that it has already become a significant part of EU enlargement law.37 Therefore, this 
thesis extensively relies on this instrument, because the FCNM contains rights 
additional to those enshrined in the ECHR and the ICCPR;38 for example, Article 11 
on the use and recognition of names in a minority language and display of signs of a 
private nature visible to the public.39  
 
Accordingly, Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter I overview minority rights under the above-
mentioned three key instruments. This thesis, however, does not explore instruments 
                                                 
 
37 For instance, in response to the European Parliament’s question seeking to clarify the meaning of 
protection of minorities in the Copenhagen criteria (Parliamentary questions, E-0620/01, 1 March 
2001, question 2.), the European Commission stated that in its assessment of progress made by the 
candidate countries with regard to this criterion, it devotes particular attention to the FCNM 
(Parliamentary questions, E-0620/01, 15 May 2001, para 2). Moreover, not only did the European 
Commission use the FCNM as a yardstick in the accession process, but it also established its own 
monitoring system of States’ compliance with this instrument by setting short- and medium- term 
priorities for each candidate country. 
 
38 Patrick Thornberry, ‘Images of Autonomy and Individual and Collective Rights in International 
Instruments on the Rights of Minorities’ in M Suksi (ed) Autonomy: Applications and Implications 
(Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1998) 116-119; see also, Sia Spiliopoulou Ǻkermark, ‘The 
Added Value of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (I)’ in A 
Verstichel et al (eds) The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: A Useful 
Pan-European Instrument? (Intersentia, Oxford 2008) 69-90. 
  
39 Both the ICCPR and the ECHR fail to guarantee these rights due to the lack of explicit references to 
specific minority rights in these instruments. On the right to display signs in a minority language, see, 
for example, the HRC’s communication in Ballantyne, Davidson, McIntyre v Canada (Communication 
no 359/1989 and 385/1989) (1993) CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989. On the recognition of names in a minority 
language see, Kuharec v Latvia (App no 71557/01) ECHR 7 December 2004 and Mentzen v Latvia 
(App no 71074/01) ECHR 7 December 2004.  
The ECtHR’s restrictive reading of the right to recognition of names in a minority language is in stark 
contrast with the ECJ’s approach, which upheld the right to one’s name in the context of free 
movement of services: Case C-168/91 Christos Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig - Standesamt and 
Landratsamt Calw – Ordnungsamt [1993] ECR I-1191. For discussion see Gulara Guliyeva, ‘Joining 
Forces or Reinventing the Wheel? The EU and the protection of national minorities’ in G Guliyeva & 
G Pentassuglia (eds) ‘Minority Groups Across Legal Settings: Global and Regional Dimensions’ 
(Special Issue 2010) 17(2) International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 287-305, 302-303. See 
also, Case C-148/02 Carlos Garcia Avello v Belgian State [2003] ECR 1-11613, where the ECJ 
emphasised that the principle of non-discrimination must be read from the perspective of substantive 
equality, and, therefore, rendered a homegenous system of attributing surnames unnecessary. For 
discussion see, Gabriel Toggenburg, ‘Who is Managing Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in the European 
Condominium? The Moments of Entry, Integration and Preservation’ (2005) 43(4) JCMS 717-738, 
727. 
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adopted under the auspices of the OSCE and the UN.40 Despite their political and 
symbolic significance, these instruments remain non-legally binding. Furthermore, 
although Sections 1 and 2 examine leading examples from the Inter-American and 
African systems of human rights protection, because these cases do not have legal 
force in EU law, the analysis is deliberately omitted from the main text and included 
in footnotes only. 
 
Then, Section 3 of Chapter I deals with the concept of ‘minority’. To fully unpack the 
term, an approach different from that in Sections 1 and 2 is adopted. In light of the on-
going debates on the definition of ‘minority’, the author extensively draws on 
academic commentaries. The discussion first highlights the diversity of minority 
groups in EU Member States (often distinguished by various adjectives preceding the 
term ‘minority’, such as ‘national’, ‘religious’, ‘linguistic’, etc.) and analyses the 
impact of the ‘labels’ on the content of a definition. Next, the three most influential 
proposals on a definition of ‘minority’ are deconstructed, with the purpose of 
identifying the elements most appropriate for the EU context. These elements are 
discussed using examples from Member States’ practice. For instance, the criterion of 
citizenship/nationality is assessed in the context of Latvia, and the concepts of 
numerical threshold and non-dominant position are based on the experience of 
Belgium. These examples are subsequently discussed further in the context of EU law 
in chapters II-V.  
 
                                                 
40 See, for example, the OSCE Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National 
Minorities in Public Life (1999) <http://www.osce.org/documents/hcnm/1999/09/2929 _en.pdf> 
accessed 11 January 2007; see also, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992) A/RES/47/135.  
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To summarise, analysis in Section 3 pursues several aims: to explain/justify relevance 
of certain elements of the definition of ‘minority’ in EU law or, alternatively, to show 
their inappropriateness; based on this assessment, to identify a working definition of 
‘minority’ for the purposes of this thesis; to contribute to debates on an EU definition 
of ‘minority’; to critically discuss some of the challenges faced by minority groups in 
EU Member States; and where relevant, to introduce issues discussed in case studies 
in Chapters II-V.  
 
Part 2: Case Studies 
 
As mentioned above, Part 2 of the thesis consists of four case studies. The case 
studies discuss the rights of minorities as elaborated on in Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter 
I. Significantly, there is no separate case study on the principle of non-discrimination, 
because analysis reveals that this principle is a driving force behind minority 
protection in all case studies. Instead the focus is on political participation in the 
context of Latvia (Chapter II), freedom to manifest religion in publicly-funded 
schools in England (Chapter III), the right to access mother-tongue education in 
Belgium (Chapter IV), and autonomy arrangements in Scotland (Chapter V).  
 
Chapter II. Lost in Transition: the Right to Political Participation of Russian-
speaking Non-citizens in Latvia  
 
Since 1991 Latvia has denied Latvian citizenship status to a large number of members 
of its Russian-speaking population, who constitute so-called non-citizens under 
domestic laws. To acquire Latvian citizenship, Russian-speaking non-citizens, who 
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were mainly Soviet-era immigrants, have to successfully undertake complex 
naturalisation procedures. Lack of Latvian citizenship subjects these minorities to 
differential treatment in the country, as they are deprived of political rights and barred 
from access to many professions. Latvia’s accession to the EU has aggravated the 
situation of non-citizens. Russian-speaking non-citizens are now further 
disadvantaged, because they cannot benefit from EU rights, reserved to nationals of 
Member States only. The Chapter ‘tests’ EU rules, such as the Directive on equal 
treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (Race Directive),41 
the Directive concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term 
residents (Long-Term Residents Directive)42 and the general principles of EU law to 
ascertain whether the EU could deal effectively with the exclusion of Russian-
speaking minorities from political participation in Latvia and the EU.  
 
Chapter III. Unveiling the Veil: Freedom to Manifest Religious Dress in 
Publicly-funded Schools in England 
 
This chapter explores permissible limitations on freedom to manifest religion in 
publicly-funded schools. It begins with the analysis of the relevant case law of 
English courts. This discussion reveals that the broader freedoms granted to racial and 
ethnic minorities who share both a common ethnic origin and a common religion is in 
stark contrast with the less generous treatment of religious minorities. Having 
overviewed this issue in the context of England, some other Member States and the 
EU as a whole, the chapter applies to this problematic issue relevant EU rules such as 
                                                 
41 Council (EC) Directive 2000/43 on equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin [2000] OJ L180/22 (Race Directive). 
 
42 Council (EC) Directive 2003/109 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term 
residents [2004] OJ L16/44 (Long-Term Residents Directive). 
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Articles 10, 14(3), 21 and 22 CFR and the Directive on establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (Employment 
Directive).43  
 
Chapter IV. Recreating Babel?  The Right to Access Mother-tongue Education 
in Belgium 
 
Education in a minority language is essential for minorities to maintain a unique 
identity, transmit a culture and preserve their language. Conversely, a lack of 
education in a mother-tongue may have an adverse impact on a group’s identity. 
International instruments do not assert this right forcefully, largely because of the 
financial implications of ensuring a wider mother-tongue education. This chapter 
explores this problematic issue in the context of Belgium, where French-speakers in 
Flanders have limited access to mother-tongue education due to a rigid application of 
the territoriality principle. Once the problem is outlined, the potential of the Race 
Directive,44 EU Treaty provisions on education and culture, and the general principles 
of EU law are ‘tested’ on this example.  
 
Chapter V. Bridging the Gap: Territorial Minorities and the EU 
 
There is no right to autonomy as such in international law. However, as the 
experiences of many Western countries illustrate,45 autonomy arrangements prove 
                                                 
 
43 Council (EC) Directive 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment 
and occupation [2000] OJ L303/16 (Employment Directive). 
 
44 Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41). 
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especially effective in protecting minorities, because they allow the group to make 
decisions of particular concern to the maintenance of its identity. Furthermore, a 
comprehensive autonomy regime may encompass all rights discussed in the above 
chapters, such as political participation, manifestation of religion and mother-tongue 
education. Significantly, the extent and content of these rights is decided by the group 
itself. The example of Scotland aims to demonstrate the benefits and deficiencies of 
devolution as a type of autonomy arrangement. The potential of the EU to foster 
closer links between the supranational and sub-State level is then assessed through the 
analysis of relevant EU Treaty provisions on the Committee of the Regions, the 
principle of subsidiarity and the ECJ’s jurisprudence.  
 
Conclusions and Recommendations: Reinventing the Wheel or Joining Forces?  
 
The conclusions and recommendations of the thesis aim to evaluate the need for more 
active EU involvement in minority protection. Furthermore, they assess to what extent 
and how existing EU laws already contribute to protecting minorities and whether a 
more coherent regime is needed at the EU level. Based on this assessment, the 
feasibility of an EU regime of minority protection is discussed.  
 
In addition, an alternative model of minority protection in the EU is suggested 
through exploring the possibility of the EU joining forces with the Council of Europe 
through internalising, or even acceding to, the FCNM. This would have numerous 
                                                                                                                                            
45 In Europe many of these arrangements either date from the World War I settlements (J Barros, The 
Åland islands question: its settlement by the League of Nations (Yale University Press, New Haven 
1968)), negotiated with a State (Kristian Myntti, ‘The Sami Cultural Autonomies in the Nordic 
Countries’ in K Gál, Minority Governance in Europe (LGI Publications, Budapest 2002) 153-170), or 
are a result of conflict-resolution efforts by the international community (Claus Neukirch, ‘Autonomy 
and Conflict Transformation: The Gagauz Territorial Autonomy in the Republic of Moldova’ in K Gál, 
Minority Governance in Europe (LGI Publications, Budapest 2002) 107-123). 
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benefits, such as providing consistent benchmarks of minority protection when 
applied to candidate States in the accession process to the EU and mechanisms to 
resolve remaining issues relating to minorities within the EU post-accession while 
eliminating double standards between ‘new’ and ‘old’ Member States. Yet these 
developments are politically sensitive and prone to create procedural difficulties. 
Nevertheless, it is suggested that instead of reinventing the wheel by attempting to 
develop a coherent system of minority protection, the EU may be better placed to 
encourage implementation of the FCNM by candidate countries and Member States. 
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PART 1. DEFINING THE KEY TERMS 
 
CHAPTER I. DEFINING THE KEY TERMS:                       
‘RIGHTS’ AND ‘MINORITIES’ 
 
Introduction 
 
As the title of the present thesis suggests, the focus of this research is on the rights of 
minorities. These two central themes are discussed in three sections of this chapter. 
Sections 1 and 2 are devoted to two distinct dimensions of minority protection. The 
first is the right to non-discrimination, discussed in considerable detail in Section 1. 
The second dimension is special rights, i.e., the rights which aim to sustain a minority 
identity, analysed in Section 2. These include the right to political participation (sub-
section 1), freedom to manifest religion (sub-section 2) and the right to education 
(sub-section 3). In addition, where a collective dimension of minority protection 
reaches a certain coherence, a State may grant a minority cultural46 or territorial 
autonomy47 (sub-section 4). To avoid entering into the debate as to what these rights 
should be as opposed to what they currently are, Sections 1 and 2 focus on the 
relevant provisions of the international agreements and their interpretation by 
international courts and quasi-judicial bodies. The analysis of case-law in these 
sections does not claim to be exhaustive; rather, the discussion focuses on the leading 
                                                 
46 Cultural autonomy allows a minority group to decide matters of particular concern to the 
maintenance of a group’s identity, such as the establishment of their own schools, the practice of 
religion and the enjoyment of their culture. It is most appropriate for dispersed groups within a State.  
 
47 Territorial autonomy allows a minority group to decide matters of particular concern to the group 
within a certain territory in a State. The degree of autonomy may vary, and may include certain 
administrative, legislative, executive and/or judicial powers. This type of autonomy is most appropriate 
for the protection of groups which densely populate certain parts of a State. 
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cases which help to identify main trends in the jurisprudence of courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. The case law is up-to-date as of 15 June 2010. A critique of the way 
in which these rules are applied is supplied where relevant. Relevant academic 
commentaries are discussed in subsequent chapters in the context of the case studies. 
 
The second important term in the title of the thesis which requires clarification is 
‘minority.’ Despite numerous attempts to define the term, political opposition from 
some States prevented the international community from reaching a consensus on a 
definition of the term. Therefore, the discussion in Section 3 of this chapter aims to 
contribute to academic debates on the necessity of defining the term in the EU 
context, furnish a working definition of the term for the purposes of the present thesis 
and highlight the diversity of minority situations across EU Member States. Based on 
the analysis of adjectives preceding ‘minority’ and of each element of the term, a 
working definition of ‘minority’ is supplied in the conclusions to this chapter.  
 
Section 1. Non-discrimination 
 
This section focuses on the guarantee of non-discrimination as one of the most 
essential aspects of minority protection. First, relevant provisions of international 
human rights treaties and minority rights instruments are reviewed (1.1). Then, the 
jurisprudence of international courts and quasi-judicial bodies is analysed with the 
focus on direct (1.2.1) and indirect discrimination (1.2.2). This analysis is followed by 
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a discussion of case law on non-discrimination on the grounds of association with a 
national minority (1.3.1), religion (1.3.2) and race or ethnic origin (1.3.3).48  
 
1.1. Guarantees of non-discrimination in international and regional 
treaties 
 
The principle of non-discrimination, as one of the facets of minority protection, is 
firmly enshrined in general human rights treaties, as well as more specific minority 
rights instruments. A general prohibition of discrimination on grounds such as race, 
religion, language and gender is well-established in international treaties on the 
protection of human rights. At the universal level, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR)49 precludes discrimination on the grounds of race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status in two provisions: Article 2 outlaws discrimination in 
the enjoyment of the ICCPR’s rights and Article 26 comprises an autonomous right to 
non-discrimination.50 Although non-discrimination against minorities is not explicitly 
mentioned in Article 27 ICCPR (regarded as a global minimum standard of minority 
protection), the Human Rights Committee (HRC), a quasi-judicial body under the 
ICCPR entrusted with monitoring compliance with the instrument and offering 
interpretations of its provisions, established that persons belonging to minorities can 
benefit from the guarantees in Articles 2 and 26 ICCPR.51 
                                                 
48 Less established prohibitions of discrimination in international law on the grounds of, for example, 
disability, age, belief and sexual orientation fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
49 ICCPR (n 17). 
 
50 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 18: Non-discrimination (Art. 26) (1989) para 12 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/3888b0541f8501c9c12563ed004b8d0e?Opendocument>  
accessed 17 September 2009. 
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 At the regional level,52 Article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights (ECHR)53 precludes discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, 
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status in the exercise of 
the ECHR rights. Similar to Article 2 ICCPR, this provision applies in conjunction 
with the substantive rights of the ECHR, i.e., it is not an independent provision. As of 
1 April 2005, Protocol No 12 to the ECHR introduced the equivalent of Article 26 
ICCPR – a general prohibition of discrimination.54 The difference between Article 14 
ECHR and Protocol 12 is that whereas Article 14 prohibits discrimination in the 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the ECHR, Article 1 of Protocol 12 
extends the scope of protection to any right set forth by law and, therefore, is absolute 
and stand-alone.55  
 
                                                                                                                                            
51 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 23: The rights of minorities (Art. 27) (1994) para 4 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/fb7fb12c2fb8bb21c12563ed004df111?Opendocument> 
accessed 17 September 2009. 
 
52 Similar provisions are included in other regional human rights treaties. For instance, the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights ((adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) 
(1982) 21 ILM 58 (African Charter) forbids discrimination in Article 2; although the list of grounds of 
non-discrimination is open-ended, similar to Article 2 ICCPR and Article 14 ECHR, the reach of 
Article 2 AfrCH is limited to the enjoyment of the Charter rights.  
The American Convention on Human Rights ((adopted 22 November 1969, entered into force 18 July 
1978) OASTreaty Series No 36, 1144 UNTS 123) has a slightly different formulation in Article 24 on 
the right to equal protection: it merges equal treatment before the law with equality of treatment. 
Moreover, unlike the above-mentioned provisions, Article 24 ACHR does not enumerate the grounds 
of discrimination. Article 24 of the American Convention on Human Rights reads as follows: ‘All 
persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal 
protection of the law.’ 
 
53 ECHR (n 24). 
 
54 Additional Protocol 12 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (adopted 4 November 2000, entered into force 1 April 2005) CETS No 177,  
Article 1(1). 
 
55 The ECtHR has recently confirmed this in the cases Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(App no 27996/06 and 34836/06) ECHR 22 December 2009, para 53 (discussed below on page 49). 
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In addition to general human rights guarantees, Article 4 of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM)56 contains a guarantee 
of non-discrimination specifically tailored to the needs of national minorities.57  
Article 4 FCNM requires States to guarantee full and effective equality of national 
minorities, which implies both the right of equality before the law and of equal 
protection of the law.58  
 
1.2. Jurisprudence of international and regional courts and bodies 
 
1.2.1. Direct discrimination 
 
In assessing a claim of discrimination, it is essential to differentiate between direct 
and indirect discrimination. Direct discrimination occurs where, based on prohibited 
grounds, there is a difference in treatment of persons in similar situations, which has 
no objective and reasonable justification. The jurisprudence of international and 
regional courts and quasi-judicial bodies on the prohibition of direct discrimination is 
                                                 
 
56 FCNM (n 3).  
 
57 Article 4 FCNM (n 3) reads as follows: 
1. The Parties undertake to guarantee to persons belonging to national minorities the 
right of equality before the law and of equal protection of the law. In this respect, any 
discrimination based on belonging to a national minority shall be prohibited.  
2. The Parties undertake to adopt, where necessary, adequate measures in order to 
promote, in all areas of economic, social, political and cultural life, full and effective 
equality between persons belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the 
majority. In this respect, they shall take due account of the specific conditions of the 
persons belonging to national minorities.  
3. The measures adopted in accordance with paragraph 2 shall not be considered to 
be an act of discrimination.  
 
58 Committee of Experts on Issues Relating to the Protection of National Minorities, ‘The Impact of 
International Norms on the Protection of National Minorities in Europe: The Added Value and 
Essential Role of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’ (2006) DH-
MIN(2006)018, 9. 
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rather straightforward and assessed below through examination of examples from 
their jurisprudence.  
 
In General Comment No 18 on non-discrimination, the HRC maintained that the term 
‘discrimination’ under Article 26 ICCPR implies  
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on 
any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, 
and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, 
of all rights and freedoms.59  
 
The HRC further noted that “not every differentiation of treatment will constitute 
discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and 
if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant.”60 Although 
the HRC affirmed that the prohibition of discrimination in Articles 2 and 26 ICCPR 
apply to minorities as well,61 regrettably, there are very few communications before 
the HRC where these provisions have been used in relation to minorities.62  
 
Similarly, the ECtHR famously ruled in the Belgian Linguistics case on access to 
education that “the principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction has 
no objective and reasonable justification.”63 Importantly, such differential treatment 
                                                 
 
59 General Comment 18 (n 50) para 7.  
 
60 General Comment 18 (n 50) para 13. 
 
61 General Comment No 23 (n 51) para 4. 
 
62 Simunek et al v the Czech Republic (Communication no 516/1992) (1995) CCPR/C/54/D/516/1992; 
J G A Diergaardt (late Captain of the Rehoboth Baster Community) et al v Namibia (Communication 
no 760/1997) (2000) CCPR/C/69/D/760/1997; Waldman v Canada (Communication no 694/1996) 
(1999) CCPR/C67/D/694/1996.  
 
63 Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium 
(Belgian Linguistics) (App nos 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64) (1969-1970) 1 
EHHR 252, para 10. 
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must pursue a legitimate aim; moreover, the means employed to achieve this aim must 
be proportionate.64  
 
Despite this clear formulation of Article 14’s application, certain reluctance to apply it 
may be observed in the ECtHR’s earlier jurisprudence. For example, in Podkolzina v 
Latvia,65 concerning additional linguistic requirements imposed on candidates for 
elections in Latvia, the ECtHR refused to consider the applicant’s claims of 
differential treatment as a member of Russian-speaking minority under Article 14 
ECHR. Likewise, in Jewish Liturgical Association Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v 
France,66 an Orthodox Jewish liturgical association did not succeed in persuading the 
ECtHR that the refusal of authorities to allow them to carry out ritual slaughter in line 
with their convictions violated Article 9 together with Article 14 ECHR. 
 
However, more recent jurisprudence of the ECtHR has been marked with significant 
developments and saw more confident application of Article 14 in (discussed on 
pages 41-49) Thlimmenos v Greece,67 Aziz v Cyprus,68 Nachova v Bulgaria,69 
Timishev v Russia,70 D H and others v the Czech Republic,71 and Sejdić and Finci v 
                                                 
 
64 Belgian Linguistics (n 63) para 10. 
 
65 Podkolzina v Latvia (App no 46726/99) ECHR 9 April 2002. The ECtHR, however, found a 
violation of Article 3 of Protocol 1 ECHR, as discussed on pages 61-62.  
 
66 Jewish Liturgical Association Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v France (App no 27417/95) (2000) 9 
BHRC 27. 
 
67 Thlimmenos v Greece (App no 34369/97) (2001) 31 EHRR 15. 
 
68 Aziz v Cyprus (App no 69949/01) (2005) 41 EHRR 11. 
 
69 Nachova v Bulgaria (App nos 43577/98 and 43579/98) (2006) (Grand Chamber) 42 EHRR 43. 
 
70 Timishev v Russia (App no 55762/00 and 55974/00) (2007) 44 EHRR 37. 
 
71 D H and others v the Czech Republic (App no 57325/00) (2008) (Grand Chamber) ELR 17. 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina.72 This is not to suggest that the ECtHR now easily agrees to 
consider Article 14 issues. A degree of reluctance may remain because of the 
controversy surrounding minority rights in some States. However, compared to the 
earlier jurisprudence of the ECtHR, Article 14 case law is currently more progressive. 
It is hoped that this approach will be further strengthened with the wider application 
of Protocol 12 ECHR.73  
 
The significance and visibility of non-discrimination against minorities is further 
heightened through the FCNM and the progressive reading of the instrument by the 
Advisory Committee on the FCNM (ACFC),74 the body monitoring the 
implementation of the FCNM.  The ACFC has consistently stressed that Article 4 
FCNM not only requires States to enact relevant anti-discrimination legislation, but 
also to have in place effective remedies against all forms of discrimination.75  
 
                                                 
 
72 Sejdić and Finci (n 55). 
 
73 There are fewer cases which came before the quasi-judicial bodies in the inter-American and African 
contexts. Overall, the Inter-American Court’s method of finding direct discrimination is similar to that 
of the ECtHR. For example, in its advisory opinion on the Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization 
Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica ((1984) OC-4/84 (Ser A) No 4) the Inter-American Court 
stated that differential treatment would not constitute discrimination when “the classifications selected 
are based on substantial factual differences and there exists a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between these differences and the aims of the legal rule under review” (para 57). Furthermore, the aims 
must not be “unjust or unreasonable” (para 57). 
Conversely, assessment of discrimination by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
is less elaborate: the African Commission identifies those who have been subjected to differential 
treatment based on ethnic origin and finds a violation of Article 2 without elaborating on the matters of 
principle, such as in Amnesty International v Zambia ((Comm no 212/98) (1999)) and the Organisation 
Mondiale Contre la Torture and others v Rwanda ((Comm nos 27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 99/93) (1996)). 
 
74 The ACFC is the independent expert committee, which evaluates the implementation of the FCNM 
by State Parties.  
 
75 ACFC, ‘First Opinion on Denmark’ (2000) ACFC/INF/OP/I(2001)005, para 25; ‘Second Opinion on 
Hungary’ (2005) ACFC/INF/OP/II(2004)003, paras 37-39; ‘First Opinion on Germany’ (2002) 
ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)008, para 22; ‘First Opinion on Slovenia’ (2005) ACFC/INF/OP/I(2005)002, 
paras 26-28; ‘First Opinion on Croatia’ (2001) ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)003, paras 24-26.  
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1.2.2. Indirect discrimination 
 
The prohibition of indirect discrimination allows targeting the impact of rules which 
are neutral on their face, but have disproportionate effects on members of a certain 
group without any objective and reasonable justification. Indirect discrimination did 
not feature strongly in the initial approach of international courts and quasi-judicial 
bodies, except in the case of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which, as early as 
1974, established that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid not only direct 
discrimination based on nationality, but also all indirect discrimination which, “by the 
application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result…”76 
 
In contrast, the HRC was hesitant to make such a finding in its early jurisprudence. 
Thus, in Ballantyne, Davidson, McIntyre v Canada77 the authors of the 
communication argued that advertising in French only in Quebec constituted 
discrimination against English-speakers. The HRC noted that domestic law requiring 
the use of French only in commercial advertising outdoors affected equally French- 
and English-speakers; therefore, there was no discrimination on the ground of 
language under Article 26 ICCPR.78 This finding ignores the concept of indirect 
discrimination against minorities. 
 
The HRC’s more recent jurisprudence reveals a notable change in approach towards 
indirect discrimination. In Diergaardt v Namibia79 the authors, members of the 
                                                 
 
76 Case 152/73 Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v Deutsche Bundespost [1974] ECR 153, para 31.  
 
77 Ballantyne, Davidson, McIntyre v Canada (n 39). 
 
78 Ballantyne, Davidson, McIntyre v Canada (n 39) para 11.5. 
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Rehoboth Basters community, claimed that by denying them the use of their mother-
tongue in administration, justice, education and public life, Namibia violated their 
rights under Articles 26 and 27 ICCPR. In particular, the State instructed civil 
servants not to reply to the authors’ written or oral communications with the 
authorities in the Afrikaans language; public authorities had to follow this instruction 
even when they were perfectly capable of speaking this language, because under 
Article 3 of the Constitution English was the only official language in Namibia.80 
Taking into account the effects of this practice on Afrikaans speakers and in the 
absence of any response from the State, the HRC found a violation of Article 26 
ICCPR without elaborating on the concept of indirect discrimination.81 
 
The HRC explicitly acknowledged indirect discrimination in its later communications, 
such as Althammer v Australia82 and Derksen v the Netherlands,83 by noting that “a 
violation of [A]rticle 26 can also result from the discriminatory effect of a rule or 
measure that is neutral at face value or without intent to discriminate.”84 The HRC 
also emphasised that a finding of such indirect discrimination should be based on the 
                                                                                                                                            
79 Diergaardt (n 62). 
 
80 Diergaardt (n 62) para 10.10. 
 
81  Interestingly, the HRC did not deal with this claim under Article 27 ICCPR. The dissenting opinions 
of Bhagwati, Colville and Yalden nonetheless suggest that some Committee members considered that 
the State could legitimately insist on all communications between the authorities and minorities take 
place in the official language; moreover, an exclusive official language did not automatically 
discriminate against minority languages. Furthermore, the authors did not allege that their language 
rights were denied under Article 27 ICCPR and limited their submission under this provision entirely to 
land use; therefore, in the absence of a complaint from the authors, the HRC was not in a position to 
construct a case under Article 27. The latter argument suggests that were the authors to insist on the 
violation of language rights under Article 27 rights, the HRC could consider their claim under this 
provision. 
 
82 Mr Rupert Althammer et al v Australia (Communication no 998/2001) (2003) CCPR/C/78/D/998/ 
2001. 
 
83 Cecilia Derksen v Netherlands (Communication no 976/2001) (2004) CCPR/C/80/D/976/2001. 
 
84 Althammer (n 82) para 10.2. 
 33
grounds listed in Article 26 ICCPR. In addition, a measure will not be found to be 
indirectly discriminatory if it can be objectively and reasonably justified. Effectively, 
the HRC used the same test to find both direct and indirect discrimination. 
Nevertheless, the finding of indirect discrimination against minorities is a welcome 
development in anti-discrimination law as it may ensure substantive equality of 
minorities.  
 
A similar initial reluctance to recognise indirect discrimination can be discerned in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR. Only in 2001 did the ECtHR explicitly recognise the 
principle of indirect discrimination. Thus, in Kelly v the United Kingdom,85 which 
concerned an allegation of discriminatory treatment, the applicants claimed that 
between 1969 and March 1994, members of the security forces killed 357 people, the 
overwhelming majority of whom were young men from the Catholic or nationalist 
community.86 In its assessment the ECtHR noted that  
[w]here a general policy or measure has disproportionately prejudicial 
effects on a particular group, it is not excluded that this may be 
considered as discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifically 
aimed or directed at that group.87  
 
The ECtHR, however, promptly added that statistics in themselves were not sufficient 
to determine a violation of Article 14 in this case.88  
 
The ECtHR’s reluctance to give full effect to the concept of indirect discrimination is 
also evident from the Chamber’s decision in D H and others v the Czech Republic,89 
                                                 
 
85 Kelly v the United Kingdom (App no 30054/96) (2001) ECHR 04 May 2001. 
 
86 Kelly v the United Kingdom (n 85) para 146. 
 
87 Kelly v the United Kingdom (n 85) para 148. 
 
88 Kelly v the United Kingdom (n 85) para 148. 
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where the Court assessed compatibility of placing Roma children in special schools 
with Article 14 ECHR read in conjunction with Article 2 of Protocol 1 (P1-2) ECHR 
on the right to education. In the Chamber’s view the Government successfully 
established that the special schools were not created to cater for Roma children; 
neither did placement rules refer to a pupil’s ethnic origin.90 Therefore, special 
schools pursued the “legitimate aim of adapting the education system to the needs and 
aptitudes or disabilities of the children.”91 As a result, the Chamber found no violation 
of Article 14 in conjunction with P1-2 ECHR.92 However, this finding ignored the 
concept of indirect discrimination. As noted above on page 32, indirect discrimination 
occurs where a neutral rule has a disproportionately adverse impact on members of a 
certain group. Intention to discriminate is irrelevant to finding indirect discrimination; 
it is the actual effect of a measure that matters.  
 
On appeal, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR rightly found a violation of Article 14 in 
conjunction with P1-2.93 In assessing the claim of indirect discrimination, the Court 
first clarified that the case did not concern the Czech Republic’s failure to ensure 
positive action to protect Roma minority in educational matters; rather, all that had to 
be established in the applicants’ submission was that,  
                                                                                                                                            
 
89 D H and others v the Czech Republic (App no 57325/00) (2006) 43 EHRR 41, para 48. 
 
90 D H and others v the Czech Republic (n 89) para 49. 
 
91 D H and others v the Czech Republic (n 89) para 49. 
 
92 Although the applicants maintained that the effects of placing Romani children in special schools 
were discriminatory and statistical evidence could support this claim, the Chamber did not find indirect 
discrimination. Compare this finding with the House of Lords decision in Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] 
AC 548. 
 
93 D H and others v the Czech Republic (n 71). 
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without objective and reasonable justification, they were treated less 
favourably than non-Roma children in a comparable situation and that 
this amounted in their case to indirect discrimination.94  
 
In the Grand Chamber’s view “a difference in treatment may take the form of 
disproportionately prejudicial effects of a general policy or measure which, though 
couched in neutral terms, discriminates against a group.”95 Assessment of relevant 
statistics is one way of determining the existence of indirectly discriminatory effects 
of neutral rules. In this respect, the Grand Chamber followed the practice of the ECJ, 
which has relied on statistics in finding indirect discrimination in the well-established 
case law on gender96 and nationality97 discrimination. The Grand Chamber found that 
because the relevant legislation had a disproportionately prejudicial effect on the 
Roma community, “the applicants as members of that community necessarily suffered 
the same discriminatory treatment.”98 Therefore, by thirteen votes to four, the Grand 
Chamber found a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with P1-2 ECHR.99 
                                                 
 
94 D H and others v the Czech Republic (n 71) para 183. 
 
95 D H and others v the Czech Republic (n 71) para 184. 
 
96 See, for example, Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus [1986] IRLR 317. 
 
97 Sotgiu (n 76). 
 
98 D H and others v the Czech Republic (n 71), para 209. 
 
99 The Government sought to justify the difference in treatment between children of Roma and non-
Roma origin based on the necessity of adapting the education system to the capacity of children with 
special needs (D H and others v the Czech Republic (n 71) para 197). Moreover, according to the 
Government, the results of psychological tests, conducted in educational psychology centres, 
established the applicants’ low intellectual capacity and led to their placement in special schools. Thus, 
the Czech Government denied that the applicants were placed in special schools due to their ethnic 
origin.   
The Grand Chamber was not convinced by the Government’s arguments. First, special schools 
followed more basic curriculum and constituted segregation in the education system (para 198). 
Furthermore, the psychological tests gave rise to controversy and continued to be the subject of 
scientific debate (para 199). Even though the Court accepted that its role did not extend to assessing the 
validity of the psychological tests, it concluded that the results of such tests were not sufficient to 
constitute an objective and reasonable justification for the purposes of Article 14 ECHR, because there 
was a danger that the tests were biased and their results did not reflect the particularities and special 
characteristics of the Roma children who sat them (para 201). 
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 Accordingly, the recent jurisprudence of the HRC and the ECtHR illustrate the 
importance of finding indirect discrimination against minorities. The ACFC, too, can 
be highly commended for consistent interpretation of Article 4 FCNM to include not 
only direct, but also indirect discrimination and its focus on whether discrimination 
against minorities exists in fact.100 
 
1.3. Grounds of discrimination: association with a national minority, 
religion and race or ethnic origin  
 
Having established general trends in the assessment of claims of discrimination, we 
now turn to the cases where the specific claimed grounds of discrimination comprised 
association with a national minority (1.3.1), religion (1.3.2) and race or ethnic origin 
(1.3.3).   
 
1.3.1. Association with a national minority 
 
There are very few cases where the ECtHR has dealt specifically with non-
discrimination based on membership in a national minority.101 The leading case 
where this ground was forcefully invoked by a minority group remains Gorzelik v 
Poland.102 Görzelik concerns freedom of association under Article 11 ECHR of 190 
persons who declared themselves ‘Silesians’ and formed an association called ‘Union 
                                                 
 
100 Committee of Experts on Issues Relating to the Protection of National Minorities, ‘The Impact of 
International Norms on the Protection of National Minorities in Europe…’ (n 58) 13. 
 
101 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium (App no 9267/81) (1988) 10 EHRR 1. 
 
102 Görzelik and others v Poland (App no 44158/98) (2005) 40 EHRR 4. 
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of People of Silesian Nationality.’ In 1996 the management committee of the Union 
applied for registration to the Katowice Regional Court. Pursuant to the Law on 
Associations, the Katowice Regional Court served a copy of the application on the 
Governor of Katowice. The Governor’s comments suggested that because there was 
no Silesian national minority, the association could be registered only if it was re-
named and paragraph 30 of the memorandum of the association which declared that 
‘The Union is an organisation of the Silesian national minority’ was deleted.103 The 
Regional Court nevertheless registered the association and left the memorandum 
unaltered. This decision was subsequently annulled by the Court of Appeal, which 
was later re-confirmed by the Supreme Court, on the ground that there was no 
Silesian national minority in Poland. In particular, the higher Courts decided that the 
recognition of Silesians as a national minority may also result in further claims of 
electoral rights that are granted to registered minority associations.  
                                                
 
When the case came before the ECtHR, the Court refused to get involved in the 
debates as to whether this group was indeed a ‘national minority’, because the concept 
is not defined in any international treaty and there is no consistent State practice 
regarding the official recognition of minorities104 (as discussed in Section 3 of this 
Chapter on pages 127-186). The lack of a definition of ‘national minority’ was 
compounded in this case by the fact that the Polish electoral legislation granted 
special benefits to registered minority associations. Therefore, the Government argued 
that the applicants had attempted to acquire the status of a minority group in order to 
claim the benefits under the domestic laws. The ECtHR observed that the 
memorandum of the association gave the impression that in the future “the members 
 
103 Görzelik (n 102) para 24. 
 
104 Görzelik (n 102) para 67. 
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of the association might … aspire to stand in elections.”105 The Court, therefore, 
concluded that the applicants were not precluded from forming an association “to 
express and promote distinctive features of a minority;”106 rather it was the creation of 
a legal entity with the possibility of a subsequent claim of special status under 
national law which appeared to be objectionable. Therefore, the refusal to register the 
applicants’ association was justified under Article 11(2) ECHR.  
 
This case is in stark contrast with other similar cases, such as the United Macedonian 
Organisation Ilinden-Pirin and others v Bulgaria107 on the dissolution of a political 
party established to protect the rights of the ‘Macedonian’ minority (discussed on 
page 114). The difference in the outcome of these cases can be explained by the fact 
that in Gorzelik under domestic law the group had a possibility to acquire additional 
electoral rights, while this was not an issue in cases involving freedom of association 
of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. Also, the lack of a uniform State practice 
defining the term ‘national minority’ and introducing procedures for their official 
recognition108 prompted the ECtHR to grant the State a broad margin of discretion. 
Overall, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on non-discrimination based on membership of a 
national minority needs further strengthening through examination of the complaints 
under Article 14 and Protocol 12 ECHR.   
 
                                                 
 
105 Görzelik (n 102) paras 64-65. 
 
106 Görzelik (n 102) para 106. 
 
107 The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-Pirin and others v Bulgaria (App no 59489/00) 
ECHR 20 October 2005. 
 
108 Görzelik (n 102) para 67. 
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1.3.2. Religion 
 
As to non-discrimination against persons belonging to a minority based on religion, 
the jurisprudence of international courts and quasi-judicial bodies is similarly 
limited.109 The HRC’s leading communication on discrimination based on religion 
remains Waldman v Canada.110 The author of the communication, a member of the 
Jewish faith, complained that in the province of Ontario, Canada provided full and 
direct public funding to Roman Catholic schools only. In the HRC’s view, the 
authorities’ decision not to fund other religious schools violated Article 26 ICCPR, 
because if a State decides to provide public funding to religious schools, “it should 
make this funding available without discrimination.”111 Canada attempted to justify 
differential treatment of religious schools in the light of its historic protection of the 
protestant minority in the province of Ontario, enshrined in the Canadian Constitution 
since 1867. However, even this Constitutional guarantee did not persuade the HRC 
that there was a need to maintain such a differential treatment between religious 
minorities:  
[t]he material before the Committee does not show that members of the 
Roman Catholic community or any identifiable section of that 
community are now in a disadvantaged position compared to those 
members of the Jewish community that wish to secure the education of 
their children in religious schools.112  
 
                                                 
109 In contrast, the jurisprudence on freedom of association of religious organisations is more 
supportive of minority groups’ claims. See, for example, the ECtHR’s decisions in Serif v Greece (App 
no 38178/97) (1999) 31 EHRR 561; Hassan and Chaush v Bulgaria (App no 30985/96) (2000) 24 
EHRR 55; Case of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v Moldova (App no 45701/99) 
ECHR 13 December 2001; Case of Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v Bulgaria (App 
no 39023/97) ECHR 16 December 2004; Case of the Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v Russia 
(App no 72881/01) ECHR 5 October 2006; Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and others v 
Austria (App no 40825/98) ECHR 31 July 2008. 
 
110 Waldman v Canada (n 62). 
 
111 Waldman v Canada (n 62) para 10(6). 
 
112 Waldman v Canada (n 62) para 10.4. 
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Accordingly, such differential treatment was not justified, and, hence, Article 26 
ICCPR was breached. 
 
Although the ECtHR’s case law on prohibition of discrimination against persons 
belonging to a minority based on religion is not particularly strong either, the Court 
can be commended for expanding the scope of the principle of non-discrimination in 
the case of Thlimmenos v Greece.113 The applicant, a Jehovah’s Witness, was 
convicted for insubordination as a result of his refusal to wear a military uniform 
during a general mobilisation. Subsequently, he was refused a post as a chartered 
accountant, because national law excluded convicted persons from such 
appointments. The applicant relied on Article 14 ECHR in conjunction with Article 9 
ECHR and complained that in the “application of the relevant law no distinction is 
made between persons convicted of offences committed exclusively because of their 
religious beliefs and persons convicted of other offences.”114  
 
The ECtHR noted that its past case-law focused on differential treatment of persons in 
analogous situations without any objective and reasonable justification; however,  
this is not the only facet of the prohibition of discrimination in 
Article 14. The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment 
of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is also violated when 
[S]tates without an objective and reasonable justification fail to treat 
differently persons whose situations are significantly different.115 
 
Therefore, the failure of Greece to ensure such differentiated treatment amounted to a 
violation of Article 14 ECHR in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR.  
                                                 
 
113 Thlimmenos v Greece (n 67). 
 
114 Thlimmenos v Greece (n 67) para 42. 
 
115 Thlimmenos v Greece (n 67) para 44. 
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 Despite the positive outcome of the above-discussed cases for the applicants, the 
jurisprudence of international courts on non-discrimination against persons belonging 
to a minority based on religion needs further expansion, mainly through more 
confident application of Article 14 ECHR, Protocol 12 ECHR and Articles 2 and 26 
ICCPR. 
 
1.3.3. Race and ethnicity 
 
Unlike the above discussed two grounds, the right of non-discrimination based on 
race and ethnicity has recently acquired a significantly higher level of protection. In 
particular, in its case law the ECtHR has clarified rules on the burden of proof in anti-
discrimination law cases and reaffirmed the duty of the authorities to investigate 
possible racist motives against persons belonging to a minority, such as in Nachova v 
Bulgaria116 concerning the death of two persons of Roma origin killed by military 
police in violation of Article 2 ECHR.117 Significantly, in deciding this case, the 
Chamber and the Grand Chamber arrived at different conclusions: the Chamber 
concluded that there was a violation of Article 14 read in conjunction with Article 2 
ECHR in its substantive aspect, while the Grand Chamber found that there was a 
violation of these provisions in their procedural aspect.   
 
                                                 
 
116 Nachova v Bulgaria (App nos 43577/98 and 43579/98) (2004) 39 EHRR 37. 
 
117 Both the Chamber and the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR established that Article 2 ECHR precludes 
the use of firearms to arrest persons “who, like Mr Angelov and Mr Petkov, were suspected of having 
committed non-violent offences, were not armed and did not pose any threat to the arresting officers or 
others” (Nachova v Bulgaria, Grand Chamber (n 69) para 89, see also Chamber’s decision in Nachova 
v Bulgaria (n 116) para 105). Due to the use of grossly excessive force and the lack of an effective 
investigation of the deprivation of life, there had been a violation of Article 2. 
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Thus, the Chamber maintained that Articles 2 and 14 ECHR together impose a duty 
on State authorities to conduct an effective investigation irrespective of the victim’s 
racial or ethnic origin; moreover, where there is “suspicion that racial attitudes 
induced a violent act it is particularly important that the official investigation is 
pursued with vigour and impartiality…”118 Having established that the authorities 
failed to conduct a meaningful investigation into racist statements made by law 
enforcement officers,119 the Chamber shifted the burden of proof on the respondent 
State, i.e., it was up to Bulgaria to provide a plausible explanation regarding the lack 
of investigation.120 Because the State did not offer any further explanation, and taking 
into consideration other cases where “[Bulgarian] law enforcement officers had 
subjected Roma to violence resulting in death”121, the Chamber found a violation of 
Article 14 taken together with Article 2 ECHR in its substantive aspect. 
 
Unlike the Chamber, the Grand Chamber considered that the alleged failure of the 
authorities to carry out an effective investigation into the supposedly racist motive for 
the killings should not shift the burden of proof to the government with regard to the 
breach of Article 14 taken together with the substantive aspect of Article 2 ECHR. 
The Grand Chamber reiterated that in certain circumstances, where events leading to a 
death of a person were within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, the burden 
of proof may rest on the authorities. It may also be possible that a government may be 
required to disprove an alleged discrimination. However, in the present case, “such an 
approach would amount to requiring the respondent Government to prove the absence 
                                                 
118 Nachova v Bulgaria (n 116) para 157. 
 
119 Nachova v Bulgaria (n 116) para 170. 
 
120 Nachova v Bulgaria (n 116) para 171. 
 
121 Nachova v Bulgaria (n 116) para 172-3. 
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of a particular subjective attitude on the part of the person concerned.”122 In 
explaining its approach, the Grand Chamber drew a distinction between violent and 
non-violent acts. While the burden of proof may shift onto the government in cases 
alleging discrimination in the course of non-violent acts, for example, employment, 
“that approach is difficult to transpose to a case where it is alleged that an act of 
violence was racially motivated.”123 
 
Considering all the circumstances of the case, the Grand Chamber departed from the 
Chamber’s approach and ruled that racist attitudes did not play a role in Mr Angelov’s 
and Mr Petkov’s deaths.124 Nevertheless, where the procedural aspect of Article 14 in 
conjunction with Article 2 ECHR is concerned, the Grand Chamber considered that  
… any evidence of racist verbal abuse being uttered by law 
enforcement agents in connection with an operation involving the use 
of force against persons from an ethnic or other minority is highly 
relevant to the question whether or not unlawful, hatred-induced 
violence has taken place125  
 
and renders necessary a careful examination. Therefore, failure of the authorities to 
take all possible steps to investigate whether or not discrimination may have played a 
role in the events breached Article 14 ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 2 in its 
procedural aspect. 
 
The Grand Chamber’s finding of a procedural violation as opposed to a substantive 
one demonstrates that the ECtHR was cautious in its approach in Nachova. 
                                                 
 
122 Nachova v Bulgaria (n 69) para 157. 
 
123 Nachova v Bulgaria (n 69) para 157. 
 
124 Nachova v Bulgaria (n 69) para 158. 
 
125 Nachova v Bulgaria (n 69) para 164. 
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Nevertheless, even though this finding is less forceful than the Chamber’s decision, it 
strongly affirmed the duty of authorities to investigate possible cases of 
discrimination against the Roma. Furthermore, the Grand Chamber accepted that in 
certain situations the burden of proof may, in principle, shift on the authorities. In 
addition, the case laid the foundation for the ECtHR’s case law on non-discriminatory 
treatment of Roma in subsequent case law.126  
 
The ECtHR has further strengthened this strong emphasis on prohibition of 
discrimination based on racial and ethnic origin in Timishev v Russia,127 where the 
applicant claimed that his right to liberty of movement was restricted based on his 
Chechen ethnic origin128 contrary to Article 14 read together with Article 2 of 
Protocol 4 ECHR. In its assessment, the ECtHR emphasised that “[d]iscrimination on 
account of one’s actual or perceived ethnicity is a form of racial discrimination”129 
and it is the duty of the authorities to investigate such cases with special vigilance. 
                                                 
 
126 Thus, in the case of Moldovan and others v Romania ((App nos 41138/98 and 64320/01) (2007) 44 
EHRR 16), the applicants claimed that they had been discriminated against based on their ethnicity as 
Roma by State officials and judicial bodies contrary to Article 14 ECHR in conjunction with Articles 6 
and 8 ECHR.  Based on the facts of the case, the ECtHR established that the applicants’ Roma 
ethnicity appeared to have been “decisive for the length and the result of the domestic proceedings…” 
(para 139). Moreover, the applicants were repeatedly subjected to discriminatory remarks made by the 
authorities while their claims were being considered by domestic authorities. Accordingly, there was a 
violation of Article 14 together with Articles 6 and 8 ECHR. 
Likewise, in D H and others v the Czech Republic (n 71), the Grand Chamber took into account that the 
applicants, who were placed in special schools, were subjected to differential treatment based on their 
Roma ethnic origin. The placement in special schools was based on parental consent. However, 
because it appeared that parents of Romani children were not fully informed and often signed a pre-
completed form, the Grand Chamber was not persuaded that “members of a disadvantaged community 
and often poorly educated, [Romani parents] were capable of weighting up all the aspects of the 
situation and the consequences of giving their consent” (para 203). The Grand Chamber concluded that 
even assuming that Romani parents gave their ‘informed consent’ for their children to be placed in 
special schools, “no waiver of the right not to be subjected to racial discrimination can be accepted” 
(para 204). 
 
127 Timishev v Russia (n 70). 
 
128 The authorities who refused to allow him to pass through the checkpoint on the administrative 
border between Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria referred to an oral instruction from the Ministry of 
the Interior of Kabardino-Balkaria not to admit persons of Chechen ethnic origin. 
 
129 Timishev v Russia (n 70), para 56. 
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Noting that the respondent State failed to present a plausible explanation for the 
differential treatment based on ethnic origin, the ECtHR stated that 
[i]n any event, the Court considers that no difference in treatment 
which is based exclusively or to a decisive extent on a person’s ethnic 
origin is capable of being objectively justified in a contemporary 
democratic society built on the principles of pluralism and respect for 
different cultures.130 
 
In this passage, the ECtHR effectively indicated that in a democratic society 
justification of a difference in treatment on the basis of race may not be acceptable. 
Such an approach indicates that the ECtHR is likely to adopt a high level of scrutiny 
in cases involving racial discrimination.  
 
This is not to say that special measures131 based on race and ethnicity, specifically 
designed to ensure substantive equality of a racial or ethnic group, could not lead to 
differential treatment.132 The ECtHR has long established that not every differential 
treatment results in discrimination.133 In addition, there may be a State duty to 
differentiate in order to protect minorities.134  
 
                                                 
 
130 Timishev v Russia (n 70), para 58. 
 
131 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), a quasi-judicial body under 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination  (adopted 21 
December 1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 (ICERD), has recently clarified the 
meaning and scope of special measures in its General Recommendation No 32. The Committee 
suggested that special measures should be “appropriate to the situation to be remedied, be legitimate, 
necessary in a democratic society, respect the principles of fairness and proportionality, and be 
temporary.” Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘General Recommendation No 
32: The meaning and scope of special measure in the International Convention on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination’ (2009) CERD/C/GC/32, para 16. 
 
132 Such measures should be designed and implemented on the basis of need and a minority group’s 
current situation: CERD (n 131). 
 
133 Belgian Linguistics (n 63).   
 
134 Belgian Linguistics (n 63) para 44. 
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The ECtHR’s strong stance in cases involving discrimination on the grounds of race 
or ethnicity under Article 14 ECHR is now extended to assessment of claims under 
Protocol 12 ECHR. This is well exemplified in the Grand Chamber’s recent decision 
in the cases of Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina.135 The cases concern the 
compatibility of the domestic legislation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which prevents 
persons not belonging to one of the three constituent peoples (Bosnians, Serbs and 
Croats) from standing for election to the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary 
Assembly and the Presidency, with Articles 14 ECHR read together with Article 3 of 
Protocol 1 (P1-3) and Article 1 of Protocol 12 to the ECHR. To stand for elections, 
individuals had to affiliate with one of the constituent peoples; as a result, the 
applicants, who are of Roma and Jewish origin, respectively, were excluded from 
political participation.  
 
The applicants complained that eligibility to stand for election to the House of Peoples 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina was based on ethnic origin and constituted unjustified 
differential treatment under Article 14 ECHR read together with P1-3. Moreover, they 
alleged that their ineligibility to stand for election to the Presidency of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was contrary to the principle of non-discrimination in Protocol 12. 
 
In assessing the State’s compliance with Article 14 read in conjunction with P1-3, the 
ECtHR reiterated that discrimination means treating differently persons in similar 
situations, without an objective and reasonable justification. ‘No objective and 
reasonable justification’, in the Court’s view,  
                                                 
 
135 Sejdić and Finci (n 55). 
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means that the distinction in question does not pursue a ‘legitimate 
aim’ or that there is not a ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised’.136 
 
Furthermore, depending on the circumstances, the subject matter and the background, 
States may have varying degrees of the margin of discretion.  
 
As to the ground for discrimination, the ECtHR reaffirmed that discrimination based 
on a person’s ethnic origin is a form of a racial discrimination. As a particularly 
egregious kind of discrimination, racial discrimination requires from the authorities 
special vigilance and a vigorous reaction. In view of its perilous consequences, in 
cases involving a difference in treatment based on race or ethnicity, the concept of 
any ‘objective and reasonable justification’ must be construed as strictly as possible. 
Moreover, no difference in treatment exclusively or primarily based on a person’s 
ethnic origin can be objectively justified in a contemporary democratic society based 
on the principles of pluralism and cultural diversity. That being said, Article 14 does 
not preclude States from treating groups differently to correct ‘factual inequalities’ 
between them. In addition, in some situations a failure to attempt to correct inequality 
through a difference in treatment without an objective and reasonable justification 
may violate this provision.  
  
Accordingly, the ECtHR has not deviated from its previous jurisprudence on Article 
14 and has reaffirmed the principles established in its case law. In applying these 
principles to the present case, the ECtHR found a violation of Article 14 ECHR read 
in conjunction with P1-3 in relation to the applicants’ right to stand for election to the 
House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly. Where eligibility to stand for 
                                                 
 
136 Sejdić and Finci (n 55) para 42. 
 48
election to the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, the ECtHR 
established that irrespective of whether elections to the Presidency fell within the 
ambit of P1-3, Article 1 of Protocol 12 applied to the case, because this was a right set 
out in law. Relying on the same reasoning as under Article 14 ECHR, the ECtHR 
ruled that there was no pertinent distinction between the House of Peoples and the 
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and concluded that there was also a violation 
of Article 1 of Protocol 12.137  
 
In his partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion, Judge Mijovic expressed 
disappointment with the ECtHR’s brief reasoning in assessing alleged discrimination 
under Protocol 12, considering the huge expectations that the Court would  
use this case, as the very first of its kind, to lay down specific first 
principles, standards or tests that might be considered universal and 
applicable to future cases concerning general discrimination.138  
 
Nonetheless, by finding a violation of Protocol 12 in the first case where the 
instrument was invoked by persons belonging to minorities suffering discrimination 
as to political participation, the ECtHR confirmed that this instrument may further 
enhance the protection of minorities under the ECHR. Furthermore, as this case 
demonstrates, the added value of Protocol 12 is in its application to any ‘right set forth 
by law’.139  
                                                 
137 So far, we have overviewed the general principles in the ECtHR’s assessment of non-discrimination. 
The ECtHR’s reasoning on non-discrimination in political participation in the context of the present 
case is discussed in more detail on pages 65-66. 
 
138 Sejdić and Finci (n 55) Partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion of Judge Mijovic, joined by 
Judge Hajiyev.  
 
139 Some developments in the area of non-discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin took place in 
the African and Inter-American contexts as well. Thus, the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) found a violation of Article 2 on non-discrimination of the African Charter 
(n 52) based on the ground of ethnic origin in the cases such as Amnesty International v Zambia 
(Comm no 212/98 (1999)) and the Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture and others v Rwanda 
(Comm nos 27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 99/93 (1996)).  
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In Amnesty International v Zambia, Zambia deported two prominent political figures, which in the 
view of the applicants constituted discrimination and violated inter alia Article 2 of the African 
Charter. The ACHPR noted that Article 2 imposes an obligation on Zambia to guarantee the rights 
protected under this instrument to all persons within its jurisdiction irrespective of political or any other 
opinion. This obligation not to discriminate against persons within its jurisdiction was reaffirmed by 
the ACHPR against Zambia in another case concerning deportations of West Africans in Rencontre 
Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme v Zambia (Comm no 71/92) (1996). Without much 
ado, the ACHPR concluded that the arbitrary removal of one’s citizenship cannot be justified and 
hence there was a violation of Article 2.   
Similarly, in Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture and others v Rwanda, the African Commission 
did not specify any particular test for applying the principle of non-discrimination. The case concerned 
the expulsion from Rwanda of Burundi nationals (who had been refugees in Rwanda for many years), 
and arbitrary arrests and detentions made on the basis of ethnic origin, including membership in the 
Tutsi ethnic group, in various parts of the country by the Rwandan security forces. In para 22 of the 
communication, the ACHPR held that  
[t]here is considerable evidence, undisputed by the government, that the violations of 
the rights of individuals have occurred on the basis of their being Burundian 
nationals or members of the Tutsi ethnic group. The denial of numerous rights to 
individuals on account of their nationality or membership of a particular ethnic group 
clearly violates Article 2. 
Such a brief reasoning may be explained by the fact that despite the numerous notifications of the 
communications sent by the ACHPR, the Government of Rwanda did not supply any substantive 
response. Thus, because the applicants’ claims remained uncontested by the Government, the ACHPR 
had to decide based on the facts provided (para 20).  
The ACHPR has slightly expanded on its interpretation of the principle of non-discrimination in 
Malawi African Association and others v Mauritania, concerning discriminatory treatment of many 
Black Mauritanians, who because of the colour of their skin were forced to flee, or were detained, 
tortured or killed. The ACHPR interpreted Article 2 AfrCH as essential to the spirit of the instrument, 
which inter alia pursues the goal of the elimination of all forms of discrimination and aims to ensure 
equality among all human beings. The ACHPR then relied on Article 1(1) of the UN Declaration of the 
Rights of People Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities and maintained that 
international human rights law and the international community accord significance to the eradication 
of discrimination in all its forms. Therefore, a State’s discriminatory treatment of its own indigenes 
based on the colour of their skin was an unacceptable discriminatory attitude in violation of Article 2. 
Thus, the ACHPR accorded a heightened scrutiny to cases of discrimination based on ethnic origin or 
race. In all three cases, discriminatory treatment of minority groups was blatantly obvious. 
Nevertheless, in the future, it is desirable for the ACHPR to provide an explicit analysis of its review 
mechanism, comparable to the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the HRC, to clearly indicate which 
State acts may contravene Article 2. 
In this regard, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ decision in The Yean and Bosico Children v 
Dominican Republic case ((Ser C) no 130 (2005)) is highly commendable for its thorough assessment 
of discriminatory denial of birth certificates to children of Haitian origin. The Yean and Bosico 
children of Haitian origin were born in the Dominican Republic. Article 11 of the Constitution of the 
Dominican Republic stipulated that all those born on its territory are Dominicans (ius soli) (para 
109(12)), except for the children of foreign diplomats resident in the country or the children of those in 
transit.  
Around 500,000 undocumented Haitian workers live in the Dominican Republic; many of them have 
been born on Dominican territory and lived there for up to 40 years (para 153). Most of them “face a 
situation of permanent illegality, which they transmit to their children, who cannot obtain Dominican 
nationality because, according to the restrictive interpretation that Dominican Authorities give to article 
11 of the Constitution, they are children of ‘foreigners in transit’” (para 153). As a result, there are 
significant obstacles for these children to receive a birth certificate, which entitles them to attend a 
public school, and have access to healthcare and social assistance services. Furthermore, because of 
their precarious economic conditions and fear of deportation, many families of Haitian origin use the 
late declaration of birth procedure to declare their children born in the Dominican Republic (para 
109(10)). To make the late declaration of birth procedure for children under 13, parents should produce 
3 pieces of evidence; for the registration of children over 13 years, there is a list of 11 requirements 
(para 109(14), 109(17), 109(18) and 109(20)). When the Yean and Bosico children’s parents made the 
late declaration of birth, both children were under the age of 13. However, the registrar refused their 
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1.4. Conclusions 
 
The principle of non-discrimination is an essential requirement of an effective regime 
of minority protection. As noted in the introduction to the thesis and illustrated in 
subsequent chapters, this principle is the driving force behind minority protection. 
Despite its importance, the jurisprudence of international courts and quasi-judicial 
bodies reveals that this principle has not been developed to its full potential. In 
particular, provisions in international and regional treaties on non-discrimination were 
mainly applied to cases concerning direct discrimination and it is only relatively 
recently that the jurisprudence of courts has begun to differentiate between cases 
involving direct and indirect discrimination. It is hoped that the free-standing 
provision on non-discrimination in Protocol 12 will strengthen further the ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence. 
 
Where direct discrimination against minorities is concerned, only a limited number of 
cases has been considered before international courts and quasi-judicial bodies. The 
                                                                                                                                            
registration, because the documents presented were insufficient for late registration, based on the list of 
11 requirements.  
The Inter-American Court observed in this regard that the State “adopted different positions regarding 
the requirements the children had to fulfil” and that “there are no standard criteria for demanding and 
applying the requirements for late birth registration of children under 13 years of age in the Dominican 
Republic” (para 109(16)). The Inter-American Court further noted that although the determination of 
who has a right to be a national falls within a State’s domestic jurisdiction, this discretionary authority 
may be restricted in order to protect individuals against arbitrary acts of States (para 140). Thus, there 
are two State obligations in this respect: to provide individuals with the equal and effective protection 
of the law and to reduce statelessness (para 140). In particular, “the peremptory legal principle of the 
equal and effective protection of the law and non-discrimination determines that, when regulating 
mechanisms for granting nationality, States must abstain from producing regulations that are 
discriminatory or have discriminatory effects on certain groups of population when exercising their 
rights” (para 141). Moreover, the obligation to respect and ensure the principle of the right to equal 
protection and non-discrimination applies irrespective of a person’s migratory status in a State. 
Consequently, States have the “obligation to ensure this fundamental principle to its citizens and to any 
foreigner who is on its territory, without any discrimination based on regular or irregular residence, 
nationality, race, gender or any other cause” (para 155). Therefore, the Dominican Republic was 
obliged to adopt all necessary positive measures for Yean and Bosico children to access the late 
registration procedure in conditions of equality and non-discrimination and to fully exercise and enjoy 
their right to Dominican nationality (para 177). The implications of this ruling are very powerful: the 
Inter-American Court strongly condemned racial discrimination in access to nationality and upheld 
equality of treatment to all individuals on the State’s territory. 
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ECtHR, for example, was often reluctant to consider the claims of minorities under 
Article 14 ECHR, partly due to political sensitivity surrounding the ‘minority 
question’ in Europe, and partly due to the accessory nature of this provision applied 
together with other ECHR rights. As a result, in the past, once the ECtHR found a 
violation of a substantive provision of the ECHR, it tended to omit assessment of 
claims under Article 14 ECHR. The ECtHR’s recent case law, however, can be 
commended for its willingness to assess anti-discrimination claims brought forward 
by minorities.  
 
As to findings of indirect discrimination against minorities, although developments in 
the HRC and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence have been slow, they can be evaluated as 
positive advancements in anti-discrimination law, because they may open the way for 
greater protection of minority groups. In this respect, a major shift can be observed in 
the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, which accepted statistical evidence and agreed that in 
certain situations the burden of proof may be shifted onto the authorities.  
 
Where the grounds for discrimination are concerned, international and regional courts 
and quasi-judicial bodies seem to accord a high level of scrutiny in cases concerning 
discrimination on the grounds of race or ethnicity. For example, Timishev v Russia 
and Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina constitute a welcome development in 
anti-discrimination law. In contrast, the case law on discrimination based on 
membership of a national minority and religion is limited and requires broader 
application. Although it is commendable that racial discrimination is strongly 
condemned, the differentiation between the grounds of non-discrimination may lead 
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to an undesirable hierarchy, with racial and ethnic minority groups receiving a higher 
level of protection than national and religious minorities.  
 
Overall, it is hoped that recent advancements in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, 
coupled with legislative developments such as Protocol 12 ECHR, may serve as a 
major impetus for strengthening anti-discrimination law. However, a wider 
ratification of Protocol 12, particularly by western European countries, is essential to 
strengthen anti-discrimination law under the ECHR. Furthermore, the application of 
the FCNM in line with the ACFC’s broad construal of the provisions on non-
discrimination may significantly enhance the rights of minorities in Europe. 
 
Section 2. Special rights of minorities 
 
As noted in the introduction to the thesis on page 8, minority protection has two main 
dimensions. The above-discussed right of minorities to non-discriminatory treatment 
is only one side of the coin. The other, equally important, aspect of minority 
protection is the need for special rights requiring positive action from States that 
actively guarantee, for example, the right to political participation and the right to 
education specifically tailored to the needs of minorities. In a sense, special rights are 
the second side of the same coin, because they aim to ensure substantive equality 
between majorities and minorities.  
 
One of the earliest authorities clarifying the dual aspect of minority protection is the 
advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in Minority 
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Schools in Albania.140 The PCIJ was asked to rule on the compatibility of 
amendments to the Constitution of Albania which abolished private schools with 
Article 5(1) of the Albanian Declaration141 made upon its accession to the League of 
Nations. The Albanian Government argued that, the abolition of private schools was 
not discriminatory because it equally affected majorities and minorities.142 Moreover, 
in the Government’s view, maintaining minority schools would privilege minorities 
over majorities; consequently, the provision should be construed “in the manner most 
favourable to the sovereignty of the Albanian State.”143  
 
The PCIJ ruled that to ensure protection for minorities States should both place 
minorities on an equal footing with other nationals (non-discrimination) and guarantee 
to minorities the means to preserve their characteristics (positive action).144 These two 
requirements are equally significant, because “there would be no true equality 
between a majority and minority if the latter were deprived of its own institutions.”145 
The PCIJ concluded that the intention of the Declaration was to “grant to the minority 
an unconditional right to maintain and create their own charitable institutions and 
                                                 
140 Greece v Albania (1935) PCIJ Series A/B no 64. 
 
141 Article 5(1) of the Albanian Declaration stated:  
Albanian nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities will enjoy 
the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Albanian nationals. In 
particular they shall have an equal right to maintain, manage and control at their own 
expense or to establish in the future, charitable, religious and social institutions, 
schools and other educational establishments, with the right to use their own 
language and to exercise their religion freely therein. 
 
142 Greece v Albania (n 140) 9. 
 
143 Greece v Albania (n 140) 12. 
 
144 Greece v Albania (n 140) 14. 
 
145 Greece v Albania (n 140) 14. 
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schools”,146 because any lesser treatment would result in inequality in fact. Therefore, 
under the Declaration,147 Albania had to preserve private minority schools. 
 
Accordingly, creating of conditions favourable to the preservation of a minority 
identity constitutes an essential feature of minority protection. In its General 
Comment on Article 27 ICCPR, the HRC confirmed that there is a State duty to adopt 
positive measures “necessary to protect the identity of a minority and the rights of its 
members.”148 Similarly, Article 5 FCNM requires States to ensure the substantive 
equality of minorities, by adopting positive measures to promote the  
conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to 
maintain and develop their culture and to preserve the essential 
elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions 
and cultural heritage.  
 
Significantly, ‘special rights’ should be differentiated from ‘special measures.’ A 
‘special measure’ is a temporary preferential treatment of certain groups with the aim 
of leveling the playing field between majorities and minorities. These include, for 
example, affirmative action and quotas. This thesis deals mainly with special rights of 
minorities, which have a general application, and does not elaborate on context-
specific temporary special measures.   
 
Consequently, Section 2 of Chapter I is devoted to the special rights of minorities. 
First, the right of minorities to political participation with an emphasis on the rights to 
vote and stand for elections is discussed (sub-section 1). Then the freedom of 
                                                 
 
146 Greece v Albania (n 140) 25. 
 
147 For the text of the Declaration, see (n 141). 
 
148 General Comment No 23 (n 51) paras 6(1) and 6(2). 
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minorities to manifest a religion with the focus on religious dress is analysed (sub-
section 2). Another significant special right of minorities, i.e., the right to education, 
with an emphasis on access to education is assessed next (sub-section 3). Finally, 
conditions for granting and withdrawing autonomy by States are evaluated. Even 
though there is no right to autonomy as such, where the collective aspect of minority 
protection is prominent, autonomy arrangements are indispensable to create effective 
protection of minorities, because they allow a group to decide on matters of special 
concern (sub-section 4).   
 
1. The Right to Political Participation 
 
It is generally recognised that minority rights are better protected when a group enjoys 
an effective right to political participation. This is so because a group may express its 
views in relation to the choice of its representatives in the legislature and other 
offices. This right may take different forms, including the right to direct 
representation at the institutional level and the right to participate in decision-making 
processes that may affect a minority group.  
 
1.1. Relevant provisions on the right to political participation 
 
The right to political participation is recognised under the main international and 
regional human rights instruments. Examples include Article 25 ICCPR and P1-3 
ECHR.149 These general human rights guarantees also apply to members of 
                                                 
149 See also, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (n 131) 
Article 5(c); American Convention on Human Rights (n 52) Article 23 and African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (n 52) Article 13. 
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minorities. In addition, a number of provisions are specifically applicable to persons 
belonging to minorities. Among these, Article 27 ICCPR and Article 15 FCNM are 
particularly significant. While Article 15 FCNM explicitly requires States to create 
the conditions necessary for effective participation of persons belonging to national 
minorities in all aspects of a country’s life, including in public affairs, and in 
particular those affecting them, Article 27 ICCPR does not include such references. 
Nevertheless, in interpreting the rights of minorities under Article 27 ICCPR the HRC 
maintained that the exercise of cultural rights may include a particular way of life in 
relation to land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples; therefore, 
States need to ensure that members of minority communities can effectively 
participate in decisions which affect them.150 The following focuses on recent 
jurisprudential developments relating to the rights to vote and to stand for elections. 
 
 
                                                 
 
150 General Comment No 23 (n 51) para 7. 
Indeed, the HRC’s jurisprudence affirms the right of minorities to participate in matters affecting their 
interests, such as in Ilmari Länsman et al v Finland (Communication no 511/1992) (1994) 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992), Jouni Länsman et al v Finland (Communication no 671/1995) (1996) 
CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995) and Apirana Mahuika et al v New Zealand (Communication no 547/1993) 
(2000) CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993). In these cases, the authors of communications complained that the 
States’ commercial exploitation of natural resources had a disruptive effect on their traditional way of 
life. In assessing whether Finland and New Zealand had violated their obligations under Article 27 
ICCPR, the HRC focused on evaluating State measures taken to ensure the effective participation of 
members of the minority communities concerned in decisions which affected them. For example, in 
Apirana Mahuika et al v New Zealand, the HRC emphasised that two criteria are essential to evaluate 
the acceptability of measures that affect or interfere with the culturally significant economic activities 
of a minority: “whether the members of the minority in question have had the opportunity to participate 
in the decision-making process in relation to these measures and whether they will continue to benefit 
from their traditional economy” (para 9.5). In all three communications, the HRC found that because 
the States consulted the groups concerned before they adopted relevant domestic legislation and took 
into specific consideration the sustainability of the minority groups’ traditional activities, there was no 
violation of Article 27 ICCPR. Thus, in Apirana Mahuika et al v New Zealand, the HRC concluded 
that “by engaging itself in the process of broad consultation before proceeding to legislate, and by 
paying specific attention to the sustainability of Maori fishing activities,” New Zealand took the 
necessary steps to comply with Article 27 ICCPR (para 9.8). Accordingly, Article 27 ICCPR also 
includes the right to effective participation of minorities in matters affecting their interests. 
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1.2. The right to Vote  
 
In its General Comment on Article 25 ICCPR, the HRC emphasised that a democratic 
government, based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles 
of the ICCPR, comprises the core of Article 25.151 States must report to the HRC on 
the conditions for access to public service positions, including dismissal or removal 
from office, so that any irregularities could be timely detected.152 Where voting rights 
are concerned, States must respect and implement the results of genuine elections.153  
 
Moreover, States are obliged to adopt legislative and other measures154 to ensure that 
minorities enjoy political rights and are not excluded from the electoral process. Thus, 
                                                 
151 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 25: The right to participate in public affairs, 
voting rights and the right of equal access to public service (Art. 25) (1996) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, 
para 1. 
 
152 General Comment No 25 (n 151) para 24. 
 
153 General Comment No 25 (n 151) para 19. 
Similar trends can be observed in the jurisprudence of regional courts and quasi-judicial bodies. Thus, 
in Walter Humberto Vasques Vejarano v Peru (Case No 11.166, Report No 48/00), the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACtHR) established that by removing the applicant from the post of 
justice of Peru’s Supreme Court of Justice, the President of the Republic of Peru, violated, inter alia, 
his right to participate in Government under Article 23 of the American Convention on Human Rights 
(n 52). Although the right to political participation does not prescribe a form of government or 
separation of powers within government, “a democratic structure is an essential element for the 
establishment of a political society where human rights can be fully realized” (para 93). The IACtHR 
emphasised that the right to govern rests with the people, “who alone are empowered to decide their 
own and immediate destiny and to designate their legitimate representatives” (para 93). 
Likewise, in Constitutional Rights Project and Civil Liberties Organisation v Nigeria (Communication 
no 102/93) (1998), the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) emphasised the 
relevance of democracy and respect for the voters’ choice in the exercise of political rights. The 
ACHPR ruled that Nigeria violated Article 13 of the African Charter (n 52) by annulling the results of 
elections from several districts during the 1993 presidential elections. The African Commission 
emphasised that under international human rights law, certain standards must be applied uniformly 
across national borders. Governments must be liable to meet these standards. It is the duty of 
international observers to ascertain whether elections were free and fair; otherwise, it would be 
contrary to “the logic of international law if a national government with a vested interest in the 
outcome of an election, were the final arbiter of whether the election took place in accordance with 
international standards” (para 47). Furthermore, the right to participate freely in government entails the 
right to vote for a representative of one’s choice; accordingly, government must respect the results of 
the free expression of the will of the voters (para 50). 
 
154 General Comment No 25 (n 151) para 1. 
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in Aziz v Cyprus155 the ECtHR established that by failing to introduce any legislative 
changes to its constitution ensuing from the occupation of northern Cyprus by Turkey, 
Cyprus violated P1-3. As a result, Cyprus did not ensure the right of Turkish-Cypriots 
to political participation.156 This failure to introduce necessary legislative provisions 
completely deprived the applicant of any opportunity to express his opinion in the 
choice of the legislature of the country of his nationality and permanent residence,157 
thus impairing the very essence of the applicant’s right to vote. 
 
However, not every differential treatment in the electoral system of a State amounts to 
discrimination. Indeed, States may choose to introduce a regime which through 
differential treatment would ensure respect for minorities’ rights. Thus, in Lindsay 
and others v the United Kingdom,158 the European Commission of Human Rights 
(ECmHR) decided that the application of a proportional representation system in 
Northern Ireland, as opposed to a ‘first past the post’ system in the rest of the United 
Kingdom, was compatible with P1-3. The reason for applying different systems was 
protection of the rights of a minority, and was, hence, justified. The ECmHR 
developed this approach further in Moureaux v Belgium159 by emphasising that States 
may be obliged to take account of the special position of minorities when electors 
choose candidates based on their belonging to an ethnic or linguistic group.  
 
                                                 
 
155 Aziz v Cyprus (n 68). 
 
156 Aziz v Cyprus (n 68) para 30. 
 
157 Aziz v Cyprus (n 68) para 29. 
 
158 Lindsay and others v the United Kingdom (n 31). 
 
159 Moureaux v Belgium (App 9267/81) (1983) 33 DR 114. 
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1.3. The right to stand for elections  
 
International instruments do not impose on States any particular electoral system. 
However, they require States to guarantee the free expression of the electorate. In 
particular, the drawing of electoral boundaries and allocation of votes “should not 
distort the distribution of voters or discriminate against any group and should not 
exclude or restrict unreasonably the right of citizens to choose their representatives 
freely.”160 Moreover, States should avoid disadvantaging minorities by introducing 
changes to the administrative structures of a country.161  
 
Thus, in Istvan Matyus v Slovakia,162 the applicant complained that the number of 
residents per representative in five voting districts in the town of RoñÁava was not 
proportional to the number of inhabitants in the various districts. As a result, there 
was  
one representative per 1,000 residents in district number one; one per 
800 residents in district number two; one per 1,400 residents in district 
number three; one per 200 residents in district number four; and one 
per 200 residents in district number five.163  
 
As a candidate in voting district number three, the applicant claimed that his right to 
political participation was violated because he was not given an equal opportunity to 
exercise his right to be elected to posts in the town council. In its decision, the 
Constitutional Court of Slovakia established that by drawing election districts for the 
                                                 
 
160 General Comment No 25 (n 151) para 21.  
 
161 In addition, States must refrain from measures which may alter the proportions of the population in 
areas inhabited by national minorities, aimed at restricting their rights and freedom under the FCNM: 
see FCNM (n 3) Article 16.  
 
162 Mátyus v Slovakia (Communication no 923/2000) (2002) CCPR/C/75/D/923/2000. 
 
163 Mátyus v Slovakia (n 162) para 2.2. 
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same municipal council with substantial differences between the number of 
inhabitants per elected representative, Slovakia acted contrary to the election law 
specifically requiring proportional representation of inhabitants in voting districts and 
the constitutional provision on equality of voting rights. However, the Constitutional 
Court dismissed the complaint of Mr Matyus because he complained after the 
election; declaring the election invalid could have interfered with the rights of elected 
representatives who acquired their positions in good faith.164 In assessing this claim 
under Article 25 ICCPR, the HRC, taking note of the Constitutional Court’s 
pronouncement and the fact that Slovakia failed to explain the differences in the 
number of representatives per district, found a violation of Article 25 (a) and (c) 
ICCPR.165  
 
Generally, when minorities’ access to standing for elections was barred without 
sufficient procedural guarantees, international courts do not hesitate to find a 
violation. For example, in Antonina Ignatane v Latvia166 and Podkolzina v Latvia167 
both the HRC and the ECtHR respectively found that Latvia breached the applicants’ 
right to stand for election. In both cases, although the applicants successfully passed 
language aptitude tests as required by electoral legislation, they were subjected to 
additional verification of language skills without sufficient procedural safeguards. 
Thus, the full responsibility for assessment of the applicants’ language proficiency 
                                                 
 
164 Mátyus v Slovakia (n 162) para 4.5. 
 
165 Similarly, the ACFC condemned changes introduced to electoral constituencies which negatively 
impacted the political participation of minorities: ‘Second Opinion on the Slovak Republic’ (2006) 
ACFC/OP/II(2005)004, para 115; see also ‘First Opinion on Ukraine’ (2002) 
ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)010, para 69. 
 
166 Antonina Ignatane v Latvia (Communication no 884/1999) (2001) CCPR/C/72/D/884/1999. 
 
167 Podkolzina v Latvia (n 65). 
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was “left to a single civil servant, who had exorbitant power in the matter.”168 This 
procedural aspect of the cases was decisive in finding a violation.169 
 
Despite international courts’ strong stance on procedural guarantees, where the access 
of minorities to standing in elections was barred due to linguistic restrictions, their 
interpretation has been less generous. By way of example, in the inadmissibility 
decision in Fryske Nasjonale Partij and others v the Netherlands,170 the ECmHR 
established that the applicants, whose names had been struck off a list of candidates 
for appearing in a minority language, could not claim a violation of P1-3. In the 
ECmHR’s view the applicants were not as such prevented from standing as 
candidates; it was rather due to problems related to the language in which the 
registration took place. The candidates could simply submit translation of their names 
to the authorities.  
 
                                                 
 
168 Podkolzina v Latvia (n 65) para 36. 
 
169 In addition to procedural guarantees, States must ensure judicial review of acts which may limit the 
right to stand for elections. In Susana Higuchi Miyagawa v Peru ((Case 11.428) (1999) Report no 
119/99), the IACtHR found that Peru violated Article 23 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (n 52). The applicant was prevented from standing for election, because the National Electoral 
Board invalidated the applicant’s registration due to typographical errors detected in the list (para 37). 
Significantly, the decisions of the National Electoral Board were not subject to review. The IACtHR 
found that Peru was obliged to guarantee effective remedies to review its acts which may violate 
political rights as protected under Article 23 ACHR (para 56).    
Moreover, States should not unreasonably limit the right of persons to stand for election by requiring 
candidates to be members of parties or of specific parties (General Comment No 25 (n 151) para 17). 
The IACtHR recently admitted a case of Nasry Javier Ictech Guifarro v Honduras ((Case 2570-02) 
(2007) Report no 30/06) challenging the refusal of Honduras to register the applicant’s independent 
candidacy in the local elections. In its submission, Honduras indicated that the applicant failed to 
submit all necessary documents required by the Electoral and Political Organizations Law; besides the 
law did not permit the registration of independent candidates. Thus, it is to be determined whether the 
IACtHR will consider a State’s refusal to register independent candidates in local elections as a 
violation of the right to political participation. 
 
170 Fryske Nasjonale Partij and others v the Netherlands (App 11100/84) (1985) 45 DR 240. 
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The ECtHR took a similar approach in Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium,171 by 
declaring that Belgium did not violate the political rights of the members of the 
French-speaking minority, who became ineligible for membership in the Flemish 
Community Council because they took their Parliamentary oaths in French. The 
ECtHR ruled that the principle of territoriality was essential to preserve a balance 
between different regions in Belgium, and, therefore, there was no discrimination 
against the applicants; the essence of their right to stand for election and to be elected 
was not violated.172  
 
Belonging to a State’s polity is another argument which States used to justify 
excluding minorities from standing for election. For example, in Ždanoka v Latvia173 
the applicant was permanently disqualified from standing for election because of her 
work for the Communist Party of Latvia (CPL) during Latvia’s transition to 
independence between January and September 1991. The First Section of the ECtHR 
reviewed the proportionality of the applicant’s permanent disqualification from 
standing for election under P1-3 and found that it impaired the essence of the 
applicant’s rights. However, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR reversed this decision 
and ruled that States may impose stricter requirements on eligibility to stand for 
election to Parliament than on the exercise of voting rights.174 Therefore, the ECtHR’s 
review was limited to checking for the absence of arbitrariness in domestic procedures 
                                                 
 
171 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt (n 101). 
 
172 It is noteworthy that the Advisory Committee for the Protection of National Minorities called on 
States to adopt a narrow approach to language proficiency requirements. See, for example, ACFC, 
‘First Opinion on Estonia’ (2001) ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)005, paras 55-60; ‘Second Opinion on 
Estonia’ (2005) ACFC/INF/OP/II(2005)001, paras 163-166.  
 
173 Ždanoka v Latvia (App no 58278/00) (2005) 41 EHRR 31. 
 
174 Ždanoka v Latvia (App no 58278/00) (2007) 45 EHRR 17. 
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to disqualify possible candidates.175 In the view of most of the judges, the applicant’s 
active participation in the CPL rendered logical and proportionate her exclusion from 
standing for a seat in the national Parliament.176 
 
Significantly, the ECtHR’s recent jurisprudence on political participation of 
minorities has been strengthened through more confident application of the principle 
of non-discrimination. This trend has started in Aziz v Cyprus.177 In addition to 
claiming a violation of P1-3 discussed above on page 59, the applicant in Aziz also 
complained that he had been discriminated against in the exercise of his voting rights 
on account of his national origin and association with a national minority, in breach of 
Article 14 ECHR read together with P1-3.178 Since 1964, the Cypriot Government 
had adopted laws which benefited the Greek Cypriots only, without safeguarding the 
rights of Turkish Cypriots. As a result, the applicant and thousands of other Turkish 
Cypriots were deprived of their right to vote or stand for election.179 The Government 
rejected these claims on the ground that the applicant was not in a comparable 
situation to voters who belonged to the Greek Cypriot community.180 The ECtHR 
concluded that there was no reasonable and objective justification for the differential 
treatment of Turkish Cypriots and found a separate breach of Article 14 in 
conjunction with P1-3. 
 
                                                 
 
175 Ždanoka v Latvia (n 174) para 115 (e). 
 
176 Ždanoka v Latvia (n 174) para 132. 
 
177 Aziz v Cyprus (n 68). 
 
178 Aziz v Cyprus (n 68) para 31. 
 
179 Aziz v Cyprus (n 68) para 32. 
 
180 Aziz v Cyprus (n 68) para 33. 
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Even more far-reaching conclusions regarding political participation of minorities 
stem from the recent cases of Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina,181 which 
allowed the ECtHR to crystallise its case law on non-discrimination under Article 14 
ECHR read in conjunction with P1-3. The cases concern the compatibility with the 
ECHR rights of the domestic legislation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which prevents 
persons not belonging to one of the three constituent peoples (Bosnians, Serbs and 
Croats) from standing for election to the Presidency and the House of Peoples of the 
Parliamentary Assembly.   
 
In its assessment, the ECtHR observed that eligibility to stand for election for the 
House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on affiliation with one of the 
‘constituent people’. Even though the exclusion pursued a legitimate aim of restoring 
peace in line with the preamble to the ECHR, the maintenance of the system did not 
satisfy the requirement of proportionality, based on the following reasons. First, the 
situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina has significantly improved since the Dayton 
Peace Agreement and the aim of restoring peace was not as pressing anymore.182 
Second, even though the ECHR does not prescribe a particular electoral system, there 
exist mechanisms of power-sharing which would not automatically lead to the total 
exclusion of persons belonging to the 23 legally recognised national minorities or of a 
person who does not want to identify himself as exclusively Bosnian, Croat or Serb, 
or refuses to so identify himself or herself for whatever reason.183 Accordingly, there 
                                                 
 
181 Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina (n 55). 
 
182 The State joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 2006, signed and ratified a Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement with the European Union in 2008, successfully amended its Constitution in 
2009 and was recently elected as a member of the UN Security Council for a two-year term. 
Furthermore, preparations are under way for the closure of an international administration as an 
enforcement measure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
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was the possibility of achieving the same end by using alternative means. Finally, as a 
member of the Council of Europe and a candidate for EU membership, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has voluntarily assumed certain obligations, including revision of its 
electoral legislation.184 Based on these considerations, the ECtHR concluded that the 
applicants’ continued ineligibility to stand for election to the House of Peoples of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina lacked an objective and reasonable justification and 
constituted a breach of Article 14 taken together with P1-3. In addition, the ECtHR 
found that an identical constitutional pre-condition concerning eligibility to stand for 
election to the Presidency violated Article 1 of Protocol 12. 
 
The case advances the right of minorities to political participation in several respects. 
First, as discussed in the section on non-discrimination on pages 27 and 49, Article 1 
of Protocol 12 widens the application of the principle of non-discrimination. In this 
case it condemns discrimination against minorities in political participation not only 
in the elected legislature, i.e., the right protected under P1-3, but also in other officies, 
such as the Presidency.185 Moreover, the ECtHR granted the State only a narrow 
margin of discretion, despite the Government’s suggestion that the ECtHR should 
follow Ždanoka v Latvia in order to reaffirm States’ considerable latitude in 
                                                                                                                                            
183 Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina (n 55) para 22. This point is well illustrated in the 
opinion of the Opinions of the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice 
Commission). The Venice Commission is the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional 
matters. 
 
184 Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina (n 55) para 49. Thus, by ratifying the ECHR and its 
Protocols, the State agreed to meet the relevant standards. Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
committed itself to review (with the assistance of the Venice Commission) its electoral legislation and 
revise it where necessary to comply with the Council of Europe standards within one year of its 
accession. This commitment is reaffirmed in the 2008 Stabilization and Association Agreement with 
the EU. 
 
185 Judge Mijovic has even questioned the application of Article 3 of Protocol 1 to elections to the 
House of Peoples, because in his view, members of this House are not elected, but designated/selected 
by the entity Parliaments: Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina (n 55) Partly concurring and 
partly dissenting opinion of Judge Mijovic, joined by Judge Hajiyev.  
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establishing electoral systems within their constitutional order and distinguish the case 
from Aziz v Cyprus, because minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina have not been 
prevented from standing for election in all bodies. Furthermore, despite Judge 
Bonello’s strong criticism,186 the ECtHR was not influenced by the historic and 
political circumstances leading to the establishment of the current electoral system in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; instead, it focused on the State’s firm commitments to 
review its electoral legislation and guarantee political participation of minorities in 
line with Council of Europe standards.   
 
Accordingly, the potential of the principle of non-discrimination to guarantee political 
participation of minorities is becoming increasingly significant. These developments 
may bring the ECtHR’s case law in line with the jurisprudence of other international 
and regional quasi-judicial bodies. Thus, the HRC has been more generous in its 
interpretation of the right to stand for election by requiring States to avoid excluding 
persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election using unreasonable or 
discriminatory requirements such as descent, or by reason of political affiliation.187  
 
Similarly, the ACFC has attached a high significance to non-discrimination in 
connection with political participation by regarding Articles 15, 4 and 5 “as the three 
corners of a triangle which together form the main foundations of the Framework 
                                                 
 
186 Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina (n 55) Dissenting opinion of Judge Bonello. 
 
187 General Comment No 25 (n 151) para 15. Likewise, in Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia 
(Communication no 211/98) (2001), the African Commission was less forgiving of Zambia’s exclusion 
of 35% of the population from standing for the office of the president by imposing the requirement of 
Zambian descent. The African Commission found a violation of Article 13 of the African Charter (n 
52), because not only did the Government violate the right of individuals to stand for election, but also 
it breached the right of citizens to freely choose political representatives of their choice (para 72).  
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Convention.”188 This is so because equal treatment of minorities in political 
participation may ensure that their concerns about preservation and development of 
their identity can be heard and considered.189 In addition, Article 15 FCNM requires 
States to create conditions conducive to minorities’ political participation, in 
particular on those issues that affect them. Therefore, representation of minorities in 
consultative and decision-making processes is essential to guarantee that they have a 
say in matters of particular concern connected with preservation of their identity. In 
this regard, the ACFC assesses the ‘effectiveness’ of minority participation by 
examining not only the means adopted by States to ensure political participation, but 
also “their impact on the situation of the persons concerned and on the society as a 
whole.”190 Accordingly, to comply with the FCNM, States have to ensure effective 
participation of national minorities under Article 15 FCNM by enacting relevant 
legislation and allowing minorities to have a substantial influence on the decisions 
made, including, where relevant, shared ownership of adopted decisions.191 
 
1.4. Conclusions 
 
The right to vote and stand for elections is essential for political participation of 
minorities. International and regional courts and quasi-judicial bodies have enhanced 
the protection of this right by condemning legislative gaps depriving minorities of 
opportunities (or limiting their ability) to express their opinion in the choice of a 
                                                 
188 ACFC, ‘Commentary on the Effective Participation of Persons Belonging to National Minorities in 
Cultural, Social and Economic Life and in Public Affairs’ (2008) ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, para 13. 
 
189 ACFC, ‘Commentary on the Effective Participation…’ (n 188) para 15. 
 
190 ACFC, ‘Commentary on the Effective Participation…’ (n 188) para 18. 
 
191 ACFC, ‘Commentary on the Effective Participation…’ (n 188) para 19. 
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legislature or to have an effective say in matters of particular concern to the group, 
such as in Aziz v Cyprus. The jurisprudence of international courts and quasi-judicial 
bodies suggests that cases challenging procedural irregularities, such as the number of 
representatives per district or a requirement of additional verification of language 
skills without sufficient procedural safeguards, proved to be successful in protecting 
the rights of members of minority groups to stand for election.  
 
Regrettably, courts have not attached similarly high importance to the use of minority 
languages in the exercise of political rights. Furthermore, there is no requirement to 
accommodate the political participation of minorities through a specific electoral 
system. In this regard, the FCNM is highly commendable for demanding States to 
ensure conditions necessary for effective participation of minorities.  
 
Currently, the main tool to advance the rights of minorities to political participation is 
more effective use of the principle of non-discrimination. As exemplified by Sejdić 
and Finci, Protocol 12 ECHR may prove a useful tool to ensure equal treatment of 
minorities in the exercise of political rights. However, on its own the principle of non-
discrimination is not sufficient to fully guarantee political participation of minorities 
and some positive State action is essential for the meaningful exercise of this right, as 
required by Article 15 FCNM. 
 
2. Freedom to manifest religion: religious dress 
 
This section is devoted to the right of minorities to manifest their religion, with the 
focus on religious dress. First, relevant provisions in international treaties on freedom 
to manifest religion are discussed (2.1). Second, the term ‘manifestation of religion’ is 
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analysed in the context of international courts’ case law (3.2). We will then turn to the 
ECtHR and the HRC’s specific headscarf-cases in educational establishments (3.3). 
The section concludes with parental rights in education, to determine whether parents 
may request schools to permit their children to wear religious dress (3.4).  
 
2.1. Relevant provisions on freedom to manifest religion  
 
International instruments differentiate between freedom of religion or belief and the 
right to manifest religious beliefs. Thus, Article 9(1) ECHR stipulates the right of 
everyone to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which includes freedom to 
change his/her religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest one’s religion or belief, in worship, 
teaching, practice and observance. The passive aspect of freedom of religion, referred 
as forum internum, is protected in its entirety. Article 9(2) then clarifies that 
manifesting a religion or belief, i.e., an active aspect of freedom of religion also 
referred as forum externum, may be subject to limitations. Freedom to manifest one’s 
religion or belief can be limited in the interests of public safety, for the protection of 
public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
These limitations must be prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. 
 
Article 18 ICCPR largely replicates Article 9 ECHR. Thus, paragraph 1 of the 
provision outlines freedom of religion, whereas paragraph 3 stipulates that limitations 
must be prescribed by law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or 
morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Significantly, paragraph 2 
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specifies that ‘[n]o one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom 
to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.’192  
 
As to freedom of religion as specifically a minority right, Article 27 ICCPR stipulates 
that minorities will not be denied the right, in community with the other members of 
their group, to profess and practise their own religion. In the light of Article 18 
ICCPR, it may be questioned whether Article 27 ICCPR really adds anything to the 
protection of religious minorities. The answer to this question should be in the 
affirmative in order not to render Article 27 meaningless. Article 27 ICCPR 
establishes the basic standard in the field of minority rights and implies a requirement 
of positive State action193 to allow a minority group to profess and practice its religion 
without discrimination. Another question that may arise in this regard is whether, in 
the absence of a limitation clause in Article 27 ICCPR, the manifestation of a 
minority religion may be limited in line with Article 18(3) ICCPR. Although some 
practices, such as human sacrifices and genital mutilation, can be legitimately 
restricted in a democratic society as violating other fundamental rights, such as the 
right to life194 and freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment,195 religious dress 
of minorities should not be subject to such limitations. 
                                                
 
 
192 Freedom of religion is also guaranteed in a non-legally binding UN Declaration on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (1981) A/RES/36/55, 
Articles 1 and 8; Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 
A(III) (UDHR) Article 18. In the Inter-American contexts, American Convention on Human Rights (n 
52) largely repeats Article 18 ICCPR in its Article 12. Furthermore, Article 8 of the African Charter (n 
52) guarantees freedom of conscience, and the profession and free practice of religion; the exercise of 
these freedoms must be subject to law and order. 
 
193 General Comment No 23 (n 51) para 4. 
 
194 Article 6 ICCPR (n 17). 
 
195 Article 7 ICCPR (n 17). 
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Similarly, Article 7 FCNM guarantees national minorities freedom of religion. In 
addition, to emphasise the significance of forum externum in the exercise of religious 
rights, Article 8 FCNM is specifically devoted to the right of national minorities to 
manifest religion. Like Article 27 ICCPR, Article 8 FCNM does not contain any 
limitations on manifestation of religion. However, the travaux preparatoires of the 
FCNM suggests that Articles 7 and 8 FCNM were phrased as principles and hence did 
not include specific details. As a result, Article 19 FCNM and the explanatory note to 
the FCNM clarify that the same limitations as in Article 9(2) ECHR apply to freedom 
of religion under this instrument.196 The explanatory note to the FCNM also specifies 
that everyone is entitled to manifest his or her religion, and national minorities should 
be able to enjoy this right without discrimination under Article 4 FCNM. In its 
practice, the ACFC insisted on the exercise of this right without discrimination.197 
Once again, the principle of non-discrimination is central to the enjoyment of 
minority rights, including freedom to manifest religion.  
 
2.2. Defining ‘Manifestation of religion’ 
 
Before we overview the jurisprudence of international courts on religious dress, it 
may be useful to define the term ‘manifestation’. The freedom to manifest religion or 
belief takes place in worship, observance, practice and teaching, which encompasses a 
broad range of acts. Thus, ‘worship’ extends to  
ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to belief, as well as 
various practices integral to such acts, including the building of places 
                                                 
 
196 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory report, 
H(1995)010, 18 <http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/minorities/2._framework_convention_%28moni 
toring%29/1._texts/PDF_H(1995)010%20FCNM_ExplanatoryReport_en.pdf> accessed 30 June 2008.  
 
197 ACFC, ‘First Opinion on Armenia’ (2002) ACFC/OP/I(2003)003, para 43. 
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of worship, the use of ritual formulae and objects, the display of 
symbols, and the observance of holidays and days of rest.198  
 
The term ‘observance’ has not been clearly defined in the jurisprudence of courts and 
quasi-judicial bodies. For example in Jewish Liturgical Association Cha’are Shalom 
Ve Tsedek v France,199 the applicant argued that by refusing to authorise the 
performance of ritual slaughter by this association and by granting such a permit to 
the Jewish Consistorial Association of Paris only, France infringed in a discriminatory 
way its right to manifest religion through observance of the rites of the Jewish 
religion. In dealing with the term ‘observance’, the ECtHR simply noted that  
[i]t is not contested that ritual slaughter, as indeed its name indicates, 
constitutes a rite or “rite” (the word in the French text of the 
Convention corresponding to “observance” in the English)…200 
 
Furthermore, in Manoussakis and others v Greece,201 the ECtHR included the term 
‘observance’ in the notion of ‘worship’. It found that Greece interfered with the 
applicants’ freedom to manifest their religion in worship and observance by 
prosecuting several Jehovah’s Witnesses who set up a place of worship without a 
governmental permit.  
 
In a similar vein, the HRC deals with the practice and teaching of religion or belief 
together. In the HRC’s view these include  
acts integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, 
such as the freedom to choose their religious leaders, priests and 
                                                 
 
198 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 22: The right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion (Article 18) (1993) CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para 4. See also Kuznetsov and others v 
Russia (App no 184/02) ECHR 11 January 2007. 
 
199 Jewish Liturgical Association (n 66). 
 
200 Jewish Liturgical Association (n 66) para 73. 
 
201 Manoussakis and others v Greece (App no 18748/91) ECHR 26 September 1996. 
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teachers, the freedom to establish seminaries or religious schools and 
the freedom to prepare and distribute religious texts or publications.202  
 
The ECtHR dealt with the term ‘teaching’ in Kokkinakis v Greece,203  where the 
applicant claimed that by convicting him for proselytism, Greece violated his freedom 
to manifest religion through teaching. The ECtHR stated that Article 9  
includes in principle the right to try to convince one’s neighbour, for 
example through ‘teaching’, failing which, moreover, ‘freedom to 
change [one’s] religion or belief’, enshrined in Article 9 …, would be 
likely to remain a dead letter.204  
 
Due to its wide scope, the term most difficult to define under Article 9 ECHR has 
proved to be ‘practice’. Thus, in Arrowsmith v the United Kingdom205  concerning a 
pacifist handing leaflets to soldiers urging them not to go to Northern Ireland, the 
ECmHR attempted to differentiate between ‘practice’ in the sense of Article 9 ECHR 
and a broad range of acts simply inspired or motivated by a religion. As a result, the 
Convention bodies have developed an additional limitation to the freedom to manifest 
religion by insisting that Article 9 does not protect “every act motivated or inspired by 
a religion or belief and does not in all cases guarantee the right to behave in the public 
sphere in a way which is dictated by a belief.”206 Thus, a ‘practice’ under Article 9 
ECHR requires a direct link between the belief and the action. For example, in 
Valsamis v Greece,207 punishment of a schoolgirl’s refusal, influenced by her 
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religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness, to attend a school parade was not sufficient 
to constitute a violation of Article 9(1), because such behaviour was not required, but 
merely encouraged by her religion.208 In its case law, the ECtHR has read a further 
limitation in relation to manifestation of religion, referred as the ‘specific situation’ 
rule. Thus, according to the ECtHR, individuals’ freedom to manifest their religion is 
not limited if they can alter their circumstances, for example, by quitting a job which 
does not accommodate their religious practices.209 Moreover, an alternative means of 
exercising freedom of religion must be impossible before the ECtHR would find a 
violation.210  
 
In the ECtHR’s view these restrictions on freedom to manifest one’s religion may be 
necessary in a democratic society where several religions coexist within one and the 
same population.211 In this respect, the ECtHR has often emphasised the role of a 
State as the neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions and the 
guarantor of public order, religious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society. A 
State, however, does not have any power to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs 
or the ways in which they are expressed.212 Thus, the role of a State is to ensure 
mutual tolerance of various groups and not to remove the cause of tension between 
                                                 
208 Valsamis v Greece (n 207) para 22; Efstratiou v Greece (n 207) para 23. 
 
209 X v Denmark (App no 7374/76) (1976) 5 DR 157; Ahmad v United Kingdom (App no 8160/78) 
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the groups by eliminating pluralism.213 Although these principles suggest that 
individual interests may on occasion be subordinated to those of a group,  
democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority must 
always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and 
proper treatment of people from minorities and avoids any abuse of a 
dominant position.214  
 
The ECtHR in its supervisory capacity determines whether national measures were 
justified in principle and proportionate. Such assessment usually includes three 
considerations, i.e., whether the interference 1. was prescribed by law; 2. pursued a 
legitimate aim; and 3. was necessary in a democratic society. As to the last criterion, 
considering that there is no uniform conception of religion and its significance in 
society throughout Europe,215 and the meaning or impact of manifesting religion in 
public may differ according to time and context,216 the ECtHR grants a wide margin 
of discretion to States in the choice of the extent and form of regulating manifestation 
of religion in the specific domestic situation.217  
 
2.3. Head-scarf case-law 
 
To date, one of the most prominent headscarf-cases remains Şahin v Turkey.218 The 
case concerns a Turkish University student excluded from attending classes and 
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taking exams for wearing a headscarf. In deciding this case, first the Chamber 
(unanimously) and then the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR (16 votes to 1) found that 
the applicant’s right to manifest her religion was violated under Article 9(1) ECHR. 
However, the interference with her right was justified under Article 9(2), because it 
was in accordance with law, pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of 
others and public order and was necessary in a democratic society where several 
religions coexist within one society; hence, restrictions may be placed on “freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or belief in order to reconcile the interests of the various 
groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected.”219 The rationale behind this 
conclusion was that in the secular Muslim-majority Turkey, the mere wearing of a 
headscarf was capable of having a proselytising effect. The Court accepted Turkey’s 
justifications based on the principles of secularism and gender equality, and found 
that the interference with the applicant’s freedom to wear religious dress in a public 
space was justified.  
 
Only Judge Tulkens dissented from the majority decision in the Grand Chamber. She 
argued that the interference could not be justified under Article 9(2) ECHR, because it 
was not necessary in a democratic society. In particular, she emphasised the need to 
harmonise the ‘principles of secularism, equality and liberty, not to weigh one against 
the other.’ Where secularism is concerned, she maintained that the fact that the Grand 
Chamber recognised the force of this principle  
did not release it from its obligation to establish that the ban on 
wearing the Islamic headscarf to which the applicant was subject was 
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necessary to secure compliance with that principle and, therefore, met 
a ‘pressing social need’.220 
 
As to gender equality, she was unable to see ‘how the principle of sexual equality can 
justify prohibiting a woman from following a practice which, in the absence of proof 
to the contrary, she must be taken to have freely adopted.’ Moreover, in her view, the 
ECtHR granted too wide margin of discretion to Turkey. This matter was not a local 
matter anymore, because similar disputes, contesting the right to manifest a religion, 
had come before the courts in several European States. Therefore, there was a need 
for European supervision.  
 
In its reasoning in Şahin, the majority of judges heavily relied on Karaduman v 
Turkey221 and Dahlab v Switzerland.222 Karaduman concerned a Muslim student who 
did not receive her degree certificate for two years because she refused to supply an 
identity photograph showing her bare-headed, which she claimed was contrary to her 
religious beliefs. The ECmHR found that there was no interference with Article 9(1) 
ECHR, because the purpose of the photograph was to identify the person concerned 
and it could not be used by an individual to manifest her religious beliefs. Hence, 
Article 9(1) ECHR did not apply to this situation.223    
 
Dahlab concerned a school teacher’s complaint that the State interfered with her 
freedom of religion by dismissing her from the job for wearing a headscarf, even 
                                                 
220 Dissenting opinion of Judge Tulkens in Şahin v Turkey (n 218). 
 
221 Karaduman v Turkey (App no 16278/90) (1993) 74 DR 93. 
 
222 Dahlab v Switzerland (n 216). 
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though there were no complaints from children or their parents. The ECtHR found the 
application inadmissible, because this interference was necessary in a democratic 
society and was justified under Article 9(2) on the grounds of protecting the rights and 
freedoms of others, public order and public safety,224 because Ms Dahlab taught very 
young children who could be easily influenced by such a manifestation.225 Arguably, 
because as a teacher Ms Dahlab represented the State and was in the position of 
authority towards the very young children, aged four to eight, that she taught, this 
case should be distinguished from Karaduman and Şahin,  
 
Indeed, holding a position of authority has proved to be of crucial significance in 
international courts’ jurisprudence. For example, in Lariss v Greece,226 the ECtHR 
did not find a violation of Article 9 ECHR, because the applicant was an officer in the 
Greek army, who sought to proselytise his subordinates. Similarly, in Delgado 
Paez,227 the HRC found that dismissal of a teacher of religion and ethics for 
advocating his own views on religion among pupils did not violate Article 18 ICCPR, 
because he used his superior position to influence children’s religious views. In 
contrast, lack of a superior position on the part of a proselytiser led the ECtHR to find 
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a violation of Article 9, such as in Kokkinakis v Greece,228 where the applicant’s 
conviction for proselytising others was found to infringe his rights under Article 9 
ECHR.  
 
Accordingly, even if the ECtHR could find an element of superior position in Dahlab 
(if not of indoctrination), and, hence, accept Switzerland’s justifications under Article 
9(2), this factor was not present in Karaduman and Şahin which concerned university 
students; clearly, the applicants were not in a position of authority towards their peers 
and did not represent a State. Regrettably, the arguments drawing on a distinction 
between the secularity as a constitutional principle requiring the government to be 
neutral towards religions, and an individual’s wearing a particular dress to take part in 
a religious practice which does not infringe upon the State’s secularity,229 fell on deaf 
ears in the case of the Convention institutions.  
 
Consequently, the ECtHR’s approach to manifestation of religion in educational 
establishments is rather restrictive. The Court continues to apply the same line of 
reasoning as in Şahin in its latest case law, without any hint at a change of direction. 
In 2006, the ECtHR declared inadmissible three ‘headscarf’ cases against Turkey. 
Emine Araç v Turkey230 concerned rejection of an application for university because 
the applicant was in her headscarf in the accompanying photo. In Şefika Köse and 93 
others v Turkey,231 the ECtHR found that a headscarf ban in a second level school 
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providing theological training did not violate Article 9 ECHR; nor did the ECtHR 
accept the arguments of a university lecturer in Kurtulmuş v Turkey,232 who lost her 
job after refusing to remove her headscarf. 
 
Moreover, the ECtHR has recently affirmed the principles established in Şahin in the 
context of secular France in its identical judgments in Dogru v France233 and 
Kervanci v France.234 Dogru concerned the case of a Muslim girl, expelled from 
school for her failure to comply with teachers’ instructions to remove her headscarf 
whilst at school.235 The applicant’s parents appealed against the school’s decision; 
however, French national courts repeatedly rejected their application, explaining that 
by not complying with instructions, Ms Dogru “overstepped the limits of the right to 
express and manifest her religious beliefs on the school premises.”236 The applicant 
claimed violation of her rights under Article 9 ECHR before the ECtHR.  
 
In its assessment, the ECtHR established that the ban on wearing a headscarf during 
sports classes and the expulsion of Ms Dogru from school for refusing to remove it 
constituted interference with her freedom of religion under Article 9(1). It then 
proceeded to determine whether such interference was justified under Article 9(2). 
First, the ECtHR found that the criterion of ‘prescribed by law’ was satisfied. Because 
the facts of the case took place in 1999, the Court considered that case law of the 
Conseil d’État comprised the relevant legal framework. In this way, the ECtHR 
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avoided dealing with the highly controversial and widely criticised 2004 French ban 
on religious symbols in public schools. The ECtHR further noted that the interference 
pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and public 
order. Where the criterion of necessity in a democratic society is concerned, the 
ECtHR recapitulated its case law237 to reiterate that to protect the rights of others 
States may impose limitations on the exercise of freedom of religion. Furthermore, the 
Court repeatedly emphasised the role of national decision-making bodies and States’ 
wide margin of appreciation in regulating the wearing of religious dress in educational 
establishments.238 The ECtHR also observed that as in Turkey and Switzerland, 
secularism is a constitutional principle in France and an attitude which “fails to 
respect that principle will not necessarily be accepted as being covered by the 
freedom to manifest one’s religion and will not enjoy the protection of Article 9 of the 
Convention.”239 Consequently, the interference with the applicant’s right was justified 
under Article 9(2).  
 
The ECtHR has recently dealt with the 2004 French law banning wearing of 
conspicuous religious symbols in public schools. In 2009, the ECtHR declared 
inadmissible several cases against France, which concerned the expulsion of pupils 
from school for wearing religious dress. Thus, in Aktas v France,240 Bayrak v 
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France,241 Gamaleddyn v France,242 and Ghazal v France243, the girls, who were 
Muslims and wore headscarves, were banned from public schools for wearing 
conspicuous religious dress.244 The ECtHR found that there was no violation of 
Article 9 ECHR, because the restriction was provided by the law of 15 March 2004 
and restated in Article L.141-5-1 of the Education Code, which pursued the legitimate 
aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others and public order. The ECtHR 
emphasised the importance of the State’s role as the neutral and impartial organiser of 
exercise of various religions. Furthermore, the ban on all conspicuous religious dress 
was based on the constitutional principle of secularism, which was, in the Court’s 
view, consistent with the values protected under the ECHR and its case law. Since the 
interference by the authorities with the pupils’ freedom to manifest their religion was 
justified and proportionate, the applications were rejected as manifestly ill-founded. 
The ECtHR also rejected the claims of discrimination under Article 14 in conjunction 
with Article 9 ECHR as manifestly ill-founded, because French law applied to all 
conspicuous religious symbols.  
 
The above overview of the ECtHR’s case law reveals that individuals practicing 
minority religions may suffer adverse treatment in education because they may be 
excluded from educational activities for dressing in accordance with their religious 
beliefs. Furthermore, the ECtHR’s approach in the headscarf cases seems to disregard 
the notion of indirect discrimination, as the Court fails to assess the disproportionate 
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effect of neutral rules on religious minorities. Overall, the ECtHR’s headscarf case 
law is disappointing, because the Court deals with these cases under Article 9 ECHR 
only and has refused to consider the applicants’ claims under Article 14 ECHR on 
non-discrimination read in conjunction with Article 9 ECHR, or has dealt with these 
claims inadequately. Although the ECHR does not contain special minority rights, the 
ECtHR has consistently taken into consideration the needs of minorities in other 
contexts.245 It is essential that the Court adopts a similar approach to the right of 
minorities to manifest their religious dress. This could be done through granting 
States a narrower margin of discretion in such cases, because these matters cannot be 
considered domestic any longer, and have a clear trans-European dimension.  
 
The ECtHR’s case law contrasts starkly with the HRC’s decision in Hudoyberganova 
v Uzbekistan.246 The applicant, a university student was stopped from wearing a 
headscarf to a public university. She was first excluded from attending the university 
and subsequently expelled pursuant to Article 14 of Law on Liberty of Conscience 
and Religious Organisations, explicitly banning wearing religious dress in public 
places. She brought a claim before the HRC and alleged that Uzbekistan violated her 
freedom of religion under Article 18 ICCPR.  
 
In its assessment, the HRC first emphasised that the freedom to manifest a religion 
encompasses wearing religious dress in public. Furthermore, it considered that to 
“prevent a person from wearing religious clothing in public or private may constitute 
a violation of article 18, paragraph 2, which prohibits any coercion that would impair 
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the individual’s freedom to have or adopt a religion.”247 The HRC has already 
affirmed this approach in its General Comment on freedom of religion: policies or 
practices intended to coerce individuals based on their beliefs, such as restricting 
access to education, are inconsistent with Article 18(2).248  
 
The HRC found that by imposing such limitation, Uzbekistan violated Article 18(2) 
ICCPR on freedom of religion, because the State failed to justify this ban on the 
permitted grounds under Article 18(3). The HRC emphasised that this finding is 
without either prejudging the right of a State party to limit expressions 
of religion and belief in the context of [A]rticle 18 of the Covenant and 
duly taking into account the specifics of the context, or prejudging the 
right of academic institutions to adopt specific regulations relating to 
their own functioning.249 
 
In her individual opinion, Ruth Wedgwood drew attention to the fact that some States 
allow any type of religious dress, including covering of one’s face, while others ban 
such attire based on the principle of secularism. She further emphasised that covering 
the face may prevent a university instructor from seeing students’ reaction to a lecture 
or seminar. Therefore, States may be permitted to ‘restrict forms of dress that directly 
interfere with effective pedagogy.’ However, the State had not advanced this 
argument and the individual opinion should not make a case for the State.  
 
Furthermore, dissenting committee member, Hipolito Solari-Yrigoyen argued that 
Uzbekistan did not violate the applicant’s rights because the ban was imposed on all 
students. A state university is not a place of worship, and, therefore, imposing of 
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limitations on the manifestation of religion was legitimate. In Solari-Yrigoyen’s view, 
‘academic institutions have the right to adopt specific rules to govern their own 
premises.’ He also emphasised that the applicant failed to rebut the assertion by the 
Committee of Religious Affairs (Cabinet of Ministers), who “informed [her] that 
Islam does not prescribe a specific cult dress.”250 
 
It is hard to agree with the dissenting opinion for several reasons. First, the case 
concerned an individual wishing to wear religious dress, not the right of an academic 
institution to govern its premises. The fact that individuals may manifest their 
religions does not mean that the university automatically subscribes to their beliefs.251 
Second, individuals should be free to interpret their beliefs and dress in accordance 
with the dictates of their faith. It is not up to a government representative to have an 
authoritative say in this matter.  
 
Despite the overall positive outcome of the case for the applicant, this dissent 
indicates that most likely the outcome of the case would be similar to that in Şahin 
were the government to provide justification under Article 18(3). Nevertheless, this 
case demonstrates that the HRC’s interpretation of Article 18(2) ICCPR could 
preclude coercion based on religion, for example, through denial of access to 
education. It is hoped that the HRC may use this provision to its fullest potential to 
safeguard the right of religious minorities to wear in educational establishments dress 
dictated by their religious beliefs. As the case law of the ECtHR on religious dress 
revealed, individuals practicing minority religions may often be subjected to 
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exclusion from educational activities for dressing in accordance with their religious 
beliefs.  
 
The next sub-section overviews parental rights in education to establish whether these 
rights add anything to the protection of minority children’s right to manifest their 
religion by dressing in educational establishments in clothes required by their faith. 
 
2.4. Parental rights in education 
 
The parental right to choose education for their children in line with their religious 
and philosophical convictions is protected under Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR 
(P1-2) and Article 18(4) ICCPR.252 Generally, according to the jurisprudence of 
international and quasi-judicial bodies, matters concerning teaching or curricula are 
within States’ margin of discretion.253 In the Danish Sex Education case, the ECtHR 
ruled that “the setting and planning of the curriculum fall in principle within the 
competence of the Contracting States.”254 This, the Court said, was necessary for the 
purposes of expediency and may vary depending on the country and the era. 
Moreover, States may impart knowledge that directly or indirectly may be of religious 
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or philosophical nature. Furthermore, parents are precluded from objecting to 
integration of such subjects into the school curricula;  “otherwise all institutionalised 
teaching would run the risk of proving impracticable.”255 Therefore, the ECtHR did 
not find a violation of P1-2 in this case. 
 
The ECtHR’s main restriction on State activity concerns prohibition of unwanted 
indoctrination by States in matters of the curriculum;256 for example, in Folgerø v 
Norway257 and Hasan and Eylem Zengin v Turkey258 the ECtHR found a violation of 
P1-2, because the educational curricula of the States concerned accorded a greater 
weight to teaching the mainstream religions. Likewise, in Delgado Paez,259 the HRC 
found no violation of the author’s rights under Article 18 ICCPR. The author of the 
communication was dismissed from his job because he advocated progressive 
religious views different from the traditional Roman Catholic religion. As a teacher of 
religion he should have respected parental wishes to educate their children in line with 
their religious views. 
 
In the light of the above-discussed jurisprudence, it is likely that if parents’ religious 
beliefs differ from those taught in public schools, upon parental request, children are 
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likely to be exempt from religious education, although not all their wishes may be 
satisfied. For example, children may be required to attend classes on the general 
history of religion and ethics provided that they are taught in an “unbiased and 
objective way, respectful of the freedoms of opinion, conscience and expression.”260  
 
Also, to be exempt from certain school activities there should be a direct link between 
the act and a belief. Thus, in Efstratiou v Greece and Valsamis v Greece261 the 
applicants’ children were Jehovah’s Witnesses who refused to associate themselves 
with any kind of violence, even indirectly. Therefore, upon their parents’ request the 
children were exempt from attending the school’s religious-education lessons and 
Orthodox Mass. This exemption, however, did not apply to the requirement of taking 
part in the celebration of the National Day, which commemorated the outbreak of war 
between Greece and Fascist Italy with school and military parades. Having failed to 
attend the parade, the children of the applicants were punished with suspension from 
school for a period of 1-2 days. The parents alleged a violation of P1-2, because their 
children should not be subjected to attending “events extolling patriotic ideals to 
which they did not subscribe.”262 The ECtHR ruled that States were not precluded 
from including in the school curriculum the requirement to parade. Moreover, 
although parents could exempt their children from certain religious activities, P1-2 did 
not require the State to guarantee all their wishes. Noting States’ wide margin of 
discretion in designing the curriculum and the mild punishment of the children, the 
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education (Art. 13)’ (1999) E/C.12/1999/10, para 28. See also Hartikainen v Finland (Communication 
no 40/1978) (1981) CCPR/C/OP/1. 
 
261 Valsamis v Greece (n 207); Efstratiou v Greece (n 207). 
 
262 Valsamis v Greece (n 207) para 22, Efstratiou v Greece (n 207) para 23. 
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Court did not find a violation of P1-2.263 Accordingly, States have a wide margin of 
discretion in matters concerning education.  
 
Where a school uniform is concerned, in Stevens v the United Kingdom,264 the 
ECmHR declared inadmissible the application of a mother who claimed that 
punishment of her son for failing to wear a school tie interfered with their right to 
family life under Article 8 ECHR. It is likely that a similar approach would be 
adopted by the ECtHR were a claim brought by parents wishing their children to dress 
in religious clothes under P1-2 or Article 9. 
 
Thus, analysis of the jurisprudence of international courts and bodies on freedom of 
religion and the parental right to ensure education in line with their religious beliefs 
reveals that any claim by parents that their children should dress in accordance with a 
family’s religious beliefs is unlikely to succeed.  
 
2.5. Conclusions 
 
Freedom of religion has two aspects – internal and external. Whilst internal beliefs are 
protected without limitations, external manifestation of religion is subject to 
limitations as set out in Articles 9(2) ECHR and 18(3) ICCPR. In addition, the ECtHR 
                                                 
 
263 The ECtHR expressed its surprise that ‘pupils can be required on pain of suspension from school – 
even if only for two days – to parade outside the school precincts on a holiday.’ The Court, however, 
refused to ‘rule on the Greek State’s decisions as regards the setting and planning of the school 
curriculum.’ This approach may be explained by the voluntary nature of CoE membership: the ECtHR 
abstains from interfering with matters of political significance for a country. This approach may be 
contrasted to that taken by the Supreme Court of the Philippines that exempted children who are 
Jehovah’s Witnesses from participating in the flag ceremony. Ebralinag v The Division Superintendent 
of Schools of Cebu (G.R.Nos 95770 and 95887) 1 March 1993 and 29 December 1995. 
 
264 Stevens v UK (App no 11674/85) (1986) 46 DR 245. 
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has read implied limitations into the assessment of claims under Article 9, insisting 
that there must be a direct link between the belief and its manifestation. This, in turn, 
has the potential of excluding minority religions or minority-in-minority situations. 
 
The ECtHR’s stance on limiting manifestations of religion has been particularly 
strong in the headscarf-cases. The Court uncritically accepted the relevant 
governments’ arguments on secularism and gender equality at face value. In the 
context of Turkey, the ECtHR took into account the political atmosphere and the 
impact that wearing a headscarf may have in a Muslim-majority country. 
Subsequently, the Court mechanically applied the same restrictive approach in the 
context of France.  
 
Nor do parental rights to influence the upbringing of their children add anything to the 
ability of minority children to manifest their religion in educational establishments. 
To make the organisation of education practical, States are granted a wide margin of 
discretion; moreover, States may enact rules that may limit the manifestation of 
religion to protect the rights of other believers. Overall, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on 
religious dress in educational establishments is unsatisfactory. 
 
In contrast, the ICCPR has more potential in this respect. This is not only because of 
the positive outcome in Hudoyberganova v Uzbekistan, but also because of the HRC’s 
interpretation of Article 18(2), which specifically precludes coercion of believers in 
educational establishments. The consistent and minority-friendly jurisprudence of the 
HRC based on Articles 18(2) and 27 ICCPR may provide a higher standard of 
protection for religious minorities at the universal level.  
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3. The Right to Education 
 
The right to education is a right essential to everyone. For minorities, however, “it is 
also instrumental as a precondition for the full enjoyment of many other rights, such 
as the right to participation, expression, association, etc.”265 In its General Comment 
on the right to education, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) detailed the essential features of education: availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and adaptability (the so-called 4As).266 The CESCR explained that 
availability requires functioning educational institutions and programmes; 
accessibility entails open access to education without discrimination, i.e., education 
should be accessible within physical or technological reach, economically affordable 
and equal without any discrimination; acceptability concerns the form and substance 
of education; finally, adaptability requires flexible education that can be adjusted 
according to changing social needs. This section reviews international guarantees and 
the jurisprudence of international and regional courts on the right to education, with 
the main focus on access to education, including education in a minority language. 
 
3.1. The right to education in international and regional treaties 
 
The ICCPR does not contain a provision on the right to education; instead, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
recognises everyone’s right to education in a very detailed Article 13.267 At the 
                                                 
265 ACFC, ‘Commentary on Education under the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities’ (2006) ACFC/25DOC(2006)002, 7. 
 
266 CESCR, ‘General Comment on the Right to education (Art.13)’ (n 260).  
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regional level,268 P1-2 ECHR also establishes that ‘[n]o person shall be denied the 
right to education.’  
 
As to the right of minorities to education, although Article 27 ICCPR does not 
specifically refer to education, the educational needs of minorities are central to 
protection of their identity and equal treatment. Furthermore, the FCNM requires 
States to guarantee access to education in Article 12, to recognise the right of national 
minorities to set up and to manage their own private educational and training 
establishments in Article 13 and to provide education in and of minority languages in 
Article 14.269  
 
The following section overviews the jurisprudence of international and regional courts 
to highlight the application of some of these standards. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
267 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (n 252) Article 13. See also, 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (n 192) Article 26; Convention against Discrimination in 
Education (n 252) Article 1(1). 
 
268 In the African context, the African Charter (n 52) includes the right to education as a matter of 
principle in Article 17(1). In the inter-American context, the Inter-American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man addresses the right to education in Article XII, as well as Article 13 of Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Protocol of San Salvador) (entered into force 16 November 1999) OAS Treaty Series No 69 
(1988) reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System 
OEA/Ser L V/II.82Doc 6 Rev 1 at 67 (1992). 
 
269 Another important instrument which has an extensive provision on education is the European 
Charter for Minority Languages (1992) ETS No 148 (Languages Charter): Article 8 offers a long list of 
possibilities for education in regional or minority languages: the higher the number of members of a 
linguistic minority, the higher protection they may claim from a State. However, States can pick and 
choose from the Charter’s provisions, taking into consideration their national circumstances: it is 
sufficient to accede to 35 out of 68 Articles of the instrument. The Languages Charter, however, aims 
to protect neither human rights, nor minority rights. The main purpose of the instrument is to promote 
linguistic diversity.  
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3.2. Access to education 
 
Equality in access to education can be denied directly or indirectly through imposition 
of additional conditions, which may disadvantage members of a particular group. 
Therefore, the right to equal access to education requires it to be non-discriminatory; 
in addition, education should be physically and economically accessible. These 
aspects of the right to access education have featured in the jurisprudence of 
international courts.  
 
The ECtHR’s first decision on access to education in Belgian Linguistics270 has been 
one of the most influential judgements in this area. The case was brought up by a 
large number of French-speaking parents living in Dutch-speaking districts of 
Belgium. The applicants complained that French-speaking children whose parents’ 
place of residence was in the Dutch-speaking region were denied access to schools in 
bilingual communes on the outskirts of Brussels which enjoyed ‘special status’. 
Access to these bilingual schools was limited to four categories of children: (1) 
children who had attended classes in 1962-1963, (2) children and family members of 
university employees, students and teaching staff, (3) children of foreign nationality, 
and (4) children of French-speaking Belgians living outside the Dutch-speaking 
region.271 Thus, children of French-speaking parents who lived in the unilingual 
Flemish region were denied access to schools in these communes. In contrast, in the 
same communes Dutch classes were open to all children irrespective of their language 
or place of residence of their parents.272  
                                                 
 
270 Belgian Linguistics (n 63). 
 
271 Belgian Linguistics (n 63) para 27. 
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 In its analysis, the ECtHR first established that P1-2 did not impose any linguistic 
requirements. Therefore, the right to education under this provision was not violated 
in Belgium because irrespective of their language children had access to public or 
subsidised education in Dutch-language schools. Moreover, the ECHR did not 
guarantee the right to be educated in the language of parents by the public authorities 
or with their financial support.273  
 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR indirectly recognised general group-oriented language/ 
education policies and the need to secure protection of certain individuals or groups 
against discrimination as a part of this process. Thus, the Court ruled that denial of 
access to existing schools was discriminatory because it stemmed solely from 
considerations relating to residence; accordingly it found a breach of P1-2 in 
conjunction with Article 14 ECHR. This finding is very cautious though. The ECtHR 
did not require Belgium to guarantee the access of French-speaking children to 
minority schools. Instead, the Court found that the requirement of residence was 
disproportional to the aims pursued. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
272 Belgian Linguistics (n 63) para 32. 
 
273 Belgian Linguistics (n 63) para 7. 
Similar conclusions were reached by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1928 in Rights of 
Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) (Germany v Poland) (1928) PCIJ Series A No 15. The 
case addressed the question whether the parental right to choose a school for one’s children guaranteed 
automatic access to such a school. This right was included in the Bilateral Convention between 
Germany and Poland concerning Upper Silesia and allowed persons legally responsible for a child’s 
education to “choose the language of instruction and the corresponding school for pupil or child, 
subject to no verification, dispute, pressure or hindrance on the part of the authorities” (Minority 
Schools, 27). The Convention did not contain a requirement to verify parents’ declarations; Germany  
argued that the lack of verification should be interpreted broadly. The PCIJ did not, in fact, agree with 
the German construal of the Convention. In its view the Convention implied only the right of parents to 
make a “declaration of intention or of a wish that the instruction of a child or pupil should be given in 
the minority language” (Minority Schools, 30 (emphasis added)). It was only the question of whether a 
person belongs to a minority that was not subject to verification. However, this did not confer on 
parents an unlimited right to choose the language of instruction. 
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Whilst in Belgian Linguistics the ECtHR condemned the requirement of residence as 
hindering access to education, the case of D H and others v the Czech Republic274 
(discussed on pages 34-36) concerned non-discriminatory access of Roma children to 
education. The Grand Chamber established that indirect discrimination in access to 
education based on racial or ethnic origin is prohibited. This finding informed the 
ECtHR’s subsequent case-law. Thus, in Affaire Sampanis et Autres c Grèce,275 the 
ECtHR found that the placement of Roma children in separate classes in a mainstream 
primary school in a Greek municipality constituted indirect discrimination. 
Furthermore, in the case of Oršuš and others v Croatia276 Roma children were placed 
in Roma-only classes within certain local primary schools. Croatia maintained that the 
measure was adopted based on the fact that Romani children did not have adequate 
command of the Croatian language. The First Section of the ECtHR accepted the 
government’s justification for differential treatment and found no violation of Article 
14 ECHR. However, the applicants’ request to refer the case to the Grand Chamber 
succeeded. Relying on D H and others and Sampanis, the applicants claimed indirect 
discrimination, and even direct discrimination based on race and ethnicity. In 2010, 
the Grand Chamber reversed the Chamber’s decision and found a violation of Article 
14 ECHR taken together with P1-2. The ECtHR distinguished the present case from D 
H and others and Sampanis, because the statistics submitted to the Court did not 
suffice as prima facie evidence that access to schools was discriminatory.277 
However, in the ECtHR’s view, indirect discrimination may be proved without 
                                                 
 
274 D H and others v the Czech Republic (n 71).  
 
275 Affaire Sampanis et Autres c Grèce (App no 32526/05) ECHR 5 June 2008, para 96 (in French). 
 
276 Oršuš and others v Croatia (App no 15766/03) ECHR 17 July 2008. 
 
277 Oršuš and others v Croatia (App no 15766/03) ECHR 16 March 2010, para 152. 
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statistical evidence.278 The placement of Roma children in separate classes on the 
basis of their insufficient command of the Croatian language clearly constituted a 
difference in treatment. Even though such placement may not automatically violate 
Article 14 ECHR, “when such a measure disproportionately or even, as in the present 
case, exclusively, affects members of a specific ethnic group, then appropriate 
safeguards have to be put in place.”279 The ECtHR assessed the conditions of Romani 
children’s placement in separate classes and found that the lack of specific language 
aptitude tests,280 as well as an adapted curriculum of a lower standard281 indicated that 
there were not adequate safeguards capable of ensuring a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means used and the legitimate aim to be pursued. Because 
the placement of the applicants in Roma-only classes lacked an objective and 
reasonable justification, the Grand Chamber held that the difference in treatment of 
Roma children constituted indirect discrimination.  
 
The ACFC took a similarly strong stance in its opinions based on Article 12(3) 
FCNM, which protects access to education and obliges States to promote ‘equal 
opportunities for access to education at all levels for persons belonging to national 
minorities.’ The clear wording of the provision allows the ACFC to set a higher 
threshold for implementation of Article 12. Thus, in its opinions on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,282 Italy,283 Slovakia,284 etc., the ACFC expressed its concern about the 
                                                 
 
278 Oršuš and others v Croatia (n 277) para 153. 
 
279 Oršuš and others v Croatia (n 277) para 157. 
 
280 Oršuš and others v Croatia (n 277) para 160. 
 
281 Oršuš and others v Croatia (n 277) para 163. 
 
282 ACFC, ‘First Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (2004) ACFC/INF/OP/I(2005)003, paras 88 and 
89.  
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high level of absenteeism of Roma children; moreover, the ACFC criticised the 
practice of placing Roma children in special schools.285 In the ACFC’s view, 
“[s]egregated education, often of lower standard than that offered to other students, is 
one of the most extreme examples of the precarious position of Roma parents and 
pupils.”286 Indeed, even though the establishment and maintenance of separate 
educational systems for linguistic reasons is allowed, for example, under the 
UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education,287 such permission is 
conditional on optional attendance and high quality education that conforms to state 
standards.288 Otherwise, segregation of minorities would constitute discrimination. 
Accordingly, access to education must be non-discriminatory.289  
                                                                                                                                            
 
283 ACFC, ‘First Opinion on Italy’ (2001) ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)007, para 55;  ‘Second Opinion on 
Italy’ (2005) ACFC/INF/OP/II(2005)003, para 114. 
 
284 ACFC, ‘Second Opinion on the Slovak Republic’ (2005) ACFC/OP/II(2005)004, para 98. 
 
285 ACFC, ‘First Opinion on the Czech Republic’ (2001) ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)002, paras 61-63; 
‘Second opinion on the Czech Republic’ (2005) ACFC/INF/OP/II(2005)002, paras 145-149; ‘First 
Opinion on Bulgaria’ (2004) ACFC/OP/I(2006)001, para 97, etc.  
 
286 ACFC, ‘Commentary on Education…’ (n 265) 21. 
 
287 UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (n 252). 
 
288 UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education (n 252) Article 2(b).  
 
289 Generally, there are fewer cases on the right to education in the inter-American and African 
contexts, because this right is perceived more as a matter of principle, with the countries striving to 
guarantee to individuals more pressing rights, such as the right to food, health, water, safe environment, 
such as in Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic (SERAC) and 
Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria (Communication no 155/96) (2001). 
In the inter-American context, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights considered a discriminatory 
denial of access to education in The Yean and Bosico Children v Dominican Republic (n 139). In the 
Dominican Republic, children who did not possess a birth certificate could not access day schools; this 
limitation adversely affected children of Haitian origin, who often struggled to acquire an identity 
document. Violeta Bosico, a child of Haitian origin, was denied her birth certificate, and, hence, access 
to education in day schools. She was initially admitted to day school without a birth certificate and 
studied up until third grade (para 109(34)). However, when she tried to enrol for the fourth grade in day 
school, she was denied access because she did not have a birth certificate (para 109(35)). Therefore, 
she enrolled in evening school for adults over 18 years of age where she attended fourth and fifth 
grades. The purpose of evening school was to teach adults to read and write only, with pupils doing 
two grades in one year. The compressed type of education adopted in this school made fewer demands 
than day school (para 109(36)). The IACHR strongly condemned this denial of access to education in 
the Dominican Republic. In 2001, as a part of a friendly settlement the State granted Violeta Bosico her 
 98
 Furthermore, access to education should be physically accessible as exemplified in the 
ECtHR’s judgment in Cyprus v Turkey.290 Significantly, the ECtHR’s interpretation 
of access to education in this case also had a linguistic component. The case 
concerned the compatibility with the terms of P1-2 of a total ban on the use of Greek 
in secondary schools in Turkish-occupied Northern Cyprus. From the facts of the 
case, it appears that secondary education in Greek was formerly available to children 
of Greek Cypriots, but was subsequently abolished by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. 
Primary education in Greek was still available to children in Northern Cyprus. 
However, if parents of these children wished them to continue their education in 
Greek they had to send them to schools in Southern Cyprus. Alternatively, children 
could attend English or Turkish schools available in the north. The vast majority of 
families chose the first option, and many schoolchildren received their secondary 
education in the south.291 However, significant restrictions existed on their return to 
the north upon completion of their studies. Until 1998 male students who attained the 
age of 16 and female students who attained the age of 18 were not allowed to return to 
the north permanently.292 This restriction resulted in the separation of many families 
upon children’s completion of their studies.    
 
In its assessment, the ECtHR first applied the principles established in Belgian 
Linguistics293 and established that in the strict sense there was no denial of the right to 
                                                                                                                                            
birth certificate and she returned to day school. Moreover, the IACHR awarded non-pecuniary damages 
to the applicant and her parents for the violation of her right to education by the Dominican Republic.  
 
290 Cyprus v Turkey (App no 25781/94) (2002) 35 EHRR 30. 
 
291 Cyprus v Turkey (n 290) para 44. 
 
292 Cyprus v Turkey (n 290) para 43.  
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education because children had access to a Turkish or English-language school in the 
north. However, taking into consideration that the authorities assumed responsibility 
for providing primary education in Greek, their failure to “make continuing provision 
for it at the secondary-level must be considered in effect to be a denial of the 
substance of the right at issue.”294 Children’s attendance of Greek schools in the south 
could not be considered as a viable alternative due to its impact on the family life in 
light of limitations imposed on their return to Northern Cyprus. In addition, the Court 
emphasised that “[t]he authorities must no doubt be aware that it is the wish of Greek-
Cypriot parents that the schooling of their children be completed through the medium 
of the Greek Language.”295 Therefore, by 16 votes to 1 the ECtHR found that there 
was a breach of P1-2.  
 
Overall, Cyprus v Turkey is a significant advancement in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence 
regarding minority education. It affirms that access to education should not negatively 
impact family life of minorities. Moreover, the ECtHR established that where the 
State offers primary education in a minority language, it may also be responsible for 
provision of secondary education in a minority language.  
 
Can the ECtHR depart from the principles in Belgian Linguistic and move from the 
case-by-case exceptions found in Cyprus v Turkey to a general right to mother-tongue 
education? Even though such a development is possible, it is unlikely. First, the 
wording of P1-2 does not allow the ECtHR to read in a general right to mother-tongue 
education; the Court is not to be blamed for the limited wording of this provision. 
                                                                                                                                            
293 Cyprus v Turkey (n 290) para 277. 
 
294 Cyprus v Turkey (n 290) para 278. 
 
295 Cyprus v Turkey (n 290) para 278. 
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Second, the ECHR does not contain an equivalent of Article 27 ICCPR. Although 
general human rights provisions can be read in a minority-friendly fashion,296 they do 
not always allow the establishment of generally applicable principles. Therefore, the 
Court’s approach in Cyprus v Turkey is more realistic.  
 
Where economic accessibility is concerned, States are free to adopt an educational 
policy as they see fit: there is no State obligation to fund private minority schools.297 
However, even though States are not obliged to financially support private schools, 
the question of public funding may arise if a State chooses to subsidise education of 
some minority groups, and refuses funding to others. Such treatment may be 
challenged as discriminatory, although it will not necessarily require positive State 
action. Thus, the decision of the HRC in Waldman v Canada298 (discussed on page 
40) suggests that although there is no requirement for States to fund private minority 
schools, if they choose to assist private schools, minority schools must be treated in an 
equal manner. Furthermore, as Scheinin argued in his individual (concurring) opinion 
in Waldman v Canada, Article 27 ICCPR imposes positive State obligations to 
promote religious instruction in minority religions; to this end, an optional 
arrangement within the public education system is one permissible arrangement.299 To 
avoid discrimination in funding religious (or linguistic) education, in some cases 
States may legitimately make decisions regarding public funding based on whether 
                                                 
 
296 Hopu and Bessert v France (n 32). 
 
297 Although minorities have the right to establish their own schools, for example, under Article 13 
FCNM, as the Advisory Committee noted, this provision does not give rise to any observations of State 
compliance, simply because minorities do not have the financial resources to establish their own 
educational institutions. ACFC, ‘Commentary on Education…’ (n 265) 22. 
 
298 Waldman v Canada (n 62). 
 
299 Waldman v Canada (n 62) Individual opinion by member Martin Scheinin (concurring), para 5.  
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there is a constant demand from minorities for such education; another legitimate 
criterion in making such decisions is whether there is a sufficient number of children 
to attend such a school to ensure viability of providing religious (or linguistic) 
education.300   
 
3.3. Conclusions 
 
Access to education is essential to guarantee the right of minorities to education, as 
well as to ensure that they have equal opportunities with majorities to enjoy other 
fundamental rights, such as the right to effective participation in the political, 
economic, social and cultural life of a country, and freedom of speech and assembly. 
States should ensure that access of minorities to education is non-discriminatory, 
physically accessible and economically affordable.   
 
Where non-discriminatory treatment in access to education is concerned, recent 
jurisprudence of international courts and quasi-judicial bodies shows notable 
development, such as in D H and others v the Czech Republic and Oršuš and others v 
Croatia. These cases strengthen the requirement of non-discrimination against 
minorities in access to education. 
 
With regard to access of minorities to education in a minority language, the 
establishment of a general right to a mother-tongue education might be difficult, 
particularly under P1-2 ECHR. Therefore, justifying ex post minority-friendly policies 
on the basis of equality and minority clauses, as well as finding exceptions on a case-
                                                 
 
300 Waldman v Canada (n 62) Individual opinion by member Martin Scheinin (concurring), para 5. 
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by-case basis, may constitute more realistic developments, such as in Cyprus v 
Turkey. That case is a significant development in ensuring access of minorities to 
education in a minority language. It imposed an obligation on States to provide 
secondary education in a minority language where it has assumed the responsibility 
for primary education. However, the precedential value of Cyprus v Turkey may be 
limited, as the context of this case should be taken into consideration. Yet it provides 
a clear indication that, although the ECtHR is unlikely to recognise a free-standing 
right to mother-tongue education, there exist situations where the Court can hardly 
ignore the group dimension of minority protection. In addition, in Cyprus v Turkey 
education was not physically accessible; thus, the case sets a clear standard on 
physical accessibility of education to minorities and may serve as a benchmark in 
future cases to substantiate demands for education in a minority language where, for 
example, existing schools in a minority language may not be physically accessible, 
and this lack may have a negative impact on family life.   
 
One solution to minorities’ demand for public schooling in a minority language is 
freedom for minorities to establish their own schools. This freedom, however, is 
intimately linked with the requirement of economic affordability of education. 
Provisions in domestic legislation on freedom of minorities to establish educational 
establishments are redundant, if a minority group does not have adequate resources to 
organise such education. So far, in the context of non-discriminatory treatment of 
various minority schools, Canada was required to provide public funding to religious 
minority schools in a non-discriminatory manner. Significantly, as discussed above, 
Article 27 ICCPR may be interpreted broadly and used to impose positive duties on a 
State to promote education of religious and linguistic minorities. In making decisions 
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regarding public funding, States should take into account whether (1) there is 
sufficient demand from minorities for religious or mother-tongue education and (2) 
whether there is a sufficient number of children to attend such schools. To conclude, 
while judicial or quasi-judicial findings of a general minority right to mother-tongue 
education might be difficult to obtain, particularly under P1-2 ECHR, justifying ex 
post minority-friendly policies on the basis of equality and minority clauses, as well 
as finding exceptions to the lack of a general entitlement on a case-by-case basis 
appear to be realistic developments. 
 
4. Autonomy as a legal mechanism of minority protection 
 
This sub-section deals with the benefits of autonomy for protection of minority 
identity. International agreements are silent on the right of minorities to autonomy, 
largely because their rights are protected on an individual, not collective basis. 
Nevertheless, some collective dimension of minority protection is present, for 
example, in Article 27 ICCPR, which notes that a group may enjoy its culture, 
religion and language in community with other members of a group. Even though this 
wording does not amount to protection of collective rights, it implies some form of 
collective exercise of minority rights. The ACFC has interpreted the FCNM in the 
same manner.301 Below, there is an overview of the jurisprudence of international 
courts and quasi-judicial bodies supporting collective enjoyment of minority rights 
(4.1). Then, specific provisions relevant to minority protection, such as Articles 27 
and 1 ICCPR and Articles 15 and 16 FCNM are discussed in more detail (4.2).  
 
                                                 
301 ACFC, ‘Commentary on the Effective Participation…’ (n 188) para 6. 
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4.1. Gleaning relevant standards from human rights law  
 
Both the ICCPR and the ECHR are silent on the right of minorities to autonomy. As a 
result, a minority group cannot rely on these instruments in order to demand special 
arrangements for protection of their identity. For example, in Marshall et al v 
Canada,302 the authors of the complaint claimed that the State’s refusal to grant a seat 
at the constitutional conferences on aboriginal matters to representatives of the 
Mikmaq tribal society violated their right to take part in the conduct of public affairs 
under Article 25(a) ICCPR.303 The HRC first maintained that Article 25(a) ICCPR 
may not mean that every citizen is entitled to determine the modes of participation in 
the conduct of public affairs. The HRC further noted that Article 25(a) ICCPR 
“cannot be understood as meaning that any directly affected group, large or small, has 
the unconditional right to choose the modalities of participation in the conduct of 
public affairs.”304 Accordingly, Canada’s failure to invite representatives of the 
Mikmaq tribal society did not infringe their rights under Article 25(a) ICCPR because 
it is “for the legal and constitutional system of the State party to provide for the 
modalities of such participation.”305 
 
                                                 
 
302 Marshall et al v Canada (Communication no 205/l986) (1991) CCPR/C/43/D/205/l9861. 
 
303 Article 25 ICCPR (n 17) stipulates: 
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Likewise, the ECmHR and the ECtHR have left the question of linguistic and 
territorial group accommodation within States’ margin of discretion. Thus, in 
Moureaux v Belgium306 and Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt v Belgium,307 the applicants 
complained that the lack of French-speakers’ representation in the councils of the 
Dutch-speaking regions of Belgium constituted a violation of P1-3 on the right to free 
elections, read in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR on non-discrimination on the 
grounds of language and membership in a national minority. In both cases, the 
Convention institutions found that there was no violation of the ECHR rights. 
 
The ECmHR’ reasoning in Moureaux v Belgium is indicative of the Convention 
institutions’ approach to autonomy: 
… in principle every High Contracting Party organises its national 
territory, from the administrative point of view, according to political 
and institutional criteria, which the organs of the Convention are not 
competent to supervise. Thus, the organisation of territorial entities 
such as Regions, or the States which compose a federation, is entirely a 
matter for the discretionary power of the State bodies of each 
Contracting Party. It also follows that the organisation of legislative 
power, when apportioned between parliament and the different 
territorial entities, is exclusively a matter for those same organs.308 
 
Accordingly, States are free to decide on how they organise their territory and what 
type of accommodation they may grant to a minority group.   
 
However, a notable support of international courts and quasi-judicial bodies for 
autonomy is apparent where States choose to introduce a regime which through 
differential treatment aims to ensure respect for minorities’ rights, such as in Lindsay 
                                                 
306 Moureaux v Belgim (n 159). 
 
307 Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt (n 101). 
 
308 Moureaux v Belgim (n 159) para 64. 
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and others v the United Kingdom,309 on the application of a proportional 
representation system in the Northern Ireland as opposed to a ‘first past the post’ 
system in the rest of the United Kingdom.  
 
Another way to protect minority groups may be through the introduction of a 
residence requirement that may exclude some individuals not belonging to a minority 
from voting in elections. In Marie-Helene Gillot v France310 and Py v France,311 both 
the HRC and the ECtHR found that the ten year period of residence requirement to 
qualify for voting in New Caledonia was compatible with the right to vote under the 
ICCPR and the ECHR. Given that the residence requirement was introduced in the 
context of self-determination of New Caledonia’s population, it was not unreasonable 
to limit participation in local referendums and elections to individuals who have 
sufficiently strong ties with the territory and are directly concerned by the future of 
New Caledonia.312 
 
Similarly, in Nicoletta Polacco and Alessandro Garofalo v Italy313 the ECmHR found 
that a four year residence requirement to vote in elections in Trento was legitimate, 
because Italy introduced this condition to protect the rights of the German and Ladin 
minorities in the Region of Trentino Alto-Adige. The requirement aimed to ensure 
that individuals taking part in elections are reasonably aware of the social, political 
and economic context of the Region. This, in the ECmHR’s view, was necessary in 
                                                 
 
309 Lindsay and others v the United Kingdom (n 31). 
 
310 Marie-Helene Gillot v France (Communication no 932/2000) (2002) UN Doc A/57/40, 270. 
 
311 Py v France (App no 66289/01) ECHR 6 June 2005. 
 
312 Marie-Helene Gillot v France (n 310) para 13.16; Py v France (n 311) paras 61, 62 and 64. 
 
313 Nicoletta Polacco and Alessandro Garofalo v Italy (App no 23450/94) ECmHR 15 September 1997. 
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order “for the elector to have a thorough understanding of the regional context, so that 
his vote in the local elections can reflect the concern for the protection of the 
linguistic minorities.”314 Hence, the measure was proportionate.  
 
In view of these cases, autonomy is not a State duty. Rather, it is a privilege granted at 
a State’s discretion. States may choose to bestow territorial or cultural autonomy to 
accommodate religious, linguistic and ethnic minorities. However, even though there 
is no State duty to grant autonomy, there is a clear obligation not to withdraw this 
privilege unilaterally against a group’s will. 
 
This State obligation not to worsen or abolish autonomous arrangements without the 
consent of the inhabitants is evident from the ECtHR jurisprudence strongly 
condemning abolition of cultural autonomy as exercised by religious minorities, such 
as in Serif v Greece,315 concerning limitations on religious and judicial autonomy of 
the Muslim minority in Greece. This autonomy originated from the 1913 Treaty of 
Peace of Athens between Turkey and Greece, whereby the Muslim community in 
Greece had the right to elect their ‘mufti’, entrusted with the exercise of some judicial 
functions. The facts of the case were as follows: after the Mufti of Rodopi died in 
1985, the government appointed a Mufti; five years later, two Muslim MPs requested 
the government to organise election of a new Mufti. Having received no reply, they 
organised the election of a Mufti themselves. Serif, a theological graduate, was 
elected as a Mufti. Subsequently, he was convicted for usurping a position of a 
minister of a ‘known religion’ and publicly wearing the dress of such a minister. Serif 
                                                 
 
314 Nicoletta Polacco and Alessandro Garofalo v Italy (n 313). 
 
315 Serif v Greece (App no 38178/97) (1999) 31 EHRR 561. 
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argued before the ECtHR that his conviction violated Article 9 ECHR on freedom of 
religion, because under the bilateral Treaty of 1913, the Muslim community was 
entitled to elect their Mufti. The government, however, maintained that Muftis 
perform judicial functions; as judges are not elected in Greece, the appointment of the 
Mufti by the government could not raise an issue under Article 9 ECHR.316 Moreover, 
Greece claimed that it intervened in this matter to avoid a split within the Muslim 
community, and, therefore, the measure pursued a legitimate aim of protecting public 
order.   
 
In assessing whether such interference was necessary in a democratic society, the 
ECtHR recognised that it is possible that tension is created where a religious or any 
other community becomes divided; however, this is “one of the unavoidable 
consequences of pluralism.”317 In such circumstances, the role of the government is 
“not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the 
competing groups tolerate each other.”318 Because the government failed to 
demonstrate any eminent danger to public order, the ECtHR found that the 
interference was not necessary in a democratic society and violated Article 9 ECHR. 
 
Similarly, in Hassan and Chaush v Bulgaria319 concerning the forced replacement of 
the leadership of the Muslim religious community (Mufti) in Bulgaria in 1995, the 
ECtHR emphasised the significance of the cultural autonomy of religious 
                                                 
 
316 Serif v Greece (n 315) para 53. 
 
317 Serif v Greece (n 315) para 46. 
 
318 Serif v Greece (n 315) para 46. 
 
319 Hassan and Chaush v Bulgaria (App no 30985/96) (2000) 24 EHRR 55. 
 109
communities and found a violation of Article 9 ECHR. In particular, the Court noted 
that  
religious communities traditionally and universally exist in the form of 
organised structures. They abide by rules which are often seen by 
followers as being of a divine origin. Religious ceremonies have their 
meaning and sacred value for the believers if they have been conducted 
by ministers empowered for that purpose in compliance with these 
rules. The personality of the religious ministers is undoubtedly of 
importance to every member of the community. Participation in the life 
of the community is thus a manifestation of one’s religion, protected 
by Article 9 of the Convention.320 
 
Likewise, Bulgaria’s interference in elections of a Mufti in the Case of Supreme Holy 
Council of the Muslim Community v Bulgaria321 was strongly condemned by the 
ECtHR as undermining the autonomy of the Muslim religious community. The 
applicants complained that the Bulgarian authorities arbitrarily interfered with the 
affairs of the Muslim community by organising and manipulating the October 1997 
Muslim conference with the aim of favouring one of the rival leaderships and 
removing Mr Gendzhev, who was supported by the community. Having assessed the 
facts of the case, the ECtHR reiterated that  
… in democratic societies the State does not need in principle to take 
measures to ensure that religious communities remain or are brought 
under a unified leadership. … State measures favouring a particular 
leader of a divided religious community or seeking to compel the 
community, or part of it, to place itself under a single leadership 
against its will would constitute an infringement of the freedom of 
religion.322 
 
                                                 
 
320 Hassan and Chaush v Bulgaria (n 319) para 62. 
 
321 Case of Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v Bulgaria (App no 39023/97) ECHR 16 
December 2004.  
 
322 Case of Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v Bulgaria (n 321) para  96.  
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Accordingly, the autonomous existence of religious communities is central to respect 
for pluralism in a democratic society. The ECtHR afforded equally high protection of 
the cultural autonomy of religious minorities in other contexts as well. Two cases 
concerning State authorities’ refusal to register a religious group are noteworthy.  
 
Thus, in the case of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v Moldova,323 the 
applicants alleged that the authorities’ refusal to recognise the Metropolitan church of 
Bessarabia violated their freedom of religion under Article 9 ECHR, because only 
State-recognised religions could be practiced in Moldova. In particular, the applicants 
were prohibited from gathering together for religious purposes and lacked any judicial 
protection of their assets. Similarly, in the case of the Moscow Branch of the Salvation 
Army v Russia,324 the Russian authorities refused to permit the applicant association 
to re-register. The applicant association complained that the refusal to grant it the 
status of a legal entity had severely curtailed its ability to manifest its religion in 
worship and practice under Articles 9 and 11 ECHR on freedom of association.   
                                                
  
In its assessment of these cases, the ECtHR emphasised that since religious 
communities traditionally exist in the form of organised structures, Article 9 ECHR 
had to be interpreted in the light of Article 11 ECHR. Such interpretation affords 
believers free association for manifestation of their religion in community with others 
without arbitrary State intervention.  
Indeed, the autonomous existence of religious communities is 
indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is thus an issue 
at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords... 
 
323 Case of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v Moldova (App no 45701/99) ECHR 13 
December 2001. 
 
324 Case of the Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v Russia (App no 72881/01) ECHR 5 October 
2006.  
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In addition, one of the means of exercising the right to manifest one’s 
religion, especially for a religious community, in its collective 
dimension, is the possibility of ensuring judicial protection of the 
community, its members and its assets…325 
 
In conclusion, the ECtHR ruled that Moldova’s refusal to recognise the applicant 
Church and Russia’s denial of re-registration of the applicant association were 
disproportionate measures, which violated the Convention rights to freedom of 
religion and association.  
 
These cases demonstrate that the ECtHR accords a high level of scrutiny in cases 
concerning the exercise of cultural autonomy by religious communities. Not only does 
the Court recognise the autonomous existence of religious communities, but it also 
emphasises the collective dimension of exercising cultural autonomy. Thus, States are 
not permitted to unilaterally abolish or deny the exercise of autonomy by religious 
communities.  
 
Another duty imposed on States is the obligation to tolerate peaceful calls by a 
minority group for autonomy and recognition of its identity. This obligation was 
consistently uphold, for example, in a number of cases to protect the rights of the 
Kurdish minority in Turkey326 and the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria327 freely to 
associate and promote minority identity.   
                                                 
 
325 Case of Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and others v Moldova (n 323) para 118; see also Case 
of the Moscow Branch of the Salvation Army v Russia (n 324) para 58 (emphasis added). 
 
326 Case of Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v Turkey (App no 23885/94) ECHR 8 December 
1999; United Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP) v Turkey (App no 19392/92) (1998) 26 EHRR 121; 
Socialist Party and others v Turkey (App no 21237/93) ECHR 25 May 1998. 
 
327 Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v Bulgaria (App nos 29221/95 and 
29225/95) (1998) 26 EHRR 103; the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v Bulgaria 
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 Thus, in the case of Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v Turkey,328 the 
applicants complained that the fact that the ÖZDEP party was dissolved and its 
leaders banned from holding similar office in any other party infringed their right to 
freedom of association under Article 11 ECHR. They have been subjected to such 
harsh measures for their decision to “press for a just, democratic and peaceful solution 
to the Kurdish problem.”329 In its decision, the ECtHR ruled that  
… the fact that such a political project is considered incompatible with 
the current principles and structures of the Turkish State does not mean 
that it infringes democratic rules. It is of the essence of democracy to 
allow diverse political projects to be proposed and debated, even those 
that call into question the way a State is currently organised, provided 
that they do not harm democracy itself.330 
 
In this passage, the ECtHR implicitly established that neither international law nor 
domestic law must prohibit peaceful calls for autonomy. The ECtHR repeated the 
same line of reasoning in United Communist Party of Turkey (TBKP) v Turkey331 and 
Socialist Party v Turkey332 also concerning dissolution of political parties propagating 
the rights of the Kurdish minority in Turkey, and found a violation of Article 11 
ECHR in all three cases. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
(App no 44079/98) ECHR 20 October 2005; the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-Pirin (n 
107).  
 
328 Case of Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v Turkey (n 326). 
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The ECtHR took these arguments a step further in the Case of the United Macedonian 
Organisation Ilinden-Pirin and others v Bulgaria,333 where a political party 
established to protect the rights of the ‘Macedonian’ minority was registered, but 
subsequently declared unconstitutional and dissolved. The grounds for dissolution of 
the party were separatist ideas and a threat to the territorial integrity of the country.334 
The ECtHR accepted that certain leaders of the party might have a political agenda on 
the autonomy of the region of Pirin. However, the Court asserted that the “mere fact 
that a political party calls for autonomy or even requests secession of part of the 
country’s territory is not a sufficient basis to justify its dissolution on national 
security grounds.”335 The incompatibility of the political party’s programme with “the 
current principles and structures of the Bulgarian State does not make it incompatible 
with the rules and principles of democracy.”336 Thus, the Court established that 
minorities are entitled to claim autonomy, provided that the means and proposed 
changes are compatible with democratic principles. 
 
Although there is no explicit right to autonomy in the ICCPR or the ECHR, as the 
above overview demonstrates, there is a significant contribution of human rights 
norms to the right of minorities to enjoy autonomy. The HRC and the ECtHR have 
implicitly upheld this right through the protection of the cultural autonomy of 
religious communities and activities of political parties. Even though States are the 
ultimate decision-makers on whether to grant autonomy to a minority, in a democratic 
society, a minority group has the right to demand peacefully arrangements for a 
                                                 
333 The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-Pirin (n 107). 
 
334 The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-Pirin (n 107) para 27. 
 
335 The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-Pirin (n 107) para 61 (emphasis added). 
 
336 The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden-Pirin (n 107). 
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group’s accommodation. Furthermore, once granted, an autonomy regime may not be 
abolished or worsened without the consent of the minority group. However, the 
protection offered by general human rights instruments does not require positive State 
action. The next section assesses whether specific minority rights instruments fill this 
gap. 
 
4.2. A minority right to autonomy? 
 
Even though there is no explicit right to autonomy in the ICCPR, two provisions may 
be of some relevance to minorities: Article 27 on minority rights and Article 1 on self-
determination of peoples. This is so because in order to achieve effective enjoyment 
of minority rights, a group should be able to determine freely matters pertinent for the 
protection of their identity.  
 
Article 27 ICCPR suggests that minorities may enjoy their culture, language and 
religion in community with other members of their group. Can this wording then be 
read to confer collective rights on a minority? Indeed, the HRC implicitly 
acknowledged a collective dimension of Article 27’s protection by establishing that a  
restriction upon the right of an individual member of a minority must 
be shown to have a reasonable and objective justification and to be 
necessary for the continued viability and welfare of the minority as a 
whole.337  
 
 
Nevertheless, the lack of an explicit acknowledgement of the right to autonomy in 
Article 27 ICCPR decreases the potential of this provision. Moreover, Article 27 
                                                 
 
337 Sandra Lovelace v Canada (Communication no R 6/24) (1981) UN Doc Supp no 40 (A/36/40) 166, 
para 15; see also Ivan Kitok v Sweden (Communication no 197/1985) (1988) CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985; 
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ICCPR is limited in its scope and aims to protect persons belonging to a minority. 
Furthermore, in the General Comment No 23 on Article 27,338 the HRC differentiated 
between Articles 27 and 1 ICCPR, by emphasising that the enjoyment of minority 
rights does not prejudice the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a State.339  
 
Can minorities then claim autonomy under Article 1 ICCPR? This is a rather 
controversial issue because the wording of this provision refers to ‘peoples’. The 
ICCPR itself defines neither the term ‘peoples’ nor ‘minority’. Nor does the HRC 
elucidate the distinction between minorities and peoples in its General Comment No 
12 on the right to self-determination of peoples.340 Until recently States preferred the 
application of the term ‘peoples’ mainly to the entire population of a State. For 
example, in Apirana Mahuika, where the Maori people invoked their right to self-
determination under Article 1 ICCPR, New Zealand argued that the “rights in Article 
1 attach to ‘peoples’ of a state in their entirety, not to minorities, whether indigenous 
or not, within the borders of an independent and democratic state.”341 As a result, 
minorities can benefit from ‘internal’ self-determination, i.e., the right to participate in 
the government of a State. In contrast, the application of external self-determination 
was mainly limited to the colonial contexts and allowed former colonies to acquire an 
independent statehood. In this context, the right is uncontested and receives strong 
support of international community as exemplified by the International Court of 
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Justice (ICJ)’s advisory opinions in the Western Sahara,342 Namibia343 and East 
Timor cases.344 
 
The ICJ’s recent case law suggests, however, that self-determination applies beyond 
colonialism; moreover, its application may benefit groups who do not necessarily 
comprise the population of a whole State. Judge Higgins has advocated this view in a 
separate opinion in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories case.345 The facts of the case are as follows. In 
2002, Israel began the construction of a wall described as a ‘security fence’ in three 
areas of the West Bank.346 The first part of constructing this wall, which extends for a 
distance of 150 kilometres, was completed in 2003 and resulted in encompassing 
56,000 Palestinians in enclaves.347 Further construction of the wall was about to begin 
and would have resulted in 160,000 Palestinians being resident in almost completely 
encircled communities.348 The ICJ ruled that by constructing the wall Israel interfered 
with the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination.349 Accordingly, the ICJ 
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recognised a right of self-determination of a people who are occupied by another 
nation. 
 
Recently, the principle of self-determination has been also invoked by States to claim 
protection of an ethnic majority where part of the territory seceded or is under the de 
facto control of separatist authorities.350 Thus, in Georgia v Russia,351 following 
ethnic conflict in August 2008, Georgia brought before the ICJ a case against Russia 
claiming that the latter violated the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).352 In particular, Georgia asserted that by 
providing unprecedented and far-reaching support to the de facto separatist authorities 
of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the implementation of discriminatory policies 
against the ethnic Georgian population, the Russian Federation denies the “right of 
self-determination to the ethnic Georgians remaining in South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia...”353 In its turn, Russia argued that this dispute relates to the use of force, 
principles of non-intervention and self-determination and violations of humanitarian 
law; therefore, the ICJ lacked jurisdiction to deal with the matter under Article 22 
CERD.354 The case is still pending before the ICJ. It is, however, unlikely that the ICJ 
                                                 
350 In the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Case (Application of the Convention on the Prevention 
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would address the issue of self-determination in this case because its jurisdiction 
under the CERD is limited to elimination of racial discrimination. Nevertheless, the 
case signals that the principle of self-determination can be invoked in post-colonial 
contexts, as well as be used for the protection of ‘minority-in-minority’, i.e., a 
recently dominant majority, which are now trapped in areas claiming independence or 
having achieved it. Significantly, external self-determination may apply to minorities 
only in extreme situations.355 It is the right to internal self-determination that is 
intimately linked with the right of minorities to autonomy.356 Thus, in Apirana 
Mahuika, the HRC acknowledged that “the provisions of article 1 may be relevant in 
the interpretation of other rights protected by the Covenant, in particular [A]rticle 
27.”357  
 
A link between internal self-determination and autonomy is also exemplified by the 
(non-legally binding) Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,358 which in 
Article 3 establishes that indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By 
virtue of this right they can “freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
                                                                                                                                            
354 Georgia v Russia (n 351) paras 95 and 110. 
 
355 The relevance of external self-determination to minorities resurfaced with full force after Kosovo’s 
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their economic, social and cultural development”, i.e., self-determine within a State. 
More significantly, Article 4 of the Declaration specifies that indigenous peoples,  
in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and 
local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous 
functions. 
 
Accordingly, these two provisions of the Declaration establish a firm link between 
internal self-determination and the right to autonomy. Its scope, however, is limited to 
indigenous peoples. The distinction between indigenous people and minorities is 
discussed in Section 3 of this Chapter on pages 134-136. 
 
In conclusion, Article 27 in conjunction with Article 1 ICCPR may accord minorities 
the right to autonomy. Currently, an explicit acknowledgment in the Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples applies only to indigenous people; its extension to 
minorities based on clear procedural guidelines is highly desirable, but unlikely. In 
granting autonomy, the central considerations should be the needs of a minority group 
to preserve its identity. States should employ the most appropriate means to achieve 
this aim.  
 
Another leading instrument on the rights of minorities, the FCNM, is similarly silent 
on the right of minorities to autonomy. This may be explained by the failed attempt of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)359 to insert an explicit 
provision on autonomy or special status in Article 11 of the PACE Recommendation 
1201 (1993) on an additional protocol on the rights of national minorities to the 
                                                 
 
359 The PACE is composed of parliamentarians from 47 Member States of the Council of Europe. 
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European Convention on Human Rights.360 The attempt, which caused significant 
controversy, is highly commendable: 
[i]n the regions where they are in a majority the persons belonging to a 
national minority shall have the right to have at their disposal 
appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status, 
matching the specific historical and territorial situation and in 
accordance with the domestic legislation of the State. 
 
The PACE has long been supportive of autonomy and self-governance. For example, 
the 1985 European Charter of Local Self-Government361 contained important provisions 
in respect of the right to autonomy. In particular, Article 3(1) of the Charter specified 
that local authorities must be capable of “regulating and managing a substantial share of 
public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interest of the local 
population.”362 Furthermore, the PACE has recently adopted an Additional Protocol to 
the European Charter of Local Self-Government on the right to participate in the 
affairs of a local authority (Local Self-Government Protocol).363 The 2009 Local Self-
Government Protocol elaborates on the right of everyone to participate in the affairs 
of a local authority; furthermore, it suggests procedures a State could follow to 
implement measures supporting the right to participate. Given the PACE’s support for 
self-governance, Recommendation 1201 naturally contained a specific right of 
minorities to claim autonomy.  
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 Bearing in mind the controversy surrounding the right to autonomy, it is not 
surprising that Article 11 contains several hedges that refer to the regions where a 
minority group constitutes a local majority, to arrangements matching the specific 
historical and territorial situation and to the domestic legislation of the State. These 
qualifications prevent the CoE from insisting that a State must adopt a particular form 
of autonomy to accommodate its minorities. Indeed, this provision created a great deal 
of uneasiness among the Contracting Parties of the CoE and was subsequently 
interpreted by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice 
Commission), the CoE’s advisory body on constitutional matters.364  
 
The Venice Commission noted that interpretation of Article 11 should be cautious and 
in the light of the present state of international law,  
a broad approach to the right of minorities to have local or autonomous 
authorities at their disposal is possible only in the presence of a binding 
instrument of international law, which is not the case in this instance.365  
 
In the Venice Commission’s view, although concentrated minorities within unitary 
States strive to have local or autonomous authorities,  
the right in question does not imply for States either its acceptance of an 
organised ethnic entity within their territories, or adherence to the 
concept of ethnic pluralism as a component of the people or the nation, a 
concept which might affect any unitarity of the State.366  
 
The Venice Commission acknowledged that many States seem to be afraid to grant 
autonomy rights so as not to encourage secessionist tendencies; even States which “have 
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granted a large degree of regional autonomy hesitate to accept binding international 
instruments on the rights of minorities to a certain autonomy.”367 Unsurprisingly, 
Recommendation 1201 was not accepted and, hence, has not acquired legal force; it 
remains a soft-law instrument. Moreover, the controversy surrounding the matter 
discouraged the drafters of the FCNM from including an explicit provision 
guaranteeing the right of minorities to autonomy.  
 
Nevertheless, some indications of such a right are scattered across the FCNM. It may 
be useful to overview relevant provisions. For example, Article 15 FCNM stipulates 
that  
[t]he Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective 
participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, 
social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those 
affecting them.  
 
Clearly, the participation of minorities in public affairs may not necessarily be 
effective in a simple majoritarian system and may require further accommodation 
through autonomy. However, in the Venice Commission’s view, under the FCNM, 
“participation in public affairs is above all a question of personal autonomy, not of local 
autonomy.”368 This interpretation is rather narrow and does not sufficiently appreciate 
that the wording of the provision requires States to create conditions favourable for 
effective participation. The ACFC’s acknowledgement that the “enjoyment of certain 
rights, including the right to effective participation, has a collective dimension”369 is 
preferable. Indeed, the ACFC has examined the impact of territorial and cultural 
                                                 
367 Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on the interpretation of Article 11…’ (n 364). 
 
368 Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on the interpretation of Article 11…’ (n 364). 
 
369 ACFC, ‘Commentary on the Effective Participation…’ (n 188) para 6. 
 
 123
autonomy in State Parties to the FCNM and found that such arrangements can foster 
more effective participation of minorities in various areas of life.370 
 
Furthermore, Article 16 prohibits States to adopt  
measures which alter the proportions of the population in areas 
inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities and are aimed at 
restricting the rights and freedoms flowing from the principles 
enshrined in the present framework Convention.  
 
The Explanatory Report on the FCNM gives examples of such prohibited measures as 
“expropriation, evictions and expulsions or redrawing administrative borders with a 
view to restricting the enjoyment of such rights and freedoms.”371 So, if a minority 
group constitutes a local majority, a State may not forcefully alter the proportions of 
the population.  
 
There are also other FCNM provisions which hint at autonomous arrangements. These 
are Article 10(2) on the use of a minority language in relations between members of a 
minority group and the administrative authorities; Article 11 on the use and 
recognition of names in a minority language and display of signs of a private nature 
visible to the public; and Article 14(2) on education in and of a minority language. 
However, although these provisions do refer to areas in which a minority group 
constitute a majority, their link to autonomy is weak.  
 
                                                 
370 ACFC, ‘Commentary on the Effective Participation…’ (n 188) paras 133-137. The ACFC 
emphasised the significance of territorial autonomy for the protection of minority autonomy in a 
number of opinions, such as ‘First Opinion on Denmark’ (n 75) para 36; ‘First Opinion on Finland’ 
(2000) ACFC/INF/OP/I (2001) 002, para 47; ‘First Opinion on Spain’ (2003) 
ACFC/INF/OP/I(2004)004, para 75; ‘First Opinion on Switzerland’ (2003) ACFC/INF/OP/I(2003)007, 
para 74; ‘First opinion on Italy’ (n 283) paras 61-62; ‘First Opinion on Serbia and Montengro’ (2003) 
ACFC/INF/OP/I(2004)002, paras 111-112; ‘First Opinion on Moldova’ (2002) 
ACFC/INF/OP/I(2003)002, para 91. 
 
371 FCNM and Explanatory Report (n 196) para 81.  
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In its practice, the ACFC has addressed the issue of autonomy in several 
circumstances; for example, where autonomy has historically existed as a result of 
inter-state agreements.372 There are also recently negotiated autonomy arrangements 
such as Gagauz autonomy in Moldova.373 The issue of the cultural autonomy of the 
Roma also features strongly in the ACFC’s opinions, which insist that States should 
not only protect their culture,374 but also ensure their effective participation in the 
economic and social life of the country. Despite these positive developments, the lack 
of explicit provision on autonomy in the FCNM may prevent the ACFC from 
requiring a State to grant new autonomy arrangements.  
 
Accordingly, even though autonomy arrangements are used by some States to protect 
the rights of minorities, the instruments on minority protection do not contain this 
right explicitly. Nevertheless, the right to autonomy can be linked to the right of 
minorities to internal self-determination, and possibly to external self-determination in 
extreme situations where a minority group is deprived of the possibility to participate 
effectively in the political, economic and cultural affairs of a State, as well as where 
there is a gross violation of fundamental rights of members of a group by a State. 
However, even such a link between self-determination and autonomy is implicit, and 
highly contested in international law. This is because States are reluctant to grant an 
explicit right to autonomy out of fear of secessionist trends, as the fate of 
Recommendation 1201 and the lack of explicit acknowledgement in the FCNM 
                                                 
 
372 Italy State Report (1999) ACFC/SR(1999)007; Moldova State Report (2000) ACFC/SR(2000)2, 82-
3; Russian Federation State Report (1999) ACFC/SR(1999)15, para 44; Slovenia State Report (2000) 
ACFC/SR(2000)4, para 108. 
 
373 ACFC, ‘First Opinion on Moldova’ (n 370) para 92. 
 
374 ACFC, ‘First Opinion on Slovakia’ (2000) ACFC/INF/OP/I(2001)001, paras 22-25, 40. 
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demonstrate. However, as references to territory in the FCNM suggest, the enjoyment 
of minority rights cannot be artificially divorced from the right to autonomy. It might 
be more beneficial for both States and minorities to have an explicit right to autonomy 
accompanied by clear guidelines for granting and withdrawing such arrangements.   
 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
Autonomy, whether territorial or cultural, is indispensable to the protection of 
minority rights, because it allows a minority to decide on matters of particular concern 
to the group. Regrettably, there is no explicit right to autonomy in international law, 
nor under human rights, or minority rights instruments. Rather, autonomy is a 
privilege, granted by States at their discretion. 
 
Yet, as the jurisprudence of international courts suggests, once States have granted 
autonomy, they are not at liberty to withdraw such arrangements unilaterally. 
Furthermore, States are obliged not to worsen autonomy arrangements established to 
protect the rights of minorities. Nor should States prevent minorities from peaceful 
calls for autonomy and other means of democratic dialogue between a minority group 
and the majority.  
 
Nevertheless, as the above discussion of Article 11 of the PACE Recommendation 
1201 suggests, States are reluctant to recognise the right to autonomy out of fear that 
minorities may then secede. However, autonomy arrangements may reconcile 
differences between various ethnic, linguistic and religious groups in a State and 
ensure the territorial integrity of these States. Therefore, it may be better for 
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international peace and security to have some clear guidelines as to when the right to 
autonomy can be claimed.  
 
Some of the criteria used to determine the legitimacy of such claims could be 
proportionality and the reasonableness of protecting a minority group’s identity. 
Moreover, if provided, the right to autonomy should be granted in accordance with 
the needs of a group. For example, territorial autonomy would be inappropriate to 
accommodate the rights of a dispersed group, while cultural autonomy may not be 
sufficient for a group that compactly lives in a certain territory, unless the group 
considers otherwise.  
 
Section 3. Who are ‘minorities’ in the context of EU law? 
 
The preceding two sections elaborated on two dimensions of minority protection. We 
now turn to the assessment of who may benefit from the rights overviewed above. As 
it stands, EU law does not contain a definition of ‘minority’.375 More importantly, nor 
                                                 
375 The fact that references to minority rights have found their way into EU primary law, will (sooner or 
later) make it necessary to define the term. This is, however, not an easy task because for the past fifty 
years attempts to define the concept of ‘minority’ have invariably failed, mainly due to States’ political 
resistance and their divergent practices in relation to minorities. As a result, some commentators 
question the need to define ‘minority’, claiming that leaving the term undefined may allow a broader 
understanding as opposed to a rigid definition, produced as a minimum common denominator 
inevitably capable of excluding some groups. Some authors argue that because of the lack of a 
definition, it was possible for monitoring bodies of minority provisions within the United Nations 
(UN), Council of Europe (CoE) and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to 
adopt more “comprehensive, progressively expanding [approach] to new minorities under the influence 
of international law”: Ioana Tanase, ‘Defining National Minorities: Old Criteria and New Minorities’, 
Presentation for Seminar Series ‘Citizenship and National Minorities in Europe’, St Antony’s College, 
University of Oxford <http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/esc-lectures/Tanase.htm> accessed 16 September 
2009. 
On the other hand, a lack of a definition in international law may lead to a narrow domestic concept 
designed to “exclude groups ‘making trouble’” (A Ǻkermark, Justifications of Minority Protection in 
International Law (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1997) 86). Ǻkermark argues that “the lack of 
a definition gives States an excuse to refuse the existence of minorities in their own territory” (ibid. 
87). By maintaining the matter within the domestic margin of discretion, States are free to decide 
which individuals belonging to certain groups may benefit from minority rights mechanisms. 
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does the EU have a clear legal basis or a competence in minority rights.376 Given that, 
despite numerous attempts, the international community has failed to reach a 
consensus on a definition of ‘minority’, this discussion does not aim enter into yet 
another quest to define the term. Instead, the focus is on highlighting the diversity of 
minority situations across the EU, and identifying a working definition of ‘minority’ 
for this thesis.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Moreover, as the assessment of minority protection mechanisms demonstrates, it is more difficult to 
adopt an inclusive approach by the monitoring bodies where States have a wide margin of appreciation 
over the definition (R Letschert, The Impact of minority rights mechanisms (TMCAsser, The Hague 
2005) 425). Furthermore, the consideration of legal certainty, clarity, reliability and foreseeability are 
of particular importance. Identification of bearers of rights and duties is essential for successful 
operation of a legal regime in practice (John Packer, ‘On the Definition of Minorities’ in J Parker and 
K Myntti (eds) The Protection of Ethnic and Linguistic Minorities in Europe (Åbo Akademi 
University, Åbo 1993) 23-65, 26). Indeed, the lack of a definition “inevitably gives rise to a broad 
range of interpretations” (Jelena Pejic, ‘Minority Rights in International Law’ (1997) 19 Human Rights 
Quarterly 666-685). Therefore, for the purposes of an effective minority protection regime, a “precise 
definition may serve to minimize controversy by drawing the bounds in a clear fashion”: Malcolm 
Shaw, ‘The Definition of Minorities in International Law’ in Y Dinstein and M Tabory (eds.) The 
Protection of Minorities and Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1992) 1. 
However, it may be difficult to define the term in the context of EU law. Indeed, the supranational 
nature of EU legal system adds to the confusion over the definition of minorities. De Witte argues that 
because there is “no European nation-state, then there can be no ‘national minorities’ in the 
Community framework” (Bruno de Witte ‘The European Communities and its Minorities’ in C 
Brolmann, R Lefeber and M Zieck (eds) People and Minorities in International Law (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, The Hague 1993) 168). This section argues that the possibility of an EU 
definition should not be excluded automatically. 
  
376 Unlike national legal systems, the EU can legislate only in those areas where Treaty provisions 
allow it to act. The legal bases for EU legislation are based on the principle of conferred powers 
(Article 5(1) TEU). Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the 
Member States (Article 4(1) and 5(2) TEU). Even where there is an EU competence, the breadth of 
measures may vary depending on whether these competences are exclusive (Articles 2 and 3 TFEU), 
shared (Article 4 TFEU) or designed to support Member States’ action (Article 5 TFEU) See also 
Declaration No 18 in relation to the delimitation of competences. See generally, Armin von Bogdandy 
and Jürgen Bast, ‘The Federal Order of Competences’ in A von Bogdandy and J Bast (eds) Principles 
of European constitutional law (Hart, Oxford 2010) 275-308; see also Paul Craig, ‘Competence and 
Member State Autonomy: Causality, Consequence and Legitimacy’ (2009) 57 Oxford Legal Studies 
Research Paper 1-38.   
So far, competence on minority protection remains with States. Moreover, the approach of Member 
States ranges from an advanced level of minority protection, such as in Finland and Sweden, to the 
outright denial of the existence of minorities in France and Greece. Therefore, Member State consensus 
to transfer their competences on minority protection to the EU may prove difficult to achieve in 
practice. Given ‘warnings’ issued by some Constitutional Courts of EU Member States to discourage 
EU encroachment upon their competences, it is unlikely that the ECJ may develop a strong 
jurisprudence on minority rights. See, for example, the decision of the German Constitutional Court on 
the Lisbon Treaty, BVerfG, 2BvE 2/08 vom 30 June 2009, Absatz-Nr. (1-421) <http://www.bverfg.de/ 
entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html> accessed 12 March 2010. For analysis see Lars 
Hoffmann, ‘Don’t Let the Sun Go Down on Me: The German Constitutional Court and Its Lisbon 
Judgement’ (2009) 5(3) Journal of Contemporary European Research 482-490. 
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Before the term is defined, however, it may be useful to enquire whether various 
adjectives preceding the term ‘minority’ may impact the content of this term. 
Therefore sub-section 3.1 overviews some aspects of defining ‘national’, 
‘indigenous’, ‘new’, ‘racial’, ‘ethnic’, ‘religious’, ‘linguistic’ and ‘territorial’ 
minorities. The discussion aims to establish how these labels affect the content and 
scope of the definition.  
 
Section 3.2 then deconstructs three influential definitions of ‘minority’ proposed by 
Capotorti,377 Deschenes378 and the PACE.379 Each of the common elements in these 
definitions, including both objective and subjective criteria, is discussed in detail. 
Moreover, the practical implications of some elements in the definition of ‘minority’ 
are demonstrated on the basis of examples from EU Member States’ experience. In 
particular, sub-section 3.2.1 discusses the objective existence of a group as a central 
element of the definition. Sub-section 3.2.2 analyses the requirement of numerical 
minority and non-dominant position, exemplified by the experience of Belgium, 
where numerical majorities at the State level constitute a minority at the regional 
level. Furthermore, sub-section 3.2.3 assesses the necessity of the criterion of 
citizenship. The situation of Russian-speaking non-citizens in Latvia illustrates how 
this requirement may limit the rights of minorities in practice. Finally, sub-section 
3.2.4 studies the subjective element, namely the collective will of a group to preserve 
its cultural identity. In conclusion, a working EU definition of ‘minority’ is proposed. 
                                                 
 
377 Francesco Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities (United Nations, New York 1979) 96. 
 
378 Jules Deschenes, ‘Proposal concerning a definition of the term “minority”’ (1985) 
E/CN4/Sub2/1985/31, 30. 
 
379 Recommendation 1201 (1993) (n 360) Article 1. 
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3.1. Do labels matter? 
 
The lack of an agreed definition of ‘minority’ in international and European law is 
further complicated by various adjectives preceding the term. In the context of EU 
law it is possible to identify some of these ‘labels’. For example, Article 21 CFR 
refers to ‘national’ minorities. Article 2 TEU follows the wording of Article 27 
ICCPR and uses ‘persons belonging to minorities’. Furthermore, under the Directive 
implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial 
or ethnic origin (Race Directive)380 ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ minorities may benefit from 
rules on non-discrimination in the public and private spheres, while the Directive on 
establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation 
(Employment Directive)381 protects ‘religious’ minorities from discrimination in 
employment and vocational training. In addition, the European Parliament (EP)’s 
early resolutions referred to ‘cultural’ and ‘linguistic’ minorities; more recently, the 
EP proposed two motions for resolutions: one concerned traditional ‘old’ minorities 
and another referred to ‘new’ minorities.382  
 
The question is then, do these labels really matter? This sub-section begins with an 
assessment of the term ‘national minority’ (3.1.1); it then compares and contrasts 
‘indigenous people’ with ‘minority’ (3.1.2). ‘New minorities’ are discussed next. 
Given the significance of migration in EU law, this section outlines several types of 
‘new minorities’, such as migrants within the EU, or third country nationals (TCNs), 
                                                 
380 Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41) 22-26. 
 
381 Directive 2000/78/EC (Employment Directive) (n 43). 
  
382 European Parliament, Motion for a ‘Resolution on the protection of traditional national and ethnic 
minorities within the framework of the European Union’, 02 October 2008; Motion for a ‘Resolution 
on the new, migrant minorities in the European Union’, 02 October 2008.  
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who could benefit from a broad definition of ‘minority’ in the context of EU law 
(3.1.3). Next, the discussion turns to assessing which term is broader: ‘ethnic 
minority’, ‘racial minority’ or ‘national minority’. This assessment draws on 
examples from the jurisprudence of English courts, which defined the concept of 
‘race’ broadly. This in turn may have implications for the application of the EU Race 
Directive modelled on the 1976 UK Race Relations Act383 (3.1.4). We then consider 
the notions of ‘religious’ and ‘linguistic’ minorities (3.1.5). The last category is 
‘territorial minorities’ (3.1.6). On the basis of the overall analysis, an assessment is 
made as to which groups should be included in an EU definition of ‘minority.’ 
 
3.1.1. ‘National’ minority 
 
It appears that the concept ‘national minority’ is a “peculiarly European term”.384 The 
term ‘national’ was chosen as a compromise between international and Eastern 
European terminology.385 In Eastern Europe, to avoid a negative connotation of the 
term, the concept of ‘minority’ was substituted for by the term ‘nationality’.386 The 
term is widely used in CoE,387 OSCE388 and EU instruments.389 This practice may be 
                                                 
383 UK Race Relations Act 1976 (c. 74) as amended in 2000 (the Race Relations Amendment Act) and 
in 2003 (to give effect to Directive 2004/43 (Race Directive) (n 41)). 
 
384 John Valentine ‘Toward a Definition of National Minority’ (2004) 32 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 445.  
 
385 Mala Tabory, ‘Minority Rights in the CSCE Context’ in Y Dinstein and M Tabory (eds) The 
protection of minorities and Human Rights (Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Hague 1992) 196. 
 
386 Tabory, ‘Minority Rights in the CSCE Context’ (n 385) 198. 
 
387 FCNM (n 3). 
 
388 Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 
29 June 1990 <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/hd/cope90e.htm> accessed 23 August 
2009. 
 
389 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (n 9) Article 21.  
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explained by the emergence of the concept in Europe. The broader description of 
‘national minorities’ identifies them as the historic minorities that emerged as a result 
of the territorial divisions after the world wars. Kymlicka characterises national 
minorities as groups created as a result of the incorporation of territories into a larger 
State; usually these communities wish to maintain their distinctness within new 
States.390 A more restrictive view of national minorities requires also an external kin-
State element, i.e., a State with similar ethnic roots. National minorities are only those 
groups which were separated from their kin States as a result of the re-drawing of 
boundaries.391 
 
Another distinct feature of national minority protection is their entitlement to political 
participation – “a right historically attached to national minority regimes.”392 
Tomuschat, for example, emphasises a strong political connotation of the term by 
describing ‘national minorities’ as “groups which have become conscious of their 
own identity to such an extent that they seek to become masters of their own fate at 
least partially.”393 The author supports the view that this strong political element is 
the reason for States’ opposition to the inclusion of this concept in international 
instruments. Lerner expresses similar views and explains the absence of the concept 
‘national minorities’ from the text of Article 27 ICCPR by the fear of multinational 
                                                                                                                                            
 
390 Will Kymlicka, ‘The Internationalization of Minority Rights’ (2008) 6 International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 1. 
 
391 Tove Malloy ‘Title and the Preamble’ in M Weller (ed) The Rights of Minorities in Europe (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2005) 51. 
 
392 Rachel Guglielmo and Tim Waters ‘Shifting European Policy Towards Roma’ (2005) 43(4) JCMS 
763-786, 769 (emphasis in original). 
 
393 Nathan Lerner, ‘The Evolution of Minority Rights in International Law’ in C Brolmann, R Lefeber, 
M Zieck (eds) People and Minorities in International Law (Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Hague 
1993) 89. 
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States of allowing secessionist trends.394 Accordingly, the term ‘national minorities’ 
has “an extra dimension, … namely a certain political aspiration for a degree of 
autonomy or even independence.”395 
 
Furthermore, Thornberry clarifies that the term ‘national’ relates to  
personal rather than legal characteristics, in line with ‘ethnic, religious 
and linguistic’ ones, and does not necessarily mean that the standards 
are confined to those having the nationality or citizenship of a State.396 
  
Thus, the concept ‘national’ does not refer to citizenship; rather, the concept ought to 
refer to ethnicity. Furthermore, Helgesen argues that the concept ‘national’ 
corresponds to the wording of Article 27 ICCPR and substitutes for the concept 
‘ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities’.397  
 
Thus, although all minority groups may be entitled to preserve their distinct culture, 
language and/or religion, the requirement of political participation in matters of direct 
concern to them differentiates national minorities from racial, ethnic, linguistic and 
religious groups. In the EU context, the reference to ‘national minorities’ in Article 21 
CFR is in line with Article 14 ECHR and suggests a similar use of the term.  
 
                                                 
394 Lerner ‘The Evolution of Minority Rights in International Law’ (n 393) 89. 
 
395 Annelies Verstichel, ‘Personal Scope of Application: An Open, Inclusive and Dynamic Approach – 
the FCNM as a Living Instrument’ in A Verstichel et al (eds) The Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities: A Useful Pan-European Instrument? (Intersentia, Oxford 2008) 140. 
 
396 Patrick Thornberry ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities: Background, Analysis, Observations, and an Update’ in A Phillips 
and A Rosas (eds) Universal Minority Rights (Abo Akademis tryckeri, Turku and London 1995) 30. 
 
397 Jan Helgesen ‘Protecting Minorities in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) Process’ in A Rosas and J Helgesen (eds) The Strength of Diversity: Human rights and 
Pluralist Democracy (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1992) 164. 
 
 133
3.1.2. ‘Indigenous people’ v ‘minority’ 
 
As with the term ‘minority’, the concept of ‘indigenous peoples’ remains undefined. 
Is there a difference between ‘indigenous peoples’ and ‘minorities’? In addressing this 
question, Kymlicka notes that 
the term ‘indigenous peoples’ arose primarily in the context of New 
World settler states and refers to the descendants of the original non-
European inhabitants of lands colonized and settled by European 
powers. … ‘National minorities,’ by contrast, is a term invented in 
Europe to refer to the European groups that lost out in the tumultuous 
process of European state formation over the past five centuries, and 
whose homelands were incorporated (in whole or in part) into larger 
states dominated by a neighboring European people.398 
 
In explaining the difference in the degree of protection granted to indigenous peoples 
(who have, for example, an explicit right to autonomy)399 and national minorities, 
Kymlicka observes that, because the subjugation of indigenous peoples was more 
disruptive to those societies compared to the treatment of national minorities in 
Europe, the international community gave priority to the protection of the former 
group.400 As a result, in the context of UN standard-setting, a dual track has emerged 
to deal with these two groups.401 It is generally perceived that the approach adopted 
for minority rights has been influenced by European experiences, while rules on 
indigenous rights have formed in the light of developments in the Americas and in the 
Pacific region.402 Furthermore, persons belonging to minorities  
                                                 
398 Kymlicka, ‘The Internationalization of Minority Rights’ (n 390) 8. 
 
399 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) UNGA Resolution 61/295, Article 4. For 
discussion see pages 119-120. 
 
400 Kymlicka, ‘The Internationalization of Minority Rights’ (n 390) 10. 
 
401 Asbjørn Eide, ‘Working paper on the relationship and distinction between the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities and those of indigenous peoples’ (2000) E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/10, 
para 22. 
 
402 Eide, ‘Working paper on the relationship and distinction …’ (n 401) para 25. 
 134
often have several identities and participate actively in the common 
domain. Indigenous rights, on the other hand, tend to consolidate and 
strengthen the separateness of these peoples from other groups in 
society.403  
 
Despite the different contexts and needs of these groups, it is debatable whether a 
clear cut distinction between indigenous people and minorities is useful.404 For 
example, if persons of indigenous origin migrate to urban areas they might be better 
protected under the regime of minority protection, while minorities who live 
compactly together in a certain region of a country may benefit from the degree of 
self-government usually accorded to indigenous people.405 This distinction is even 
less pertinent in the context of European minorities and indigenous peoples protected 
under the umbrella concept of ‘national minorities’. For example, the ACFC 
confirmed that indigenous groups, such as the Sami in Norway, can benefit from 
protection under the FCNM,406 in addition to other instruments that specifically apply 
to indigenous people. Consequently, an EU definition of ‘minority’ should not draw a 
distinction between indigenous people and minorities. The degree of protection 
accorded should depend, not on a label, but on the needs and specific circumstances 
of a group.  
 
 
                                                 
 
403 Eide, ‘Working paper on the relationship and distinction …’ (n 401) para 23. 
 
404 After considering the defining elements of the terms ‘minority’ and ‘indigenous people’, Daes 
concludes that the main legal distinction between these two groups is in the degree of internal self-
determination granted to the latter group: Erica-Irene Daes, ‘Working paper on the relationship and 
distinction between the rights of persons belonging to minorities and those of indigenous peoples’ 
(2000) E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/10, para 43. 
 
405 Eide, ‘Working paper on the relationship and distinction …’ (n 401) para 26. 
 
406 ACFC, ‘First opinion on Norway’ (2002) ACFC/INF/OP/I(2003)003, para 19. 
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3.1.3. ‘New’ minorities 
 
One of the stumbling blocks in defining the concept ‘minority’ is whether the so-
called ‘new’ minorities should be included. Given the controversy surrounding this 
matter, this sub-section assesses whether a definition of ‘minority’ in EU law should 
cover ‘new’ minorities as well. A useful starting point for such assessment is a 
working distinction drawn between ‘old’ and ‘new’ minorities. Thus,  
[o]ld minorities are composed of persons who lived, or whose 
ancestors lived, in the country or a part of it before the state became 
independent or before the boundaries were drawn in the way they are 
now. New minorities are composed of persons who have come in after 
the state became independent.407 
 
This latter category includes migrant workers, as well as new groups of minorities that 
appeared in the process of State dissolution and succession. As to migrant workers, 
there is a “broad assumption that since they have decided to immigrate of their own 
free will, they should generally accept the cultural and linguistic make-up of the 
country in which they now want to settle.”408 However, the fact that someone left 
behind their country for economic or political reasons, does not mean that they can 
easily give up their identity.409 Besides, even though migrants are protected under 
other international rules,410 they may still benefit from the protection accorded to 
                                                 
 
407 Asbjørn Eide, ‘The Rights of ‘Old’ versus ‘New’ Minorities’ (2002/2003) 2 European Yearbook of 
Minority Issues 365-379, 365. 
 
408 Eide, ‘The Rights of ‘Old’ versus ‘New’ Minorities’ (n 407) 366. 
 
409 Verstichel, ‘Personal Scope of Application…’ (n 395) 148. 
 
410 For example, the right to education of migrant workers is protected under the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination (adopted 21 December 1965, entered 
into force 4 January 1969) UNGA Resolution 2106 (XX), Article 5; International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990) A/RES/45/158, 
Article 30 (children’s education), Articles 43(1)(a) and 45(1)(a) (adult education); ILO Convention no 
97 on Migration for Employment (adopted 1 July 1949, entered into force 22 January 1952) 120 UNTS 
70, Article 6; ILO Convention no 143 on Migrant Workers (adopted 24 June 1975, entered into force 
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traditional minorities. Indeed, a certain parallel can be drawn here with indigenous 
people, protected both under the FCNM and other specialised instruments. As the 
ACFC emphasises, “it is not because certain groups can enjoy the protection of other 
legal regimes, that they cannot enjoy the protection of the FCNM.”411 In addition, 
international instruments on the protection of migrant workers place increasingly 
strong emphasis on the protection of their cultural identity.412 Therefore, groups that 
constitute a ‘new’ minority and wish to preserve their distinct cultural identity should 
be afforded the protection available under relevant international and regional 
instruments.413  
 
In addition, States often rely on the term ‘new’ minority to avoid granting protection 
to unwanted groups. For example, Slovenia refuses to offer protection equivalent to 
that available to the traditional Italian and Hungarian minorities to ‘new’ minorities 
originating from other parts of the former Yugoslavia, such as ethnic Serbs, Croats, 
Bosnians, Kosovo Albanians and Roma from Kosovo and Albania.414 The ACFC has 
strongly criticised such a restrictive interpretation and encouraged Slovenia to adopt a 
“more inclusive approach in order to better respond to the established reality on the 
                                                                                                                                            
09 December 1978) Article 8(2); European Convention on Establishment (1955) ETS No 19, Article 20 
(the right to education of migrants’ children); European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant 
Workers (1977) ETS No 93, Article 14 (adult education); and Council (EEC) Regulation No 1612/68 
on freedom of movement for workers within the Community [1968] OJ L 257/2, Article 12.  
For discussion see Marianne Van Den Bosch and Willem Van Genugten, ‘International Legal 
Protection of Migrant Workers, National Minorities and Indigenous Peoples – Comparing Underlying 
Concepts’ (2002) 9 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 195-233. 
 
411 Verstichel, ‘Personal Scope of Application…’ (n 395) 149. 
 
412 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families (1990) UN Doc A/Res/45/158, Article 12 on freedom of religion and Article 31 on 
respect for cultural identity. 
 
413 Rudiger Wolfrum, ‘The Emergence of “New Minorities” as a result of Migration’ in C Brolmann, R 
Lefeber and M Zieck (eds) Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht 1993) 165. 
 
414 Ringelheim, ‘Minority Protection and Constitutional Recognition of Difference…’ (n 19) 42. 
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ground.”415 In general, the ACFC adopts a so-called article-by-article approach, 
where some provisions (for example, Article 11(3) FCNM) apply to ‘old’ minorities, 
while ‘new’ minorities could benefit from others (Articles 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 FCNM).416 
                                                
 
In the EU context, there are two possible groups that may fall into this category: 
migrant workers within the EU and Third Country Nationals (TCNs). In EU law, 
freedom of movement and freedom of establishment encourage EU citizens to reside 
in Member States other than their State of origin. May these groups of migrants, 
which are numerically fewer than the majority population, be classified then as 
possible EU minorities? As discussed above, some commentators argue that migrant 
workers should benefit from the regime of minority protection.417 Furthermore, it is 
suggested that these groups would comprise a minority in a host Member State 
because of their cultural differences from the majority of the population.418  
 
However, it is important to note some differences between migration within the EU 
and from third countries. Often EU migrants are not disadvantaged in comparison 
with the majority of the population in a host State, as EU citizenship offers them 
considerable legal safeguards in access to, for example, social rights and education. 
 
 
415 ACFC, ‘Second opinion on Slovenia’ (2005) ACFC/INF/OP/II(2005)005, para 39. 
 
416 Rianne Letschert, ‘Successful Integration while Respecting Diversity; ‘Old’ Minorities versus ‘New 
Minorities’ (2007) 1 Helsinki Monitor: Security and Human Rights 46-56, 50. 
 
417 Wolfrum, ‘The Emergence of “New Minorities” as a result of Migration’ (n 413); Gwendolyn Sasse 
‘Policies towards Minorities and Migrants in Europe’ (2005) 43(4) JCMS 673-693; Ryszard 
Cholewinski ‘Migrants as Minorities: Integration and Inclusion in the Enlarged European Union’ 
(2005) 43(4) JCMS 695-716. 
 
418 Gabriel Toggenburg, “Minorities ‘…’ the European Union: is the Missing Link an ‘of’ or a 
‘within’?” (2003) 25 (3) Journal of European Integration 273-284, 276; see also, Bruno de Witte ‘The 
European Communities and its Minorities’ in C Brölmann, R Lefeber, M Zieck (eds) People and 
Minorities in International Law (Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Hague 1993) 167-185. 
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Moreover, these groups should not suffer discrimination based on their nationality,419 
although they may encounter linguistic barriers as ‘traditional’ minorities sometimes 
do.420 Their European citizenship also gives them limited political rights, such as the 
ability to vote in elections for the European Parliament.  
 
In addition, the EU has offered some protection to preserve migrant workers’ cultures 
by, for example, enacting the Directive on the education of the children of migrant 
workers.421 According to the Directive, Member States are required both to integrate 
the children of migrant workers into the educational environment and facilities of the 
host State, and to facilitate their learning of their parents’ mother-tongue and culture. 
However, it has proved difficult to put this Directive into practice and the instrument 
remaines amongst the most under-implemented of EU instruments.422 This shows that 
Member States prefer migrants to be assimilated. Even though EU law provides 
significant guarantees for migrants within the EU, it is desirable that migrant workers, 
whose needs genuinely shifted from a mere economic activity to the preservation of 
the cultural, religious and linguistic identity of their groups, should not be denied 
minority status.423 
 
                                                 
 
419 Article 18 TFEU (ex-Article 12 TEC). 
 
420 Case C-379/87 Anita Gröener v Minister for Education and City of Dublin Vocational Education 
Committee [1989] ECR 3967. 
 
421 Council (EEC) Directive 77/486 on the education of the children of migrant workers [1977] OJ 
L199/32. 
 
422 de Witte, ‘The European Communities and its Minorities’ (n 418) 182. 
 
423 Wolfrum argues that immigrant workers may benefit from the protection of Article 27 ICCPR if 
they can demonstrate that they have preserved their identity on the territory of a host State for a certain 
time: Wolfrum, ‘The Emergence of “New Minorities” as a result of Migration’ (n 413) 163. 
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Another trend in the literature is to identify TCNs as EU minorities,424 because they 
are numerically fewer than the citizens of the EU. It is argued that because of their 
underprivileged situation, the most logical group to qualify as an EU minority is 
TCNs.425 Staples defines TCNs as  
nationals from non-Member State countries who have been authorised 
to take up residence and pursue an economic activity in one of the 
Member States of the European Union in accordance with that Member 
State’s immigration legislation and who have benefited from these 
rights over a period of time.426 
 
Thus, unlike migrant workers who come from other EU Member States, TCNs, 
predominantly immigrants and refugees, come from outside of the EU, and thus do 
not hold EU citizenship. Because under Article 8 TFEU (ex-Article 17(1) TEC) EU 
citizenship is additional to national citizenship and does not replace it, the legal status 
of TCNs depends on national legislation, international arrangements between their 
country of origin and the EU Member States and the Schengen measures.427 
Interestingly, Article 8 TFEU changed a reference to EU citizenship in Article 17(1) 
TEC from complimentary to additional to a Member State’s citizenship. Even though 
this wording may prove potent in the ECJ’s future case law, it may still be difficult to 
offer protection to TCNs, as this fragmented group lacks a united identity. 
 
                                                 
424 Steve Peers, ‘“New” Minorities: What Status for Third Country Nationals in the EU system?’ in G 
Toggenburg (ed) Minority protection and the enlarged European Union: the way forward (OSI/LGI, 
Budapest 2004). 
 
425 Toggenburg, ‘Minorities ‘…’ the European Union: is the Missing Link an ‘of’ or a ‘within’?’ (n 
418) 277; see also, de Witte, ‘The European Communities and its Minorities’ (n 418) 185. 
 
426 H Staples, The Legal Status of Third Country Nationals Resident in the European Union (Kluwer 
law International, The Hague 1999) 12. 
 
427 Protocol (No 19) on the Schengen acquis integrated into the framework of the European Union 
[2010] OJ C 83/290.  
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Nevertheless, an effort was made to link TCNs with the EU level. The 1999 European 
Council in Tampere recommended conferring on legally-residing TCNs, who hold 
long-term residence permits, “a set of uniform rights which are as near as possible to 
those enjoyed by EU citizens.”428 These rights would include the rights to residence, 
education and employment, as well as the right not to be discriminated against vis-à-
vis the citizens of a host State. Based on these recommendations, in 2003, the Long-
Term Residents Directive was adopted to address the rights of TCNs.429 One striking 
feature of the Directive is the requirement for TCNs to comply with integration 
conditions set by Member States in their national legislation.430 Such requirements 
may often aim to assimilate newcomers through demanding knowledge of national 
language and culture, while recent approaches to minority rights have been mainly 
perceived as protection from forced “state-imposed assimilation”.431 Therefore, the 
Directive may not be appropriate for the protection of minority rights. 
 
Another instrument that may indirectly prevent discrimination against TCNs is the 
Race Directive.432 However, TCNs may only invoke the Race Directive if they can 
demonstrate that they were discriminated against based on their racial or ethnic origin, 
not their nationality or immigration status.433 Thus, Article 3(2) of the Race Directive 
                                                 
 
428 European Council, Tampere Summit Conclusions, 15-16 October 1999 <http://www.statewatch.org/ 
news/2003/sep/tamp.htm> accessed 12 September 2008. For criticism see Louise Halleskov, ‘The 
Long-Term Residents Directive: A Fulfilment of the Tampere Objective of Near-Equality? (2005) 7 
European Journal of Migration and Law 181-201. 
 
429 Directive 2003/109 (Long-Term Residents Directive) (n 42). 
 
430 Directive 2003/109 (Long-Term Residents Directive) (n 42) Article 5(2). 
 
431 Mária Kovács, ‘Standards of self-determination and standards of minority-rights in the post-
communist era: a historical perspective’ (2003) 9(3) Nations and Nationalism 433-450, 437. 
 
432 Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41). 
 
433 Peers, ‘“New” Minorities: What Status for Third Country Nationals in the EU system?’ (n 424) 158. 
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stipulates that the instrument does not cover differences in treatment on the basis of 
nationality. Moreover, it is without prejudice to provisions and conditions relating to 
the entry into and residence of TCNs and stateless persons on the territory of Member 
States, and to any treatment which arises from the legal status of the TCNs and 
stateless persons concerned. Because race and nationality are often intertwined, 
arguably, the Race Directive may perpetuate double standards in relation to TCNs.434 
 
Despite some similar problems that both TCNs and minorities may face, such as 
language, citizenship and enjoyment of political rights, it is sometimes argued that the 
regimes for their protection should be kept separate. For example, the EP emphasised 
that, although migrants and overseas minorities may share the disadvantages of 
linguistic minorities, “their specific problems deserve detailed and separate 
treatment.”435 However, in some ways such a distinction is artificial. In 2008, the EP 
adopted two motions for resolution: one concerned traditional ‘old’ minorities, and 
the other, ‘new’ minorities. Yet, on closer inspection, similarities can be found in the 
preamble and some provisions of the resolutions.436 This is not surprising because in 
many respects these two groups may have to tackle similar issues. For example, Van 
Den Bosch and Van Genugten compared the regimes of migrant and minority groups’ 
protection with an emphasis on citizenship, access to education in mother tongue, and 
                                                                                                                                            
 
434 Fernne Brennan, ‘The Race Directive, Institutional Racism and Third Country Nationals’ in T Takis 
and P Nebbia (eds) European Union Law for the Twenty-First Century (Vol 2) (Hart, Oxford 2004) 
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435 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the Languages and Cultures of Regional and Ethnic Minorities 
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436 For example, the preambles of both resolutions have regards to Articles 13 TEC (now Article 19 
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voting rights.437 They conclude that both groups face similar problems.438 For 
example, the right to vote is tied to citizenship, the acquisition of which may be 
lengthy and equally difficult for both migrants and minorities.  
 
Admittedly, before a ‘new’ minority is firmly established in a State it may have 
different needs, such as non-discrimination in education and employment. This, 
however, should not affect the definition of ‘minority’. After all, the labels ‘new’ and 
‘old’ are “expressions of a rather relative and arbitrary parameter, namely the lapse of 
time.”439 Therefore, positive State action to protect a group’s identity may be afforded 
based on a sliding scale, depending on the needs of a group. 
 
With the process of European integration, which encourages migration and leads to a 
higher degree of inter-ethnic mixture among Europeans, it is argued that any 
distinction between ‘new’ (migrant workers and non-citizens) and ‘old’ (traditional) 
minorities should be eliminated.440 This is so because not only may long-term 
migrants gradually become ‘old’ minorities, but also members of ‘old’ minorities may 
exercise their right to free movement in the EU and become part of a ‘new’ 
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minority.441 Furthermore, in Nowak’s view in such multicultural society it will be 
“difficult to justify why only long-established ‘old minorities’ should enjoy special 
protection”442. Similarly, Arzoz argues that undeniably “it is politically very 
advantageous that the European Union, in the twenty-first century, commits itself to a 
basic common standard applicable to every kind of minority, be it ‘old’ or ‘new’.”443 
Ultimately, this distinction “drawn between minorities and immigrants”, as Kurban 
maintains, “rests upon an unjustified and arbitrary categorisation, legally explicable as 
it may be.”444 Indeed, ‘new’ minorities may also wish not to be assimilated in their 
host States, but to preserve and cultivate their cultural, linguistic and religious 
characteristics. Therefore, an EU definition should not contain the distinction between 
‘new’ and ‘old’ minorities. Ideally, rights granted to a minority, whether ‘new’ or 
‘old’, should be tailored to the specific needs of a group.   
 
3.1.4. ‘Ethnic’ v ‘racial’ v ‘national’ minorities 
 
This sub-section aims to clarify which of the terms ‘ethnic’, ‘racial’ or ‘national’ is 
the broadest. In this respect, a generous interpretation of the term ‘ethnic’ minority in 
the UN context is contrasted to the equally broad use of ‘racial’ in the UK. Because 
the EU Race Directive uses both terms, with an emphasis on ‘race’, the experience of 
British courts in defining this term is briefly overviewed.   
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Until the 1950s, the UN mainly used the term ‘racial’ minorities, with a subsequent 
focus on ‘ethnic’ minorities, because the latter term is “wider in referring to all 
biological, cultural and historical characteristics, whereas the former term seem[s] to 
be restricted to inherited physical characteristics.”445 Because in the UN context the 
term ‘ethnic’ is the broadest term available,446 other terms, such as ‘racial’ and 
‘national’, are subsumed under this umbrella term,447 without affecting the defining 
features of ‘minority.’ Thus, “we witness different uses of terms and not different 
meanings.”448 
 
In the EU context, the use of ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ is combined under the Race 
Directive, which is preferable, as it may “prevent potentially undesirable gaps 
regarding the field of application.”449 However, it is not yet clear whether these terms 
also include ‘national minorities’, because none of these terms are defined in the Race 
Directive. It is probably only a matter of time before the ECJ is asked to clarify the 
scope of the instrument’s application. Furthermore, the presence of the term ‘national 
minorities’ in the CFR may suggest that a different use of the terms might have been 
                                                 
 
445 Malcolm Shaw, ‘The Definition of Minorities in International Law’ in Y Dinstein and M Tabory 
(eds) The Protection of Minorities and Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1992) 
17. 
 
446 For various recommendations concerning a definition of ‘minority’ see the United Nations Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (SCPDPM) (1950) 
UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/119, para 31 and 32; see also (1951) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/140/Annex I/ Draft 
res 11 and (1952) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/149, para 26. 
 
447 P Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991) 161. 
 
448 G Pentassuglia, Minorities in International Law: an Introductory Study (Council of Europe 
Publishing, London 2002) 63. 
 
449 K Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, 
Minority Rights, and the Right to Self-determination (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 2000) 
49; Shaw, ‘The Definition of Minorities in International Law’ (n 445) 17. 
 145
intended. Nonetheless, there is nothing to prevent a national minority that shares a 
common ethnic origin from relying on the provisions of the Race Directive.  
 
Given that the EU Race Directive was modelled on the UK Race Relations Act 
(RRA)450 it may be useful to overview briefly the UK’s approach to the definition of 
minorities. In interpreting the concept of ‘national’ minority under the FCNM, the UK 
adopted a broad reading of the concept ‘racial group’ under the RRA, which allowed 
the inclusion of ‘national minorities’ in the scope of this instrument.451 Such a 
definition is in line with the defining criteria established in Mandla v Dowell Lee.452 
A Sikh boy was refused admission to a school because he did not comply with the 
school’s rules regarding a uniform. In accordance with the Sikh tradition, his father 
insisted that his son should wear a turban over uncut hair, which was contrary to the 
school uniform rules. The headmaster refused to make an exception, and the 
applicants claimed indirect discrimination under the RRA. For the RRA to apply, it 
was essential to establish that Sikhs are a distinct ethnic group. Lord Fraser suggested 
a test on how to define the concept of ‘ethnic origins.’ His test consisted of two 
essential and five relevant characteristics.  
The essential characteristics are the following: 
- a long shared history, of which the group is conscious as distinguishing 
it from other groups, and the memory of which keeps it alive; 
- a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and 
manners, often, but not necessarily, associated with religious observance; 
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Relevant characteristics are: 
- either a common geographical origin, or descent from a small number 
of common ancestors; 
- a common language, not necessarily peculiar to a group;  
- a common literature peculiar to the group; 
- a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups or from 
the general community surrounding it; 
- being a minority, or being an oppressed or dominant group within a 
larger community. 
 
It was established that under this test the Sikhs are a distinct ethnic group, because 
they are a self-conscious community with a common history dating back to the 15th 
century, with a common language, and a common religion. Based on this test, 
members of the ‘traveller’ community were also recognised as an ethnic group 
because they share a common history, geographical origin, customs and folk tales and 
music.453  
 
Accordingly, in interpreting the concepts ‘race’ and ‘ethnic origin’, the EU may draw 
on the experience of the British courts, which have interpreted these terms broadly, 
and even included the concept of ‘national’ minority under the FCNM. However, the 
British experience reveals that this definition has certain deficiencies. For example, it 
may inevitably exclude religious minorities, as discussed below.  
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3.1.5. ‘Religious’ and ‘linguistic’ minorities 
 
This sub-section sheds light on difficulties in defining religious and linguistic 
minorities. In particular, we draw on the experience of British courts in defining 
‘racial’ groups, which exclude some groups with a common religion from the scope of 
the RRA. Given that the EU Race Directive was modelled on the RRA, we assess the 
implications of the EU following this practice. The sub-section is concluded with a 
brief overview of problems in identifying linguistic groups. 
 
At first sight, it may seem easy to identify a ‘religious’ minority. A ‘religious’ 
minority is a group “the members of which are united by a common belief.”454 
However, on closer inspection it appears that the lack of a clear dividing line between 
‘religion’ and other spiritual practices causes problems in identifying relevant groups. 
Furthermore, different denominations may emerge within the main belief system 
which may cause further controversy.455  
 
Moreover, religious minorities “do not fit strictly into the characteristics of 
spontaneity and permanency. One’s religion can be changed by a voluntary act, which 
is not the case with race, color, language – relatively – and culture.”456 If an 
individual opts out of belonging to a religious minority, his/her individual freedom of 
religion is protected under Article 18 ICCPR. In contrast, Article 27 addresses the 
problems of minority religious communities, i.e., the “establishment and maintenance 
                                                 
454 Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection… (n 449) 51. 
 
455 Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection… (n 449) 51. 
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of religious institutions and schools and the protection of religious rites and holy 
places…”457 Furthermore, there is  
                                                
nothing to suggest that the religious rights that are recognized, e.g. 
under article 27 of the CCPR, are contingent on the prior existence of 
the religion. The focal point is the existence of persons wishing to 
profess their religion rather than the types of religions that are 
professed.458 
 
Where the EU Race Directive is concerned, it appears that groups that share a 
common ethnic origin and a common religion, such as the Sikhs, may benefit from the 
extensive provisions of this instrument, while groups that share only a common belief 
may be excluded. Let us turn to another example from the jurisprudence of English 
courts. In Crown Suppliers v Dawkins,459 a Rastafarian who wore his hair in 
dreadlocks was refused employment by a government agency when he did not cut his 
hair. To establish whether the applicant was discriminated against based on his race, it 
was essential to decide whether Rastafarians comprise a distinct ethnic group. An 
industrial tribunal applied the test in the Mandla case and concluded that Rastafarians 
who shared common history only for sixty years did not form a distinct ethnic group. 
The length of the period was relevant here because although Rastarfarians could be 
regarded as a separate group, they were not identified as distinct by reference to their 
ethnic origin.460 Similarly Muslims do not comprise an ethnic group because they 
have different nationalities, colour and languages.461  
 
 
457 Shaw, ‘The Definition of Minorities in International Law’ (n 445) 19; Thornberry, International 
Law and the Rights of Minorities (n 447) 192.  
 
458 E Gayim, The Concept of Minority in International Law: a Critical Study of the Vital Elements 
(University of Lapland, Rovaniemi 2001) 49. 
 
459 Crown Suppliers (Property Services Agency) v Dawkins [1993] ICR 517. 
 
460 Crown Suppliers v Dawkins (n 459). 
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 Even where a religious group is protected under the Employment Directive, the scope 
of such protection is limited to employment only. Recent reforms proposed by the 
Commission to expand the scope of the Employment Directive in order to match the 
Race Directive are significant developments in this respect and may ensure equal 
treatment of religious minorities who do not share a common ethnic origin, not only 
in employment, but also in education. Religious minorities are often in a vulnerable 
position in Europe, because they are also ‘new’ minorities. To prevent discrimination 
against these groups, it is important to follow the practice of the ACFC, which 
confirmed that, for the purposes of the FCNM, ‘religious’ minorities are also 
‘national’ minorities.462  
 
As to linguistic minorities, they are easily identifiable by a common language. 
However, problems may arise in identifying and protecting such groups “where 
multiple languages are spoken and where a variety of dialects exist.”463 In States with 
multiple languages, if groups satisfy other defining criteria of ‘minority’ (discussed 
below in sub-section 3.2 on pages 155-182), all of these languages may require 
protection. However, if one of them develops into a lingua franca in the public 
domain, it may lose the status of a ‘linguistic’ minority.464 As to dialects, a pragmatic 
approach is necessary depending on the particular circumstances of a group and the 
principle of proportionality.465  
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 Accordingly, an EU definition of ‘minority’ should not be based on differences 
between racial, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities. Rather their protection 
should be tailored to their needs based on the rights discussed in Sections 1 and 2 of 
this chapter.   
 
3.1.6. ‘Territorial’ minorities 
 
Various terms are used to denote situations where States accord collective rights to a 
minority group through granting varying degrees of autonomy, such as ‘stateless 
nations’, ‘nations without states’ or ‘minority nations’, i.e., groups that, “in spite of 
having their territories included within the boundaries of one or more States, by and 
large do not identify with them.”466 This thesis will use the term ‘territorial’ 
minorities to include not only these groups, but also groups which acquired or strive 
to receive various degrees of autonomy.                                 
                                                
 
Catalans are a good example of a ‘territorial’ minority. Catalonia became one of 17 
autonomous regions of Spain under the 1978 Spanish Constitution. Under the Spanish 
Constitution decentralisation of powers to Autonomous Communities may be 
characterised as a “right and not an obligation, political in content, limited in its 
scope, gradual in its exercise and not necessarily homogeneous in its final result, to be 
exercised by equally heterogeneous subjects.”467 Thus, decentralisation takes place 
 
 
466 Montserrat Guibernau, ‘Nations without States: Political Communities in the Global Age’ (2004) 25 
Michigan Journal of International Law 1251, 1254; see also, Pau Puig i Scotoni, ‘Exercising Self-
Determination without Jeopardising the Rights of the Others: the Catalan Model’ (2001) 14 Saint 
Thomas Law Review 395-409, 397.  
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where a State delegates limited powers from the centre to the periphery, “subject to 
the control and overriding responsibility of the centre.”468  
 
By decentralising the State, Spain met the increasing demands of its territorial 
minorities, i.e., those residing in Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia, for 
autonomy. However, in addition to granting regional autonomy to its “historically 
distinct peoples with long-standing aspirations to autonomy,”469 Spain created other 
administrative units which lacked such identity, for example, Madrid. Although the 
degree of powers conferred on various Autonomous Communities varies depending 
on their history and demands, the effects of this universal Spanish devolution470 
dilutes the significance of regional autonomy granted to territorial minorities. 
Moreover, Article 2 of the 1978 Constitution asserts ‘the indivisible unity of the 
Spanish Nation’, while acknowledging “the right to autonomy of the nationalities and 
regions which form it and the solidarity among them.”471 Such a formulation, 
indicative of Spain’s centrist historic past and quasi-federalist present, denies formal 
recognition of territorial minorities’ identities.  
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Moreover, in the mid-1990s, a trend emerged in other autonomous regions which 
amended their statutes to declare themselves ‘nationalities’, despite the fact that this 
term clearly referred only to the historic three nations, i.e., Catalan, Basque and 
Galician.472 This resulted in Catalonia’s demands for recognition as a ‘nation’.473  By 
insisting on ‘national autonomy’ as opposed to ‘regional autonomy’, Catalonia tries to 
emphasise that it remains a “cultural nation if not a sovereign state.”474  
 
If, under this pressure, Spain recognises Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia as 
nations, it would have to re-conceptualise the notion of ‘nation’ under Article 2 of the 
1978 Spanish Constitution. This, in turn, could lead to acceptance of the idea that 
Spain is a “nation of nations”475, which could impact on its approach to minority 
protection. Currently, Spain denies that there are minorities within its territory, except 
for the ethnic Roma population.476 As a result, there are no policies to protect 
minority cultures and languages at the central level.  
                                                
 
This, however, is partially compensated for by the Autonomous Communities’ powers 
over matters such as culture and education. For example, Catalonia has developed 
 
472 Michael Keating, ‘Federalism and the Balance of Power in European States’ (OECD, Sigma 2007) 
21. 
 
473 Keating, ‘Federalism and the Balance of Power in European States’ (n 472) 21. 
 
474 Michael Kelly, ‘Political Downsizing: the Re-emergence of Self-Determination, and the Movement 
Towards Smaller, Ethnically Homogenous States’ (1998-1999) 47 Drake Law Review 209-278, 232. 
 
475 Montserrat Guibernau, ‘Between autonomy and secession: the accommodation of Catalonia within 
the new democratic Spain’ (2002) ESRC “One Europe or Several?” Working Paper 48/02, 17. 
 
476 Eduardo Ruiz Vieytez ‘Federalism, Subnational Constitutional Arrangements, and the Protection of 
Minorities in Spain’ in A Tarr, R Williams and J Marko (eds) Federalism, Subnational Constitutions, 
and Minority Rights (Praeger, London 2004). 
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policies to protect autochthonous languages and cultures.477 Moreover, within 
Catalonia, the language of education is Catalan, as part of an effort to assert the 
national identity of the region.478 Accordingly, by permitting a group to govern 
matters of special concern to them, such as culture, language and education, 
decentralisation allows protection of minority rights through a combination of 
individual and collective rights.   
 
To conclude, as the above overview of various types of minorities illustrates, there are 
different groups that may be protected under the umbrella concept of ‘minority’. 
Although not all of them may need an identical level of protection, this should not 
lead to different categories of minorities, which may create further confusion in this 
complicated area of law. In addition, such a categorisation of minorities may allow 
States to evade “their obligations by using different designations for groups that could 
be considered minorities, such as ‘aboriginal’, ‘immigrant’ or whatever.”479 Even the 
ACFC emphasises that applicability of the FCNM “does not necessarily mean that the 
authorities should in their domestic legislation and practice use the term ‘national 
minority’ to describe the group concerned.”480 However, the protection accorded to 
such groups under the regime of minority protection (discussed in Sections 1 and 2 of 
this Chapter) is based on a sliding scale of rights, including the “origin of their 
                                                 
477 Vieytez ‘Federalism, Subnational Constitutional Arrangements…’ (n 476) 150; see also, Giovanni 
Poggeschi, ‘Linguistic Rights in Spain’ in S Trifunovska and F de Varennes (eds) Minority Rights in 
Europe: European Minorities and Languages (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2001) 85-101. 
 
478 Keating, ‘Federalism and the Balance of Power in European States’ (n 472). 
 
479 Jennifer Preece, ‘National minority rights vs. state sovereignty in Europe: changing norms in 
international relations?’ (1997) 3(3) Nations and Nationalism 345-364, 348; see also the ACFC’s 
criticism of State practice of narrowing personal and territorial scope of the FCNM’s application: ‘First 
Opinion on Denmark’ (n 75); ‘Second Opinion on Denmark’ (2004) ACFC/INF/OP/II(2004)005; 
PACE, ‘Minority Protection in Europe: Best Practices and Deficiencies in Implementation of Common 
Standards’ (2010) Doc 12109, paras 69-72. 
 
480 ACFC, ‘First Opinion on Norway’ (n 406) para 19. 
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situation, length of stay in a particular country, and the reasonableness of a minority 
preserving and protecting its own culture.’”481 Accordingly, the present thesis aims to 
look beyond labels and focus on the essence of the definition of ‘minority’. 
 
3.2. What are the defining elements of the term ‘minority’? 
 
What constitutes a ‘minority’ for the purposes of EU law? To address this question, 
the sub-section, first, outlines the three most-quoted proposals on the definition of 
‘minority’.482 These definitions are then deconstructed and the common elements in 
all three proposals are discussed in detail with the aim of defining the term in the EU 
context.  
 
                                                 
 
481 Working Group on Minorities (1996) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/28, 26. 
 
482 In the thematic comment on the rights of minorities, the EU Network of Independent Experts on 
Fundamental Rights (‘Thematic Comment No 3 (n 15)) emphasised that even though they are not 
legally binding, the definitions proposed by Mr Francesco Capotorti (Study on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (n 377), and Mr Jules Deschenes ‘Proposal 
concerning a definition of the term “minority”’ (n 378) under Article 27 ICCPR for the UN Sub-
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities are very influential. 
Similarly, a definition suggested by the PACE in Article 1 of  the 1993 Recommendation 1201 (n 360) 
is used as a reference to determine the meaning of the notion of a ‘minority’.   
Placing the definition in the EU context, the Network acknowledged that the concept of a ‘minority’ 
may be subject to diverse interpretations in different Member States; therefore, it did not offer its own 
definition. Nevertheless, even though the approaches of Member States differ, this does not exclude the 
possibility of identifying a meaning of the term on the basis of a consensus between the Member 
States, “insofar as it is based on the acquis of international and European human rights law” (Thematic 
Comment No 3, 11). The main instrument constituting such an acquis is the FCNM. Even though the 
FCNM does not define the concept of a ‘minority’, the Network considered that a clear message by the 
EU and its institutions, committing themselves to comply with the FCNM would affirm their 
willingness to respect, protect and promote the rights of minorities. Regrettably, the Network did not 
specify how such compliance can take place without relevant EU competences to protect minorities, 
and limited itself to suggesting that such a clarification could take the form of an inter-institutional 
declaration or a communication by the Commission. Overall, even though the Network did not define 
the term ‘minority’ in the context of EU law, it is commendable that it advocated the need for its 
clarification. 
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The most widely quoted definition in the literature483 was proposed by Capotorti: 
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in 
a non-dominant position, whose members – being nationals of the state 
– possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from 
those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense 
of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, 
religion or language.484 
 
A less successful, yet quite influential definition,485 strongly resembling Capotorti’s 
proposal, was suggested by Deschenes: 
A group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in 
a non-dominant position in that state, endowed with ethnic, religious or 
linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the 
population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if 
only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to 
achieve equality with the majority in fact and law.486 
 
At the European level, the PACE’s non-legally binding proposal in Recommendation 
1201 has been widely cited by commentators:487  
… the expression ‘national minority’ refers to a group of persons in a 
state who: 
 reside on the territory of that state and are citizens thereof; 
 maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with that state; 
                                                 
483 Philip Vuciri Ramaga, ‘The Bases of Minority Identity’ (1992) 14(3) Human Rights Quarterly  409-
428, 410; Patrick Thornberry, ‘Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of 
International Instruments’ (1989) 38 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 867-889, 878; 
Geoff Gilbert, ‘The Council of Europe and Minority Rights’ (1996) 18(1) Human Rights Quarterly 
160-189, 164; Thomas Simon, ‘Minorities in International Law’ (1997) 2 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence 507-519, 512. 
 
484 Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
(n 377) 96.  
 
485 Michael Geroe and Thomas Gump, ‘Hungary and a New Paradigm for the Protection of Ethnic 
Minorities in Central and Eastern Europe (1995) 32 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 673-705, 
674; Jean-Paul Schreuder, ‘Minority Protection Within the Concept of Self-Determination’ (1995) 8 
Leiden Journal of International Law 53-80, 55; Adina Preda, ‘The Principle of Self-Determination and 
National Minorities’ (2003) 27 Dialectical Anthropology 205-226, 213. 
 
486 Deschenes, ‘Proposal concerning a definition of the term “minority”’ (n 378) 30. 
 
487 Stephen Deets, ‘Reconsidering East European Minority Policy: Liberal Theory and European 
Norms’ (2002) 16 East European Politics and Societies 30-53, 44; Martin Alexanderson, ‘The Need for 
a Generalised Application of the Minorities Regime in Europe’ (1997) 8 Helsinki Monitor 47-58, 55; 
Stephen Deets, ‘Liberal Pluralism: Does the West Have Any to Export?’ (2002) 4 Journal on 
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 1-12, 2. 
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 display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic 
characteristics; 
 are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than 
the rest of the population of that state or of a region of that 
state; 
 are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which 
constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their 
traditions, their religion or their language.488 
 
There are certain common features present in all three definitions. These features may 
be divided into objective (identified externally) and subjective characteristics 
(intrinsic to a group).  
 
Objective elements include: 
- A group 
- Non-dominant position 
- Numerical minority 
- Citizenship/nationality of a State, as well as the requirement of 
maintaining long-standing, firm and lasting ties with the State. 
 
The subjective element is:  
- a sense of solidarity to preserve a minority identity. 
 
The following discussion will analyse each element in turn and evaluate its 
appropriateness for inclusion in an EU definition of ‘minority’.   
 
 
                                                 
 
488 Recommendation 1201 (1993) (n 360) Article 1. 
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3.2.1. The existence of a distinct group 
 
This sub-section deals with the existence of a group as a central element of the 
definition. In international law, the “notion of group requires the presence of … 
unifying, spontaneous (as opposed to artificial or planned) and permanent factors that 
are, as a rule, beyond the control of the members of the group.”489 Accordingly, a 
minority group can be characterised “by common descent and kinship. It follows that 
no person can become a member of an ethnic community just by declaring his 
sympathy or personal liking for that group.”490 At the same time, if group members 
do not wish to be regarded as a minority, their treatment as a distinct group would be 
a violation of the individual rights of its members.491 As Article 3(1) FCNM states,  
                                                
[e]very person belonging to a national minority shall have the right 
freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such and no 
disadvantage shall result from this choice or from the exercise of the 
rights which are connected to that choice. 
 
Moreover, the existence of a minority is a matter of fact, and is not determined by 
law, as established by the PCIJ in 1930.492 The HRC confirmed this rule in its General 
Comment on Article 27 ICCPR.493 Even though in practice an official act of 
recognition of a minority group may significantly facilitate its protection, such an act 
is not decisive to determine a minority’s existence in a State. Otherwise, States could 
 
489 Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law (n 456) 107. 
 
490 Kay Hailbronner, ‘The Legal Status of Population Groups in a Multinational State under Public 
International Law’ in Y Dinstein and M Tabory (eds) The Protection of Minorities and Human Rights 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1992) 135. 
 
491 H O’Nions, Minority Rights Protection in International Law: The Roma of Europe (Ashgate, 
Aldershot 2007) 60. 
 
492 Advisory Opinion on the Greco-Bulgarian Community [1930] PCIJ Ser B No 17, 22. 
 
493 General Comment No 23 (n 51) para 5.2. 
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easily undermine provisions of international treaties by “simple legislative 
inaction.”494  
 
Accordingly, for the purposes of the present thesis, a proposed definition of ‘minority’ 
should take into consideration the concept that a minority is a group unified on the 
basis of spontaneous and permanent features. Its existence is determined by fact, not 
law, although official State recognition may be beneficial for a group’s protection. 
 
3.2.2. Numerical minority and non-dominant position 
 
Where a numerical criterion is concerned, the above-discussed definitions by 
Capotorti, Deschenes and the PACE have different ways of identifying a minority. 
Capotorti refers to a group with ethnic, religious, cultural characteristics which is 
numerically fewer than the rest of the population of a State. Deschenes writes of a 
numerical minority, while the PACE suggests that a minority should be ‘sufficiently 
representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the population of that state 
or of a region of that state’, thus adding another defining dimension of the term 
‘minority.’  Based on the example of Belgium, this sub-section aims to demonstrate 
that the PACE’s approach may lead to a more coherent definition. A minority in a 
non-dominant position should be protected both at State and regional levels.  
 
It is a common assumption that a minority group constitutes a numerical minority. No 
minimum or maximum threshold is, however, identified, and a context-specific and 
                                                 
 
494 Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (n 447) 157. 
 
 159
pragmatic approach to the matter is preferred.495 Even where a minority is a 
numerical one, statistics should be used cautiously, because “[a]n ethnic, religious or 
linguistic group may prove to be a minority in the State as a whole, yet a majority in 
some districts (where the overall majority is actually in a minority).”496 Therefore, the 
PACE’s approach is more useful. 
 
As to ‘non-dominance’, the term does “not necessarily imply being subordinate or 
oppressed, which tends to support the view that in a plural society the several ethnic, 
religious and linguistic groups could all be considered minorities.”497 Yet a mere co-
existence of several minority groups in a country does not automatically suggest a 
non-dominant position.498 To qualify for minority protection, a group may need to 
have a disadvantaged political, economic, social or cultural status.499  
 
However, the requirement of non-dominance is complicated by the fact that in some 
States the country-wide majority may constitute a minority at a regional level and 
may need the protection afforded to a minority group.500 This may depend on the 
degree of autonomy accorded to a district/region where a minority group constitutes 
an overall majority. Therefore, it may be useful to think of a minority “in the sense 
that such a group plays a minor role in the affairs of its country”501 or a region. 
                                                 
495 Shaw, ‘The Definition of Minorities in International Law’ (n 445) 25. 
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 Nonetheless, the protection of minorities at the sub-State level is extremely 
controversial. There is even a significant discrepancy in the approaches of the UN and 
CoE institutions. Thus, in Ballantyne, Davidson, McIntyre v Canada,502 concerning 
the usage of signs in English in French-speaking Québec, the HRC observed that 
Article 27 ICCPR refers to minorities in States.503 The HRC interpreted Article 27 in 
the light of Article 50 ICCPR, which provides that the ICCPR applies to all parts of 
Federal States. Hence, the English-speaking citizens of Canada could not benefit from 
the protection under Article 27.504   
 
In an individual opinion, Evatt et al rightly criticise this narrow interpretation of the 
HRC, because it could have the  
… result that a State party would have no obligation under the 
Covenant to ensure that a minority in an autonomous province had the 
protection of article 27 where it was not clear that the group in 
question was a minority in the State considered as a whole entity.505  
 
In contrast to the HRC’s narrow approach, various CoE bodies consider that national 
minorities should be protected both at a sub-State and State levels. Recent debates 
within the CoE concerning Belgium exemplify this tension between a numerical 
criterion and the requirement of non-dominance at the State or regional levels. 
                                                                                                                                            
501 Dinstein, ‘Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities’ (n 496) 112. 
 
502 Ballantyne, Davidson, McIntyre v Canada (n 39). 
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504 Significantly, Article 23 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms remedies this situation by 
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505 Elisabeth Evatt, Individual opinion co-signed by Nisuke Ando, Marco Tulio Bruni Celli and Vojin 
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Belgium’s experience, discussed below, sheds light on these two defining criteria of 
‘minority’.  
 
Currently, French-speakers represent 40% (3.36 million inhabitants) and Dutch-
speakers 59% (5.9 million inhabitants)506 of the population of Belgium; a German-
speaking minority constitutes a small percentage of the total population. Despite a 
slight numerical majority of Dutch-speakers as compared to French-speakers, these 
groups are co-dominant because they are on an equal political footing. Generally, 
international law does not protect co-dominant majorities in a State, because there is 
little risk that another language, culture or religion may be imposed on them against 
their will. The FCNM, however, specifies that if a majority constitutes a minority in 
the areas populated by another co-dominant nation, they may sometimes be protected 
as minorities.507 In its monitoring of State compliance, the ACFC follows the same 
practice in relation to, for example, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, as in Belgium, 
has three co-dominant majorities.508 This approach is not fully supported in Belgium, 
where Flanders insists that the principle of territoriality should be enforced rigidly in 
order to protect the Flemish language. Therefore, in their view, French-speakers do 
not constitute a minority at the regional level. In contrast, French-speakers residing in 
Flanders argue that they have the right to preserve their cultural identity. To this end, 
they have (unsuccessfully) contested a strict application of the territoriality principle 
                                                 
 
506 Patxi Juaristi, Timothy Reagan and Humphrey Tonkin, ‘Language Diversity in the European Union: 
An overview’ in X Arzoz (ed) Respecting Linguistic diversity in the European Union (John Benjamins 
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in the context of educational and political rights before the ECtHR on numerous 
occasions.509 
 
The issue of who are minorities in Belgium was magnified when Belgium, upon 
signing the FCNM, made the following reservation:   
[t]he Kingdom of Belgium declares that the Framework Convention 
applies without prejudice to the constitutional provisions, guarantees or 
principles, and without prejudice to the legislative rules which 
currently govern the use of languages. The Kingdom of Belgium 
declares that the notion of [a] national minority will be defined by the 
inter-ministerial conference of foreign policy.510  
 
To ascertain whether this declaration contradicts the FCNM, the PACE requested the 
Venice Commission to express an opinion on possible groups of persons who could 
be protected under the FCNM in Belgium. Van Dijk’s preliminary observations 
clarify that the lack of a definition in the FCNM does not mean that States can 
determine for themselves who constitutes a minority. Moreover, the fact that the 
FCNM refers to ‘national minorities’ does not exclude a regional approach. Thus, if 
the communes and regions of Belgium are treated as separate territories, then the 
French-speakers in Flanders and the Dutch-speakers in Wallonia would constitute 
national minorities. This approach is compatible with the FCNM “if and to the extent 
that the communities and regions concerned have legislative and/or executive and/or 
judicial powers which determine rights and obligations covered by the Framework 
Convention.”511  
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 In Belgium, where the State transferred powers in the sphere of education to the 
communes, a regional approach should be favoured. Indeed, this was confirmed by 
the Court of Arbitration, the highest court in Belgium, in its judgment no 54/1996. 
The Court ruled that “it is the duty of each legislator, within the limits of its 
competence to ensure the protection of minorities”512 and held Flanders responsible 
for the protection of French-speakers in the Flemish communes with linguistic 
facilities.  
 
Furthermore, the Venice Commission emphasised that in a context of devolving 
political powers and territorial sub-divisions, “an increasing number of laws and 
decisions affecting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities are taken at 
the regional and local level, not at the State level.”513 Therefore, while a State bears 
international accountability for its obligations under the FCNM, it should take into 
account the decentralisation of powers. If regional authorities take decisions affecting 
national minorities, excluding application of the FCNM may contradict the spirit of 
the Convention.  
 
To reaffirm this finding, the PACE condemned the broad reservation to the FCNM by 
Belgium, considering it to be incompatible with the instrument and capable of 
                                                                                                                                            
511 Venice Commission, ‘Preliminary observations on Possible Groups of Persons to which the 
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513 Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on Possible Groups of Persons to which the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities could be applied in Belgium’ (2002) CDL-AD (2002) 1. 
 164
violating Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.514 In its 
Resolution on protection of minorities in Belgium, the PACE warned that the French-
speakers in Flanders and the Dutch-speakers in Wallonia may be “in danger of losing 
… [their] identity by the operation of democratic institutions at the regional level.”515 
Article 20 FCNM reaffirms this finding. The provision stipulates that, where a 
minority group constitutes a local majority, they should “respect the rights of others, 
in particular those of persons belonging to the majority” who form a so-called 
minority-in-minority, i.e. “a minority in a sub-State unit where the majority 
constitutes a minority at the State level.”516 This provision is supported, for example, 
by the declaration made by Switzerland to the FCNM, which defines national 
minorities as “groups of individuals numerically inferior to the rest of the population 
of the country or of a canton.”517 Furthermore, according to the PACE 
Recommendation 1201 (quoted on page 157), one of the defining criteria of 
minorities is sufficient representation of a minority group in a State or a region of that 
State.518 The French-speakers in Flanders satisfy this criterion: the last population 
census in Belgium that included language data in 1947 showed that French-speakers 
comprised between 20% and 46% in many Flemish communes.519   
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On the basis of the above discussion it is possible to conclude that in Belgium, at the 
State level French-speakers do not constitute a minority group, because politically 
they are on the same footing as the Dutch-speaking population. The same applies to 
Brussels-capital with a population of 980,000,520 where Dutch-speakers comprise 
only 15% of the population, but have substantial guarantees at the same level as 
French-speakers. Consequently, only the German-speaking minority constitutes a 
minority at the State level. However, because of the territorial division of the country 
and allocation of competences, on the regional and local levels French-speakers may 
constitute a minority in the Dutch- and German-speaking areas and so may Dutch-
speakers in French- and German-speaking regions. Chapter IV of this thesis explores 
in more detail the legal implications of the territoriality principle in Belgium, with a 
focus on education.  
 
The above example demonstrates that, in defining ‘minority’, both statistics and the 
requirement of non-dominance should be handled with care. In Belgium, even though 
Dutch-speakers constitute a slight numerical majority they have felt minoritised for 
decades; therefore, the numerical criterion should not feature in the definition of a 
minority. Equally, the criterion of non-dominance may be misleading if its application 
is limited to the State level only. Where minority-in-minority situations are present, 
the correct approach is to take as a frame of reference the internal political make up of 
the country “insofar as these entities have certain concrete competences which can 
influence the population groups concerned.”521 Overall, it is the minor position of a 
minority that should prevail in defining the term. Thus, for the purposes of an EU 
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definition, a ‘minority’ is a group which is in a non-dominant position at the State or 
regional level. 
 
3.2.3. Nationality/citizenship requirement 
 
There is significant controversy surrounding the requirement of citizenship for 
protection of minority rights. All three definitions considered above contain the 
criterion of citizenship/nationality. The terms citizenship/nationality are often used 
interchangeably. Indeed, they denote two interlinked aspects of an individual’s 
connection with a State. The concept of ‘citizenship’ describes the internal dimension 
of an individual’s belonging to a State, where he/she enjoys civil and political rights, 
while the term ‘nationality’ is the external aspect of a legal connection between an 
individual and a State; it is a term of international public law.522  
 
Some commentators support inclusion of this requirement in the definition of 
‘minority’.523 This narrow view, however, is increasingly criticised in the literature.524 
This sub-section first contrasts the generous approach of the HRC, which does not 
require nationality/citizenship as a pre-requisite of minority protection, with the 
restrictive approach adopted by the PACE. On the basis of Latvia’s example 
discussed below and explored in more detail in Chapter III of this thesis, it then 
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demonstrates how the requirement of nationality/citizenship in the definition of 
‘minority’ may disadvantage a minority group.  
 
One of the arguments against a citizenship requirement in the definition of ‘minority’ 
is that Article 27 ICCPR refers to persons, not citizens, as does Article 25 ICCPR on 
political rights.525 Therefore, a definition of ‘minority’ under Article 27 should not 
include the requirement of citizenship. Indeed, the HRC in its comment on Article 27 
noted that  
… the individuals designed to be protected need not be citizens of the 
State party. In this regard, the obligations deriving from article 2.1 
[ICCPR] are also relevant, since a State party is required under that 
article to ensure that the rights protected under the Covenant are 
available to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction, except rights which are expressly made to apply to 
citizens…526 
 
The HRC’s approach is rather generous, because it insists that not only is it 
unnecessary for minorities to be nationals or citizens, but also they need not be 
permanent residents: accordingly, “migrant workers or even visitors in a State party 
constituting such minorities are entitled not to be denied the exercise of those 
rights.”527 
 
This is, certainly, a very broad reading of Article 27 ICCPR, where the requirement of 
citizenship is omitted. It is not, however, as broad as the wording may suggest. 
Scheinin clarifies that,  
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… contrary to what some ironic commentators have suggested, the 
HRC did not say that visitors as a group would be a minority in the 
sense of Article 27. Rather, … a state must not deny a migrant worker 
or a visitor membership in an existing minority merely on the basis of 
the temporary nature of his or her stay.528 
 
Consequently, if migrant workers wish to identify with a well-established pre-existing 
minority group in a State, those workers may “very well claim the same protection as 
other members of the group, for instance, in the education system.”529 However, a 
completely new linguistic, religious or ethnic group that arrives in a country may not 
immediately demand the same level of protection.530 This is what the requirement of 
maintaining “longstanding, firm and lasting ties with [the] state” in the definition 
proposed by the PACE emphasises. It aims to discourage newly arrived groups from 
profiling themselves as minorities “since this is perceived to have negative 
repercussions for national unity.”531 However, as Shaw rightly warns, the requirement 
of ‘long-established’ should not be subject to excessive interpretation: “[i]t means that 
the minority must exist as such. There is no stipulation as to how long this state of 
affairs has continued, nor any minimum qualification period.”532  
 
The following example of Latvia aims to illustrate how a strict interpretation of the 
requirements of ‘citizenship’ and ‘long-established’ in the State may lead to exclusion 
of large segments of a population. A brief historic overview aims to place the issue of 
strict citizenship laws in its context.  
 
                                                 
528 Scheinin, ‘The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights…’ (n 17) 26. 
 
529 Scheinin, ‘The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights…’ (n 17) 31. 
 
530 Scheinin, ‘The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights…’ (n 17) 31. 
 
531 Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection… (n 449) 41. 
 
532 Shaw, ‘The Definition of Minorities in International Law’ (n 445) 27. 
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Latvia has never been independent for long. Since the 10th century it had been ruled in 
turn by Russia, Germany, Sweden and Poland.533 This is why the acquisition of 
independence from the Russian Empire in 1919 had such a profound significance for 
Latvia. It wanted to assert itself not only as a State, but also as a nation.534 The 
collapse of the Russian empire in 1917535 and imperial Germany in 1918 marked a 
new stage in Latvia’s evolution. The Allied Powers hastily recognised it as an 
independent State to prevent any further strengthening of Germany on the Baltic 
Sea.536 Latvia also concluded peace treaties with the German Reich on 15 July 1920 
and Russia on 11 August 1920.537 This was a significant development, because it 
                                                 
 
533 The strategic location of Latvia on the shores of the Baltic Sea has always attracted Russia, 
Germany, Sweden and Poland, which have competed to establish their influence over this territory 
since the 10th century. As early as 1030, Russian princes, who sought to access the western shore, 
established the military outpost of Yuriyev in Tartu and had a significant influence in the Baltic region. 
Interrupted by Mongol invasions in 1240–1480, Russia renewed its efforts to re-establish influence 
over this region, beginning in the 16th century. As a result of these efforts, Russia acquired the Northern 
part of Latvia from Sweden in 1721 (Treaty of Nystadt) and the southern part of the country during the 
partition of Poland in 1795. The independence of Kurland (present day Latvia) was re-established for a 
short period by Napoleon. Finally, the incorporation of Latvia into the Russian Empire in 1813 lasted 
for over a century: Nicolai Vakar, ‘Russia and the Baltic States’ (1943) 3(1) Russian Review 45-54, 
45-46. 
 
534 Throughout history the Latvians were exposed to strong external influences. For over 150 years, the 
German minority remained in a privileged position and played the role of intermediary between the 
Russians and the local population in Latvia. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Russian Empire 
asserted its influence over the Latvians and began an active policy of Russification of the population: 
after 1890, the Russian language became compulsory in schools: Vakar, ‘Russia and the Baltic States’ 
(n 533) 46. 
 
535 Following the February Russian Revolution, on 5 July 1917, Latvia was granted local self-
government. The Latvians perceived this as insufficient, and on 30 July 1917 the Latvian Political 
Conference declared that Latvia should be independent; finally, a Latvian Provisional National 
Committee adopted a resolution on Latvian separation from Soviet Russia on 17-18 November 1917: 
Alfred Bilmanis, ‘Free Latvia in Free Europe’ (1944) 232 Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science 43-48, 45. 
 
536 Likewise, on 11 November 1918 the British Government and on 28 April 1920 France granted de 
facto recognition to Latvia. This development was convenient to Russia too: as a buffer zone Latvia 
removed “the ghost of Allied military intervention in Russia”: Vakar, ‘Russia and the Baltic States’ (n 
533) 48; see also Max Laserson, ‘The Recognition of Latvia’ (1943) 37(2) The American Journal of 
International Law 233-247, 236. 
 
537 Laserson, ‘The Recognition of Latvia’ (n 536) 240. 
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allowed Latvia to assert its independence, thus making void under international law 
any future territorial claims from Germany or Russia.538 
  
With the rise of Nazism in Europe and Germany’s interest in re-incorporating Latvia, 
Soviet Russia felt free to renounce its previous obligations towards the State.539  On 
23 July 1940, Latvia became one of the Republics of the Soviet Union.540 Following 
the Soviet annexation of Latvia and its occupation by Germany during World War II, 
the ethnic composition of the country underwent significant changes.541 Thus, the 
percentage of Latvians decreased from 73.4% in 1934 to 52% by 1989, with a 
simultaneous increase of Russians from 10.6% to 34%.542 Moreover, supported by the 
Soviet policy of Russification, these immigrants, mainly military or blue-collar 
workers, had little incentive to assimilate. As a result, Latvia came “to the verge of 
losing its ethnic majority.”543  
 
                                                 
 
538 Laserson, ‘The Recognition of Latvia’ (n 536) 240. 
 
539 On 5 October 1939, Russia pressured Latvia to sign a Pact of Mutual Assistance and established 
control over its naval and coastal artillery bases. On 23 August 1939, Germany and Russia signed a 
treaty concerning spheres of influence, which resulted in Russia’s annexation of Latvia by military 
aggression in breach of all international agreements: Laserson, ‘The Recognition of Latvia’ (n 536) 
247; see also Bilmanis, ‘Free Latvia in Free Europe’ (n 535) 47. 
 
540 This act was condemned by the West; for example, the USA “denounced the tactics used by the 
Soviet Union in ‘deliberately annihilating’ the independence of the three Baltic States”: Laserson, ‘The 
Recognition of Latvia’ (n 536) 247. 
 
541 German occupation resulted in the near elimination of the Jewish community; also 51,000 Baltic 
Germans had already left Latvia during the War. Moreover, the Soviet Union deported 15,000 
Latvians, Poles and other ethnic groups in 1941. Additionally, in 1949, 45,000 people were exiled from 
Latvia to Siberia. The Soviet Union occupation of Latvia after World War II was accompanied by a 
policy of heavy industrialisation leading to a mass immigration of Russians. Approximately 1,500,000 
people were moved both voluntarily and by force from different regions of the USSR to Latvia: Latvia 
State Report (2006) ACFC/SR(2006)001, para 29-30. 
 
542 Gabrielle Hogan-Brun, ‘Baltic National Minorities in a Transitional Setting’ in G Hogan-Brun and S 
Wolff (eds) Minority Languages in Europe: Frameworks, Status, Prospects (Palgrave Macmillan, 
Houndsmills 2003) 122. 
 
543 Hogan-Brun, ‘Baltic National Minorities in a Transitional Setting’ (n 542) 123. 
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When Latvia re-established its independence on 21 August 1991, it denounced the 
Soviet Union’s absorption as invalid in international law.544 Thus, the 1990 
Declaration on the Renewal of the Independence of the Republic of Latvia reinstated 
the authority of the Constitution of 1922.545 By relying on the principle of State 
continuity, Latvia resumed the legal order that had existed before the Soviet 
occupation.546 
 
International law defines State succession as “the replacement of one State by another 
in the responsibility for the international relations of territory.”547 State restoration 
based on the principle of continuity is a particularly controversial type of State 
succession.548 Unlike other types of succession, such as the dissolution or merger of 
States, the principle of State continuity relieves restored States from having to act as 
                                                 
 
544 Latvia relied on the principle of ex injuria non oritur jus (no one may derive an advantage from his 
own unlawful acts (“clean hands theory”)): the Soviet Union must not benefit from its illegal 
occupation in any way: Ineta Ziemele, ‘Incorporation and Implementation of Human Rights in Latvia’ 
in M Scheinin (ed) International Human Rights Norms in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague 1996) 75. 
 
545 Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR on the Renewal of the Independence of the 
Republic of Latvia, 4 May 1990, Section 3 <http://www.uta.edu/cpsees/latind.htm> accessed 20 
August 2007. 
 
546 Latvia wanted to emphasise that it was “‘restored’ rather than [having] ‘new’ sovereignt[y]”: Jeff 
Chinn and Lise Truex, ‘The Question of Citizenship in the Baltics’ (1996) 7(1) Journal of Democracy 
133-147, 133. The restoration of the Latvian State was internationally recognised. On 27 August 1991, 
the European Community issued a Declaration welcoming the restoration of the Baltic States. Also, the 
USA recognised this restoration on 4 September 1991: M Shaw, International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2003) 866.  
 
547 Constantin Economides, Declaration on the Principles, Rules and Recommendations concerning the 
Question of the Nationality of Individuals and Legal Persons in State Succession (1996) CDL-
NAT(1996)003e-restr <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1996/CDL-NAT(1996)003-e.asp> accessed 12 
September 2007. 
 
548 Matthew Craven, ‘The Problems of State Succession and the Identity of States under International 
Law’ (1998) 9 EJIL 142. 
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direct successors to predecessor States.549 Thus, Latvia does not consider itself a 
successor of the USSR. Moreover,  
there is a legal presumption that a State which lost its sovereignty but 
reverted to it (before the dust of history ha[s] settled), recovers a full 
… sovereignty. The interpretation of rights and obligations connected 
with such sovereignty would therefore be in favour of the reverting 
State.550  
 
Directly connected with sovereignty is nationality, “jealously guarded by States.”551 
Nationality represents a “legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a 
genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence 
of reciprocal rights and duties.”552 International law allows several ways of acquiring 
nationality. First, the entire population of a State can be granted nationality based on 
the ‘zero option’ model. Second, restored States may reinstate their original 
citizenship legislation. Third, the ‘mixed model’ makes new elements in restored 
legislation the preconditions for acquiring nationality.553  
 
Latvia followed the more restrictive second model. It restored its citizenship laws of 
1919. Automatic citizenship was granted only to residents and their descendants who 
had lived in Latvia before 1940.554 Because the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991, 
                                                 
 
549 Rein Müllerson, ‘The Continuity and Succession of States by Reference to the Former USSR and 
Yugoslavia’ (1993) 42 ICLQ 473, 482. 
 
550 Charles Alexandrowicz, ‘New and Original States: The Issue of Reversion to Sovereignty’ (1969) 
45(3) International Affairs 465-480, 474. 
 
551 Vaclav Mikulka, State Succession and Its Impact on the Nationality of Natural and Legal Persons 
(1995) Forty-seventh session of International Law Commission 14 citing Chan Johannes, ‘The Right to 
a Nationality as a Human Right: the current Trend towards Recognition’ (1991) 12(1-2) Human Rights 
Law Journal 1. 
 
552 Nottebohm case, second phase (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) [1955] ICJ Reports 4. 
 
553 Carmen Thiele, ‘The Criterion of Citizenship for Minorities: the Example of Estonia’ (1999) ECMI 
Working paper No 5, 12.  
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740,000 Soviet-era immigrants in Latvia became non-citizens. In 1994, Latvia 
introduced a rigorous process of naturalization for non-citizens, which included inter 
alia “a test on constitutional and historical knowledge, and on language 
competence.”555  
 
Moreover, the Law on Naturalization instituted a ‘windows’ system based on age and 
birthplace. This established eight categories, with the last category beginning the 
naturalisation process after 1 January 2003.556 Effectively, the stronger the links with 
the Soviet regime, the longer applicants had to wait to begin the naturalisation 
process.557 In addition, several categories could never become citizens.558 Under 
                                                                                                                                            
554 Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia, ‘Resolution on the Renewal of Republic of Latvia 
Citizens’ Rights and Fundamental Principles of Naturalization’, 15 October 1991.  
Citizenship of Latvia is granted to persons, who belong to the aggregate body of 
Republic of Latvia citizens and who had Republic of Latvia citizenship on 17 June 
1940, and their descendants, who at the moment of this resolution's adoption live in 
the Republic of Latvia or abroad. Those who did not hold citizenship on 17 June 1940 
may acquire it by naturalization. (emphasis added). 
For further discussion see Brigita Zepa, ‘Citizenship, Official Language, Bilingual Education in Latvia: 
Public Policy in the Last 10 Years’ (2003) Baltic Institute of Social Sciences 86. 
 
555 Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Latvia, 21 June 1994 (as amended on 22 July 1994), Article 
12 (General regulations for naturalization) <http://www.humanrights.lv/doc/latlik/citiz1.htm> accessed 
22 August 2007.  
Citizenship of Latvia shall be granted through naturalization only to those persons 
who are registered in the Residents’ Registry and:  
(i) Whose place of permanent residence, on the submission date of their application 
for naturalization, has been Latvia for no less than five years counting from 4 May 
1990 (for persons who arrived in Latvia after 1 July 1992, the five-year term shall be 
counted from the date of the issuance of their permanent residence permit);  
(ii) Who have command of the Latvian language;  
(iii) Who know the basic principles of the Republic of Latvia Satversme 
(Constitution) and the Constitutional Law on the Rights and Obligations of a Citizen 
and a Person;  
(iv) Who know the national anthem and the history of Latvia;  
(v) Who have a legal source of income;  
(vi) Who have taken an oath of loyalty to the Republic of Latvia;  
(vii) Who have submitted a statement of renunciation of their former citizenship and 
have received an expatriation permit from the State of their former citizenship, if 
such permit is provided for by the laws of that State, or have received a document 
certifying the loss of citizenship.  
For a critique see Hogan-Brun, ‘Baltic National Minorities in a Transitional Setting’ (n 542) 129.   
 
556 Nida Gelazis, ‘The effects of EU Conditionality on Citizenship Policies and Protection of National 
Minorities in the Baltic States’ (2000) 68 EUI working papers 8. 
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pressure from the international community, Latvia eliminated the windows system in 
1998 and thereafter all eligible candidates could apply for citizenship.559 
 
Nevertheless, even nowadays Russian-speaking minorities have to undergo a strict 
process to acquire Latvian citizenship. Although rigorous naturalisation procedures 
exist in many countries,560 they are generally applied to workers who choose to 
migrate. The Russian-speakers’ immigration during the Soviet era was profoundly 
different, because they were moving freely within one State, or were forced to move 
by the authorities. The Russian-speaking minority who settled in Soviet Latvia “in 
good faith assuming that it was their own country”561 considered the denial of 
                                                                                                                                            
557 For example, under this system Latvian-born descendants of migrants could apply for naturalization 
before 2000, while Soviet-era migrants had to wait even longer. In 1994, there was also an attempt to 
adopt a bill which would set an annual naturalization quota. However, the President sent it back to the 
Parliament after international pressure from Russia, Scandinavian States and the OSCE: Chinn and 
Truex, ‘The Question of Citizenship in the Baltics’ (n 546) 137-138. 
  
558 Law on Citizenship (n 555) Article 11 (Restrictions on naturalization) 
Citizenship is denied to persons who:  
(i) Using anti-constitutional methods, have turned against the Republic of Latvia's 
independence, its democratic, parliamentary State system or the existing State power 
in Latvia, if such has been established by a court decree;  
(ii) Have been convicted with imprisonment for international criminal acts or have 
been called to criminal responsibility at the time that the granting of citizenship is 
being decided;  
(iii) Are serving in the USSR Armed Forces, USSR Interior Armed Forces or State 
security services, as well as persons who after 17 June 1940, have chosen the 
Republic of Latvia as their place of residence after demobilization from the USSR 
Armed Forces, USSR Interior Armed Forces or State security services and who, upon 
induction into such service, did not permanently reside in Latvia's territory. 
 
559 However, the protectionism of the majority and resistance to the Soviet past transmuted into 
stringent language policies which were intended to revive Latvian language and subordinate Russian. 
For criticism of international organizations see Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations 
on Latvia’ (1995) CCPR/C/79/Add.53. See also PACE, ‘Resolutions on the Situation of the Russian 
and Russian-speaking population in Latvia and Estonia’ (1997) Written Declaration No 266, Doc 7951; 
‘Civil rights situation of non-titular communities in Latvia’ (1997) Written Declaration No 257, Doc 
7855; ‘Latvia’s honouring of commitments and obligations undertaken upon accession to the Council 
of Europe’ (1997) Motion for a Resolution, Doc 7879; ‘Violation by the Latvian authorities of 
universally recognised human rights’ (1998) Motion for a resolution Doc 8039. 
 
560 For discussion see Ferenc Feher and Agnes Heller, ‘Naturalisation or “Culturalisation”?’ and Dilek 
Cinar, ‘From Aliens to Citizens: A Comparative Analysis of Rules of Transition’ in R Baubock (ed) 
From Aliens to Citizens: Redefining the Status of Immigrants in Europe (Avebury, Aldershot 1994).  
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citizenship discriminatory, believing that their rights have been “taken away.”562 
Therefore, the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia thought that they should not be 
treated as aliens because of their established domicile.563 Moreover, they should not 
lose their political rights, which are “among the most precious of all human rights”.564 
From the perspective of Latvia, however, this policy compensated for the wrongs of 
the Soviet regime. International organizations,565 including the EU, strongly objected 
to this policy and encouraged Latvia to integrate its Russian-speaking population.   
 
Nevertheless, there are still approximately 350,000 Russian-speaking non-citizens in 
Latvia.566 The naturalisation rate of non-citizens has been very slow. It reached its 
peak in 2004 (21,297); however, in 2008 this number decreased by almost eight times 
                                                                                                                                            
561 Asbjørn Eide, ‘Citizenship and the Minority Rights of Non-citizens’ (1999) Working Paper of the 
Commission on Human Rights, E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/1999/WP.3, para 31. 
 
562 Lowell Barrington, ‘The Domestic and International Consequences of Citizenship in the Soviet 
Successor States’ (1995) 47(5) Europe-Asia Studies 731-763, 747 (emphasis in original). 
The situation of the Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia is in stark contrast with their position in 
Lithuania, where the Russian-speaking population acquired automatic citizenship.  
 
563 See the objection of Ms Ždanoka, the representative of Latvian Human Rights Committee, who 
emphasised that “The same naturalization procedures were applied to non-citizens and foreigners alike.  
Such procedures were ineffective and slow”: Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
‘Thematic Discussion on Non-citizens and Racial Discrimination’ (2004) CERD/C/SR.1624, para 43.  
see also, James Hughes, ‘Exit in Deeply Divided Societies’ (2005) 43(4) JCMS 739, 755; Eide, 
‘Citizenship and the Minority Rights of Non-citizens’ (n 561) para 32. 
 
564 A.Eide, ‘Citizenship and the Minority Rights of Non-citizens’ (n 561) para 46. 
Minorities should not be deprived of their right to political participation as it constitutes a human right 
of all individuals: Henry Steiner, ‘Political Participation as a Human Right’ (1988) 1 Harvard Human 
Rights Year Book 77. 
 
565 The requirement of no arbitrary and unjustified discrimination between citizens and ‘non-citizens’ 
was a membership conditionality of the Council of Europe. See PACE, ‘On the application by Latvia 
for membership of the Council of Europe’ (1995) Opinion No 183, para 7. 
 
566 The total number of non-citizens in Latvia is 372,421. Non-citizens (Latvia) 
<http://www.smso.net/Non-citizens(Latvia)> accessed 31 August 2009. There are approximately 
410,000 Russian-speaking citizens in Latvia. The population of Latvia is 2.27 million (Latvians 
59.03%, Russians 28.29%, others 12.68%); 16% of the Latvian population are non-citizens 
<http://www.li.lv/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=222&Itemid=1¿> accessed 31 
August 2009. 
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(2,601). It slightly increased in 2009 reaching 3,470. Overall, in 1995–2009, only 
131,102 persons acquired citizenship by naturalisation.567 
 
This example aimed to demonstrate that the requirement of citizenship should not be a 
defining criterion of ‘minority’,  
… since the status as non-citizens is not always a result of recent 
arrival. But lack of citizenship can have serious consequences for 
members of minorities. In particular, it can seriously undermine their 
possibilities of effective participation in the political life of the 
country.568 
 
Nevertheless, some commentators express concern that “by abandoning the 
requirement of citizenship and easing the necessity of a long stay on the territory of 
the state”569 international law may weaken the regime of minority protection by 
opening it to a large number of persons. In particular, if a group meets most of the 
defining criteria of ‘minority’ as in the case of traditional ethno-cultural groups of 
non-citizens, it is important to establish whether the lack of citizenship is the result of 
domestic policies which violate international rules.570 For example, “unreasonable 
distinctions in determining citizenship”571 may breach Article 26 ICCPR572 on equal 
                                                 
567 Information on naturalisation process in Latvia <http://www.np.gov.lv/index.php?id=440&top= 
440> accessed 29 January 2010. 
 
568 Asbjørn Eide, The Rights of ‘Old’ versus ‘New’ Minorities (2002/2003) European Yearbook of 
Minority Issues 379.  
 
569 Pentassuglia, Minorities in International Law (n 448) 59. 
 
570 Pentassuglia, Minorities in International Law (n 448) 70. 
 
571 Pentassuglia, Minorities in International Law (n 448)  70. 
 
572 Article 26 ICCPR reads as follows:  
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
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treatment or even Article 25 ICCPR573 on political rights. Furthermore, ethnically 
motivated deprivation of citizenship may violate Article 5 of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.574 Therefore, it 
is argued that, instead of broadening the definition of minorities, it is important to 
remedy obstacles to the enjoyment of minority rights.575  
 
However, as the above example of Latvia suggests, States may use the citizenship 
criterion to limit the enjoyment of minority rights. Despite significant international 
pressure to alter the situation, Latvia has maintained its restrictive policies for the past 
twenty years. Even though this situation is indicative of weak enforcement of some 
international rules, the fact that States are allowed a broad margin of discretion in the 
matter sometimes results in a restrictive interpretation of the concept ‘minority.’ For 
example, because the FCNM does not contain a definition of ‘minority’, Latvia, upon 
                                                 
 
573 Article 25 ICCPR reads as follows: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions 
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:  
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives;  
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free 
expression of the will of the electors;  
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.  
 
574 Article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(n 131) stipulates:  
… States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its 
forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or 
national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the 
following rights:  
… 
(c) Political rights, in particular the right to participate in elections-to vote and to 
stand for election-on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the 
Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal 
access to public service; 
(d) Other civil rights, in particular:  
… 
(iii) The right to nationality;  
… 
 
575 Pentassuglia, Minorities in International Law (n 448) 70. 
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its ratification of the instrument in 2005, placed an interpretative declaration which 
defines national minorities as only those minorities who possess Latvian 
citizenship.576 Non-citizens may “enjoy the rights prescribed in the Framework 
Convention, unless specific exceptions are prescribed by law”.577 By adopting this 
restrictive interpretation, Latvia can, for example, restrict political rights to those 
minorities who are citizens: the rights of non-citizens to effective participation in 
political life of the country may be limited through national laws. The legality of the 
Latvian reservation is discussed further in Chapter II of this thesis on pages 223-224.  
 
Therefore, the requirement of citizenship/nationality should not feature as a defining 
criterion of ‘minority’. The ACFC, too, warns that “the citizenship criterion may 
cause problems linked to certain guarantees relating to important areas covered by the 
Framework Convention.”578 Furthermore, in the context of EU law, the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ579 suggests that “it will become increasingly difficult for States to restrict 
arrangements for linguistic minorities to its own citizens.”580 During its monitoring of 
the accession process to the EU, the Commission, too, has not relied on a citizenship 
criterion in the definition of minorities. For example, the Commission disagreed with 
Estonia’s “citizenship-centred definition”581, introduced in a reservation to the 
                                                 
 
576 Latvia’s reservation to the FCNM <http://www.coe.int/t/e/human rights/minorities/Country specific 
eng.asp#P423 21869> accessed 31 August 2009. 
 
577 Latvia’s reservation to the FCNM (n 576). 
 
578 ACFC, ‘Second Opinion on Hungary’ (n 75) para 22; ‘Second Opinion on Italy’ (n 283) para 32.  
 
579 Bickel and Franz (n 34); Case 137/84 Ministere Public v Robert Heinrich Maria Mutsch [1985] 
ECR 2681. 
 
580 Verstichel, ‘Personal Scope of Application…’ (n 395) 146. 
 
581 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘Pre-accession, Naturalisation and “Due Regard to Community Law”’ (2004) 
4(2) Romanian Journal of Political Science 71, 80. 
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FCNM.582 In both Estonia and Latvia, the Commission applied minority standards 
“regardless of the nationality held and difference in personal status arising from 
nonpossession of Latvian [or Estonian] nationality”.583 Significantly, the European 
Parliament in its Resolution on the protection of minorities and anti-discrimination 
policies in an enlarged Europe,584 while recommending basing an EU definition of 
minorities on Recommendation 1201(1993) of the PACE (quoted above on page 157), 
has deliberately omitted the requirement of citizenship from the list of defining 
elements.585 Accordingly, an EU definition of minorities should not contain the 
criterion of citizenship. The legal effect of this would be protection of groups which 
satisfy all the conditions to qualify for ‘minority’ status, but who might have been 
arbitrarily excluded through restrictive citizenship policies in their home State. 
  
3.2.4. The subjective element 
 
Another important consideration in defining ‘minority’ is a group’s sense of solidarity 
aimed at preserving their identity. This sub-section briefly outlines the subjective 
elements of a definition: an implicit intention to maintain a common identity as a 
group and self-identification of individuals as belonging to a minority.  
                                                 
582 Estonia, Declaration contained in the instrument of ratification, deposited on 6 January 1997 
<http://www.coe.int/t/e/human rights/minorities/Country specific eng.asp#P263 14100> accessed 13 
July 2008. 
 
583 Commission, ‘Agenda 2000 – Opinion on Latvia’s Application for Membership of the European 
Union’ [1997] DOC/97/14, 18. Both Latvia and Estonia use terms the terms ‘citizenship’ and 
‘nationality’ interchangeably. For discussion see, Gerard-René de Groot, ‘Towards a European 
Nationality Law’ (2004) 8(3) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 2. See also Latvia’s Law on 
Entry into and Residence in the Republic of Latvia of Aliens and Stateless Persons, Part I 
<http://www.ttc. lv/New/lv/tulkojumi/E0039.doc> Accessed 13 July 2007. 
 
584 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the protection of minorities and anti-discrimination policies in 
an enlarged Europe’ [2005] 2005/2008(INI), A6-0140/2005. 
 
585 Verstichel, ‘Personal Scope of Application…’ (n 293) 147. 
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 If there is no sentiment to maintain a distinct identity, Article 27 ICCPR would not 
apply.586 To qualify as a ‘minority’ it is not enough that, for instance, a group speaks 
the same language. The group also needs to decide that exactly those people who 
share common characteristics should form a group.587 Such a decision to preserve a 
minority identity, as the definitions by Capotorti and Deschenes suggest, may be 
implicit. Otherwise States could pressure a minority so that they would be unable to 
express their collective wish to survive as a group,588 in particular, in the case of those 
minorities which live under undemocratic regimes.589  
 
Equally important in this respect is self-identification as a minority. Article 3(1) 
FCNM leaves this choice with individual members of a group. This choice, however, 
does not imply a “right for an individual to choose arbitrarily to belong to any 
national minority.”590 Self-identification is “inseparably linked … to objective criteria 
relevant to the person’s identity.”591 Let us take the example in Lovelace,592 where, 
under domestic legislation, the female author, who married a non-aboriginal person, 
was permanently excluded from her aboriginal community. The HRC stressed that 
Sandra Lovelace “not only identified herself (subjectively) as a Maliseet Indian but 
                                                 
586 Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (n 447) 165. 
 
587 Marko, ‘Constitutional Recognition of Ethnic Difference…’ (n 14) 22. 
  
588 Shaw, ‘The Definition of Minorities in International Law’ (n 445) 28. 
 
589 Pentassuglia, Minorities in International Law (n 448) 69. 
 
590 FCNM and Explanatory Report (n 196) para 35.  
 
591 Verstichel, ‘Personal Scope of Application…’ (n 395) 130. 
 
592 Lovelace v Canada (n 337). 
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also was ethnically (objectively) a Maliseet Indian.”593 Therefore, she had the right to 
belong with her group and reside on reserve lands belonging to her group. The HRC 
deemed the State’s denial of her rights as unjustifiable and found a violation of Article 
27 ICCPR.  
 
Accordingly, an implicit will to maintain a common identity should be regarded as a 
defining element of a ‘minority’. Moreover, self-identification with a group is a 
matter of individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from making such choice.  
The subjective element is linked to the objective elements of the definition – self-
identification is not enough to qualify as a minority. 
 
Overall Conclusions to Chapter I 
 
 
This chapter aimed to identify the scope of rights covered in this thesis and the 
beneficiaries of these rights in the context of EU law. It established that the minimum 
standard of minority protection includes the principle of non-discrimination. To 
ensure substantive equality of minorities, however, States may also need to grant 
special rights. These rights are not privileges. Rather they aim to put minorities, 
disadvantaged from the outset through speaking a different language or practicing a 
different religion, on an equal footing with majorities. These rights include political 
participation, freedom to manifest religion, the right to education, and autonomy 
arrangements. Sections 1 and 2 of this chapter highlighted the dual nature of minority 
protection.  
                                                 
 
593 Scheinin, ‘The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights…’ (n 17) 29. 
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 As to the principle of non-discrimination, it appears to be the least controversial 
among minority rights. Nevertheless, even this right has not been fully explored, 
especially in relation to non-discrimination based on a national minority status. It is 
hoped that Protocol 12 ECHR and the FCNM may positively impact the development 
of anti-discrimination law based on the membership in a national minority. In 
addition, wider application of the principle of indirect discrimination may have a 
beneficial impact on the protection of minority rights. 
 
Where special rights are concerned the picture is less satisfactory. As to political 
participation, the analysis shows that the principle of non-discrimination remains a 
driving force in ensuring equal treatment of minorities in the exercise of this right. 
However, non-discriminatory treatment in political participation is not sufficient on 
its own. States also must ensure the conditions necessary for the effective 
participation of minorities, i.e., take positive State action to guarantee that minorities 
can participate in matters of particular concern to them, as required by Article 15 
FCNM. 
 
An even less satisfactory picture exists in relation to the manifestation of religion. The 
ECtHR’s restrictive reading of Article 9 ECHR is disappointing, because it disregards 
the need of minorities to preserve their identity, which in case of some religions may 
manifest itself through religious dress. In this respect, the potential of Article 18(2) 
ICCPR should be used to its fullest to avoid coercion against religious minorities in 
education.  
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In education, given the narrow wording of P1-2, there is only a possibility for a case-
by-case assessment by the ECtHR of access to mother-tongue education. Despite the 
significance of Cyprus v Turkey, it is unlikely that the ECtHR would develop a 
general principle on mother-tongue education. The potential of Article 27 ICCPR has 
not yet been fully explored. Arguably, this provision should cover positive State 
action on the provision of education in a minority language.  
 
The least satisfactory situation presents itself in relation to autonomy arrangements, 
which do not even feature as a minority right. International human right instruments 
are silent on this right, although the jurisprudence of courts is favourable where the 
context allows. Where minority-specific instruments are concerned, some inferences 
may be made through reading Articles 1 and 27 ICCPR together or broad construal of 
the ‘conditions’ necessary for effective participation of minorities under Article 15 
FCNM. More explicit endorsement of this right could significantly enhance the 
protection of minorities.  
 
As to the beneficiaries of these rights, the sheer diversity of situations and approaches 
across Member States renders it necessary to have a broad definition under EU law. In 
the light of the discussion in Section 3 of this Chapter and given the presence of 
diverse minority groups in EU Member States, an EU definition of minorities must 
inevitably be broad. The following elements can be suggested: 
- The protection of minorities should focus on their needs, not on their 
labels. Labels should not affect the content of the definition of ‘minority’; 
rather, the particular needs of a group may inform the degree of required 
positive State action. For example, a linguistic minority may need mother-
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tongue education, while a religious one may only require accommodation of 
its religious practices. If such groups are also protected under other 
international instruments, this should not detract from their enjoyment of 
minority guarantees. 
- The presence of a well-established group in one or more Member 
State, such as Catalans in Spain and France, is one of the defining features of 
‘minority’. A well-established group should regard itself and be regarded in 
the community as having a particular historic identity of belonging to another 
group. Such a group possesses certain religious, linguistic, cultural or other 
characteristics which distinguish them from the majority of the population at 
the State or regional levels.  
- To benefit from the regime of minority protection, a group should be in 
a non-dominant position at the State or regional level. The numerical factor is 
not necessary as it may limit the scope of the definition. 
- The requirement of citizenship should not feature as a defining 
criterion of ‘minority’, because States may use this condition to exclude 
unwanted groups. 
- The subjective element of the definition is closely linked to the 
objective criteria – it is not sufficient to self-identify as a minority.  
- Both collective and individual rights of minorities should be 
guaranteed because only a combination of individual, minority and collective 
rights can ensure meaningful protection of minorities.  
 
Summing up the proposed features, the following working EU definition of ‘minority’ 
may be suggested:  
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A ‘minority’ is a well-established group in one or more EU Member States. 
Such a group identifies itself and is identified by others as different from the 
rest of the population of a State or a region, on the basis of its language, 
religion, common culture, history and/or geographic origin. Only groups in a 
non-dominant position at a State or regional level may benefit from the regime 
of minority protection. The existence of a minority is determined by fact, not 
law. The choice of belonging to a ‘minority’ lies with the individual. 
Citizenship/nationality is not a defining criterion of a minority as such. The 
degree of protection, entailing different rights, depends on particular needs of 
a group. A minority group is entitled to individual and collective enjoyment of 
their rights to a separate language, religion, culture, and political participation 
domestically (including regional level where relevant) and on the EU level in 
matters of direct concern to them. 
 
Accordingly, for the purposes of this thesis, a broad definition of ‘minority’ is 
adopted. The novelty of this definition is that it is based on examples from EU 
Member States and it takes into consideration the peculiarities of EU law resulting, 
for example, from the existence of the EU free movement regimes and EU 
citizenship. This definition is preferable because it is more inclusive in that it 
emphasises the needs of minorities, as opposed to ‘labels’. Such a broad definition 
may prevent States from excluding unwanted minority groups from the enjoyment of 
rights at the domestic and EU levels.   
 
The next four chapters build on the discussion in Chapter I, placing the rights of 
minorities in the EU context.   
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PART 2. CASE STUDIES 
 
CHAPTER II. LOST IN TRANSITION: THE RIGHT TO POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION OF RUSSIAN-SPEAKING NON-CITIZENS IN LATVIA 
 
1. Introduction 
 
With the inception of EU citizenship, the political rights of EU citizens594 have 
acquired strong symbolic and practical significance.595 However, EU law contains no 
minority right to political participation596 in EU law-making in matters which may 
affect their identity. The political rights of minorities,597 exercised through the 
participation in electoral processes, are “crucial to enable minorities to express their 
views when legislative measures and public policies of relevance to them are 
                                                 
594 For example, Article 22 TFEU (ex-Article 19 EC) equipped EU citizens with the right to vote and 
stand for elections in municipal and European Parliament elections in a host State under the same 
conditions as nationals of that State. See also, Article 20(2)(b) TFEU and Articles 39(1) and 40 CFR. 
Other political rights include the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European 
Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty 
languages and to obtain a reply in the same language. See, Article 20(2)(d) TFEU and Articles 41(4), 
43 and 44 CFR. 
 
595 P Craig and G de Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (4th ed OUP, Oxford 2008) 869. See 
also European Parliament and Council (EC) Decision 1904/2006 establishing for the period of 2007 to 
2013 the programme ‘Europe for Citizens’ to promote active European citizenship [2006] OJ L 378/32. 
On political participation of minorities and migrants see, Anais Faure Atger, ‘Education and Political 
Participation of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities in the EU’ (2009) CEPS Special Report. 
 
596 The notion of ‘political participation’ encompasses a broad range of rights guaranteed by 
international and regional human rights instruments, such as the right to vote and stand for election, to 
access the public service and to take direct or indirect part in the conduct of public affairs: Marc 
Weller, ‘Effective Participation of Minorities in Public Life’ in M Weller (ed) Universal Minority 
Rights: A Commentary on the Jurisprudence of International Courts and Treaty Bodies (OUP, Oxford 
2007) 484. This chapter does not deal with all rights constituting political participation, but rather 
focuses only on the right to vote and be elected. The issue is discussed in the context of Latvia. 
 
597 Sasse suggests that minority rights themselves are political rights: “[u]ltimately, the right to a 
distinct cultural identity and its active preservation and promotion embodies a political claim to 
difference and recognition, and it may be articulated in public, though not necessarily through political 
institutions”: Gwendolyn Sasse, ‘The Political Rights of National Minorities: Lessons from Central and 
Eastern Europe’ in W Sadurski (ed) Political Rights under Stress in 21st Century Europe (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2007) 239-282, 244; see also, S Wheatley, Democracy, Minorities and 
International law (CUP, Cambridge 2006) 193. 
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designed.”598 With the expansion of EU competences which have an impact on 
minorities in Member States, it is increasingly important to have specific provisions in 
EU law which guarantee effective political participation of minorities at the EU level, 
particularly where a State excludes a minority from political participation through 
restrictive citizenship laws, as in Latvia. Sub-section 3.2.3 of Chapter I (pages 167-
180) traced the historical background of exclusionary citizenship policies towards 
Russian-speaking non-citizens in Latvia which inter alia affect their political 
participation. Based on that overview, Section 1 of Chapter II assesses the EU’s 
response to this issue before (1.1) and after Latvia’s accession to the EU (1.2). Section 
2 then evaluates whether there are any possible EU rules which could improve the 
political participation of Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia.  
 
2. The European Union and Latvia 
 
2.1. EU pre-accession conditionality 
 
 
EU relations with Latvia developed smoothly. Within a week of Latvian 
independence, on 27 August 1991, it had established diplomatic relations with the EC. 
Furthermore, the EC signed the 1992 Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Latvia, 
and these links were strengthened through the 1994 Free Trade Agreement. Finally, 
on 12 June 1995, Latvia and the EC entered into a Europe Agreement. Latvia then 
sought EU membership on 27 October 1995. 
 
                                                 
 
598 ACFC, ‘Commentary on the Effective Participation…’ (n 188) para 80. 
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Before the membership negotiations began, the Commission’s approach to the issue 
of non-citizens in Latvia had echoed international concerns. In its communication on 
the strategy vis-à-vis the Baltic States, the Commission made it clear that integration 
of the Russian-speaking residents, following the recommendations of international 
organisations, would significantly improve regional security and stability.599 
Moreover, the Commission envisioned that the EU had “a role in promoting . . . the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities”.600 
 
However, after negotiations commenced, the greater leniency of the Commission on 
the issue of non-citizens in Latvia contrasted with the approach of the UN601 and the 
CoE,602 which condemned exclusionary practices towards Russian-speaking non-
citizens. This divergence may be explained by the Commission’s desire to expedite 
the integration process of the CEECs. In July 1997, the Commission approved Latvia 
as a candidate for EU membership, describing it as having “the characteristics of a 
democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights, and 
respect for and protection of minorities”.603 
 
Furthermore, in its opinion on Latvia’s application, the Commission stated:  
[a]s regards the more general situation of the Russian-speaking 
minority (regardless of whether they possess Latvian citizenship or 
                                                 
599 Commission, ‘Orientations for a Union Approach towards the Baltic Sea Region’ [1994] SEC(94) 
1747 final, 3. 
 
600 Commission, ‘Orientations for a Union Approach towards the Baltic Sea Region’ (n 599). 
 
601 Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on Latvia’ (1995) CCPR/C/79/Add.53. 
 
602 PACE, ‘On the application by Latvia for membership of the Council of Europe’ (n 565) para 7. 
 
603 D Bungs, The Baltic States: Problems and Prospects of Membership in the European Union 
(Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1998) 50. 
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not), their rights are respected and protected even though some 
problems still have to be resolved.604  
 
While the UN and the CoE condemned the differential treatment of non-citizens, the 
Commission found “no evidence that these minorities are subject to discrimination 
except for problems of access to certain professions in Latvia”.605 In approving 
Latvia’s accession, the Commission chose to overlook approximately sixty 
“legislative differences between the rights of Latvian citizens and those of non-
citizens, including rights pertaining to employment and involvement in political 
life”.606 
 
To accede to the EU, Latvia was required to respect human rights and protect 
minorities pursuant to two documents. First, the Europe Agreement607 contained a 
stringent human rights clause, which suspended the agreement without consultation in 
case of breaches of human rights. Second, under the 1993 Copenhagen criteria,608 to 
qualify for EU membership Latvia had to demonstrate respect for and protection of its 
minorities. The Commission closely monitored Latvia’s compliance with the 
accession criteria. In its annual monitoring reports on Latvia’s progress, the 
Commission made recommendations for improving the situation of non-citizens in 
Latvia. For example, the Commission, like the OSCE, the UN and the CoE, criticised 
                                                 
604 Commission, ‘Agenda 2000 – Opinion on Latvia’s Application for Membership’ (n 583) 20. 
 
605 Commission, ‘Agenda 2000: For a stronger and wider Union’ (Vol I); ‘The Challenge of 
Enlargement’ (Vol.II) [2000] COM(97)2000final, 45. 
 
606 CERD, ‘Thematic Discussion on Non-citizens and Racial Discrimination’ (2004) 
CERD/C/SR.1624, para 43. 
607 Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their 
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Latvia, of the other part, 12 June 1995.   
608 Copenhagen criteria (n 5). 
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the ‘windows’ system for naturalisation, discussed on pages 174-175. However, after 
this system was abolished in 1998, the major focus of its recommendations became 
the requirements for Russian-speaking minorities to become proficient in Latvian. 
Indeed, the reports mainly focused on statistics indicating the number of Russians 
who had mastered Latvian.609 The 1999 Commission’s regular report states, for 
example:  
[s]ince currently, about 43% of the population has a language other 
than Latvian as a first language, language training will remain one of 
the key instruments for the integration of the ethnic minorities in the 
years to come.610  
 
While international law encourages minorities to gain proficiency in the State 
language to ensure integration,611 this process should not seek to assimilate. As 
McKean explains,  
any assimilation that might take place must be clearly voluntary and 
members of minority groups should not be deprived of the rights 
enjoyed by other citizens of the state so as to enable them to integrate 
should they so desire.612 
 
The monitoring reports stressed the significance of integrating the Russian-speaking 
minorities, particularly in matters concerning language, to the extent that the 
Commission’s approach suggested a preference for assimilation.613 Overall, views on 
the impact and quality of the Commission’s monitoring differ markedly. Some 
                                                 
609 For example, Commission, ‘1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Latvia’s Progress 
towards Accession’ [1999] <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/latvia 
_en.pdf> accessed 22 April 2007 17. 
 
610 Commission, ‘1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Latvia’s Progress…’ (n 609). 
 
611 FCNM (n 3) Article 14(3). 
 
612 W McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1983) 
142. 
 
613 Gwendolyn Sasse, ‘EU Conditionality and Minority Rights: Translating the Copenhagen Criterion 
into Policy’ (2005) 16 EUI Working Papers 16. 
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commentators maintain that accession conditionality played a crucial role in 
improving minority protection in Latvia.614 Others argue that the Commission’s 
regular reports were superficial and inconsistent regarding minority rights.615 Most 
commentators agree, however, that the EU used the most leverage when it decided to 
defer the opening of negotiations with Latvia in 1997.616 This decision had a drastic 
effect on Latvian policies, affecting amendments to the Citizenship Law,617 the 
Language Law618 and the Constitution.619  
 
The strength of the EU’s bargaining position declined once accession negotiations 
began. Certainly, EU accession conditionality had limited success in Latvia because, 
first, the EU lacked both a legal basis for and internal standards of minority 
protection,620 and, secondly, minority rights “have never been an internal EU political 
priority”.621 As a result, in the process of monitoring, the EU mainly relied on the 
                                                 
614 Nida Gelazis, ‘The effects of EU Conditionality on Citizenship Policies and Protection of National 
Minorities in the Baltic States’ (2000) 68 EUI Working Papers 27; Jekaterina Dorodnova, ‘EU 
Concerns in Estonia and Latvia: Implications of Enlargement for Russia’s Behaviour Towards the 
Russian-speaking Minorities’ (2000) 40 EUI Working Papers 30. 
 
615 James Hughes and Gwendolyn Sasse, ‘Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality 
and Minority Protection in the CEECs’ (2003) 1 Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues (Europe 
Issue). 
 
616 Tim Haughton, ‘When does the EU Make a Difference? Conditionality and the Accession Process in 
Central and Eastern Europe’ (2007) 5 Political Studies Review 233, 238; see also, Sasse, ‘The Political 
Rights of National Minorities…’ (n 597) 262. 
 
617 The age windows system was abolished in 1998 and children of non-citizens obtained the right to 
citizenship: Sasse ‘The Political Rights of National Minorities’ (n 597) 263. 
 
618 The Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga refused to sign a very restrictive Language Law and 
returned it to the Parliament for revision in line with EU legislation: Haughton, ‘When does the EU 
Make a Difference?...’ (n 616) 238. 
 
619 In 1998, Chapter VIII on Fundamental Rights was incorporated into the Constitution of Latvia: 
Anita Usacka ‘The Impact of the European Integration Process on the Constitution of Latvia’ in A 
Kellermann, J de Zwaan, J Czuczai (eds) EU Enlargement: The Constitutional Impact at EU and 
national level (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2001) 338. 
  
620 Sasse, ‘EU Conditionality and Minority Rights…’ (n 613) 5. 
 
621 Sasse, ‘EU Conditionality and Minority Rights…’ (n 613) 5. 
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standards and reports of the CoE and the OSCE. This in turn led to inconsistencies in 
the Commission’s reports. For example, the 1999 Commission Report on Latvia’s 
progress stated that, “Latvia now fulfils all recommendations expressed by the OSCE 
in the area of naturalization and citizenship”.622 However, in the 2001 report, fresh 
concerns emerged over stringent language regulations.623 The 2002 report condemned 
the language policy for hindering the naturalisation process and the political 
participation of minorities; yet it concluded with praise for the county’s considerable 
progress in protecting its minorities.624 Sasse convincingly argues that this practice of 
imposing different external standards produced “ambiguity and internal 
inconsistencies”.625 Instead of developing internal monitoring mechanisms, the 
Commission preferred to rely on vague ‘international’ or ‘European’ standards 
without properly specifying their requirements.626  
 
Moreover, this inconsistency led the Commission to adopt two contradictory 
approaches to minority protection, i.e., favouring their assimilation in Latvia and 
Estonia, but promoting the cultural autonomy of minorities in other candidate 
countries,627 such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. Thus, the 
Commission’s demands to the Czech Republic to modify exclusionary citizenship 
                                                                                                                                            
 
622 Commission, ‘1999 Regular Report from the Commission on Latvia’s Progress…’ (n 609) 17. 
 
623 Commission, ‘2001 Regular Report on Latvia’s progress towards Accession’ [2001] 
SEC(2001)1749, 26; see also, Sasse, ‘EU Conditionality and Minority Rights…’ (n 613) 8. 
 
624 Commission, ‘2002 Regular Report on Latvia’s Progress Towards Accession’ [2002] 
Sec(2002)1405, 141. 
 
625 Sasse, ‘EU Conditionality and Minority Rights…’ (n 613) 9. 
 
626 Hughes and Sasse, ‘Monitoring the Monitors…’ (n 615) 17. 
 
627 Dimitry Kochenov, ‘A Summary of Contradictions: An Outline of the EU’s Main Internal and 
External Approaches to Ethnic Minority Protection’ (2008) XXXI(1) Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review 1, 5. 
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policies are in stark contrast with Latvia’s experience. The Czech citizenship law 
prevented many Roma from acquiring citizenship status. Despite the similarities in 
these situations, the Commission made demands of the Czech Republic only. The 
country was required to change its naturalisation policy, including the grounds for 
naturalisation, “something that had never happened in the context of reporting of 
Latvian or Estonian progress towards accession”.628 Consequently, a lack of 
consistent yardsticks on minority protection allowed the Commission to evade sharp 
edges in politically sensitive matters and apply conditionality selectively. As a result, 
inconsistencies in the Commission’s reports sent the wrong signals to Latvia: if it 
could join the EU without resolving the issue of its minorities, it might be able to 
avoid criticism afterwards.629 
                                                 
628 Kochenov, ‘A Summary of Contradictions…’ (n 627) 47. 
 
629 Interestingly, this is not the first time that Latvia has excluded a minority group from citizenship. 
After World War I, the first years of Latvia’s independence were marked by defective citizenship 
policies which targeted the Jewish minority. The Jewish minority has lived in Latvia since the 14th 
century. The economic development in the second half of the 19th century significantly enhanced the 
role of the Jewish community in Latvia. So many Jews moved to Latvia from Lithuania, Belarus, 
Poland and Ukraine that before World War I their number reached 170,000 persons. During World War 
I, 127,000 Jews fled Latvia, and “only one third of them was to return after the war”: ‘The Euromosaic 
Study: Other Languages in Latvia’, para 5 <http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/languages/ 
langmin/euromosaic/lat5_en.html> accessed 7 September 2009.  
Initially, the 1919 Law on Citizenship gave “Latvian nationality to all former Russian citizens living on 
Latvian territory, and all who are nationals of districts now belonging to Latvia, who belonged to these 
districts by Russian law”; however, in 1921, the amended law limited the acquisition of citizenship to 
“persons not formally registered, if they had been resident in Latvia for 20 years before 1 August  
1914, or had resided there continuously up to 1884, and the descendants of such persons”: L Mair, The 
Protection of Minorities: the Working and Scope of the Minorities Treaties under the League of 
Nations (Christophers, London 1928) 13 and 114.  
It appears that the law targeted Jews specifically because they had had to leave the country during the 
war as a result of the Russian Empire’s policies, and were to be barred from returning because of 
Latvia’s restrictive legislation. The apparent reason for the denial of citizenship was the number of 
Jews who returned to Latvia in 1920: according to Latvian official statistics their number was greater 
“than the number of persons belonging to any other minority”: Mair, The Protection of Minorities…, 
(above) 114. Heyking argues that another significant reason for their exclusion was the fact that these 
individuals did not belong to the Latvian race (Baron Heyking, ‘The Baltic Minorities’ (1921) 7 
Transactions of the Grotius Society 119-132, 124). Accordingly, the Jewish minority was excluded 
from citizenship, even though they were legally residents in Latvia before its independence. Although a 
naturalisation process was established, it was denied to many Jews: Ztle Zigurds, ‘The Legal 
Framework of Minorities’ policies in Latvia: Background Constitution, and the League of Nations’ 
(1980) 11(1) Journal of Baltic Studies 10.  
It is also instructive that, to acquire international support and assert itself as an independent State, 
immediately after becoming independent, Latvia applied to become a member of the League of 
Nations. After World War I, the Versailles Peace Treaty of 28 June 1919 (effective as of 10 January 
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1920) made specific references to Latvia in Articles 116, 117 and 433. By these references, it 
effectively granted Latvia de facto recognition. It is noteworthy in the context of the geo-political 
interests of the Allied Powers in Latvia that this recognition took place a month and a half before the 
Latvian Government was established on 14 July 1919. Yet Latvia struggled to acquire de jure 
recognition for political reasons surrounding its cession from Russia.  
However, the lack of de jure recognition hampered the development of economic partnerships of the 
principal powers with Latvia. Moreover, the interests of the UK and France required the establishment 
of a buffer State which would be equally alien to Russia and Germany. As a result, Latvia was 
recognised de jure by the League of Nations on 24 January 1921. On 22 September 1921 Latvia 
became a member of the League of Nations: Laserson, ‘The Recognition of Latvia’ (n 536) 238-244. 
As a condition of membership, the League of Nations obliged Latvia to protect its minorities. On 15 
December 1920, the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted recommendations requiring Latvia to 
comply with the principles of the Minorities Treaties. This requirement stemmed from the fact that the 
League of Nations lacked universal minority provisions. Instead, general principles were derived from 
a number of bilateral treaties concluded between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
individual States in Europe in which the ethnic composition had been altered as a result of border shifts 
after World War I. To accede to the League, the Latvian Government adopted a declaration confirming 
its commitment to “enter into negotiations with the Council of the League of Nations in order to 
determine the extent and the methods of carrying out its international obligations for the protection of 
minorities”: Laserson, ‘The Recognition of Latvia’ (n 536) 246 citing League of Nations, Records of 
the First Assembly, the 25th Plenary Meeting, 15 December 1920.  
However, Latvia’s attitude drastically changed after its accession to the League was finalised. On 11 
January 1922, the Council invited Latvia to draft a declaration on the protection of minorities. In 
response, Latvia strongly objected to this idea and negotiated a minority clause for two years. Among 
the arguments Latvia advanced were claims that its Constitution had more extensive guarantees, its 
minority population was very small, conditionality of this kind could not be imposed on a recognised 
State, agreement on minority rights should bind all members of the League, and the Covenant did not 
authorise the League to protect minority rights: Mair, The Protection of Minorities…(above) 53-55. 
On 26 September 1922, Da Gama’s report on Protection of Minorities in Latvia was laid before the 
Council and Latvia. A draft declaration was enclosed with the report. It established the principle of 
non-discrimination, as well as guarantees on the acquisition of citizenship, equal protection of the law, 
religious tolerance and linguistic freedom. Latvia strongly opposed this declaration under the excuse it 
contradicted her Constitution and threatened her sovereignty. The negotiations continued for two years 
until the Latvian government resigned: Zigurds, ‘The Legal Framework of Minorities’ policies in 
Latvia…’ (above) 18. A compromise was finally reached in July 1923: “while avoiding the obnoxious 
word ‘guarantee,’ Latvia in fact accepted practically the same obligations as the States which have 
signed Minorities Treaties”: Mair, The Protection of Minorities… (above) 56.  
Why, then, could not the League of Nations prevent Latvia from depriving the Jewish minority of 
citizenship status? One reason for the League’s failure was the lack of universally applicable minority 
provisions: the Allied Powers imposed responsibility to protect minorities only on the States defeated 
in World War I or new States in return for additional territory or recognition of independence: Alfred 
de Zayas ‘The International Judicial Protection of Peoples and Minorities’ in C Brölmann, R Lefeber 
and M Zieck (eds) Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1993) 
258. This created resentment in the States which were bound by the standards of Minorities treaties. It 
led to States’ failing to implement or even make commitments; moreover, minorities themselves 
regarded these treaties as inadequate: David Wippman ‘The Evolution and Implementation of Minority 
Rights’ (1998) 66 Fordham Law Review 597, 602. As a result, these treaties were not implemented in 
good faith, and the system eventually failed. 
Actually, parallels between the League of Nations and the EU may be drawn here. In both regimes, 
pre-accession conditionality was applied to selected countries, but did not bind the system as a whole. 
Moreover, both the end of World War I and the political transformation in Europe in the 1990s 
influenced the security considerations behind the protection of minorities. It is convincingly argued that 
the EU concern for Russian-speaking and Roma minorities during the accession process was informed 
more by “its external relations with its most powerful neighbour and main energy supplier, and own 
narrow soft security migration problems, than with minority protection as a norm per se”: Hughes and 
Sasse, ‘Monitoring the Monitors…’ (n 615) 16. Accordingly, minority provisions were “the clearest 
indication of the political, not the humanitarian, character of the protection”: Pablo de Azcarate, 
‘Protection of Minorities and Human Rights’ (1946) 243 Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science 124-128, 127. Furthermore, in both frameworks, any acceptance of minority 
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2.2. Latvia in the European Union: post-accession situation 
 
Latvia’s accession to the EU in 2004 did not automatically solve the problems of a 
large number of mainly Russian-speaking non-citizens in Latvia.630 On the contrary, 
Latvia has attempted to tighten further the rules on naturalisation of non-citizens or 
retention of their legal status as non-citizens.631 Thus, only twenty days after Latvia’s 
accession to the EU, on 20 May 2004, the Latvian Parliament (Saeima) amended the 
law on the status of non-citizens to the effect that, if they acquire permanent residence 
in another country, they automatically lose their non-citizen status and become 
                                                                                                                                            
protection in Latvia was partly driven by its desire to gain international support and membership of 
international organisations; “inevitably interest fell away as these goals were achieved…”: John Hiden 
and David Smith, ‘Looking beyond the Nations State: A Baltic Vision for National Minorities between 
the Wars’ (2006) 41 Journal of Contemporary History 387, 390.  
The similarities between the systems are not coincidental. Following the ethnic conflicts in Europe, 
Western States attempted to establish standards of minority protection to influence the transition 
process to democracy in post-communist Europe. The League of Nations system provided a useful 
guide for debates in contemporary Europe: despite its deficiencies, the system provided for elaborate 
guarantees on minority rights.  
However, the different context of these debates must also be considered. First, it took the EU itself a 
long time to initiate ‘minority talk.’ Anyone who compares the present rules with the mainly economic 
background of integration might applaud the EU for its achievements, because it has no explicit 
mandate to protect minorities. It is only when judged against the present level of European integration 
that it seems unsatisfactory for these rules to remain incomplete: EU accession conditionality managed 
to bring the issue of protecting minorities to the agendas of many European countries. However, it 
failed to clarify “the issue, substantive measures and policy practice, [and thereby] allowed historical 
domestic precedents to resurface”: Sasse, ‘EU Conditionality and Minority Rights…’ (n 613) 25. 
Second, unlike the League of Nations, the European Union is not alone in dealing with minority rights. 
The CoE, the OSCE and the UN have in place complex legal and political instruments and monitoring 
mechanisms (discussed in Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter I), albeit not particularly strong ones. Thus the 
political and legal environment is quite different, although the claims that it is not time for a 
supranational regime of minority protection remain the same. Proposals to establish a universally 
applicable general system of minority protection or supranational guarantees were rejected under the 
League of Nations, because “it would be too rigid to meet special cases; more probably, as a matter of 
fact, it would be too vague”: Lucy Mair, ‘The Machinery of Minority Protection’ (1928) 7(4) Journal 
of the Royal Institute of International Affairs 256-266, 264. For views regarding the EU see de Witte, 
‘The European Communities and its Minorities’ (n 418) 185. 
 
630 Peter van Elsuwege, ‘The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Triangular Relationship between the 
EU, Russia and the Baltic States’ (2006) Jean Monnet Conference on ‘European Union Enlargement of 
2004 and Beyond: Responding to the Political, Legal and Socio-Economic Challenges’, Riga, 20–22 
April 2006, 3. 
 
631 J Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union: Electoral Rights and the 
Restructuring of Political Space (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007) 330. 
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stateless.632 Another limitation was enacted in August 2006: individuals who fail 
Latvian language tests three times can no longer qualify for naturalisation.633 Latvia’s 
accession to the EU has also increased the number of legislative differences between 
Latvian citizens and non-citizens. In 2008, there were 75 such differences, ranging 
from a prohibition on occupying certain positions in the public and private sectors, to 
enjoyment of political and property rights.634  
 
The most contentious areas, where differential treatment is the most adverse, remain 
strict naturalisation rules, the lack of political rights and the hardening of linguistic 
policies, harshly criticised by international organisations such as the UN and the CoE. 
The main criticism concerns the slow naturalisation process and emphasises three 
aspects. First, naturalisation conditions remain too complex.635 Making the conditions 
for naturalisation, such as language and history tests, more flexible may increase the 
naturalisation rate.636 Secondly, a common criticism concerns children’s rights: there 
are 13,000 non-citizen or stateless children in Latvia; this number increases from year 
                                                 
632 The Constitutional Court of Latvia subsequently declared these amendments to be incompatible 
with Article 3(1) of Protocol 4 to the ECHR, which provides the right not to be expelled individually or 
collectively from a country where an individual is a national. Case No 2004-15-0106, Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Latvia, Riga, 7 May 2005. For further discussion see page 212. 
 
633 Shaw, The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union (n 631) 330. 
 
634 Only citizens can work as state officials, civil servants, judges, public prosecutors, police and prison 
guards; be sworn advocates and advocate’s assistants, defenders in criminal proceedings, court bailiffs, 
sworn notaries and notary’s assistants; stand and vote in parliamentary and local elections, participate 
in the elections to the European Parliament and State referenda; and own land: Latvian Human Rights 
Committee, ‘Citizens of a Non-Existent State: The Long-term Phenomenon of Mass Statelessness in 
Latvia’ (Riga, 2008) 24–28. 
 
635 The most recent examples are: Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), ‘Latvia’ (2006) 
CRC/C/LVA/CO/2, para 26; Committee against Torture (CAT), ‘Latvia’ (2008) CAT/C/LVA/CO/2 
para 19; PACE, ‘Resolution on Rights of national minorities in Latvia’ (2006) Res 1527, para 17.10 
<http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/ adoptedtext/ta06/eres1527.htm> accessed 23 June 
2008; Commissioner for Human Rights (CHR), ‘Memorandum to the Latvian Government: 
Assessment of the progress made in implementing the 2003 recommendations of the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ (2007) CommDH(2007)9 para 33; European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), ‘Third report on Latvia’ (2008) CRI(2008)2, para 117. 
 
636 PACE, ‘Resolution 1527(2006)’ (n 635) para 17.10. 
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to year because children continue to be born as non-citizens.637 It is argued that Latvia 
should amend its legislation to enable parents to choose the status they want for their 
children when they register their births.638 The third concerns the elderly. It is 
suggested that 300,000 elderly people in the country would not be able to comply 
with naturalisation requirements however simple the tests are.639 Therefore, Latvia 
should automatically naturalise the elderly.640 
 
Furthermore, significant criticism is directed towards non-citizens’ lack of political 
rights,641 mainly aimed at excluding Russian-speaking minorities from participation 
in the political life of the country. Thus, out of a hundred members of the Saeima, 
only eighteen belong to ethnic minorities.642 By maintaining political dominance, 
ethnic Latvians retain the power to enact restrictive laws. However, arguably, a 
national government should not only represent a simple majority, but as far as 
possible all the people.643 It is clear that in Latvia a balance between majorities and 
minorities is significantly tilted towards the ethnic majority: “[c]itizens elected 
parliaments controlled by members of the respective titular nation who, once in office, 
implemented policies that extend Baltic ownership of the state.”644 
                                                 
 
637 CRC, ‘Latvia’ (n 635) para 27. 
 
638 CHR, ‘Memorandum to the Latvian Government…’ (n 635) para 38. 
 
639 Melanie Feakins and Luiza Białasiewicz, ‘“Trouble in the East”: The New Entrants and Challenges 
to the European Ideal’ (2006) 47(6) Eurasian Geography and Economics 647, 653. 
 
640 PACE, ‘Resolution 1527(2006)’ (n 635) para 17.8. 
 
641 PACE, ‘Resolution 1527(2006)’ (n 635) para 17.11; CHR, Memorandum to the Latvian 
Government (n 635) para 43; ECRI, ‘Third report on Latvia’ (n 635) para 132. 
 
642 ECRI, ‘Third report on Latvia’ (n 635) para 130. 
 
643 Chassagnou v France (App nos 25088/94, 28331/95, 28443/95) (2000) 29 EHRR 615, para 112. 
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 One way in which Latvia excludes Russian-speaking minorities from political 
participation is through tightening Latvian language regulations:  
[a]s ethnic Latvians have begun to speak Latvian much more widely in 
interpersonal contacts, and more aggressively insist that non-Latvians 
learn the Latvian language, there appears evidence of retrenchment and 
hardening of the language situation.645  
 
For instance, since 1998 Latvia has been moving towards a Latvian-only educational 
system. The first stage of reforms began in 2004, when minority schools were 
required to teach 60% of subjects in Latvian, with only 40% being taught in Russian. 
Fear of forced assimilation created significant opposition among Russian-speaking 
minorities:  
[p]rotest actions were organised throughout 2003 and climaxed with a 
100,000-signature petition against the language shift inscribed in the 
education reform. The government responded by making such 
demonstrations illegal and maintained the foreseen plan and time-
schedule.646  
 
Despite the Government’s contentions that 60–70% of schools were ready for the 
language shift,647 a lack of qualified Latvian-speaking teachers and textbooks 
exacerbated further difficulties in the implementation of reforms. 
 
Some commentators argue that these processes in Latvia are both natural and 
legitimate in the light of the country’s past. Hogan-Brun explains that the titular 
nation in Latvia “feel that they have been victimised by their (previously dominant) 
                                                                                                                                            
644 Michele Commercio, ‘Systems of Partial Control: Ethnic Dynamics in Post-Soviet Estonia and 
Latvia’ (2008) 43 St Comp. Int. Dev. 81, 96. 
 
645 Carol Schmid, ‘Ethnicity and language tensions in Latvia’ (2008) 7 Language Policy 3, 15. 
 
646 Jean-Bernard Adrey, ‘Minority Language Rights Before and After the 2004 EU Enlargement: The 
Copenhagen Criteria in the Baltic States’ (2005) 26(5) Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural 
Development 453, 461. 
 
647 Adrey, ‘Minority Language Rights Before and After the 2004 EU Enlargement…’ (n 646) 461. 
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minorities, and there is a fear that the latter lack loyalty, and that they will collaborate 
with their powerful kin-state (i.e. Russia)”.648 Similarly, Ozolins claims that there is 
no minority issue in Latvia, rather it is a policy of a “neighbouring State utilising 
some population aspect to impose foreign relations demands”.649 Moreover, in 
Ozolins’ view, Latvia’s restrictive policies are essential to protect its language and 
culture from Russian-speaking minorities, which makes the language situation in 
Latvia unique.650  
 
Other authors argue that Latvia should integrate its Russian-speaking minorities and 
develop a “sense of ‘belonging’ to Latvian culture”.651 Such integration may increase 
their identity of being Latvian despite the fact that they have privileged links to 
Russia.652 Besides, if in the early years of independence exclusion of Russian-
speaking minorities from public life might have been justified as strengthening 
democracy by isolating potentially destabilising cleavage,653 it is very hard to sustain 
this excuse now. Latvia has established a strong democracy and become a member of 
leading international organisations, such as the EU, the UN, the OSCE and the CoE. 
Moreover, as a State Latvia holds “all the cards, not only in terms of sovereignty and 
                                                 
 
648 Gabrielle Hogan-Brun, ‘The Baltic Republics and Language Ideological Debates Surrounding 
European Union Accession’ (2005) 26(5) Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 367, 
372. 
 
649 Uldis Ozolins, ‘The Impact of European Accession upon Language Policy in the Baltic States’ 
(2003) 2 Language Policy 217, 226. 
 
650 Uldis Ozolins, ‘Between Russian and European Hegemony: Current Language Policy in the Baltic 
States’ (1999) 6(1) Current Issues in Language and Society 6, 43. 
 
651 Pieter Batelaan, ‘Bilingual Education: the case of Latvia from a comparative perspective’ (2002) 
13(4) Intercultural Education 359, 373. 
 
652 Batelaan, ‘Bilingual Education…’ (n 651) 373. 
 
653 Timm Beichelt, ‘Minorities in New European Democracies: A Source of Destabilization?’ (2003) 2 
European Yearbook of Minority Issues 53. 
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territorial integrity but also in terms of national implementation”.654 Consequently, 
Latvia’s exclusionary practices towards its Russian-speaking minorities based on the 
requirement of citizenship are unjustified. 
 
3. ‘Testing’ relevant EU rules on Latvia 
 
As there is no explicit right to political participation of minorities in EU law, it may 
be useful to overview relevant EU rules on non-discrimination which could require 
equal treatment of minorities. The principle of non-discrimination based on sex655 and 
nationality656 featured strongly from the early years of the EC. Recent years have 
been marked by the further development of the principle of non-discrimination in EU 
law. Thus, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam introduced Article 13 TEC (now Article 19 
TFEU) to provide that the Council may adopt secondary legislation against 
discrimination on several grounds, such as sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age and sexual orientation.657 This list of grounds does not, 
however, include national minority status, nationality or language.  
                                                
 
Within one year of Article 13 TEC’s (now Article 19 TFEU) entering into force, the 
Council adopted Directives on the ‘Equal Treatment between Persons Irrespective of 
 
 
654 Alfredsson, ‘A Frame an Incomplete Painting…’ (n 13) 304. 
 
655 Sotgiu (n 76). 
 
656 Bilka-Kaufhaus (n 96); see also E Ellis, EU Anti-Discrimination law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2005). 
 
657 In addition, Article 10 TFEU specifies that ‘[i]n defining and implementing its policies and 
activities, the Union shall aim to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’ 
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Racial or Ethnic Origin’ (Race Directive)658 and on ‘Establishing a General 
Framework for Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation’ (Employment 
Directive),659 together referred to as the Equality Directives.660 The Equality 
Directives require Member States to protect individuals against direct and indirect 
discrimination, harassment and victimisation on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin 
(Race Directive), and religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation 
(Employment Directive). The scope of the Race Directive is significantly wider, 
because it applies to employment and occupation, the provision of goods and services, 
including education in both public and private spheres. Conversely, the Employment 
Directive has a somewhat more limited scope, because it applies to employment and 
occupation in the public sector only.661 
 
Under the Equality Directives, direct discrimination takes place where one person is 
treated “less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable 
situation”662 on grounds specifically prohibited by the respective Directives. Indirect 
discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice 
would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin, sex, religion or belief, disability, age 
                                                 
 
658 Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41). 
 
659 Directive 2000/78 (Employment Directive) (n 43). In addition, in 2004, the Council adopted a 
Directive on equal treatment in access to and supply of goods and services to combat gender 
discrimination in provision of goods and services: Council (EC) Directive 2004/113 implementing the 
principle of equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services 
[2004] OJ L373/37 (Goods and Services Directive). 
 
660 For an assessment of the Equality Directives’ contribution to the development of EU anti-
discrimination law see, Ellis, EU Anti-Discrimination law (n 655); Marc Bell, ‘Equality and the 
European Union Constitution (2004) 33 Industrial Law Journal 242-260.   
 
661 Furthermore, although the Goods and Services Directive (n 659) applies to both public and private 
sectors, it is limited to access to and supply of goods and services; for example, it explicitly excludes 
from its scope the content of media and advertising, as well as education (Article 3(3)). 
 
662 Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41) Article 2(2)(a). 
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and sexual orientation at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons.663 
Under the Race and Employment Directives, indirect discrimination may, however, 
be justified if a measure has a legitimate aim, to be achieved by appropriate and 
necessary means.664  
 
In addition, the Equality Directives contain several exceptions. For example, Article 4 
of the Race Directive and Article 4(1) of the Employment Directive stipulate that 
differential treatment based on a characteristic related to inter alia racial or ethnic 
origin, and religion or belief, would not be considered discriminatory if, by reason of 
the nature of the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context in 
which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining 
occupational requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the 
requirement is proportionate.665 It is hoped that the limitations in the Equality 
Directives will not detract from their protective scope, but this will largely depend on 
the ECJ’s reading of the instruments.  
 
So far the ECJ’s interpretation of the Race Directive has been generous, such as in 
Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV 
(Feryn),666 where the Court dealt with the concept of direct discrimination. The case 
                                                 
 
663 Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41) Article 2(2)(b). 
 
664 Directive 2004/113 (Goods and Services Directive) (n 659) introduces the similar concept of 
objective justification without limiting it to cases of indirect discrimination (Article 4(5)). The 
preamble of the Goods and Services Directive refers, for example, to single-sex shelters aimed at 
protecting victims of sex-related violence (Preamble (Recital 16)). 
 
665 Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41) Article 4. 
 
666 Case C-54/07 Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v Firma Feryn NV 
[2008] All ER 1127. 
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concerned public statements by one of the directors of Feryn, who claimed that his 
firm, which specialised in the sale and installation of doors, would not recruit persons 
of Moroccan origin, because some customers do not want them in their private homes. 
The Belgian Centre for Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism brought 
proceedings against Feryn before national courts. The national court stayed the 
proceedings and asked the ECJ to provide guidance on whether public statements by 
an employer declaring that it would not recruit employees of a certain ethnic origin 
constitute direct discrimination under the Race Directive. 
 
One of the distinct features of the case is a lack of an identifiable victim in the case. 
The United Kingdom and Ireland, therefore, argued that this claim by a public interest 
body was hypothetical: the Race Directive does not apply “in the absence of an 
identifiable complainant who has become the victim of discrimination”.667 
Conversely, Advocate General Maduro maintained that if situations where no victim 
could be identified were excluded from the scope of the Directive, employers could 
discriminate against racial and ethnic minorities “simply by publicising the 
discriminatory character of their recruitment policy as overtly as possible 
beforehand”.668 Therefore, there was a case of direct discrimination.  
 
The ECJ agreed with the Advocate General’s arguments and held that the existence of 
direct discrimination was not dependant on an identifiable complainant who claims to 
be a victim.669 The scope of the Race Directive would be limited if it only applied to 
                                                 
667 Feryn (n 666) para 10. 
 
668 Feryn (n 666) Opinion of Advocat General Maduro, 12 May 2008, para 17. 
 
669 Feryn (n 666) para 25. 
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“those cases in which an unsuccessful candidate for a post, considering himself to be 
the victim of direct discrimination, brought legal proceedings against the 
employer”.670 The ECJ ruled that an employer’s public statements in the context of a 
recruitment drive, stating that applications from persons of a certain ethnic origin 
would be turned down, amounted to direct discrimination under the Race Directive. 
This is so because such statements are likely to hinder access to the labour market by 
dissuading certain candidates from applying for advertised positions.  
 
The ECJ’s generous interpretation of the Race Directive confirms that the Court is 
likely to take racial and ethnic discrimination in the EU very seriously. Thus, in 
Feryn, neither the ECJ nor the Advocate General discussed the possibility that, in 
some exceptional cases, genuine and determining occupational requirements671 may 
require an employer to differentiate among the applicants. Although the 
straightforward facts of the case might have rendered such discussion unnecessary, 
this may also be indicative of the ECJ’s intention to interpret exceptions under the 
Race Directive very narrowly. 
 
Were a member of the Russian-speaking minority in Latvia to consider that State 
policies contravene the Equality Directives, could they rely on these instruments or 
domestic law implementing the Directives? The Employment Directive is unlikely to 
be of significant help, because exclusion of these minorities is based on their language 
and not on religion. However, in cases of direct discrimination based on ethnic origin, 
exclusionary practices against Russian-speaking minorities could be attacked under 
                                                 
670 Feryn (n 666) para 24. 
 
671 Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41) Article 4. 
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the Race Directive. In the absence of explicit statements by employers as in Feryn, it 
is possible to invoke rules on indirect discrimination672 by demonstrating that 
obstacles to accessing the labour market disproportionately affect Russian-speaking 
minorities as compared to ethnic Latvians. Indeed, the Report on the Implementation 
of the Race Directive in Latvia explicitly refers to language regulations and ethnic 
origin as ‘suspect’ grounds.673 Therefore, rigid linguistic regulations limiting access 
to the labour market and differential treatment of non-citizens could be challenged 
under the provision on indirect discrimination in the Race Directive.674  
                                                
 
However, even if a provision of Latvian legislation were to be found indirectly 
discriminatory, this finding would not fully remedy violations of the rights of 
Russian-speaking non-citizens. The Race Directive does not contain special rights 
essential to protect minority identity; it is limited to the prohibition of discrimination 
only,675 leaving positive action at Member States’ discretion. Thus, Article 5 of the 
Race Directive specifies that, to ensure full equality in practice, Member States are 
not precluded from maintaining or adopting positive action to prevent or compensate 
for disadvantages entailed by discrimination.676 
 
672 Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41) Article 2(2)(b). 
 
673 European Network of Independent Experts, ‘Latvia: report on measures to combat discrimination 
Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78’ [2007] Country report 2007, 2, <http://www.non-discrimination. 
net/content/media/2007-LV-Country%20Report%20Final.pdf>; see also ‘Latvia: report on measures to 
combat discrimination Directives 2000/43 and 2000/78’ [2008] Country report 2008, 4 <http://www. 
non-discrimination.net/content/media/2008-LV-Country%20Report%20final.pdf> accessed 29 June 
2009.  
 
674 Norbert Reich, ‘The Constitutional Relevance of Citizenship and Free Movement in an Enlarged 
Union’ (2005) 11(6) ELJ 675, 694. 
 
675 Reich, ‘The Constitutional Relevance of Citizenship…’ (n 674) 694. 
 
676 Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41) Article 5; Directive 2000/78/EC (Employment Directive) 
(n 43), Article 7; Directive 2004/113 (Goods and Services Directive) (n 659) Article 6. 
In addition, the Equality Directives clarify that the provisions of these instruments are minimum 
standards and Member States are free to maintain higher standards of protection: Directive 2000/43 
 206
 In addition, the range of issues which could come under the Race Directive does not 
extend to political participation per se. Although Recital 12 of the Preamble of the 
Race Directive states that the development of democratic and tolerant societies 
requires active participation of everyone irrespective of ethnic origin, it is unlikely 
that Russian-speakers’ exclusion from political participation would fall within the 
ambit of this instrument. The Race Directive could be invoked by a member of the 
Russian-speaking minority if this individual is denied access to employment based on 
ethnic origin, for example, in a political party. Consequently, the Race Directive may 
have limited impact on the rights of Russian-speaking non-citizens. 
 
Potentially, several other provisions of EU law may be relevant. First, a continued 
democratic deficit in Latvia may trigger the application of Article 7 (2) and (3) TEU. 
This provision may apply if the principles in Article 2 TEU, i.e., democracy and 
fundamental rights, including the rights of persons belonging to a minority, were 
seriously and persistently breached by a Member State. In this case, recommendations 
may be addressed to this Member State and some of its rights might be suspended, 
including voting rights in the Council. However, the mechanism of Article 7 is 
politically sensitive and constitutes a procedure for crisis response.677 Therefore, in 
                                                                                                                                            
(Race Directive) (n 41) Article 6(1); Directive 2000/78/EC (Employment Directive) (n 43) Article 8(1); 
Directive 2004/113 (Goods and Services Directive) (n 659) Article 7 (1). 
Moreover, the implementation of these Directives may not reduce the level of protection that was 
already afforded under national laws: Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41) Article 6(2); Directive 
2000/78/EC (Employment Directive) (n 43) Article 8(2); Directive 2004/113 (Goods and Services 
Directive) (n 659) Article 7(2). 
 
677 In 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced Article 7 TEU. In 2000, the mechanism already 
proved inefficient in fashioning a response to the Haider affair, when an extreme right-wing party 
entered into a coalition government in Austria. On its own, this victory in domestic elections did not 
constitute a breach of fundamental rights and, therefore, did not trigger application of the Article 7 
mechanism. Consequently, 14 Member States imposed sanctions on Austria outside of the EU legal 
framework. Subsequently, Article 7 TEU was revised by the Treaty of Nice. For discussion see, 
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practice, it will be invoked only if there is a serious and persistent breach of minority 
rights. The application of this mechanism to Latvia has not yet been contemplated by 
the EU institutions or Member States. Most likely, this provision would apply to 
Latvia only if exclusionary practices against Russian-speaking non-citizens escalate 
into ethnic conflict or civil unrest, which could draw the EU’s attention to the 
problem. This, however, is unlikely given the weak political organisation among 
Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia.678 So, the EU may avoid sanctioning Latvia 
under this mechanism. 
 
Because the status of non-citizens in Latvia is almost equivalent to stateless 
persons,679 under EU law they may qualify as TCNs,680 and hence may benefit from 
the Long-Term Residents Directive.681  However, the Directive does not grant TCNs 
political rights, even though TCNs contribute to the economic, cultural and social 
well-being of the EU on an equal footing with EU citizens. Currently, TCNs are 
entitled only to petition the European Parliament (EP) and have a right of appeal to 
the European Ombudsman.682 As highlighted in Chapter I on pages 138-143, despite 
                                                                                                                                            
Gráinne de Búrca, ‘Beyond the Charter: How Enlargement has Enlarged the Human Rights Policy of 
the European Union’ (2004) Fordham International Law Journal 679-714, 695-699. 
 
678 Anton Steen, ‘Ethnic relations, elites and democracy in the Baltic States’ (2000) 16(4) Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics 68, 73. 
 
679 Non-citizens in Latvia have a special legal status under the Law on the Status of the Former USSR 
Citizens who are not Citizens of Latvia or any other State of 12 April 1995 <http://www.humanrights. 
lv/doc/latlik/noncit.htm> accessed 25 May 2007. As amended in 2000, this defines “the basic rights 
and obligations attached to such status, which include many fundamental social and economic rights, 
the right of exit and entry and the right to family reunification”: European Commission against Racism 
and Intolerance ‘Second report on Latvia’ (2002) 21, para 33. Nevertheless, non-citizens have 
significant limitations on the right to employment and involvement in political life: Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination ‘Thematic Discussion on Non-citizens and Racial 
Discrimination’ (n 563) para 43. 
  
680 The status of TNCs as a minority in EU law is discussed in Chapter I on pages 140-143. 
 
681 Directive 2003/109 (Long-Term Residents Directive) (n 42) Preamble (Recital 5). 
 
682 Charter of Fundamental Rights (n 9) Articles 41 and 46. 
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the improvement in the TCNs’ legal position, significant differences remain between 
EU citizens and permanently-resident TCNs, further marginalised by being “pushed 
to a third-class citizenship status in their host states”.683  
 
The ECJ’s ruling in Spain v the United Kingdom684 suggests some development in 
this regard. Spain challenged the United Kingdom’s rules granting a right to all 
residents of Gibraltar, including those who do not hold EU citizenship, to vote and to 
stand for election to the EP. Conversely, the UK argued that no EU rules prohibit 
extending these rights to nationals of non-Member States.685  
                                                                                                                                           
  
In Advocate General Tizzano’s view, the electoral base of a Member State might be 
widened to include foreigners “by reason of specific national situations or political 
choices made by the legislature.”686 In principle, the Advocate General advocated the 
recognition of voting rights of the maximum number of persons, including foreigners 
established in a Member State, “who, like citizens, are effectively subject to the 
measures approved by the national and Community legislative authorities”.687 
However, in this particular case, granting votes to non-citizens in Gibraltar 
contravened Annex II to the Act on Direct Elections; the extension did not “stem from 
 
 
683 Ece Atikcan, ‘Citizenship or Denizenship: The Treatment of Third Country Nationals in the 
European Union’ (2006) 85 Sussex European Institute Working Paper 21. 
 
684 C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom (Gibraltar) [2006] ECR I-7917; [2007] 1 CMLR 3. 
 
685 Gibraltar (n 684) para 49. 
 
686 Gibraltar (n 684) Opinion of Advocat General Tizzano, para 84. 
 
687 Gibraltar (n 684) Opinion of Advocat General Tizzano, para 93. 
 
 209
the need to ensure the exercise of a fundamental right”.688 Although granting voting 
rights to foreigners is desirable, it is “a freely made political choice”.689 
 
The ECJ dismissed the Advocate General’s arguments and established that the EC 
legislation did not define “expressly and precisely who are to be entitled to the right to 
vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament”.690 
Therefore, EC law did not preclude Member States from granting the right to persons 
“other than their own nationals or citizens of the Union resident in their territory”.691 
This lenient approach may be also explained by the ECtHR’s judgment in Matthews v 
the United Kingdom,692 which established that withholding by the UK of the right to 
participate in elections to the EP in Gibraltar in 1994 was incompatible with Article 3 
of Protocol 1 to the ECHR (P1-3).693 Nevertheless, the wording of the judgment is 
                                                 
688 Gibraltar (n 684) Opinion of Advocat General Tizzano, para 128. 
 
689 Gibraltar (n 684) Opinion of Advocat General Tizzano, para 130. 
 
690 Gibraltar (n 684) para 70. 
 
691 Gibraltar (n 684) para 78. 
 
692 Matthews v the United Kingdom (App no 24833/94) (1999) 28 EHRR 361.  
 
693 When the United Kingdom acceded to the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 
pursuant to the Treaty on the Accession of 22 January 1972, it restricted the application of certain 
provisions of the EEC Treaty to Gibraltar, as its dependent territory (for example, Gibraltar was 
excluded from certain parts of the EEC, such as the free movement of goods: Matthews v the United 
Kingdom (n 692) paras 8, 11 and 12). Furthermore, the application of Annex II of the 1976 Act on 
Direct Elections to the European Parliament was limited to the United Kingdom, and did not apply to 
Gibraltar (Council (EEC) Decision 76/787 relating to the Act concerning the election of the 
representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage, OJ 1976 L278/1: “The United Kingdom 
will apply the provisions of this Act only in respect of the United Kingdom.”)  Consequently, the 
population of Gibraltar could not participate in elections to the European Parliament and was affected 
by “legislation emanating from the legislative process of the European Community” (Matthews v the 
United Kingdom (n 692) para 34), but had no say in the choice of their legislature.  
In the ECtHR’s view this situation was incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR, which 
“enshrines a characteristic of an effective political democracy” (Matthews v the United Kingdom (n 
692) para 41), where people can freely express their choice of legislature. Because the applicant was 
completely deprived of the right to vote in the 1994 elections to the European Parliament, the ECtHR 
found a violation of the Convention right: Ms Matthews was “completely denied any opportunity to 
express her opinion in the choice of the members of the European Parliament” (Matthews v the United 
Kingdom (n 692) para 64). 
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very careful. It does not affirm granting voting rights to foreigners as a general rule; 
rather, it uses negative terms, not criticising the United Kingdom for its action.694  
 
Consequently, persons who do not hold EU citizenship can have the right to vote and 
to stand for election to the EP. However, this encouraging finding has one significant 
limitation. The decision to grant EU political rights to non-citizens remains with a 
Member State. Therefore, this dictum is unlikely to alter the political rights of 
Russian-speaking non-citizens in Latvia.   
 
Accordingly, there is little likelihood that the position of the Russian-speaking 
minorities in Latvia would improve if they acquired the status of EU long-term 
residents.695 Besides, the acquisition of the status of EU long-term resident requires 
TCNs to comply with the integration conditions set by Member States in their 
national legislation.696 In Latvia, these requirements, which include knowledge of a 
State language, stable and regular resources and sickness insurance, are rather similar 
to the requirements for naturalisation for Russian-speaking minorities. So, if non-
citizens can pass the hurdles of the integration requirements they would be better off 
to naturalise and, thus gain the full benefits of EU citizenship. 
 
However, there might be an easier way for Russian-speaking non-citizens to acquire 
EU citizenship. This could be achieved through a generous interpretation of Articles 9 
TEU and Article 20(1) TFEU (ex-Article 17 TEC). Article 9 TEU establishes that 
                                                 
694 Gibraltar (n 684) paras 95 and 96. 
 
695 Peter Van Elsuwege, ‘Russian-speaking Minorities in Estonia and Latvia: Problems of Integration at 
the Threshold of the European Union’ (2004) 20 ESMI Working Paper 43. 
 
696 Directive 2003/109 (Long-Term Residents Directive) (n 42) Article 5(2). 
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‘[e]very national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.’697 Article 20(1) 
TFEU is worded slightly differently and stipulates that ‘[e]very person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.’698  
 
Significantly, the Constitutional Court of Latvia, in interpreting the term ‘national’ in 
Article 3(1) of Protocol 4 (P4-3) to the ECHR, shed some light on the legal status of 
the Russian-speaking non-citizens in Latvia.699 In the view of the Constitutional 
Court, the concept ‘national’ in P4-3 refers ‘to persons with a legal status in the 
territory of the state, which is determined in accordance with the national laws’. 
Consequently, because the status of a non-citizen is created under national law, non-
citizens could not be expelled from Latvia. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court 
confirmed that the concept of ‘national’ includes ‘non-citizens’. However, the 
Constitutional Court emphasised that these terms are not equivalent. ‘Non-citizens’ is 
a category of persons ‘up to that time unknown in the international law’. Therefore, 
they cannot be treated as Latvian citizens. Nevertheless, they are entitled to protection 
under the ECHR.  
 
Let us consider the Constitutional Court’s assertion that a legal category of non-
citizen is unknown in international law. The Latvian Law on Citizenship creates four 
categories of persons: citizens,700 foreigners,701 stateless persons702 and non-
                                                 
697 Emphasis added. 
 
698 Emphasis added. 
 
699 Case No 2004-15-0106 (n 632). 
 
700 Citizenship Act of 22 July 1994 (n 555) governs the legal status of citizens. 
 
701 Aliens and Stateless Persons (Entry and Residence) Act of 9 June 1992 regulates the concept of 
aliens, which includes foreign nationals and stateless persons.  
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citizens.703 The 1995 Law on the ‘Status of the Former USSR Citizens who are not 
Citizens of Latvia or any other State’ (Status of the Former USSR Citizens) defines 
non-citizens as those individuals who had Latvian residence before 1 July 1992 and 
do not have citizenship of any State.704 This categorization differs, however, from all 
three types of non-citizen in international law:  
[f]irstly, non-citizens may enjoy the status of ‘aliens’, i.e. foreign 
citizens. Secondly, non-citizens may under certain circumstances be 
granted the status of ‘refugees’. Thirdly, non-citizens may be 
‘stateless’ persons.705  
 
This divergence has important implications. Although there is no binding 
international document on the status of aliens, their core fundamental human rights 
are entitled to protection in a host State.706 Moreover, their State of citizenship 
provides them with diplomatic and consular protection.707 As regards refugees, under 
the 1951 Convention related to the Status of Refugees, they are entitled to the same 
treatment as aliens.708 Additionally, they cannot be discriminated against based on 
                                                                                                                                            
702 Stateless Persons Act of 18 February 1999 read in conjunction with the Immigration Act of 1 May 
2003 defines the status of stateless persons. 
 
703 The Law on the Status of the Former USSR Citizens who are not Citizens of Latvia or any other 
State of 12 April 1995 governs the status of non-citizens <http://www.humanrights.lv/doc/ 
latlik/noncit.htm> accessed 25 May 2007. 
 
704 The Law on the Status of the Former USSR Citizens… (n 703) Article 1:  
those citizens of the former USSR of their children, residing in Latvia or are 
temporarily away from the country for a specified period of time, who are not or have 
not been citizens of Latvia or any other country, who had registered residence in 
Latvia as of July 1, 1992, as well as persons whose last registered place of residence 
before July 1, 1992 was Latvia, or persons who resided on the territory of Latvia for 
at least 10 years without interruption. 
 
705 Venice Commission, ‘Report on Non-citizens and Minority Rights’ (2007) CDL-AD(2007)001, 
para 96. These three categories (aliens, refugees and stateless persons) differ largely in the degree of 
protection offered by host States (paras 97-100).    
 
706 Venice Commission ‘Report on Non-citizens and Minority Rights’ (n 705) para 97. 
 
707 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (adopted 24 April 1963, entered into force 19 
March 1967) 596 UNTS 261, Article 5  <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/ 
conventions/9_2_1963.pdf> accessed 22 September 2007. 
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race, religion or State of origin,709 and have rights to education710 and freedom of 
religion.711 Also, the status of stateless persons partly resembles that of aliens and 
refugees under the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.712 
 
Non-citizens in Latvia do not fit any of the above categories. They have no other State 
to protect them, because they were citizens of a State now defunct. Under Latvian 
laws they are neither refugees nor stateless.713 Consequently, Russian-speaking non-
citizens cannot rely on the guarantees of relevant international instruments governing 
other regimes. Effectively, by creating this special legal category of non-citizens, 
Latvia not only violates its obligations under international law to avoid 
statelessness714 and denies these minorities protection under the existing international 
regimes for non-citizens,715 but also may be in breach of EU law.  
                                                                                                                                            
708 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 
1954) 189 UNTS 137, Article 7 <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/v1crs.htm> accessed 22 
September 2007. 
 
709 Convention related to the Status of Refugees (n 708) Article 3. 
 
710 Convention related to the Status of Refugees (n 708) Article 22. 
 
711 Convention related to the Status of Refugees (n 708) Article 4. 
 
712 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (adopted 28 September 1954 entered 
into force 6 June 1960) <http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/stateless.htm> accessed 23 September 
2007. Article 3 provides for the principle of non-discrimination similar to that in the Convention 
related to the Status of Refugees (n 709). 
 
713 There are separate laws on the status of asylum-seekers and refugees in Latvia (Asylum Act of 7 
March 2002) and stateless persons (Stateless Persons Act of 18 February 1999). 
 
714 International law prohibits the creation of statelessness by States. See The UN Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness (adopted 30 August 1961 and entered into force 13 December 1975) UN 
Doc A/Conf.9/15. Thus, Article 9 of this instrument precludes States from depriving “any person or 
group of persons of their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds”; moreover, Article 
8 requires States Parties “not deprive a person of his nationality if such deprivation would render him 
stateless”. Latvia ratified the UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness on 14 April 1992.  
See also European Convention on Nationality (1997) ETS No 166, Article 4. Latvia signed the 
European Convention on Nationality on 30 May 2001.   
 
715 To demonstrate the depth of the problem and international disapproval of a similar deprivation of 
political rights, a parallel can be drawn between non-citizens in Latvia and the situation of Blacks in 
South Africa during apartheid (1948-1990) (The term ‘Black’ with a capital letter was officially used in 
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 This is so because, although Member States may identify their nationals, according to 
the ECJ’s ruling in M V Micheletti v Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria,716 this 
right is not absolute. In a preliminary ruling procedure, the ECJ ruled that EC law 
prevented Member States denying Community rights to nationals of other Member 
States who were also nationals of third States.717 Moreover, the ECJ established that 
“[u]nder international law, it is for each Member State, having due regard to 
Community law, to lay down the conditions for the acquisition and loss of 
nationality.”718 Thus, the judgment conveys the Court’s intention to leave some scope 
for restricting Member States’ rights in this matter. The Court’s approach is 
                                                                                                                                            
the legislation of South Africa to describe the African people): Dugard, ‘South Africa’s “Independent” 
Homelands…’ (n 522). Although the political context and scale of this denial in Latvia and South 
Africa are different, the issue is essentially the same. South Africa initiated a policy of homelands to 
evade world criticism for denying political rights to Blacks: since 1971 it proclaimed Bophuthatswana, 
the Ciskei, Lebowa, Venda, Gazankulu, Qwaqwa and kwaZulu as self-governing territories: J Dugard, 
Human Rights and the  South African Legal Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1978) 93. 
According to this policy, Blacks exercised political rights in their own ‘States,’ so that Whites could 
retain political control over the rest of the territory. Consequently, the political rights of Blacks in 
homelands were not equivalent to those enjoyed by Whites, because they did not extend to the central 
political process. Even more, through granting independence to some of these homelands (Transkei, 
Bopthuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei), South Africa denationalized the Blacks who had linguistic, 
cultural and ethnic links with the ‘independent’ homelands. Although legislation on denationalization 
did not refer specifically to race, it was intended to apply to Blacks.  
The international community understood that the price for the new States’ independence would be the 
denationalization of Blacks, and refused recognition: Dugard, ‘South Africa’s “Independent” 
Homelands…’ (n 522) 15, footnote 14 citing General Assembly of the United Nations, UNGA Res 
3151G, 28 UN GAOR, Supp (No 30) 32, UN DocA/9030 (1973); UNGA Res 3411D, 30 UN GAOR, 
Supp (No 34) 37, UNDocA/10034 (1975). Nevertheless, millions of Blacks living and working in 
South Africa were treated as aliens without any right to political participation there. Although 
international law provides for the right not to be arbitrarily deprived of nationality, it was the 
implementation of carefully worded domestic legislation that was discriminatory: Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (n 192) Article 15: “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his 
nationality.” 
This example from the experience of South Africa demonstrates that “denationalization measures based 
on racial, ethnic, religious, or other related grounds are impermissible under contemporary international 
law”: M McDougal, H Lasswell and L Chen, ‘Nationality and Human Rights: the Protection of the 
Individual in External Arenas (1974) 83 Yale Law Journal 900, 958. See also International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (n 131)) Article 5(d)(iii); Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness (n 714) Article 9. 
 
716 Case C-369/90 M V Micheletti v Delegacion del Gobierno en Cantabria [1992] ECR I-4239. 
 
717 Micheletti (n 716) para 15 
 
718 Micheletti (n 716) para 10 (emphasis added). 
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justifiable; because the Community chose to define the personal scope of free 
movement and political rights based on nationality, “the determination of which 
nationals qualify for the enjoyment of … [these rights] is also a question for 
Community law…”719 
 
Were the ECJ to follow Micheletti and the reasoning of the Constitutional Court of 
Latvia, it could rule that the term ‘non-citizens’ is included in the definition of 
‘national’ under Articles 9 TEU and 20(1) TFEU. As a result, Russian-speaking non-
citizens in Latvia could acquire the benefits of EU citizenship, including political 
rights. After all, the term ‘non-citizen’ was artificially fashioned to avoid international 
condemnation for creating statelessness, while excluding a large segment of the 
population from political participation.  
 
The general principles of EU law and constitutional traditions common to Member 
States (general principles), as developed by the ECJ in its jurisprudence, provide 
another source of vague promise. The ECtHR’s case law on the rights of Russian-
speaking minorities in Latvia is of particular significance in this respect. Two 
categories of cases are noteworthy. First, even though the ECHR does not include the 
right to citizenship, the ECtHR considered the compatibility of deportation orders in 
respect of Russian-speaking individuals in Latvia with their right to private and family 
life under Article 8 ECHR. The second relevant category of cases came before the 
                                                 
719 S O’Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: From the Free Movement of Persons 
to Union Citizenship (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1996) 40-41; see also, T Hartley, EEC 
Immigration law (European Studies in Law, Amsterdam 1978) 78. For the opposite view see, H 
D’Oliveira and A Evans, ‘Nationality and Citizenship’ in A Cassese, A Clapham and J Weiler (eds) 
Human Rights and the European Community. Towards 1992 and Beyond: Methods of Protection (Vol 
2 Nomos, Baden Baden 1991) 299-348. 
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ECtHR under P1-3 ECHR, which guarantees the “free expression of the opinion of 
the people in the choice of the legislature.”  
 
Where leave to remain in Latvia is concerned, the ECtHR has not developed general 
principles on the rights of Russian-speaking non-citizens in Latvia, but has limited its 
role to finding violations of Article 8 ECHR in individual cases, such as in Slivenko v 
Latvia,720 Shevanova v Latvia,721 Kaftailova v Latvia,722 and Sisojeva v Latvia,723 
relating to deportation orders against Russian-speaking non-citizens from Latvia. In 
the ECtHR’s view, an arbitrary denial of nationality may amount to interference with 
the rights protected under Article 8 ECHR on the right to private and family life. In its 
jurisprudence on the rights of Russian-speaking non-citizens to remain in Latvia, the 
ECtHR interpreted the concept of private life to include “the network of personal, 
social and economic relations that make up the private life of every human being.”724 
Relying on this generous interpretation, the ECtHR had no difficulty in finding that 
the deportation orders against the applicants interfered with their right to private life 
under Article 8(1). In addition, the Court established that Article 8 does not merely 
compel States to abstain from interference with these aspects of private life, but also 
entails “positive obligations inherent in effective respect for private or family life”.725 
In other words, it was not enough that Latvia refrained from deporting the applicants 
                                                 
720 Slivenko v Latvia (App no 48321/99) (2004) 39 EHRR 24. 
 
721 Shevanova v Latvia (App no 58822/00) ECHR 15 June 2006. 
 
722  Kaftailova v Latvia (App no 59643/00) ECHR 22 June 2006. 
 
723  Sisojeva v Latvia (App no 60654/00) (2006) 43 EHRR 33. 
 
724 Daniel Thym, ‘Respect for Private and Family Life under Article 8 ECHR in Immigration cases: A 
Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay?’ (2008) 57 ICLQ 87, 88. 
 
725 Shevanova v Latvia (n 721) para 69. 
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from the country after long periods of uncertainty and insecurity. The Government 
also had to take necessary measures to afford these individuals the enjoyment of 
Convention rights, such as their right to private life.726 
 
Having found an interference with Article 8(1), the ECtHR considered whether such 
interference could be justified under Article 8(2) ECHR. To be justified, a restriction 
should be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim listed in Article 8(2), such as 
protection of national security and preventing disorder, and be necessary in a 
democratic society. The ECtHR accepted the lawfulness and legitimate aims of 
deportation orders without much ado. Where the necessity test is concerned, the Court 
stated that in the light of the circumstances,  
the Latvian authorities overstepped the margin of appreciation enjoyed 
by the Contracting Parties in such a matter, and … they failed to strike 
a fair balance between the legitimate aim of the protection of national 
security and the interest of the protection of the applicants’ rights 
under Article 8.727  
 
Thus, the interference with the applicants’ rights had not been necessary in a 
democratic society. Therefore, Latvia was in breach of the ECHR.  
 
Despite the significance of these findings, these cases have allowed the applicants 
only to remain in Latvia without remedying their long-term exclusions from public 
life or guaranteeing citizenship status. Nor did the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR 
rectify this omission. In Shevanova v Latvia,728 Kaftailova v Latvia729 and Sisojeva v 
                                                 
726 Shevanova v Latvia (n 721) para 69. 
 
727 Slivenko (n 720) para 128. 
 
728 Shevanova v Latvia (App no 58822/00) ECHR 7 December 2007. 
 
729 Kaftailova v Latvia (App no 59643/00) ECHR 7 December 2007. 
 
 218
Latvia,730 the Grand Chamber, having established that the applicants did not face 
deportation orders anymore and measures indicated by the Latvian authorities would 
allow them to remain in the country, stated that,  
neither Article 8 nor any other provision of the Convention can be 
construed as guaranteeing, as such, the right to a particular type of 
residence permit; the choice of permit is in principle a matter for the 
domestic authorities alone.731 
 
As a result, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence has had a limited impact on the political rights 
of Russian-speaking non-citizens in Latvia. The more-recently admitted case of Jurijs 
Petropavlovskis v Latvia732 may induce the ECtHR to deal with the legal status of 
non-citizens in Latvia more directly. The case concerns a Russian-speaking non-
citizen who has passed all necessary tests to naturalise and acquire citizenship. 
However, when the Naturalisation Board sent his documents to the Cabinet of 
Ministers for the final approval, the Cabinet refused to grant him citizenship. The 
applicant attempted to challenge this decision in the Latvian courts. However, the 
administrative courts in the country ruled that the measure was political and not legal. 
Therefore, it was not possible to quash the decision of the Cabinet. The applicant 
complained to the ECtHR and claimed that the only reason for the refusal of 
citizenship status was his active participation in meetings and demonstrations 
protesting against Latvian-only education in 2003–2004. He argued that Latvia 
violated his rights to free speech733 and freedom of assembly.734 When the ECtHR 
decides this case, the analysis could reveal that denial of Latvian citizenship aims to 
                                                 
730 Sisojeva v Latvia (App no 60654/00) (2007) 45 EHRR 33. 
 
731 Sisojeva (n 730) para 91. 
 
732 Jurijs Petropavlovskis v Latvia (App no 44230/06) ECHR (admissibility decision) 3 June 2008. 
 
733 ECHR (n 24) Article 10. 
 
734 ECHR (n 24) Article 11. 
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exclude Russian-speaking non-citizens from public life. However, it is likely that the 
Court may limit its assessment to the facts of the case and avoid broader discussion of 
this problem in Latvia, largely due to the political sensitivity of the issue.  
 
Similarly, the ECtHR case law on the political rights of Russian-speaking minorities 
in Latvia only partially remedies their situation. As discussed in Chapter I on pages 
61-62, in Podkolzina v Latvia, the ECtHR’s finding of a violation of P1-3 ECHR was 
purely on procedural grounds and did not question the strict linguistic requirements 
involved.735 Furthermore, in Ždanoka v Latvia736 (discussed on pages 63-64), the 
Grand Chamber overly relied on the historical and political context of the country and 
found that the applicant’s active participation in the work of the Communist Party 
during Latvia’s transition to independence rendered logical and proportionate her 
exclusion from standing for a seat in the national Parliament.737   
 
The ECtHR’s more recent jurisprudence in Sejdić and Finci v Bosnia and 
Herzegovina on the right of minorities not to be discriminated against in political 
participation (discussed on pages 47-49 and 65-66)738 may eventually impact the 
political rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia. The case affirmed the 
importance of guaranteeing the enjoyment of political rights in countries where such 
participation by minorities may be politically sensitive.  
 
                                                 
735 See also the communication of the HRC in Antonina Ignatane v Latvia (n 166).  
 
736 Ždanoka v Latvia (n 173). 
 
737 Ždanoka v Latvia (n 174) para 132. 
 
738 See also, Case Comment, ‘Sejdic and Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina (Application Nos 27996/06 
and 34836/06): discrimination on grounds of ethnic origin - eligibility to stand for election to 
legislature and Presidency’ (2010) European Human Rights Law Review 235-239.  
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However, can non-citizens rely on P1-3 ECHR? Smyth argues that although “non-
citizens do have a right of universal suffrage under P1-3, … States may impose a 
citizenship criterion on the exercise of the right.”739 Given that there are significant 
variations in electoral systems of European countries,740 the ECtHR is likely to grant 
States a wide margin of discretion, if restriction of non-citizens’ political rights 
pursues a legitimate aim. In addition, exclusion must be proportionate to the aim 
pursued because  
[a] blanket restriction of the right to vote/stand for election applied to 
all non-citizens, regardless of the duration of their residence, and to all 
manner of elections (local, national, European Parliament) could 
offend against the proportionality test.741  
 
Regrettably, such a claim has not yet been brought by a Russian-speaking non-citizen 
in Latvia. Were a Russian-speaking non-citizen to complain to the ECtHR about 
restrictions on his/her political rights, what would be the outcome of the case? 
Theoretically, the ECtHR could find a violation of the Convention through a 
combined reading of its rulings in Matthews and Sejdić and Finci. It seems only 
logical that non-citizens in Latvia are as entitled to enjoy voting rights as non-citizens 
in Gibraltar and minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the lack of political 
rights deprives them of participation in both domestic and EU decision-making. 
 
                                                 
 
739 Ciara Smyth, ‘The Right to Vote and Participate in Local Elections: Citizen’s Right or Human 
Right?’ (2006) 1 Law WPS 18. 
 
740 Andrew Reynolds, ‘Electoral Systems and the Protection and Participation of Minorities’ (Minority 
Rights Group International 2006) <http://www.conflictrecovery.org/bin/Minority_rights_group_ 
international_202006.pdf>; see also, Yash Ghai, ‘Public Participation and Minorities’ (Minority Rights 
Group International 2003) <http://www.minorityrights.org/980/reports/public-participation-and-
minorities.html> accessed 12 May 2009. 
 
741 Smyth, ‘The Right to Vote and Participate in Local Elections…’ (n 739) 19. 
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One argument that Latvia could advance to oppose such development is to rely on 
Article 16 ECHR, which specifies that nothing in Article 10 on freedom of speech, 
Article 11 on freedom of assembly and Article 14 on non-discrimination can prevent 
States from imposing restrictions on the political activity of aliens. The ECtHR has 
interpreted this provision only once in Piermont v France,742 which touched upon 
political participation in the EC prior to the inception of EU citizenship. The case 
concerned a German national who alleged that administrative measures regarding 
political participation taken by France infringed inter alia her right to freedom of 
expression. France attempted to justify the restriction under Article 16. Because the 
application was launched before the inception of EU citizenship, France considered 
that both this factor and the applicant’s status as a Member of the EP (MEP) were 
irrelevant. This is because Member States had the right to lay down the rules on the 
acquisition and loss of nationality.743 Since the applicant was not a national of France, 
the restriction on her political rights as an alien were legitimate.  
 
The ECtHR disagreed and established that because the applicant possessed the 
nationality of an EU Member State and was a MEP, France could not invoke Article 
16 against the applicant.744 Because of this narrow reading of Article 16, the ECtHR 
has “avoided dealing with the substantive and problematic content”745 of the 
provision. Regrettably, this archaic norm may still affect the rights of Russian-
speaking non-citizens in Latvia, because they do not possess EU citizenship. 
                                                 
 
742 Piermont v France (App no 15773/89; 15774/89) (1995) 20 EHRR 301. 
 
743 Piermont v France (n 742) para 61. 
 
744 Piermont v France (n 742) para 64. 
 
745 Smyth, ‘The Right to Vote and Participate in Local Elections…’ (n 739) 20. 
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However, were the ECtHR to take into consideration the Latvian Constitutional 
Court’s dictum, which included the term ‘non-citizen’ as part of the concept  
‘national’ (discussed on page 212),  the outcome of the case could be in favour of a 
Russian-speaking non-citizen.    
 
Overall, although the restrictions on the political rights of Russian-speaking 
minorities in Latvia may in theory contravene the ECHR provisions, implied 
limitations read by the ECtHR in the exercise of political rights, as well as Article 16 
ECHR, may induce the Court to retain its reserved position on the issue.  
  
Were the FCNM a part of the general principles of EU law, would it have a 
significant impact on the political rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia? As 
noted in Chapter I on pages 178-179, Latvia narrowed the scope of the FCNM’s 
application to non-citizens through a reservation. None of the contracting States 
objected specifically to Latvia’s reservation. There is no definition of the concept 
‘national minority’ in the FCNM and some States either listed specific minorities746 
or supplied their own definitions,747 thus limiting the instrument’s scope. Only the 
Russian Federation (which has a national interest in exerting influence over former 
Soviet Republics) placed a declaration with the FCNM, objecting to States’ unilateral 
definitions of ‘national minorities’ and,  
attempts to exclude from the scope of the Framework Convention the 
persons who permanently reside in the territory of States Parties to the 
Framework Convention and previously had citizenship but have been 
                                                 
 
746 Germany, Slovenia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. For the list of declarations 
made with respect to the FCNM see <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations. 
asp?NT=157&CM=8&DF=25/06/2010&CL=ENG&VL=1> accessed 12 July 2008. 
 
747 Estonia, Luxembourg and Switzerland: list of declarations made with respect to the FCNM (n 746). 
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arbitrarily deprived of it, [which] contradict the purpose of the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.748  
 
It appears that the Russian declaration of 1 December 1998 was pre-emptively 
directed against Latvia seven years before the latter ratified the FCNM. So far the 
ACFC has interpreted the declaration to mean that the Russian Federation itself offers 
protection to non-citizens within its jurisdiction749 and its impact on Latvia is not 
clear. 
 
The second obstacle to the FCNM having an impact on the situation of Russian-
speaking non-citizens in Latvia stems from the controversy between the universal and 
European standards as to the criterion of citizenship as a prerequisite of minority 
protection. As discussed in Chapter I on pages 167 and 169, some European 
instruments still maintain this criterion,750 although there are suggestions that this 
requirement should be relaxed. This is particularly so “in the case of a break-up of a 
multi-ethnic State, [where] those who suddenly lost the citizenship of their State of 
residence were at particular risk of exclusion”,751 as in Latvia. Therefore, on the 
European level, a citizenship criterion, which determines the scope of minority rights, 
“should be replaced by a residence requirement”.752 This, however, has been difficult 
to achieve under the FCNM; ACFC suggestions to include non-citizens in the 
definition of ‘national minority’ under the instrument created considerable opposition 
                                                 
748 Russian Federation’s declaration to the FCNM: list of declarations made with respect to the FCNM 
(n 746). 
 
749 ACFC, ‘First Opinion on the Russian Federation’ (2002) ACFC/INF/OP/I(2003) 005, para 21. 
 
750 PACE, ‘Recommendation on the Rights of Minorities’ (1990) Rec 1134, para 11 <http://www. 
minelres.lv/coe/pace/rec1134.htm> accessed 30 June 2008. 
 
751 Venice Commission, ‘Report on Non-citizens and Minority Rights’ (n 705) para 137; see also 
PACE, ‘Resolution 1527(2006)’ (n 635) paras 2–4, 9, 11. 
 
752 Venice Commission, ‘Report on Non-citizens and Minority Rights’ (n 705) para 137. 
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from some Member States. For example, in response to the suggestions of the 
Advisory Committee to expand the scope of the FCNM’s application,753 the Italian 
government commented that  
the possible extension of the safeguards provided by the Framework 
Convention to include other minorities can only be examined in the 
event that the Italian Parliament decides, under appropriate draft 
legislation, to recognise the existence of any additional minority 
language groups.754  
 
Similarly, the ACFC’s insistence in its monitoring reports that Latvia ought to grant 
all non-citizens the right to full political participation may create opposition from 
Latvia. Nevertheless, as the ACFC suggests, 
[w]hile citizenship requirements can be applied in relation to 
parliamentary elections, State Parties are encouraged to provide non-
citizens belonging to national minorities with a possibility to vote and 
to stand as candidates in local elections and governing boards of 
cultural autonomies.755 
 
Furthermore, language proficiency requirements imposed on candidates for 
parliamentary and local elections contravene Article 15 FCNM,756 because they have 
a negative impact on effective participation of national minorities in public affairs.757 
 
Does Latvia comply with the FCNM? The ACFC has not disclosed the report on 
Latvia’s compliance with the FCNM. Therefore, the overall impact of the instrument 
                                                 
753 ACFC, ‘First Opinion on Italy’ (n 283) 19.  
 
754 ‘Comments of the Government of Italy on the Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the 
implementation of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in Italy’, 
(2002) GVT/COM/INF/OP/I(2002)007, 2; for discussion of similar comments made by Germany, see 
Elizabeth Craig, ‘The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the 
Development of a ‘Generic’ Approach to the Protection of Minority Rights in Europe?’ in G Guliyeva 
& G Pentassuglia (eds) ‘Minority Groups Across Legal Settings: Global and Regional Dimensions’ 
(Special Issue) (2010) 17(2) International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 307-325. 
 
755 ACFC, ‘Commentary on the Effective Participation…’ (n 188) para 101. 
 
756 ACFC, ‘Commentary on the Effective Participation…’ (n 188) para 102. 
 
757 See, for example, ACFC, ‘First Opinion on Estonia’ (n 172) para 55. 
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on the situation of non-citizens is not yet clear. Chapter I on page 68 highlighted 
requirements towards States under Article 15 FCNM, which includes effectiveness of 
participation, especially in matters of a particular concern to a group. In Latvia, while 
the overwhelming majority of non-citizens belong to minorities, they are debarred 
“from participating in the political life of their country. They can neither vote nor be 
elected, even at the local level”.758 Despite numerous recommendations of 
international organisations to allow participation of non-citizens in local elections,759 
Latvia adamantly maintains its exclusionary practices. Furthermore, the participation 
of those representatives of the Russian-speaking minorities who have already acquired 
citizenship is hampered by the stringent language requirements. Consequently, Latvia 
may be in breach of Article 15 FCNM.760  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This chapter dealt with the right of minorities to political participation in the context 
of Latvia. The case study showed how through restrictive citizenship policies Latvia 
has effectively deprived a large number of Russian-speaking minorities from political 
participation. Significantly, political rights are at the heart of protecting minorities, 
because they allow minorities to participate in shaping the rules they must follow. 
This is even more important in the EU, where an additional layer of political rights are 
available through EU citizenship. Arguably, in the EU, which was created to balance 
                                                 
 
758 CHR, ‘Memorandum to the Latvian Government’ (n 635) para 43. 
 
759 See PACE, ‘Resolution 1527(2006)’ (n 635) para 17.11; CHR, ‘Memorandum to the Latvian 
Government’ (n 635) para 43; ECRI, ‘Third report on Latvia’ (n 635) para 132. 
 
760 This conclusion may be further supported by the ACFC’s approach to the similar situation of 
Russian-speaking minorities in Estonia. 
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the excesses of State power, the political rights of minorities and the benefits of 
political union should be linked. 
 
As the analysis in Section 3 of this Chapter highlighted, the EU legal framework is 
not equipped adequately to deal with Latvia’s exclusion of large numbers of Russian-
speaking non-citizens from political participation. Although the Equality Directives 
may have some impact on this situation, they are limited to non-discrimination and do 
not elaborate on the special rights necessary to protect this group’s identity. 
Moreover, their scope does not extend to political participation per se. Furthermore, 
even though theoretically the EU could put some pressure on Latvia under Article 7 
TEU, this mechanism is too politically sensitive and is likely to be used only if there 
is a persistent and serious breach of minority rights, threatening to escalate into ethnic 
conflict. Were Russian-speaking non-citizens to acquire a status of TCNs they would 
still be excluded from political participation. Besides, the integration requirements 
under the Long-Term Residents Directive are similar to the naturalisation demands, so 
acquisition of citizenship may be more beneficial and no more burdensome. Access of 
Russian-speaking non-citizens to EU citizenship rights could in principle be achieved 
through a generous reading of Articles 9 TEU and 20(1) TFEU, interpreted in the 
light of Micheletti and the Latvian Constitutional Court’s decision on the term 
‘national’ (discussed on page 212). Although possible and highly desirable, such a 
development could prove highly controversial in practice. Finally, where the general 
principles of EU law are concerned, Article 8 ECHR guarantees individuals belonging 
to Russian-speaking minorities mainly the right to remain on the territory of Latvia. 
This, however, does not entitle those individuals to acquire citizenship (and, by 
extension, political rights) automatically. As to political rights, so far the ECtHR’s 
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approach to the political rights of Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia has been 
fairly reserved, based on historical and political considerations. It is to be hoped that 
Sejdić and Finci will impact the future case law of the ECtHR, particularly the 
pending case of Jurijs Petropavlovskis.  
 
The only instrument that explicitly requires States to ensure effective participation of 
national minorities in the political life of a country is the FCNM. The analysis above 
suggested that Latvia may be in breach of Article 15 FCNM. However, first the 
ACFC has not disclosed its findings. This may be partly explained by the weaker 
monitoring mechanism under the FCNM – a failure of a State to follow the ACFC’s 
recommendations may undermine the usefulness of the instrument. Therefore, the 
ACFC prefers constructive dialogue with a State to open condemnation. Second, the 
FCNM has not yet been formally endorsed as a part of the general principles of EU 
law. 
 
Accordingly, the EU has some potential to address the issue of political rights of 
minorities in its Member States. As it stands, however, the EU lacks a coherent 
system of minority protection. The question then is, should the EU get involved in 
minority protection any further, and why? 
 
The main lesson for the EU from Latvia’s treatment of minorities is that it should be 
consistent in its accession conditionality and ensure that it has mechanisms to tackle 
unresolved minority issues in its Member States.761 As the case study suggests, to 
deal effectively with exclusionary practices of States aiming to restrict the political 
                                                 
761 EUobserver, ‘MEPs revisit post-WW II period in debate on Slovak minorities’, 06 November 2007, 
<http://euobserver.com/9/25091/?rk=1> accessed 06 November 2007.  
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participation of minorities, the EU may need a more effective legal framework. 
Moreover, the example of Latvia is not unique. Other countries that aspire to EU 
membership have similar exclusionary practices against minorities, such as the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,762 Kosovo763 and Bosnia and Herzegovina.764 
However, as Latvia’s experience demonstrates, the usefulness of EU conditionality in 
candidate countries may be limited in time and space.765 Therefore, the EU will either 
need to insist that candidate countries fully resolve all the issues concerning 
minorities before accession (which may delay some enlargement negotiations), or 
have internal mechanisms in place that would guarantee political participation of 
minorities in domestic and EU affairs in matters of particular concern to these groups.  
 
Accordingly, there would be several benefits of an EU regime of minority protection. 
First, the EU would have a consistent set of benchmarks to avoid double standards 
towards candidate countries and its Member States. Moreover, it would have in place 
                                                 
 
762 Ljubica Spaskovska, ‘Macedonia’s Nationals, Minorities and Refugees in the Post-Communist 
Labyrinths of Citizenship’ (2010) 05 CITSEE working paper series. On exclusion of minorities from 
political participation through citizenship requirements in the Former Yugoslav Republics see Igor 
Štiks, ‘A Laboratory of Citizenship: Shifting Conceptions of Citizenship in Yugoslavia and its 
Successor States’ (2010) 02 CITSEE working paper series. 
 
763 Gëzim Krasniqi, ‘The challenge of building an independent citizenship regime in a partially 
recognised state: the case of Kosovo’ (2010) 04 CITSEE working paper series. 
 
764 Interestingly, in its 2009 Progress Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s accession to the EU, the 
Commission maintained (before the ECtHR’s judgment in Sejdić and Finci) that the exclusion of 
minorities from elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina is incompatible with Protocols 1 and 12 ECHR: 
Commission, ‘2009 Progress Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina, accompanying the Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council’ [2009] SEC(2009)1338, 8. 
 
765 Thorsten Gromes, The Perspective of European Integration and Conflict Transformation in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’ (2007) Paper presented at the conference on Making Sense of a Pluralist World: 
Sixth Pan-European Conference on International Relations of the ECPR Standing Group on 
International Relations, Turin, 12-15 September 2007, 24; Edward Joseph and Bruce Hitchner, 
‘Making Bosnia Work: Why EU Accession is Not Enough’ (2008) USIPeace Briefing 5, 8; Edin 
Sarcevic, ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina and Controversies of the EU Integration Processes (Constitutional 
View)’ (2009) 64 ZÖR 237-249, 249; Eldar Sarajlic, ‘The Bosnian Triangle: Ethnicity, Politics and 
Citizenship’ (2010) 06 CITSEE working paper series. 
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mechanisms to address outstanding minority issues in its new Member States post-
accession. The conclusions and recommendations of this thesis discuss the form that 
an EU regime of minority protection could take.  
 
The desirability of a coherent system of minority protection in the EU does not mean, 
however, that this will be easily achieved in practice. Given political opposition to the 
protection of minority rights in some Member States,766 such a development may be 
unlikely in the short run. Nevertheless, in the light of explicit references to minorities 
in EU primary law, sooner or later the ECJ may be asked to interpret the term. A 
generous interpretation of the term by the ECJ (as proposed in Chapter I on page 186) 
may be one concrete way that the EU could contribute to minority protection. A broad 
definition of ‘minority’ could, for example, address the situation of Russian-speaking 
non-citizens in Latvia, who undoubtedly constitute a minority group. Therefore, they 
are entitled not only to non-discriminatory treatment, but also special rights, such as 
the right to political participation (discussed in Chapter I on pages 56-69). 
Accordingly, a broad definition of ‘minority’ in EU law could ensure the right of 
minorities to political participation irrespective of their status or ‘label’ under 
domestic law. Furthermore, by omitting a citizenship requirement from the defining 
characteristics of ‘minority’, the EU could prevent States from excluding unwanted 
groups through restrictive citizenship policies. Even though such a development is 
possible in principle, for now it remains unrealistic, because of some Member States’ 
sensitivity to minority protection and their determination to stop the EU from acting 
outside of its competences.    
                                                 
766 Indeed, during the drafting process of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, the Latvian 
and Slovakian Governments strongly opposed the Hungarian proposal to include explicit minority 
rights in the draft Constitutional Treaty. As a result, instead of explicit minority rights, only a vague 
reference to ‘respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minority groups’ 
was included in Article I-2 of the Draft Constitutional Treaty. 
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CHAPTER III. UNVEILING THE VEIL: THE FREEDOM TO WEAR 
RELIGIOUS DRESS IN PUBLICLY-FUNDED SCHOOLS IN 
ENGLAND 
 
Indeed, individuals belonging to ethnic minority groups 
often face a predicament. They either comply with the 
religious law of their faith, which requires wearing the 
symbol and which means they fail to comply with state 
law, or else they violate the religious law to obey the 
secular law. These individuals end up breaking the law 
one way or the other.767 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recent negotiations of the draft Constitutional Treaty in 2002-2004 brought the issue 
of religion in the EU to the forefront of public attention. The proposal from Germany, 
Italy, Poland and Slovakia to include in the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty 
references to ‘God’ and to ‘Europe’s Christian heritage’,768 based on requests from 
the late Pope John Paul II, was strongly opposed by secular France and the 
Netherlands; as a result, the Preamble of the draft Constitutional Treaty (and now the 
Lisbon Treaty) only refer to “[d]rawing inspirations from the cultural, religious and 
humanist inheritance of Europe…”769 This debate reignited during the adoption of the 
EU’s 50th birthday declaration in March 2007 and negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty. 
Once more there was an attempt to include references to ‘God’ and ‘Christianity’ in 
the EU Treaties. German proposals to incorporate religion in the Lisbon Treaty were 
opposed by France and the UK, “worried over national secularist traditions or 
                                                 
767 Alison Renteln, ‘Visual Religious Symbols and the Law’ (2004) 47(12) American Behavioral 
Scientist 1573-1596, 1574.  
 
768 D McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion – The Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2006) 15-16. 
 
769 McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion… (n 768) 15-16. 
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damaging relations with Islamic EU candidate Turkey.”770 Indeed, some argue that 
such references have the potential to exclude many who do not share those ideals, 
because 
… an EU founded on Christian values implicitly suggests the 
inferiority of non-majority religious identities already present within 
the Union, and rejects the idea of a place in Europe for some who are 
currently outside the EU, such as Turkey and other predominantly 
Muslim candidate states. 771 
 
These proposals in EU law and the heated debates on permissible restrictions on the 
freedom to manifest religion in a number of EU Member States (discussed below on 
pages 238-246) have important repercussions on the freedom of religious minorities 
to manifest their beliefs. Freedom of religion is one of the central facets of protecting 
a minority group’s religious identity. As outlined in Chapter I, such protection 
presupposes not only non-discriminatory treatment (pages 40-42), but also special 
rights allowing a group to manifest religion by, for example, wearing religious dress 
(pages 69-92).772 As indicated in Chapter I on page 53-56, these special rights aim to 
                                                 
770 Andrew Rettman, ‘Merkel gives up on God in EU treaty’ EU Observer, 15 May 2007 
<http://euobserver.com/9/24066> accessed 20 September 2008. 
 
771 Madeleine Heyward, ‘What Constitutes Europe?: Religion, Law and Identity in the Draft 
Constitution for the European Union’ (2005) 1(2) Hanse Law Review 227-235, 229; for further 
discussion see Philip Schlesinger and François Foret, ‘Political Roof and Sacred Canopy?: Religion 
and the EU Constitution’ (2006) 9 European Journal of Social Theory 59; Robert Congdon, ‘The 
European Union and the Supra-Religion’ (2005) Paper presented at Fourteenth Annual Pre-Trib Study 
Group, Dallas, 5 December 2005; Ronan McCrea, ‘The Recognition of Religion within the 
Constitutional and Political Order of the European Union’ (2009) LEQS Paper No 10. 
 
772 The UN Human Rights Committee interpreted broadly the right to manifest one’s religion. In its 
view  
[t]he freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and 
teaching encompasses a broad range of acts. The concept of worship extends to ritual 
and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to belief, as well as various practices 
integral to such acts, including the building of places of worship, the use of ritual 
formulae and objects, the display of symbols, and the observance of holidays and 
days of rest. The observance and practice of religion or belief may include not only 
ceremonial acts but also such customs as the observance of dietary regulations, the 
wearing of distinctive clothing or headcoverings, participation in rituals associated 
with certain stages of life, and the use of a particular language customarily spoken by 
a group. 
General Comment No 22 (n 198) para 4 (emphasis added).  
 232
ensure that minorities enjoy all human rights and to “eliminate discrimination in both 
law and practice.”773 However, it is worth noting from the outset that there are many 
different views 
on whether it is necessary for religious adherents to wear particular 
head coverings such as the Muslim hijab, Sikh turban or Jewish 
yarmulke. For some it may be considered necessary, for others 
permissible but not necessary and for others not necessary at all, 
depending upon their perspective.774 
 
This chapter deals with minorities’ freedom of religion, with the focus on its 
manifestation through wearing religious dress in publicly-funded schools in England. 
Before considering the limitations on freedom to manifest religion775 in England and 
possible remedies available to religious minorities in EU law, Section 2 paints a 
bigger picture of the role and place of religion in the EU. Several factors are relevant 
to this discussion: the role of manifesting religion in public space in Europe since 
World War II (2.1); debates in some Member States on curtailment of religious 
manifestation, closely interlinked with matters of migration (2.2.); the broader role of 
the EU in dealing with migrants from third countries (2.3) and demands made to 
candidate countries in connection with EU accession (2.4). Section 3 then presents 
England’s experience, with the focus on judicial decisions involving limitations on 
freedom to manifest religion. Section 4 seeks possible solutions in EU law for 
advancing the rights of religious minorities.   
 
                                                 
 
773 Alfredsson, ‘A Frame an Incomplete Painting …’ (n 13) 293. 
 
774 S Knights, Freedom of Religion, Minorities and the Law (OUP, Oxford 2007) 45. 
 
775 Article 18(3) ICCPR and Article 9(2) ECHR permit limitations only on manifesting religious beliefs 
and do not allow the imposition of limitations on conscience itself: Jeremy Gunn, ‘Introduction: The 
Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative 
Perspective’ (2005) 19 Emory International law Review vii-xi, ix.  
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2. Painting a bigger picture 
 
2.1 The role of religion in Europe since the EU’s inception  
 
The original EC Treaties did not refer to the religious heritage of Europe. However, 
the position of European States on this matter may be inferred from the drafting of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which took place prior to 
negotiation of the EC Treaties. As discussed in Chapter I on page 70, Article 9 ECHR 
accords absolute protection to private beliefs of individuals (paragraph 1), while 
permitting limitations on the external manifestation of such beliefs in public space 
(paragraph 2).776 Arguably, the structure of Article 9 ECHR, written in a context of 
relative religious homogeneity in Europe, “reflects the needs of fragmented 
Christianity within a Christian continent, not the broader religious diversity we … 
face today.” 777 This is clear from the public/private divide central to the structure of 
this provision.  
 
It may be useful to clarify the European conception of ‘public space’ and why the 
manifestation of religion may be limited in this sphere. Chelini-Pont argues that 
because “Europeans understand the State as the first intermediary between society and 
citizens – the State is responsible for legal and practical civil society.”778 Thus, in 
some European States, such as France, the true public sphere is “the space where the 
                                                 
776 P van Dijk et al, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Intersentia, 
Oxford 2006) Chapter 13. 
 
777 Gareth Davies, ‘(Not Yet) Taking Rights Seriously: The House of Lords in Begum v. Headteacher 
and Governors of Denbigh High School’ (2006) Human Rights and Human Welfare Working Paper No 
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State exerts its authority for the benefit of all and at the service of all.”779 
Accordingly, the State is responsible for public order and may impose legal 
limitations in the public sphere in order to protect its citizens.780 
 
This perception of a public sphere is influential in two ways. First, a State and religion 
have a specific relationship, where the State grants religion a status and exercises the 
power to limit religious activities. Second, religion is considered to be a “public, 
charitable, medical, educational, and even spiritual service”781 that a State acquires 
for its citizens by collaborating with religious leaders. Thus, based on the Western 
conception of religion, in some States where religious institutions are structurally 
separated from political bodies,782  
the European public sphere is well delineated and ordered. The clarity 
of religion’s role in the public sphere means that new or minority 
religions benefit from the state-religion dynamic only after they make 
necessary legal claims. 783  
 
This background may explain why, in its jurisprudence, the ECtHR has read implied 
limitations in the interpretation of Article 9 ECHR (discussed in Chapter I on pages 
74-75). The ECHR institutions’ conception of public space is based on the separation 
of State and religion, i.e., the principle of secularism.784 This is, however, largely a 
                                                 
779 Chelini-Pont, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere…’ (n 778) 615. 
 
780 Chelini-Pont, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere…’ (n 778) 615. 
 
781 Chelini-Pont, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere…’ (n 778) 617. 
 
782 Donna Sullivan, ‘Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief through the UN Declaration on the 
Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination’ (1988) 82 American Journal of International 
law 487-520, 490. 
 
783 Chelini-Pont, ‘Religion in the Public Sphere…’ (n 778) 617. 
 
784 Where the principle of secularism is concerned, it may be helpful to distinguish two notions of 
secularism: liberal and fundamentalist. Although both notions of secularism have as their starting point 
a distinction between the competence of religion and the powers of political institutions, they have 
different approaches to the idea that religion is confined to private space only: Ingvill Thorson Plesner, 
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Western approach to religious freedoms, which may not necessarily accommodate 
other religions. Not every religion permits believers to leave their symbols and 
practices at home when they enter public space. Indeed, the ECtHR has been “accused 
of being unsympathetic to the claims of those from non-Christian traditions or 
religions without a long history in Europe”,785 while having no difficulty in upholding 
the right to proselytise;786 arguably, the Court’s support for mainly familiar religious 
practices may have serious repercussions for religious minorities.787 Furthermore, the 
ECtHR tends to “substitute the actual experience of affected minorities with its own 
objective assessment of the impact of state action”,788 such as in headscarf case-law 
(discussed in Chapter I on pages 76-87).789 Kurban offers a solution by arguing that 
                                                                                                                                            
‘The European Court on Human Rights between fundamentalist and liberal secularism’ (2005) Paper 
for the seminar on The Islamic Head Scarf Controversy and the Future of Freedom of Religion or 
Belief, Strasbourg, 28-30 July 2005. Liberal secularism regards religion as a private issue in the sense 
that “it is neither a public responsibility nor right to enforce a religious (or non-religious) doctrine or 
practice on its citizens, because religion and belief is a matter of personal conscience and identity” 
(ibid). Accordingly, although liberal secularism excludes the influence of religious groups over 
political institutions, “the separation does not exclude religious manifestation in the public realm” 
(ibid). Conversely, the fundamentalist notion of secularism builds on the idea that the religious identity 
of individuals should be “left behind, hidden, or at least not clearly manifested when entering the 
public domain and especially public institutions” (ibid). The fundamentalist nature of this approach 
stems from its blanket character of imposing a secularist lifestyle on all individuals entering the public 
domain. It appears that the ECtHR has adhered to fundamentalist secularism by simply accepting that 
“wearing the headscarf contravened the principle of secularism”: Sylvie Langlaude, ‘Indoctrination, 
secularism, religious liberty, and the ECHR’ (2006) International & Comparative Law Quarterly 929-
944. 
 
785 C Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 
2001) 125. 
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787 Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (n 785) 125; see 
also, P Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Human Rights Law and Practice (CUP, 
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788 Peter Danchin and Lisa Forman, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Protection of Religious Minorities’ in P Danchin and E Cole (eds) Protecting the 
Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe (Columbia University Press, New York 2002) 
192-221, 210. 
 
789 In finding limitations on wearing headscarves compatible with Article 9 ECHR, the ECtHR sought 
to exploit the “liberating potential of the secular public sphere … as a corrective for the oppression of 
Muslim girls and women”: Lieve Gies, ‘What not to wear: Islamic Dress and School Uniforms’ (2006) 
14 Feminist Legal Studies 377-389, 383. The ECtHR assumed that the headscarf is not consistent with 
and detrimental to gender equality, because it is a “requirement imposed upon women by a precept of 
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the freedom of minorities to wear religious dress should be regarded as an 
accommodation of a group’s different way of life under Article 8 ECHR, as opposed 
to manifesting religion, which could be limited on the basis of the grounds listed in 
Article 9(2) ECHR.790 Indeed, such an approach is capable of ensuring that religious 
minorities can preserve their practices distinct from those of the majority, including 
the wearing of religious dress. As discussed in Chapter I on pages 76-87, the ECtHR’s 
current restrictive jurisprudence built on the public/private divide under Article 9 
ECHR is largely unsatisfactory, because it fails to “construct a consistent vision of 
religious freedom alongside the core value of pluralism that the Court has 
endeavoured to articulate over the last decade.”791  
 
Significantly, by virtue of Article 6(3) TEU, the ECtHR’s interpretation of religious 
freedoms is a part of the general principles of EU law. Furthermore, once the EU 
accedes to the ECHR pursuant to Article 6(2) TEU, arguably, the EU will be under 
the legal obligation to take full account of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                                            
the Koran”: Dahlab v Switzerland (n 216); see also Dawn Lyon and Debora Spini, ‘Unveiling the 
Headscarf Debate’ (2004) 12 Feminist Legal Studies 333-345, 338. In the Court’s view, shariah is not 
conducive to the constant evolution of public freedoms because it is too stable.  
However, there is a consistent jurisprudence of the ECtHR that accepts Islam as compatible with the 
ECHR. On the one hand, in 2005, in I A v Turkey ((App no 42571/98) ECHR 13 September 2005) the 
ECtHR established that Islam is one of the protected religions under the Convention. Furthermore, in 
Gunduz v Turkey ((App no 35071/97) (2005) 41 EHRR 59), the ECtHR ruled that Article 10 ECHR 
permitted a sect to advocate the introduction of shariah. In addition, in Hasan and Eylem Zengin v 
Turkey (n 258) the ECtHR affirmed the compatibility of religious teaching with the ECHR. On the 
other hand, the ECtHR defies the practices that are part of the Islamic religion. (See also the ECtHR’s 
approach to the dissolution of political parties in Turkey. The Court found that the dissolution of the 
Communist Party (n 331) and Socialist Party (n 332) violated Article 11 ECHR, while Turkey was 
justified in dissolving an Islamic Party in Case of Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and others v Turkey 
(n 212); see also ECHR (Grand Chamber) 13 February 2003.) It is rather contradictory to accept the 
religion, but not its practice. 
 
790 Kurban, ‘Substantive Challenges to the Protection of Religious Freedom…’ (n 444) 125. 
 
791 Isabelle Rorive, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a European Answer’ (2009) 
30(6) Cardozo Law Review 2669-2698, 2672. 
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the ECtHR’s restrictive position on the public/private divide is taken even further in 
some Member States, as discussed next.  
 
2.2. Religious dress and immigration rules in some Member States 
 
Over the past few years, heated debates surrounding the issue of religious dress have 
taken place in a number of EU Member States. These debates, which have led to 
certain legal and political developments, indicate that religious freedoms are 
significant factors in the formation of the identities of Member States themselves, and 
in shaping the ‘Europeanness’792 of EU citizens. In the face of the post-9/11 world, 
potential Turkish membership in the EU, and relatively large numbers of Muslim 
migrants in the EU, it appears that attempts to base European belonging on ‘Christian 
values’ are strengthening. The most severe restraint that comes with the imposition of 
‘European’ values on members of minority religions, however, is “the acceptance of 
limitations on the public role of religion and of the legitimacy of a zone of individual 
freedom from religion and its prescriptive norms.”793  
 
One such limitation concerns the manifestation of religious dress, such as the hijab 
(headscarf traditionally worn by Muslim women), which is perceived by some “as a 
blanket instrument of oppression of women, as religious extremism, as a political 
symbol, as evidence of the failed integration of immigrants, and as linked to holy war 
(jihad) and terrorism.”794 Furthermore, these debates have resulted in tightening of 
                                                 
792 Schlesinger and Foret, ‘Political Roof and Sacred Canopy?...’ (n 771) 60. 
 
793 Ronan McCrea, ‘Limitations on Religion in a Liberal Democratic Polity: Christianity and Islam in 
the Public Order of the European Union’ (2007) 18 LSE Working Papers 19. 
 
794 McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion… (n 768) 13. 
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immigration rules, requiring immigrants from predominantly Muslim-majority 
countries to comply with integration requirements. Let us consider each of these 
developments in turn.   
 
Debates about religious dress in publicly-funded schools were first sparked in France. 
The controversy started in 1989, when three Muslim girls came to school in Creil 
wearing their headscarves. Having failed to persuade them to remove their 
headscarves, the school’s principal, in the name of the school’s secularity (laïcite), 
excluded those students from the school. The matter ultimately came before the 
Conseil d’État, which ruled that pupils in state schools had the right to manifest their 
religious beliefs as long as they respected pluralism and the freedoms of others.795  
 
This case, along with subsequent similar claims,796 generated debates on religious 
dress in France. In 2003, the President of France instructed the ‘Stasi Commission’, 
named after the chair Bernard Stasi, the Ombudsman of France, to study the 
compatibility of religious symbols in public schools with the principle of laïcite. In its 
Report, the Stasi Commission established that wearing religious dress such as a 
headscarf or yarmulke/kippa (Jewish skullcap) contravenes the principle of neutrality. 
Moreover, according to the Stasi Commission, women wearing headscarves may 
discriminate against themselves by accepting a subordinate position, because this 
                                                 
 
795 Paul Meredith, ‘Incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into UK Law: 
Implications for education’ (1998) 2 European Journal for Education Law and Policy 7-23, 16-18. 
 
796 On the annulment of the internal rules of schools banning religious dress or signs in classes or on 
the school premises on the grounds that the terms used were too general see Kehrouaa (no 130394) 
2 November 1992 and Melles Yilmaz (no 145656) 14 March 1994; prohibition of penalties for mere 
wearing of a headscarf without any intention to proseletyse Mlle Saglamer (no 169522) 27 November 
1996 and époux Mehila (no 173130) 2 April 1997. However, French courts upheld expulsions from 
school for failure to remove a headscarf during sports lessons: époux Aoukili (no 159981) 10 March 
1995, and Aït Ahmad (no 181486) 20 October 1999, or refusal to attend sports classes Chedouane and 
Wissaadane (no 170209) 27 November 1996. 
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religious dress undermines the principles and values that the school should develop, 
including equal treatment of men and women.797 Based on these findings and relying 
on the principle of laïcite, in 2004, France banned any attire which may 
conspicuously exhibit the religious affiliation of students in public schools.798 
Significantly, small crosses and Stars of David are exempt, “raising questions as to 
the extent to which the law is intended to exclude and discriminate against adherents 
to only some religions.”799 Arguably, this law has a disproportionately adverse effect 
on Muslim, Sikh and Jewish minorities. The invocation of the principle of laïcite in 
French law has been a subject of significant criticism because in practice France does 
“in fact support private schools where the religious symbols, such as headscarves, 
skull caps and crosses are worn.”800 Moreover, “the French secularist principles are 
not even uniformly applied within the territory of Metropolitan France in that 
secularism does not apply in Alsace-Moselle”,801 where public religious schools are 
directly supported by the government.  
 
As in France, in the Netherlands public schools are neutral. However, unlike in 
France, this neutrality is manifested by permitting both religious and non-religious 
                                                 
 
797 Nusrat Choudhury, ‘From the Stasi Commission to the European Court of Human Rights: L’Affaire 
du Foulard and the Challenge of Protecting the Rights of Muslim Girls’ (2007) 16 Columbia journal of 
gender and law 199-296, 202, footnote 11. 
 
798 Act of 15 March 2004 regulating, in implementation of the principle of secularism, the wearing of 
signs or clothing demonstrating adherence to a particular religion in public primary and secondary 
education (2004) Act No 2004-228, JO 5190. See also, Leigh Phillips, ‘French National Assembly bans 
burqa’ EU Observer 14 July 2010 <http://euobserver.com/9/30477/?rk=1> accessed 14 July 2010. 
 
799 Madeleine Heyward, ‘What Constitutes Europe?...’ (n 771) 233. 
 
800 Alan Riley, ‘Headscarves, Skull Caps and Crosses: Is the Proposed French Ban Safe from European 
Legal Challenge?’  (2004) 49 Centre for European Policy Studies Policy brief 3. 
 
801 Riley, ‘Headscarves, Skull Caps and Crosses…’ (n 800) 3. 
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expression to be present in Dutch society.802 In 2000, a case concerning restrictions 
imposed on a Muslim student, who wished to cover her face completely, came before 
the Dutch Equal Treatment Commission. A school dress code precluded students from 
wearing items of clothing which would conceal their facial expressions during 
lessons. The Equal Treatment Commission decided that the “educational policy of the 
school did not suffice to justify this indirect discrimination”803 and found a violation. 
Significantly, in a subsequent case decided in 2003, concerning two female Muslim 
pupils in a school preparing them for a career in education, the Equal Treatment 
Commission decided that a ban on wearing clothing covering their faces completely 
was indirectly discriminatory; however, these measures were justified, because the 
niqab (a full face cover) makes communication between staff and students more 
difficult. Moreover, it would be impossible to identify people visiting school premises 
if wearing the niqab was allowed.804 Thus, recent trends in the Netherlands mirror 
developments in other Member States. 
 
As in France, in Germany the State ought to be neutral towards religions. However, 
unlike the French law based on laïcite, which requires the State to distance itself from 
religious matters, neutrality in Germany demands the State to be “even-handed in 
granting public status to religion”.805 This may explain the different outcome of a 
headscarf-case that came before German courts. In 2003, a Muslim primary school 
teacher, Fereshta Ludin, was refused a job in Baden-Wüttemberg because she wanted 
                                                 
802 Primary Education Act, Article 46, Section 1. 
 
803 Sophie van Bijsterveld, ‘The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitations on the Freedom of Religion or 
Belief in the Netherlands’ (2005) 19 Emory International Law Review 929. 
 
804 EU Network of Independent Experts, ‘Thematic Comment No 3…’ (n 15) 39 citing the decision of 
the Equal Treatment Commission of 20 March 2003, oordeel 2003-04. 
 
805 Christian Joppke, ‘State neutrality and Islamic headscarf laws in France and Germany’ (2007) 36 
Theor Soc 313–342, 314. 
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to wear a headscarf to school.806  Although she had worn a headscarf to her teaching 
training, the school board decided that young children could be easily influenced if 
she were to teach wearing a headscarf. Therefore, it was not permissible for her to 
cover her head at school. In its assessment of the case, the German Constitutional 
Court emphasised the principle of State neutrality, i.e., the policy to “open the sphere 
of the state for religions in principle though within certain limits, to give them room 
without endorsing any of them.”807 It emphasised a crucial distinction  
between religious symbols installed on public property on the order of 
the state, and the state tolerating the personal decision of an individual 
to wear a religious symbol herself. If the state tolerates such a symbol 
worn by an individual, it is not making this a symbol of its own.808 
 
Significantly, in the view of the Constitutional Court, a headscarf should not be 
interpreted as a sign of women’s oppression or an obstacle to teaching the values of 
the German Constitution. Nor was there sufficient empirical data to “indicate any 
harmful influence of the headscarf-hijab on children.”809 However, in the Court’s 
view, the German Länder had the power to ban religious headscarves as long as they 
enacted specific legislation; as there was no legislation in place at the time of the 
judgment, Ms Ludin had a technical victory in this case.810 Subsequently, several 
Länders, such as Baden-Wurttemberg, Hessen and Bavaria,811 adopted laws 
                                                 
 
806 Bundesverfassungsgericht (n 224).  
 
807 Matthias Mahlmann, ‘Religious Tolerance, Pluralist Society and the Neutrality of the State: The 
Federal Constitutional Court’s Decision in the Headscarf Case’ (2003) 4(11) German Law Journal 
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808 Riley, ‘Headscarves, Skull Caps and Crosses…’ (n 800) 4. 
 
809 McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion… (n 768) 113. 
 
810 McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion… (n 768) 122. 
 
811 Christine Langenfeld and Sarah Mohsen, Case Comment ‘Germany: the teacher head scarf case’ 
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prohibiting teachers from wearing headscarves in schools. However, these laws may 
be problematic, because despite their broad wording they mainly target the wearing of 
Islamic religious dress, with practically no impact on the Christian cross or Jewish 
kippa (skullcap).812  
 
Similarly, in Sweden, pursuant to the decision of the Swedish National Agency for 
Education of 24 October 2003, educational establishments have the right to ban 
students from wearing the burqa (head-to-toe covering) and niqab (a full face cover), 
both for educational reasons and as part of general school rules. The EU Network of 
Independent Experts considered such a ban undesirable, because it took effect 
“without a discussion of values, equality issues and democratic obligations and 
rights.”813  
 
Luxembourg and Austria have adopted a less stringent approach, which does not 
impose prohibition on the wearing of religious dress, such as headscarves, turbans, 
kippas and Christian crosses, unless compelling circumstances so require, for 
example, for reasons of safety.814 
 
Let us now turn to debates concerning immigration rules. Since the late 1940s, a large 
number of migrants from third countries have been moving to EU Member States to 
fulfil labour demands. This has continually increased the number of religious 
minorities in the EU:  
                                                 
812 McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion… (n 768) 115.  
 
813 EU Network of Independent Experts, ‘Thematic Comment No 3…’ (n 15) 39. 
 
814 EU Network of Independent Experts, ‘Thematic Comment No 3…’ (n 15) 39. 
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[t]hese migration flows had a considerable impact on the religious 
diversity of western Europe and juxtaposed a dominant, complacent 
and increasingly secular Christian majority against vulnerable 
minorities, many of whom were not Christian but for whom religion 
was an important aspect of their identity.815  
 
To cope with these changes and protect their values, some Member States have 
resorted to integration requirements, which increasingly demand “explicit 
reassurances from individual migrants that they are personally committed to liberal 
democratic values.”816 Thus, in 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2006, the Netherlands amended 
its laws to require individuals wishing to naturalise to indicate their integration by 
passing exams on the knowledge of Dutch society and language.817 If applicants 
failed to integrate or supposedly were unable to integrate, they would be refused 
admission or a more secure status, including the equal treatment stemming from that 
status.818 Arguably, these tests have mainly targeted applicants from Muslim-majority 
countries,819 such as Morocco and Turkey, because immigrants from, for example, the 
USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan are exempt from taking these 
exams.820 The government attempted to justify this differentiation by claiming that 
the exempted countries share social and economic backgrounds similar to the Dutch 
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Education’ (2005) 5 European Human Rights Law Review 499-516. 
 
816 McCrea, ‘Limitations on Religion in a Liberal Democratic Polity…’ (n 793) 19. 
 
817 McCrea, ‘Limitations on Religion in a Liberal Democratic Polity…’ (n 793) 33-34; see also 
‘Netherlands introduces Dutch language test for immigrants’, 21 February 2006 
<http://www.workpermit.com/news/2006_02_21/europe/netherlands_introduces_immigrant_test.htm> 
accessed 23 March 2010.  
 
818 Kees Groenendijk, ‘Legal Concepts of Integration in EU Migration Law’ (2004) 6 European Journal 
of Migration and Law 111–126, 113. 
 
819 McCrea, ‘Limitations on Religion in a Liberal Democratic Polity…’ (n 793) 34. 
 
820 ‘New Dutch immigration test under attack’, 06 April 2006 <http://www.workpermit.com/news/ 
2006_04_06/europe/new_dutch_immigration_test.htm> accessed 23 March 2010. 
 
 244
one; therefore, their integration will not lead to problems within Dutch society.821 
However, as Human Rights Watch argues, this explanation shows that “the measure 
was primarily introduced to limit immigration and not to improve integration.”822  
 
In 2000, similar reforms took place in Germany through the amendments of laws on 
nationality, which require candidates for citizenship to adhere to the values in the 
Basic law.823 Tests designed to examine such a commitment were initially applied to 
applicants from 57 States which have Muslim-majority population.824 Although the 
authorities may now require applicants from a broader range of countries to take these 
exams, it is argued that more Muslims have to take these exams, because there are 
discrepancies between Muslim beliefs and the German Constitution where, for 
example, gender equality is concerned.825 
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 Some of these moves in Member States not only severely curtail the freedom of 
minorities to manifest their religion, but also have broader implications at the EU 
level. In particular, changes to immigration rules in some Member States have been 
translated into the imposition of a ‘European’ identity on TCNs with the potential of 
limiting manifestation of religion. The section below briefly overviews EU law and 
policy in relation to migrants from third countries.  
 
2.3. Religious freedoms and immigration laws in the EU 
 
The above-discussed trends taking place in Member States have found their way into 
EU law. The recently adopted Refugee,826 Long-Term Residents827 and Family 
Reunification828 Directives all contain references to integration requirements as set by 
Member States. Although the Directives themselves do not mention limitations on 
manifestation of religion, these may well be required under domestic laws. Thus, 
Article 33 of the Refugee Directive specifies the access of refugees to integration 
programmes that Member States may consider appropriate. In addition, Member 
States may create pre-conditions that guarantee access to such programmes. These 
pre-conditions may well contain requirements of adherence to ‘European’ values and 
have exclusionary effects on some refugees.  
                                                 
826 Council (EC) Directive 2004/83 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
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 In a similar manner, the Long-Term Residents Directive specifies in Article 5(2), 
regarding conditions for acquiring long-term resident status, that ‘Member States may 
require third-country nationals to comply with integration conditions, in accordance 
with national law.’ The rationale for creating Long-Term Resident status was to allow 
third-country nationals to exercise some of the rights that EU citizens enjoy, such as 
free movement rights within the EU. However, if an individual acquired this status in 
a Member State that does not have strict integration requirements and then moved to a 
State with stricter rules, the second Member State may still require third-country 
nationals to comply with integration measures, in accordance with its national laws.829 
Bearing in mind the hardening of immigration rules in the domestic legislation of 
some Member States, it is likely that these integration requirements may also include 
limitations on manifestation of religion in public space and lead to the exclusion of 
some individuals who belong to religious minorities.  
  
Perhaps the most controversial of all these instruments is the Family Reunification 
Directive,830 some provisions of which were unsuccessfully challenged by the EP 
before the ECJ.831 The Directive facilitates family reunification of TCNs, mainly with 
their spouses and minor children.832 Article 7(2) of the instrument stipulates that 
‘Member States may require third country nationals to comply with integration 
                                                 
829 Directive 2003/109 (Long-Term Residents Directive) (n 42) Article 15(3) on Conditions for 
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830 Directive 2003/86 (Family Reunification Directive) (n 828). 
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measures, in accordance with national law.’ Moreover, where a child of a third 
country national is  
aged over 12 years and arrives independently from the rest of his/her 
family, the Member State may, before authorising entry and residence 
under this Directive, verify whether he or she meets a condition for 
integration provided for by its existing legislation on the date of 
implementation of this Directive.833 
 
Furthermore, by way of derogation, Member States may refuse family reunification 
with children over 15 years.834 In addition, spouses under 21 years old are suspected 
of forced marriages, and, therefore, may be required to wait until they reach the 
minimum marriageable age of a Member State before they can re-unite with their 
spouses.835  
 
All these requirements and derogations are indicative of an uneasiness of the EU and 
its Member States with integrating TCNs, who may belong to religious minorities. In 
the light of developments in some Member States as discussed in Section 2.2 above 
(pages 238-246), the references in these Directives to the integration requirements as 
set in domestic laws may lead to exclusionary practices against religious minorities, 
including Muslims. Nevertheless, the Commission has recently “boldly announced 
that the integration of immigrants goes hand in hand with acceptance of the 
fundamental values of the EU…”836 However, it is essential that the fundamental 
values of the EU set out in Article 2 (ex-Article 6(1)) TEU837 are not interpreted in an 
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exclusionary manner. For example, the principle of pluralism should not curb 
religious freedom and violate the “axiomatic principle of religious pluralism, and by 
extension, democracy itself.”838 Therefore, setting out standards applicable to all 
religions may eliminate the appearance of double standards applied by the EU and its 
Member States to religious minorities. A lack of such yardsticks may create an 
impression that the EU has chosen to 
assume compatibility between Christianity and the model of liberal 
democracy to which the Union attached while subjecting Muslims to 
rigorous examination of their secular bona fides.839   
 
The EU has already been criticised for applying double standards in the enlargement 
practice, overviewed next, based on examples from the Commission’s monitoring of 
Bulgaria and Turkey’s compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. 
 
2.4. Religious freedoms in EU enlargement law and practice 
 
The Commission’s Progress Reports have not yet dealt with the issue of manifesting 
religion in publicly-funded schools; the monitoring reports have mainly picked up on 
broader issues of freedom of religion. Let us examine, for example, the Commission’s 
response to controversy surrounding religious freedoms in Bulgaria. In 2003, Bulgaria 
substituted its Denominations Act of 1949 with the Religious Denominations Act, 
which established governmental control over religious activities in the country. The 
                                                                                                                                            
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member 
States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. 
 
838 Parker Todd, ‘The Freedom to Manifest Religious Belief: An Analysis of the Necessity Clauses in 
the ICCPR and the ECHR’ (2006) 17 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 91-129, 99. 
 
839 McCrea, ‘Limitations on Religion in a Liberal Democratic Polity…’ (n 793) 43. 
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Act legalised Bulgaria’s attempts to restrict the activities of minority religions and 
established the privileged position of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.840 In 2002, the 
representatives of Protestant, Muslim, Catholic, Orthodox and Hare Krishna groups 
unsuccessfully petitioned the President of Bulgaria to veto this discriminatory law.841 
Moreover, the ECtHR842 and a number of international organisations, such as the 
OSCE843 and CoE,844 criticised Bulgaria’s discriminatory treatment of minority 
religions, often stemming from the implementation of ambiguous provisions of the 
Religious Denominations Act. For example, Hassan and Chaush v Bulgaria845 and 
the case of Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v Bulgaria,846 discussed 
in Chapter I on pages 109-110, highlighted the authorities’ interference with the 
leadership of religious groups, which the ECtHR found contrary to Article 9 ECHR.   
 
                                                 
 
840 Krassimir Kanev, ‘The New Bulgarian Religious Law: Restrictive and Discriminatory’ (2002/3) 2 
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By contrast, the Commission did not mention the Act even once in its 2003 report.847 
The 2004 Regular Report discussed it in one paragraph only. The Commission 
indicated that there was a lack of clear procedural guidelines in the Denomination 
Act, which created difficulties in the implementation of registration requirements at 
the local level. Bulgaria was advised to clarify the property rights of local churches.848 
Thus, the matter of religious freedoms did not find prominence relating to Bulgaria’s 
accession process to the EU. 
 
Conversely, Turkey’s Regular Reports have consistently devoted at least two full 
pages on discussion of religious freedoms in the country.849 The Commission 
criticised the Turkish authorities for restrictive interpretation of domestic legislation, 
which significantly limited freedom of religion as compared with European standards. 
In particular, problems of non-Muslim religious communities “related to legal 
personality, property rights, training of clergy, schools and internal management”850 
have been consistently emphasised.  
 
These examples indicate that, in dealing with religious freedoms in candidate 
countries, the EU has differentiated between the countries and minorities at issue. 
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This is not to say that the Commission’s assessment of Turkey’s treatment of religious 
minorities should have been sketchy. Rather these comparisons highlight how the lack 
of uniform yardsticks in EU enlargement practice impacts the Commission’s 
assessment of the progress made by candidate countries. The EU is in need of 
consistent benchmarks of minority protection, which would eliminate any doubts that 
the EU is open to all religions and not create the impression of being an exclusive 
‘Christian club’. 
 
The next section presents a case study of England, with the focus on the judgments of 
English courts dealing with religious dress in publicly-funded schools. 
 
3. Lessons from England 
 
Historically, in the 1689 Toleration Act, England made the first steps towards 
ensuring legal equality amongst many different religions.851 In common law, religious 
liberty was a negative freedom, which generally favoured individual freedom of 
action; in the absence of a legal prohibition people were permitted to do as they 
wished.852 Therefore, courts have tended to accommodate the situation of specific 
individuals as opposed to prescribing rules relating to their behaviour.853 Moreover, 
English legal system has significant accommodation of religious minorities, in matters 
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such as school uniforms.854 Furthermore, racial and ethnic minorities have generally 
received a higher level of protection under the national law than the ECHR by relying 
on the Race Relations Act (RRA)855 and the Wednesbury856 unreasonableness test. 
For example, whereas the ECmHR held that Sikhs had to wear crash helmets while 
driving motorcycles,857 in 1976, the British Parliament enacted an explicit exemption 
of turbaned Sikhs from the statutory requirements to wear crash helmets.858  
 
However, the 1998 Human Rights Act (HRA), which incorporated the ECHR into the 
legal system of the UK, has clearly affected the “legal regulation of religious symbols 
and dress.”859 Despite adding to the strong guarantees on non-discrimination some 
positive rights on the freedom to manifest religion, the HRA has deepened the divide 
between ethnic and religious minorities, because the former can benefit from both the 
RRA and the HRA, while the latter group can rely only on the HRA. In addition, 
when  
ruling on whether a public authority has breached s 6 [HRA], the 
courts are not so much concerned with the extent to which a school has 
reached the ‘right decision’, but rather whether the school has arrived 
at its decision i[n] a lawful manner.860  
 
                                                 
854 McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion… (n 768) 175. 
 
855 Race Relations Act (n 383). 
 
856 Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v Wednesbury Corportation, 7 November 1947. 
 
857 X v the United Kingdom (1978) 14 DR 234. 
 
858 Peter Cumper, ‘Religious Liberty in the United Kingdom’ in J van der Vyver and J Witte (eds) 
Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives (Kluwer Law International, the 
Hague 1996) 228. 
 
859 Sandberg, ‘Is nothing sacred?...’ (n 852) 488. 
 
860 Sylvie Bacquet, ‘School Uniforms, Religious Symbols and The Human Rights Act 1998: The 
‘Purity Ring’ Case’ (2008) Westminster School of Law Research Paper No 08-05.  
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In their assessment the courts also determine whether a public authority’s measures 
are proportionate.861  
 
These legislative developments demonstrate that the gap between religious and ethnic 
minorities in England is widening, which is clearly exemplified by the different 
outcomes of the cases involving two Muslim girls862 and a Christian girl863 who relied 
on the HRA864 on one hand, and a Sikh girl865 who relied on the RRA on the other 
hand, all wishing to manifest their religion while attending a publicly-funded school.  
 
We will overview each case in some detail. Perhaps the most significant case is that of 
Shabina Begum.866 Shabina attended a majority-Muslim school (79% of students) in 
Luton. The Head Teacher of the school was a Bengali Muslim woman. The school 
had generally accommodated religious minorities by allowing them to wear an 
alternative school uniform called shalvar kameez (shalvar is loose trousers, kameez is 
a long tunic), designed in consultation with parents, the school and the local 
mosques.867 After wearing this uniform for two years, Shabina refused to wear 
                                                 
 
861 Christopher Knight, ‘The Test that Dare Not Speak its Name: Proportionality Comes Out of the 
Closet?’ (2007) 12(2) Judicial Review 117-121. 
 
862 R (on the application of Begum (by her litigation friend, Rahman)) (Respondent) v Headteacher and 
Governors of Denbigh High School (Appellants) [2006] UKHL 15;  R (on the application of X) v 
Headteachers and Governors of Y School [2007] EWHC 298 QBD (Admin). 
 
863 R (on the application of Playfoot) v Governing Body of Millais School [2007] EWHC 1698 
(Admin). 
 
864 Human Rights Act, Sections 2, 3 and 6. 
 
865 R (on the application of Watkins-Singh) v Aberdare Girls’ High School Governors [2008] WL 
2872609. 
 
866 Shabina Begum (through her litigation friend Mr Sherwas Rahman) v the Headteacher and 
Governors of Denbigh High School [2004] EWHC 1389 (Admin). 
 
867 Shabina Begum (Admin) (n 866) para 42. 
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shalvar kameez after puberty because it was not sufficiently modest according to a 
strict interpretation of Islam. The school did not allow her to attend school unless she 
complied with the school uniform. Shabina applied to the High Court claiming that 
the school violated her freedom of religion under Article 9 ECHR.  
 
The High Court dismissed Shabina’s claims.868 In the High Court’s view, she was not 
excluded from school for her religious beliefs, but rather because she refused to 
comply with the school uniform. Moreover, she had alternative means of exercising 
this right, for example, by attending another school or receiving her education at 
home. Therefore, there was no violation of Article 9(1) ECHR. Nor did the High 
Court recognise that Shabina’s right to education was breached under P1-2 ECHR, 
because she was not excluded from school. The provision guaranteed only the right to 
be educated. It did not impose an obligation to ensure the enjoyment of this right at a 
particular school. As long as a pupil was offered education at other schools, P1-2 was 
not breached.  
 
The applicant appealed. The Court of Appeal rightly pointed out that in considering 
this case nobody  
started from the premise that the claimant had a right which is 
recognised by English law, and that the onus lay on the School to 
justify its interference with that right. Instead, it started from the 
premise that the uniform policy was there to be obeyed: if the claimant 
did not like it, she could go to a different school.869  
 
                                                 
 
868 Shabina Begum (Admin) (n 866). 
 
869 Shabina Begum  v the Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2005] EWCA Civ 199. 
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The Court of Appeal overturned the decision of the High Court. It found that Article 
9(1) ECHR was engaged in this case. In the Court’s view, Shabina was excluded from 
school due to her religious beliefs. However, in deciding whether the limitation could 
be justified under Article 9(2) ECHR, instead of assessing whether the limitation was 
necessary in a democratic society, the Court of Appeal “outlined the decision-making 
structure which the school should have used since … the onus lay on the school to 
justify its interference with the Convention right.”870 However, while a procedural test 
is used in judicial review of public authorities’ decisions, it may be too much to 
expect the public authorities themselves to apply the proportionality test to every 
decision they make.871 
 
That is why the House of Lords overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal and 
restored the decision of the High Court.872 The Law Lords did not accept that the 
measures taken on disciplinary grounds amounted to exclusion from school, because 
Shabina could return to her school at any time were she to comply with the school 
uniform policy. Therefore, there was no interference with her freedom of religion 
under Article 9 ECHR.  
 
In deciding the case, the House of Lords relied extensively on the ECtHR’s restrictive 
jurisprudence on freedom of religion, discussed in Chapter I on pages 76-87, in 
particular, the ‘specific situation’ rule as developed by the ECtHR. Thus, if an 
individual is, for example, in a contractual relation, one’s freedom to manifest religion 
                                                 
870 Sandberg, ‘Is nothing sacred?...’ (n 852) 488. 
 
871 Sandberg, ‘Is nothing sacred?...’ (n 852) 488. 
 
872 R (on the application of Begum (by her litigation friend, Rahman)) v the Headteacher and 
Governors of Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15. 
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may be legitimately limited by a contract.873 In addition, Article 9 ECHR is not 
violated, if an individual has a possibility to alter his/her situation. However, applying 
this particular line of argument to Shabina’s case ignores the fact that in “state schools 
there is no contractual relationship between school and pupil.”874  
 
Moreover, there is a certain amount of confusion in the House of Lords’ application 
of the ECtHR’s ‘headscarf’ jurisprudence. As discussed in Chapter I on page 78, in 
the first headscarf case, Karaduman v Turkey,875 the ECmHR found that there was no 
interference with Article 9(1) ECHR. Subsequently, in Şahin v Turkey the Chamber876 
and the Grand Chamber877 of the ECtHR “reinterpreted Karaduman to be a case 
where there was in fact an interference but one that was justified under Art.9(2)”,878 
without any explicit indication that they changed the interpretation of the precedent. 
The implications of this re-interpretation is that manifestation of religion through, for 
example, a headscarf, falls within the ambit of Article 9(1) ECHR, even though based 
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on the specific facts of a case the limitation on manifestation may be legitimately 
justified under Article 9(2). It appears that although the House of Lords did refer to 
Şahin v Turkey, they mainly followed the reasoning in Karaduman, which denied that 
wearing a headscarf comes within the ambit of Article 9(1). This, however, leads to 
an unsatisfactory line of reasoning, because the ECtHR’s recent jurisprudence 
recognises that wearing a headscarf may be regarded as “motivated or inspired by a 
religion or religious belief”,879 while the Law Lords’ majority reasoning880 fails to 
recognise that wearing religious dress is covered by Article 9(1) ECHR, even though 
a limitation may be justified under Article 9(2) ECHR.  
 
Lord Nicholls and Lady Hale’s joint concurring opinion in Begum is more satisfactory 
in this respect. Unlike the other three Law Lords, they approached the issue in line 
with the ECtHR’s current jurisprudence881 and argued that Shabina’s rights under 
Article 9(1) ECHR was breached; however, the interference was justified under 
Article 9(2) ECHR. Regrettably, the dissenting Judges’ opinions are silent on why 
their approach is more consistent with the ECHR.   
 
There is significant academic criticism of this decision, particularly where the 
application of the proportionality test is concerned. While it is important that the 
school made an effort to respect the religious freedoms of the majority of pupils, the 
House of Lords decision failed to consider whether the school chose to achieve its aim 
of being inclusive by an appropriate means. Gies further questions “whether it is 
                                                 
879 Şahin v Turkey (n 218) para 78. 
 
880 Lord Bingham, Lord Hoffmann and Lord Scott.  
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justified for a public body to favour particular religious beliefs on no other ground 
than that they are majoritarian and moderate.”882 Accordingly, the judgment implies 
that a non-individualised view towards religious dress is favoured and “school 
authorities can now select between religious beliefs (i.e. adopt the views considered 
acceptable by mainstream Muslim opinion, but ignore the views of stricter 
Muslims).”883 Similarly, Vakulenko criticises the House of Lords for not questioning 
the school’s ‘knowledge’ on the matter:  
[t]he House of Lords did not explain why banning certain clothes 
would be the best way of protecting girls from ‘external pressures’, let 
alone why being pressurised into wearing a jilbab [long and loose-fit 
coat] might be worse than being told to remove it.884 
 
On the other hand, Bennoune, building on her personal experience, argues that  
Begum is a sensible, careful, contextual consideration of limits on 
religious expression in school in light of its meanings and impact on 
the human rights of others and questions of agency, particularly 
appropriate with regard to children. It is in accordance with 
international human rights law, limiting religious expression in only a 
minimal way and doing so in the face of serious questions about the 
freedom of choice of the girl in question and her classmates, in 
context.885 
 
Surely meeting the needs of the majority of Muslims is not a sufficient ground to 
assume that it is “simply for the minority to obey the policy and if they do not like it 
                                                 
882 Lieve Gies, ‘What not to wear: Islamic Dress and School Uniforms’ (2006) 14 Feminist Legal 
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to choose a different school.”886 Arguably, the balancing exercise between individual 
rights and collective welfare caused more harm than permitting more conservative 
religious dress, because it alienated a “minority which already feels marginalised to a 
worrying extent.”887  Undoubtedly, society would achieve more sustainable results in 
integrating minorities by permitting girls to wear their religious clothing while 
educating them in the spirit of tolerance, openness and gender equality, as opposed to 
excluding them from schools. The former is more likely to imbue in them the “values 
of sexual equality and independent thought, so that by the time they reach adulthood 
they will be in a position to make an informed decision as to whether or not to 
continue to wear the hijab.”888 
 
Regrettably, Begum set the tone for the subsequent case law of the British courts. 
Thus, in 2007, a 12-year old Muslim girl who was a pupil at Y school wished to wear 
a niqab (a full face cover) while attending the school when she was taught by male 
teachers or was likely to be seen by males.889 The claimant’s three sisters had studied 
in the same school and had worn niqab in accordance with the school’s uniform 
policy at the time in 1997-2004. Despite the claimant’s arguments that she 
legitimately expected to be permitted to wear a niqab as her sisters had, she was not 
allowed to attend the school until she complied with the school uniform policy. The 
school arranged for her to receive some tuition at home funded by the school, which 
was not comparable to the tuition she could have received were she allowed to attend 
                                                 
886 Ann Blair and Will Alps, ‘What not to wear and other stories: addressing religious diversity in 
schools’ (2005) 17(1-2) Education and the Law 1-22, 8. 
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her school. She challenged the school’s decision by claiming that her freedom to 
manifest religion under Article 9 ECHR was violated. The High Court decided that 
there was no interference with her rights under Article 9 ECHR, because she had 
alternative means to exercise her freedom. That is, she had been offered a place at 
school Q where she could wear the niqab. However, the claimant rejected this offer 
without any explanation as to why this school was unacceptable to her. Furthermore, 
the High Court held that the school was justified in imposing the restriction in the 
public interest as it is difficult to recognise a person entering the school’s premises in 
the niqab. As in Begum, the High Court failed to recognise that, even though 
interference with the applicant’s freedom to manifest religion may be justified under 
Article 9(2) ECHR, wearing a niqab is covered by Article 9(1) ECHR.890 
 
Claims regarding manifestation of religion are not limited to Muslims only. In 2007, 
Ms Lydia Playfoot, who wished to wear a Silver Ring Thing Purity ring891 to school, 
brought a case before the courts claiming a violation of her freedom to manifest 
religious beliefs under Article 9 ECHR. Lydia had worn the ring for a year starting in 
2004. In 2005, she was asked to remove the ring as the school uniform policy 
precluded pupils from wearing jewellery to school. In 2006, having failed to comply 
                                                 
 
890 The broader implications of these cases translated into new guidance on school uniforms. In 
assessing the UK’s compliance with the FCNM, the ACFC has criticised the new guidance for schools 
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with the instruction again, she received disciplinary sanctions and was taught 
separately from her class.  Following this incident, Lydia wrote to the Assistant Head 
Teacher and explained that she was a “committed Christian with a genuine belief that 
she should remain sexually abstinent before marriage, and that the ring is a sign of 
this belief.”892 The matter was brought to the Governing Body of the school, which 
decided that there was “no evidence or explanation linking the belief in sexual 
abstinence to wearing the ring to the extent that [they] could conclude that wearing 
the ring was a manifestation of her belief.”893 Lydia and her father challenged this 
decision before the court. The court assessed whether Lydia’s actions were ‘intimately 
linked’ to her belief894 and concluded that the “[c]laimant was under no obligation, by 
reason of her belief, to wear the ring; nor does she suggest that she was so 
obliged.”895 Moreover, in its reasoning the judge relied on Lord Bingham’s argument 
in Begum:  
rvance and there 
are other means open to the person to practise or observe his or her 
religion without undue hardship or inconvenience.896 
[t]he Strasbourg institutions have not been at all ready to find an 
interference with the right to manifest religious belief in practice or 
observance where a person has voluntarily accepted an employment or 
role which does not accommodate that practice or obse
 
                                                 
892 R (on the application of Playfoot) v Governing Body of Millais School (n 863) para 11. 
t relied on a number of judgments, including R (Williamson) v Secretary of State for Education 
nd Employment [2005] UKHL 15; [2005] 2 AC 246 and R (on the application of Begum (by her 
006] UKHL 
5. 
5 R (on the application of Playfoot) v Governing Body of Millais School (n 863) para 11. 
6 R (on the application of Playfoot) v Governing Body of Millais School (n 863).  
 
893 R (on the application of Playfoot) v Governing Body of Millais School (n 863) para 11. 
 
894 R (on the application of Playfoot) v Governing Body of Millais School (n 863) para 20 and 21. The 
Cour
a
litigation friend, Rahman)) v the Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2
1
 
89
 
89
 262
Building on this reasoning, the judge concluded that “[w]hatever the ring is intended 
to symbolise, it is a piece of jewellery.”897 The judge outlined a list of alternative 
course of action the claimant could undertake, such as attaching her ring, or a key ring 
or other visible sign, to her bag, using key chains, badges or stickers, generating open 
discussion of these issues in her class or transferring to another school, such as 
Thomas Bennett Community College, which would allow her to wear the ring. 
Because there were alternative means to exercise her right, as well as no clear 
connection between wearing the ring and her belief, the judge found that there was no 
terference with her Article 9 ECHR right. Therefore, the school was justified to 
 on the 
cts of the case under Article 9(2) ECHR, it is important to recognise that individuals 
involving a Sikh girl wishing to wear at school the Kara, a plain steel bangle 
                                                
in
preclude Lydia from wearing it. 
 
These judgments demonstrate that the reasoning of the British courts is not 
compatible with the recent jurisprudence of the ECtHR: “[t]he assertion that 
insistence on wearing religious dress does not constitute a manifestation of one’s 
religion or belief is plainly wrong.”898 Even though limitations may be justified
fa
do have freedom to manifest their religious beliefs under Article 9(1) ECHR.  
 
Another controversy surrounding freedom of religion in England stems from the fact 
that some minorities which share both a common ethnic origin and a common religion 
are entitled to a higher level of protection under the Race Relations Act (RRA) than 
religious minorities, as discussed in Chapter I on pages 148-150. In 2008, in a case 
 
 
897 R (on the application of Playfoot) v Governing Body of Millais School (n 863). 
 
898 Sandberg, ‘Is nothing sacred?...’ (n 852) 488. 
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manifesting her religious beliefs, Justice Silber found that there was a violation of the 
applicant’s rights.899 From the outset the judge differentiated this case from the 
preceding three
”), which are provisions on 
hich the claimants in the previous three cases were unable to rely but 
on which the claimant can and does rely. 
to wear their religious dress at school, as 
iscussed in Chapter I on pages 146-147.  
 cases by emphasising that all of them were 
founded largely, if not solely, on the provisions of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 but in this case the claim is based mainly on the totally 
different provisions of the Race Relations Act 1976 (“RRA”) as 
amended and the Equality Act 2006 (“EA
w
 
Relying on sections 1(1A) and 71 of the RRA and Part II of the EA, in particular 
Section 49(1) thereof, the applicant argued that by precluding her from wearing the 
Kara and by excluding her from school for failure to remove the bangle, the school 
indirectly discriminated against her as a member of an ethnic minority. The applicant 
also relied on the House of Lords decision in Mandla v Dowell Lee900 establishing 
that Sikhs are an ethnic minority entitled 
d
 
In R (on the application of Watkins-Singh), the Judge did not accept the school’s 
arguments which tried to justify its uniform policy in line with the previous case law, 
by arguing, for example, that there was no direct link between wearing the Kara and 
the Sikh beliefs. The Court accepted expert evidence on the significance of the Kara. 
Moreover, the judge, following the French practice of outlawing large symbols, 
emphasised that the niqab (a full face cover) and jilbab (long and loose-fit coat) were 
                                                 
 
989  R (on the application of Watkins-Singh) v Aberdare Girls’ High School Governors (n 865). See also, 
 in Religious Liberty’ (2009) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 65. Ian Leigh, ‘Recent Developments
 
900 Mandla v Dowell Lee (n 92).  
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much more visible than the small and unostentatious Kara901 (although this line of 
reasoning does not explain why a similarly small symbol such as a Purity Ring should 
not benefit from a similar protection). Accordingly, the Court found that the school 
indirectly discriminated against the applicant by precluding her from wearing the 
ara. 
ic and religious minorities 
is most eviden
oups, 
ch as Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and others do not have this 
protection unless they are linked to a recognised ethnic group.902 
 to a school), but does not permit individuals to claim freedom to manifest 
ligion. 
 
                                                
K
 
It is significant that the claim was represented not as a case concerning freedom to 
manifest religion, but rather as indirect discrimination, and, hence, was significantly 
stronger. Moreover, the imbalance in the protection of ethn
t in these cases. Thus, the ACFC noted that  
[w]hile the Race Relations Act (1976) has been interpreted to provide 
protection from discrimination to those religious groups that are 
considered to be an ethnic group, such as Jews and Sikhs, other gr
su
 
This gap may be bridged to an extent through the Equality Act, as it prohibits 
discrimination based on religion in Section 45, which defines direct and indirect 
discrimination on the ground of religion. Unlike the EU Employment Directive, 
which is limited to employment and vocational training, the Equality Act applies to 
educational establishments as well. Thus, religious discrimination in publicly-funded 
schools is contrary to Section 49. This, however, precludes differential treatment of 
pupils from various religions (for example, if children of a certain religion are refused 
admission
re
 
901 R (on the application of Watkins-Singh) v Aberdare Girls’ High School Governors (n 865) para 78. 
 
902 ACFC, ‘First Opinion on the United Kingdom’ (2001) ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)006, 14. 
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How might these legislative developments affect the question of religious dress in 
England? It is argued that unlike  
disputes concerning sex-based dress codes where direct discrimination 
is usually the issue, [reference is omitted] but similar to race 
discrimination, it will usually be indirect discrimination that will form 
the basis of a claim based on dress associated with religion.903  
 
Although religious minorities may be successful in demonstrating that they are 
disadvantaged compared to other individuals where the manifestation of religion is 
concerned, the courts are likely to find indirect discrimination unjustifiable only 
where a school fails to defend an imposed limitation by reference to matters other 
than a pupil’s religion or belief.  
 
So far, the courts have accepted the schools’ justifications. Thus, in the case of a 
Muslim girl wishing to cover her face, the school relied on twelve justifications, 
including the necessity of a teacher observing a pupil’s facial expression as a “key 
part of the learning process and of skill development in, for example, drama, English 
and any subject in which role play is adopted”,904 and the need to identify persons on 
the school’s premises for security reasons.905 So, although indirect discrimination 
may be found in more cases from now on, limitations on pupils’ right to wear 
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religious dress are likely to be approved based on the objective justifications of 
, because even though a violation may be justified 
nder Article 9(2) ECHR, it is essential to recognise that a ban on wearing religious 
he next section overviews relevant provisions of EU law that could support claims 
of religious minorities wishing to manifest their religion by wearing religious dress. 
would make it impossible for a person of a particular religious persuasion to undergo 
                                              
schools.  
 
As argued in Chapter I on page 84, although non-discrimination on the ground of 
religion is essential to the protection of minorities, it is equally important that States 
undertake positive action to preserve the religious identity of a group. Although the 
ECHR does not contain specific minority rights, nevertheless, Article 9 ECHR 
envisions some positive rights. Therefore, it is crucial that courts in England change 
their assessment of Article 9 ECHR
u
dress violates Article 9(1) ECHR.  
 
T
 
4. ‘Testing’ EU rules 
 
As early as 1976, the ECJ emphasised the significance of accommodating practices of 
religious minorities in Vivien Prais v Council.906 For religious reasons, the applicant 
could not attend a test required to take part in a job competition for the European 
Communities. The ECJ established that, if informed duly, it is the duty of the 
appointing authority “to take reasonable steps to avoid fixing for a test a date which 
   
6] ECR 1589. 906 Case 130/75 Vivien Prais v Council [197
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the test.”907 Moreover, it is desirable for an appointing authority to inform itself of 
dates which may be unsuitable for religious reasons and to avoid fixing such dates for 
sts.908  
ould depend on the ECJ’s 
terpretation of the existing EU rules, discussed below. 
                       
te
 
Thus, the ECJ’s early approach suggested the accommodation of religious minorities. 
Were a member of a religious minority in England to succeed in persuading a national 
court to address the ECJ with a preliminary ruling question enquiring whether 
limitations on the manifestation of religion contravene any EU rules, would the ECJ 
be equally generous? The outcome of such a case w
in
 
The Employment Directive precludes direct and indirect discrimination, harassment 
and victimisation on the ground of religion or belief in employment, occupation and 
vocational training. However, the ECJ’s reasonable accommodation of applicants on 
the ground of religion in Vivien Prais did not find its way into the Employment 
Directive; currently, such a duty exists only in relation to disability.909 Furthermore, 
the instrument does not apply to education or provision of services. As a result, even 
though a Muslim woman dismissed from her job for wearing a headscarf may claim 
discrimination under the Employment Directive, a young girl who has been subjected 
to differential treatment in an educational establishment may not rely on this 
                          
 
907 Vivien Prais v Council (n 906) para 19. 
 
908 Vivien Prais v Council (n 906) para 18. 
 
909 Kristin Henrard, ‘Equal Rights versus Special Rights? Minority Protection and the Prohibition of 
Discrimination’ (European Commission, 2007) 28. 
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instrument. In 
instrument is without prejudice to measures laid down by national law which  
in a democratic society, are necessary for public security, for the 
for the protection of health and for the protection of the rights and 
 
his limitation, which replicates Article 9(2) ECHR, may further curtail the scope of 
he Employment Directive stipulates an exception: 
notwithstandin
treatment base
considered dis
by reason of the nature of the particular occupational activities 
characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational 
requirement is proportionate.  
itimate and justified 
occupational requirement.’ However, when transposing the Directive into their 
addition, the Employment Directive establishes in Article 2(5) that the 
maintenance of public order and the prevention of criminal offences, 
freedoms of others.  
T
rights under the Directive, i.e., the ECJ may interpret this provision in light of the 
ECtHR’s restrictive headscarf jurisprudence. 
 
Moreover, the Directive leaves Member States a broad margin of discretion. For 
example, Article 4(1) of t
g provisions on direct and indirect discrimination, differential 
d on a characteristic related to religion or belief would not be 
criminatory if  
concerned or of the context in which they are carried out, such a 
requirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the 
910
 
In addition, based on Article 4(2), which permits a specific exception to the principle 
of equal treatment in the case of churches and other organisations with an ethos based 
on religion or belief, employers may choose a ‘person of the same religion or belief 
for a job where being of that religion or belief is a genuine, leg
                                                 
 
910 Directive 2000/78/EC (Employment Directive) (n 43) Article 4(1). 
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national laws, some Member States have provided “exceptions that may go beyond 
n the ground of religion under the 
mployment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, which incorporates EU 
the strict terms of the Directive or which remain ambiguous.”911 
 
To date, the ECJ has not considered a case concerning religious discrimination based 
on the Employment Directive.912 However, the application of the above-mentioned 
limitations is clear from the case of Mrs Azmi in England.913 The applicant, a Muslim 
teaching support assistant at the Headfield Church of England (Controlled) Junior 
School,914 was dismissed for refusing an instruction not to wear a veil covering her 
face while assisting a male teacher in class with pupils. Mrs Azmi brought a case 
before the Employment Tribunal (ET) at Leeds, claiming direct and indirect 
discrimination, harassment and victimisation o
E
Employment Directive in the UK legal system.  
                                                 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘The application of Directive 
911 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation’ [2008] COM(2008) 225 final/2, 4. 
 
912 Case C-144/04 Mangold v Helm [2006] 1 CMLR 43 and Case C-411/05 Felix Palacios de la Villa v 
Cortefiel Servicios Sa [2007] ECR I-853 on age discrimination; Case C-303/06 S Coleman v Attridge 
Law and Steve Law [2008] ECR I-5603 and Case C-13/05 Chacon Navas v Eurest Collectividades SA 
[2006] 3 CMLR 40 on disability discrimination; and Case C-276/06 Tadao Maruko v 
Versorgungsanstalt der deutschen Buhnen [2008] ECR I-1757 on discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.   
 
913 Azmi v Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council [2007] Employment Appeal Tribunal, Appeal no 
UKEAT/0009/07/MAA. 
Eweida v British Airways plc [2009] ICR 303 is another case where the applicant claimed direct and 
indirect discrimination, due to limitations imposed on the manifestation of her religion. She was 
suspended from her job for wearing a cross on top of her uniform. The applicant’s claims were 
unsuccessful at the employment tribunal, because wearing a cross was not required by her religion; the 
subsequent appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) attempted to challenge the finding on 
indirect discrimination. The EAT too did not find indirect discrimination, because there was no 
identified group which was disadvantaged by the employer’s decision and the Employment Equality 
(Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/1660) did not protect individual religious views. See 
also, Lucy Vickers, ‘Case Comment, Indirect Discrimination and Individual belief: Eweida v British 
Airways Plc’ (2009) Ecclesiastical Law Journal 197.  
 
914 92% of pupils and 35% of the staff of the school were Muslims: Azmi v Kirkless Metropolitan 
Borough Council (n 913) para 3. 
 
 270
 In the decision of 19 October 2006 the Employment Tribunal dismissed her claims of 
direct discrimination and harassment; the claim of victimisation succeeded and she 
as awarded monetary compensation. Furthermore, the Tribunal found that although 
kely to help the claim of 
ny Muslim woman dismissed for a failure to follow the instructions which she 
                                                
w
the treatment in question could amount to indirect discrimination against the applicant 
on the ground of religion, such treatment was justified because it pursued a legitimate 
aim and was proportionate.   
 
The Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) upheld this decision. In its assessment it 
relied on Articles 1 (Purpose of the Employment Directive), 2 (Concept of 
Discrimination) and 4 (Occupational Requirements).915 Where direct discrimination is 
concerned, the EAT followed the restrictive approach of the ET by ruling that Azmi’s 
comparator should not be another Muslim woman who covers her head but not her 
face.916 Instead, the appropriate comparator was a person who was issued instructions 
and following a failure to follow the instructions was suspended.917 In applying this 
approach, both the ET and the EAT simply substituted the term ‘religious belief’ for 
‘gender’918 and applied principles developed in the context of sex discrimination law. 
The case signals the significance of choosing an appropriate comparator. A choice of 
such a broad comparator in this case is unfortunate and is unli
a
 
915 The EAT specifically emphasised that Article 2(5) of Directive 2000/78/EC (Employment 
Directive) (n 43) replicates Article 9(2) ECHR by providing limitations on freedom to manifest religion 
(para 42); however, it was noted that the UK implementing legislation did not have an equivalent 
provision: Azmi v Kirkless Metropolitan Borough Council (n 913) para 47. 
 
916 Azmi v Kirkless Metropolitan Borough Council (n 913) para 55. 
 
917 Azmi v Kirkless Metropolitan Borough Council (n 913) para 56. 
 
918 Azmi v Kirkless Metropolitan Borough Council (n 913) para 53 quoting Shamoon v Chief Constable 
of the RUC [2003] ICR 337, para 4; Showboat Entertainments Centre Ltd v Owens [1984] IRLR 7, para 
20. 
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deemed to contradict her religious belief. Arguably, in a case of discrimination on the 
ground of religion, at the very least, a comparator should have been a person who 
refused to follow instructions due to one’s religion or belief.  
 
Furthermore, both Tribunals found that persons who shared the applicant’s belief 
were likely to be disadvantaged by the school’s practice as compared to others. The 
Tribunals, however, were influenced by the school’s statements indicating that 
observation of Mrs Azmi’s teaching demonstrated that it was unsatisfactory when she 
taught in a veil covering her face as compared to her teaching without it. Accordingly, 
her dismissal was a proportionate measure necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of 
ensuring proper learning by pupils who should be able to interpret the facial 
expression of a teacher. Thus, this case demonstrates that, although the Employment 
irective made it possible for individuals to bring claims of discrimination on the 
In its recent re
States, the C
discrimination
ointed out that  
highlighted conflicts between employee dress codes and manifestations 
rights matters (raising issues of freedom of religious expression) rather 
D
ground of religion, it may be too weak to remedy the situation of religious minorities. 
It is regrettable that the EAT refused to refer a preliminary ruling question to the ECJ, 
so we will need to wait and see what the latter’s approach would be.  
 
port on the implementation of the Employment Directive by Member 
ommission indicated several issues concerning the prohibition of 
 on grounds of religion or belief.919 In particular, the Commission 
p
[n]ational case law arising since the adoption of the Directive has 
of religious belief. Some of these cases have been treated as human 
                                                 
919 Commission, ‘The application of Directive 2000/78/EC…’ (n 911). 
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than discrimination cases, but they indicate that this area is likely to be 
920
 
Another problem in implementing the Employment Directive may stem from the lack 
of a definition of the terms ‘religion’ or ‘belief’ in the majority of Member States. 
Arguably, it is often difficult to delimit race and religion,
a sensitive issue in implementing the Directive.  
nic origin and a 
ommon religion, such as Sikhs,923 Gypsies924 and Jews,925 may be protected as 
group of minorities may indirectly benefit from the Race Directive.  
                                                
921 which may prove 
problematic in the application of the Race and the Employment Directives, 
particularly where “a religion can be linked to ethnicity, either because a religious 
group is considered to have an ethnic character, or because members of a religion 
belong predominantly to particular ethnic groups.”922 Indeed, as the practice of courts 
in England shows, some groups which have both a common eth
c
ethnic/racial minorities, while others, who share only religion, such as Muslims,926 
Rastafarians927 and Jehovah’s Witnesses,928 may be excluded. As a result, the former 
 
0 Commission, ‘The application of Directive 2000/78/EC…’ (n 911). 
lass Wars? 
eligion and (in)equality in the Workplace’ (2009) 38(1) Industrial Law Journal 1-29, 6-7. 
easures in Europe: An Attack on Two Fronts’ (2005) 11(4) European Law 
urnal 468–486, 475. 
3 Mandla v Dowell Lee (n 92). 
4 Commission for Racial Equality v Dutton [1989] IRLR 8. 
5 Seide v Gillette Inudsties Ltd [1980] IRLR 427. 
6 Tariq v Young [1988] COIT 24773/88. 
7 Crown Suppliers v Dawkins (n 459). 
92
 
921 See, for example, a recent case concerning denial of access to a Jewish school in the UK. The school 
admissions policy allowed access only to children whose mothers were either Orthodox Jews or had 
undergone a recognised conversion. As the mother’s conversion in this case was not recognised, the 
pupil was denied admission to the school. The case illustrates the difficulties in delimiting religion and 
ethnicity: R (E) v Governing Body of JFS and another (United Synagogue and others intervening), 
High Court [2008] EWHC 1535 & 1536 (Admin); Court of Appeal [2009] EWCA Civ 626; Supreme 
Court [2009] UKSC 15; [2009] WLR (D) 366. For discussion see Aileen McColgan, ‘C
R
 
922 Commission, ‘The application of Directive 2000/78/EC…’ (n 911) 4. See also Erica Howard, ‘Anti 
Race Discrimination M
Jo
 
92
 
92
 
92
 
92
 
92
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 In short, the Employment Directive would not remedy a situation of a school-girl 
ishing to wear religious dress to a publicly-funded school, because its scope does 
ion 
recently propo
protection, in
w
not extend to education; even if it did, the limitations in the instrument significantly 
reduce its potential, as compared to the Race Directive.   
 
Thus, if an individual belonging to an ethnic group succeeds in invoking the 
protection of the Race Directive, unlike a member of a religious minority, s/he may 
bring a claim of discrimination not only in employment, occupation and vocational 
training, but also in education and provision of goods and services in both public and 
private spheres. This may result in an imbalance in the protection of ethnic and 
religious minorities. Indeed, commentators emphasise the hierarchy of the grounds 
under the Equality Directives; thus, in education “pupils now enjoy equivalent rights 
to their teachers in the case of race, a slightly less advantageous position in sex 
discrimination, and no targeted provision at all in the case of Religion or Belief and 
Sexual Orientation.”929 To remedy this hierarchy of grounds, the Commiss
sed to expand the scope of the Employment Directive to cover social 
cluding inter alia education.930 Regrettably, in relation to the 
                                                                                                                                            
928 Lovell-Badge v Norwich City College of Further and Higher Education [1998] ET/1502237/97. 
 
929 Ann Blair and Will Alps, ‘What not to wear and other stories: addressing religious diversity in 
schools’ (2005) 17(1-2) Education and the Law 1-22, 11; For criticism see Lisa Waddington and Mark 
Bell, ‘More Equal than Others: Distinguishing European Union Equality Directives’ (2001) 38 
Common Market Law Review 587–611, 588; Elisabeth Holzleithner, ‘Mainstreaming Equality: 
Dis/entangling Grounds of Discrimination’ (2005) 14 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 
27-957, 932; for explanation of factors which may have contributed to differing levels of protection 
 Commission, Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
ities: A 
enewed Commitment’ [2008] COM(2008) 420 final, 2. 
9
see Mark Bell and Lisa Waddington, ‘Reflecting on Inequalities in European Equality Law’ (2003) 
28(3) European Law Review 349-369. 
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Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Non-discrimination and Equal Opportun
R
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manifestation of religion, the Commission specified that the Employment Directive 
institutions, nor to the status of religious organisations. Member States 
schools.  
s wishing to 
reserve their distinct features. In contrast, if the Race Directive were interpreted in 
does not cover 
national laws relating to the secular nature of the State and its 
may thus allow or prohibit the wearing of religious symbols in 
931
 
Moreover, all the matters concerning the organisation of the school system, including 
activities and the content of education and differential treatment in access to religious 
educational institutions, will remain within the Member Sates’ discretion.932 
Consequently, the expansion of the Employment Directive’s scope would not enhance 
the EU’s role in this field. Instead, the instrument explicitly excludes its involvement 
with the right of religious minorities to display their dress in publicly-funded schools. 
Accordingly, if the Commission’s proposal including the suggested limitations is 
accepted, it will be too restrictive to offer any relief to religious minoritie
p
line with the jurisprudence of English courts, groups which share both a common 
ethnic origin and a common religion could claim indirect discrimination in education 
and could succeed in wearing religious dress to publicly-funded schools. 
 
                                                 
 
931 Commission, ‘Non-discrimination and Equal Opportunities…’ (n 930) 9 (emphasis added). 
 
932 Article 3(3) and 3(4) of the proposed Directive provide:  
3. This Directive is without prejudice to the responsibilities of Member States for the 
content of teaching, activities and the organisation of their educational systems, 
including the provision of special needs education. Member States may provide for 
differences in treatment in access to educational institutions based on religion or 
belief. 
4. This Directive is without prejudice to national legislation ensuring  the secular 
nature of the State, State institutions or bodies, or education, or concerning the status 
and activities of churches and other organisations based on religion or belief. It is 
equally without prejudice to national legislation promoting equality between men and 
women. 
See also Commission, ‘Non-discrimination and Equal Opportunities…’ (n 930) 8. 
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Another instrument of relevance to the situation of religious minorities may be the 
CFR. It is noteworthy from the outset that the CFR is not addressed to individuals and 
applies to the EU institutions when they legislate and to Member States when they 
plement EU law. Therefore, were there an EU act which had an impact on the 
s to Article 9 ECHR, and hence may be limited in 
 democratic society in accordance with law if justified by a legitimate aim of 
iscrimination in wide ranging areas. Its aim is mainly to address 
discriminations by the institutions and bodies of the Union themselves, when 
im
manifestation of religion, an applicant could in principle challenge this act before the 
ECJ and invoke the provisions of the CFR as grounds for review. Similarly, an 
individual could challenge, based on the CFR, a Member State’s implementing 
measures of such an act. The relevant provisions of the CFR are discussed below. 
 
Article 10 CFR stipulates everyone’s freedom of religion. However, where the 
manifestation of religion is concerned, the explanatory memorandum to the CFR 
indicates that Article 10 correspond
a
protecting, inter alia, the rights of others. The same requirement can be found in 
Article 52(3) CFR, which requires the interpretation of the meaning and scope of the 
rights in line with the ECHR. So, the outcome of such a case would be no different 
from the ECtHR’s jurisprudence.  
 
Furthermore, Article 21 CFR precludes discrimination against minorities based on 
religion and membership of a national minority. However, despite its wide reach, 
Article 21 does not create any power for the EU institutions to enact anti-
discrimination laws protecting religious minorities, nor does it comprise a sweeping 
ban on d
“
exercising powers conferred under the Treaties, and by Member States only when 
 276
they are implementing Union law.”933 So, the application of this provision will not 
guarantee the right of religious minorities to wear clothes prescribed by their 
religions.  
 
Arguably, Article 22 CFR, committing the EU to respect religious diversity, should 
entail “respect for the differences of religious minorities, requiring the adaptation of 
dominant practices.”934 One implication of such adaptation could be the right of 
persons belonging to religious minorities to dress in clothing required by their 
religion. However, a substantial impact of Article 22 CFR on the rights of religious 
minorities is unlikely. The explanatory memorandum to the CFR specifies that this 
provision was inspired by the Declaration on the Status of Churches and Non-
confessional Organisations, which is now Article 17 TFEU. The Declaration, adopted 
simultaneously with the introduction of Article 13 TEC (now Article 19 TFEU), 
signalled the uneasiness of EU Member States with a provision authorising the 
Council to adopt secondary legislation prohibiting discrimination on the ground of 
religion or belief in EU law. The Declaration, and now Article 17(1) TFEU, specifies 
that the EU ‘respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches 
and religious association or communities in the Member States.’ Furthermore, while 
cognising their identity and specific contribution, under Article 17(3) TFEU, the EU re
is committed to maintaining an open, transparent and regular dialogue with churches 
and philosophical and non-confessional organisations. We need to wait and see how 
the ECJ interprets Articles 22 CFR and 17 TFEU.  
                                                 
933 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007) C 303/02 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/32007X1214/htm/C2007303EN.01001701.htm#Note_E0001_expl> 
accessed 12 June 2008. 
 
934 Marguerite Bolger, ‘Discrimination on Grounds of Religion’ in C Costello and E Barry (eds) 
Equality in Diversity: The New Equality Directives (Irish Centre for European Law, 2003) 377. 
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 Finally, Article 14(3) CFR guarantees the right of parents to educate their children in 
line with their religious beliefs and freedom to establish schools. These guarantees are 
somewhat curtailed by the references to respect for democratic principles and the 
national laws governing the exercise of such freedom and right. Nevertheless, Article 
14 could be strengthened if coupled with other provisions of the Charter, such as 
rticles 10, 21 and 22.935 This will, however, depend on the context of a particular 
e right of their children to wear particular dress at school. A 
milar interpretation is likely to apply under the CFR.  
their beliefs,936 and 
A
case and the ECJ’s willingness to be creative in ensuring the right of religious 
minorities to manifest their religious dress in publicly-funded schools. Besides, as 
discussed in Chapter I on pages 87-90, parental rights in education under the ECHR 
have not entailed th
si
 
Regrettably, because of the vague wording of the CFR’s provisions and the EU’s 
limited competence in the field of minority protection, even the combined effect of 
relevant norms may not be enough to have sufficient ‘bite’ to remedy the situation of 
religious minorities. 
 
As to the general principles and constitutional traditions common to Member States, 
the ECtHR’s ‘headscarf’ case law has been consistently criticised for not upholding 
the right of minorities and individual believers to manifest 
                                                 
 
593  European Parliament, ‘Article 22: Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Diversity’ <http://www. 
;  Zdenka 
achnyikova, ‘Religious Rights’ in M Weller (ed) Universal Minority Rights: A Commentary on the 
europarl.europa.eu/comparl/libe/elsj/charter/art22/default_en.htm> accessed 12 March 2008. 
 
936 Evans, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights (n 785) 132
M
Jurisprudence of International Courts and Treaty Bodies (OUP, Oxford 2007) 187-188, 195. 
 
 278
ignoring the concept of indirect discrimination developed in its earlier 
gion. However, according to Article 19 
CNM and the explanatory note to the FCNM, the same limitations as in Article 9(2) 
ECHR are likely to apply under Articles 7 and 8 FCNM. While emphasising the 
portance of the manifestation of religion, the drafters of the instrument intended 
ese provisions as declaration of principle only.938 Besides, these provisions are as 
5. Conclusion 
jurisprudence.937 What the general principles could achieve is to correct the erroneous 
application of Article 9 ECHR by English courts as discussed on pages 252-267. 
Unfortunately, none of the cases considered in England have reached either the 
ECtHR or the ECJ. Consequently, national courts may continue to exclude freedom to 
manifest religious dress from the scope of Article 9(1) ECHR.   
 
As discussed in Chapter I on page 82, the FCNM contains two provisions on freedom 
of religion: Article 7 corresponds to Article 9(1) ECHR, and Article 8 emphasises the 
freedom of minorities to manifest their reli
F
im
th
yet unlikely to have an impact on EU law, because the FCNM has not been endorsed 
as part of the general principles of EU law.  
 
 
 
This Chapter illustrated that the manifestation of religion is perhaps one of the most 
controversial aspects of minority protection. Even in England, which historically 
                                                 
937 Isabelle Rorive, ‘Religious Symbols in the Public Space: In Search of a European Answer’ (2009) 
30(6) Cardozo Law Review 2669-2698, 2695. 
 
938 Zdenka Machnyikova, ‘Article 8’ in M Weller (ed) The Rights of Minorities in Europe: A 
Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (OUP, 
Oxford 2005) 242. 
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tolerated religious freedoms, we can detect a tightening of rules in relation to religious 
dress and a questionable application of Article 9 ECHR.  
 
What is the EU’s current contribution to this field? First, under the Employment 
Directive, the EU can deal with direct and indirect discrimination based on religion. 
However, the requirement of reasonable accommodation established by the ECJ in 
Vivien Prais v Council is unlikely to extend to matters of religious dress under the 
Employment Directive for several reasons. First, the scope of the Employment 
Directive is currently confined to employment and vocational training. When and if 
the Commission’s proposals are accepted, the matter of religious dress may be 
excluded from the potentially wider scope of the Employment Directive. Second, 
ven without the Commission’s explicit exclusion of this matter from the instrument’s e
scope, the limitations clauses could achieve the same result. As the case of Azmi 
demonstrated, although claims of indirect discrimination could be brought under the 
Employment Directive, the difference in treatment can be justified by States and the 
success of such claims will depend on the choice of comparator. Furthermore, a lack 
of a definition of ‘religion or belief’ in the instrument may lead to divergent practices 
in Member States.  
 
In contrast, the Race Directive could prove a potent instrument to challenge direct and 
indirect discrimination against groups which share a common ethnic origin and a 
religion. If the instrument is interpreted in line with the jurisprudence of English 
courts, some groups, such as Sikhs and Jews, may be able to manifest their religion in 
publicly-funded schools. However, the EU-wide implications of such an interpretation 
could prove problematic in States like France.  
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 At first sight, the CFR has a number of useful provisions, such as Articles 10, 14, 21 
and 22. However, the CFR has to be interpreted in line with the ECHR. Given the 
ECtHR’s restrictive headscarf jurisprudence, neither the CFR nor the general 
principles of EU law are likely to remedy the situation of religious minorities 
revented from wearing religious dress in schools. Even though the combined reading 
 
endments in EU law, controversy surrounding 
ermissible limitations on religious dress, as well as changes to immigration 
p
of the CFR’s provisions could in principle lead to a more favourable interpretation, 
they are too vague to be construed as conferring a freedom of minorities to manifest 
their religion. Moreover, such a reading could be regarded as an extension of EU 
competences, explicitly precluded by Article 51(2) CFR. What the EU could achieve, 
however, is to correct a questionable application of Article 9 ECHR, were a relevant 
claim to come before the ECJ.  
 
Should the EU has any further contribution into this field, and why? The issue of the 
manifestation of religion is becoming increasingly prominent in the EU through 
constitutional debates and Treaty am
p
legislation, in some Member States, and the jurisprudence of the ECtHR based on the 
public/private divide embedded in the structure of Article 9 ECHR. The implications 
of these debates are two-fold: first, they result in tightening of rules on religious 
manifestation at domestic level; and second, restrictive rules at national level have a 
spill-over effect on EU Directives, requiring compliance with integration 
requirements as set in domestic law.  
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These developments lead some to argue that the EU favours only particular religions. 
This is not only detrimental to the image of the Union based on the principles of 
democracy, pluralism and respect for fundamental rights, including persons belonging 
to a minority, but also may negatively impact on its relations with candidate countries, 
such as Turkey. Moreover, the situation is further aggravated by the fact that the 
impact of changes at the EU level is felt mostly by religious minorities which are also 
TCNs, and hence already constitute a vulnerable group. 
 
One way in which the EU could contribute to this field is through adopting a broad 
definition of ‘minority’, as discussed in Chapter I on page 186, which includes both 
TCNs and religious minorities, because these two categories often overlap and are in 
need of protection. In addition, such definition may help the EU to close a gap 
between religious and ethnic minorities, which otherwise may lead to a hierarchy in 
grounds of protection, as the experience of England demonstrates.  
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CHAPTER IV. RECREATING BABEL? THE RIGHT TO ACCESS 
MOTHER-TONGUE EDUCATION IN BELGIUM 
 
The language of a minority group being an 
essential element of its culture, its capacity to 
survive as a cultural group is in jeopardy if no 
instruction is given in that language.939 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Even before the Member States introduced an explicit, though limited, EC 
competence in education in 1992, access to education strongly featured in the ECJ’s 
case law through its generous interpretation of the concept of vocational training, 
equal treatment based on nationality, free movement regimes, and, subsequently, EU 
citizenship.940 Where minority education is concerned, an attempt was made to ensure 
access to mother-tongue education of migrant workers’ children from other Member 
States under Directive 77/486.941 Despite the significance of these developments, the 
role of the EU in education remains limited. This is so because Member States are 
unwilling to relinquish their powers in the field of education, as exemplified by an 
                                                 
939 Capotorti, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities 
(n 377) 84. 
 
940 For example, in Gravier the ECJ ruled with respect to enrolment fees imposed on a French national 
in Belgium (which were not levied on Belgian nationals) that  
… any form of vocational training which prepares for a qualification for a particular 
profession, trade or employment or which provides the necessary training and skills 
for such a profession, trade or employment is vocational training, whatever the age 
and the level of training of the pupils or students, and even if the training programme 
includes an element of general education. 
Case 293/85 Gravier v City of Liège [1985] ECR 593, para 30. 
Furthermore, the ECJ established that under Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 access to education 
extends to all forms of education, whether primarily vocational or not. Joined cases 389/87 and 390/87 
Echternach and Moritz v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen [1989] ECR 723, para 29. 
 
941 Directive 77/486 on the education of the children of migrant workers (n 421). 
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emphasis on funding programmes942 and Member States’ cooperation in the field of 
higher education under the Bologna Declaration.943 Member States’ reluctance to 
accord the EU wider powers in education is likely to be even stronger in relation to 
minority education, because in States like Belgium “language frontiers paved the way 
for the development of political boundaries”944.  
 
However, education in a minority language and learning a minority language945 are 
essential to protect the identity of minorities. As discussed in Chapter I on pages 53-
56, because minority rights are distinct from and additional to fundamental rights, it 
follows that in addition to non-discriminatory treatment in education, further 
requirements, such as equality of opportunity with the majorities and pluralism in 
education,946 have to be satisfied. As Van Dyke puts it: 
if pupils who speak different languages are in the same school and if 
one of the languages becomes the medium of instruction, then some 
                                                 
 
942 Council (EC) Regulation 1360/90 on establishing a European Training Foundation [1990] OJ L 131; 
Council (EC) Decision 1999/311 adopting the third phase of the trans-European cooperation scheme 
for higher education (Tempus III) (2000-2006) [1999] OJ L 120/30; European Parliament and Council 
(EC) Decision 253/2000 establishing the second phase of the Community action programme in the 
field of education ‘Socrates’ [2000] OJ L 28. For discussion of EU soft law instruments in education, 
see Ulf Fredriksson, ‘Changes of Education Policies within the European Union in the Light of 
Globalisation’ (2003) 2(4) European Educational Research Journal 522-546; Hubert Ertl, ‘European 
Union Policies in Education and Training: the Lisbon Agenda as a Turning Point?’ (2006) 42(1) 
Comparative Education 5-27; Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘EC Law and Minority Language Policy: Some 
Recent Developments’ in X Arzoz (ed) Respecting Linguistic diversity in the European Union (John 
Benjamins B.V., Amsterdam 2008) 123-143. 
 
943 European Ministers of Education, ‘Bologna Declaration’, 19 June 1999 <http://www.bologna-
bergen2005.no/Docs/00-Main_doc/990719BOLOGNA_DECLARATION.PDF> accessed 23 March 
2008.  
 
944 Jean-Claude Scholsem, ‘Belgium: Federalism and Protection of Minorities’ (1994) CDL-MIN(94)7, 
4-15, para 1.5 (emphasis omitted) <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/1994/CDL-MIN(1994)007-e.pdf> 
accessed 23 April 2008; Xabier Arzoz, ‘The Nature of Language Rights’ (2007) 6 Journal on 
Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 1-34, 32. 
 
945 These rights are not mutually exclusive. See, ACFC, ‘Commentary on Education…’ (n 265) 24. 
 
946 Holly Cullen, ‘Education Rights or Minority Rights?’ (1993) 7 International Journal of Law and the 
Family 143-177; it is also argued that conflict prevention is another founding principle of minority 
protection: Jan de Groog and Gracienne Lauwerst, ‘Education Policy and Law: the politics of 
multiculturalism in education’ (2002) 14(1-2) Education and the Law.  
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students automatically gain an advantage and others are handicapped. 
At the same time, to teach some in a language that is widely used and 
others in a language that is little used would mean that the life chances 
opened up to members of the two groups would be very unequal.947 
 
In light of this dual need of minorities, to be integrated whilst preserving their unique 
identity, it is rightly argued that education of both majorities and minorities may pose 
the greatest challenge to States wishing to accommodate the educational rights of its 
minority groups.948 This challenge is further compounded by the fact that minority 
languages are often regarded as obstacles to the unity of a State, which, in this 
context, “correlate with exclusiveness”949 of majority languages. Because the choice 
of national language is a “deliberately political act”,950 minority languages are likely 
to lack protection through institutional and political structures,951 and have reduced 
value if States do not offer additional protection. Therefore, States should evaluate 
minority demands against the principle of substantive equality, and ensure a 
differential approach based on the particular circumstances of a group.952 
 
                                                 
 
947 Vernon Van Dyke, ‘Equality and Discrimination in Education: A Comparative and International 
Analysis’ (1973) 17 International Studies Quaterly 375, 384. 
 
948 Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection… (n 449) 262; see also Tamas 
Kozma, ‘Minority Education in Central Europe’ (2003) 35(1) European Education 35-53, 51-52. 
 
949 Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (n 447) 1. 
 
950 Stephen May ‘Language, Nationalism and Democracy in Europe’ in G Hogan-Brun and S Wolff 
(eds) Minority Languages in Europe: Frameworks, Status, Prospects (Palgrave Macmillan, 
Houndsmills 2003) 212; see also, F de Varennes, Language, Minorities and Human Rights (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1996) 87.  
 
951 N Nic Shuibhne, EC Law and Minority Language Policy: Culture, Citizenship and Fundamental 
Rights (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2002) 50. 
 
952 Kristin Henrard, ‘Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection in the Area of Language 
Rights’ in G Hogan-Brun and S Wolff (eds) Minority Languages in Europe: Frameworks, Status, 
Prospects (Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmills 2003) 41.  
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This chapter assesses the right to access education in the EU, with an emphasis on the 
needs of minorities to preserve their identity. As discussed on page 92, access to 
education has to satisfy three requirements: physical accessibility, economic 
accessibility and non-discriminatory treatment. The discussion begins with a case 
study of Belgium in section 2, followed by the application of relevant EU rules on 
access to education and choice of language in section 3. The chapter concludes with 
suggestions as to the future courses of action the EU could take in this field.  
 
2. Case study: Belgium 
 
The language of instruction in Belgium has been an issue of political controversy 
between Flemings (Dutch-speakers) and Walloons (French-speakers) for centuries. 
Even though Flemings constitute the numerical majority in the country, until recently 
Flemish was a minority language.953 The 1831 Constitution of Belgium affirmed the 
equal status of both languages, but, “this remained a dead letter.”954 It took Flemings 
a century before language laws established in 1932 that the local language would be 
the language of instruction in primary and secondary schools, with special facilities 
granted in areas where 30% of the population spoke another language.955 
Accordingly, the 1932 linguistic legislation based on the territoriality principle 
established the use of French or Dutch in monolingual regions of Belgium. However, 
this law did not significantly improve the position of Flemish, because many 
Flemings and French parents evaded this law by sending their children to French 
                                                 
 
953 W Halls, ‘Belgium: a case study in educational regionalism’ (1983) 19(2) Comparative Education 
170. 
 
954 Halls (n 953) 171. 
 
955 Halls (n 953) 174. 
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schools. As a result, a linguistic census due to take place in 1960 was cancelled 
because, in the view of Flemings, some inhabitants were declaring themselves to be 
French-speakers, leading to Walloons taking over Flemish communes.956  
 
This controversy sparked a determination to fix the linguistic boundaries in Belgium. 
The issue of language in education “turned this reform into a battlefield of social and 
political views on society and its future.”957 The 1961 and 1962 acts established “a 
definitive linguistic frontier, with no further reference to subsequent population 
movements or the wishes of the inhabitants.”958 The laws of 1962-1963 finalised the 
demarcation of linguistic boundaries and established unilingualism in linguistic 
communes of Belgium. The inhabitants of only 27 communes acquired the right to 
request linguistic facilities inter alia in education. Thus, education in French is 
available in all nine communes of the German-speaking Community and six 
communes situated in the periphery of Brussels, which is a Flemish Region with a 
large number of French-speakers.959 Furthermore, the communes on the border 
between Wallonia and Flanders grant facilities to Dutch- and French-speakers 
respectively.960 Lastly, linguistic facilities are granted to German-speakers in the two 
borderline communes in Wallonia. The Constitutional amendments of 1988 sealed 
                                                 
 
956 In the view of Flemish politicians, Francophone majority “spreads into Dutch-speaking Flanders 
like an ‘oil stain’”: Sherrill Stroschein, ‘What Belgium can teach Bosnia: The Uses of Autonomy in 
‘Divided House’ States’ (2003) 3 Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 7.  
 
957 Willy Wielemans, ‘Comprehensive Education in Belgium: a Broken Lever?’ (1991) 26(2) European 
Journal of Education 167.  
 
958 Scholsem, Belgium: Federalism and Protection of Minorities (n 944) para 1.4. 
 
959 Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on Possible Groups of Persons to which the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities could be applied in Belgium’ (2002) CDL-AD(2002), 1 
<http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL-AD(2002)001-e.asp> accessed 12 January 2008. 
 
960 Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on Possible Groups of Persons…’ (n 959). 
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these arrangements and changes can be adopted only by enacting a federal law with a 
special majority.961 Therefore, French-speakers in Flanders and Dutch-speakers in 
Wallonia cannot benefit from education in their mother tongue and run the risk of 
assimilation into the regional language. Consequently, the boundaries of public 
education are strictly delimited.  
 
Accordingly, access to education in Belgium is largely informed by the principle of 
territoriality. In unilingual communes, education is exclusively in the language of the 
commune: in Wallonia it is French, in Flanders, Dutch, and in the German-speaking 
communes, German. Only in 27 communes of Belgium (out of 589) is there access to 
education in a minority language. Six of these communes are in the Brussels 
periphery in Flanders.  
 
Conflicts between French-speakers and the Flemish Government regarding access to 
education in French have arisen since the 1960s. In 1968, the dispute regarding access 
to education in French in the Flemish communes reached the ECtHR in the Belgian 
Linguistics case, discussed in Chapter I on pages 94-95. Even though the ECtHR did 
not criticise the rigid application of the principle of territoriality in Belgium, it found 
that the requirement of residence violated Article 2 of Protocol 1 ECHR (P1-2).  
 
To date, Belgium has failed to implement fully the ECtHR’s judgment in Belgian 
Linguistics. Seeking to remedy this situation, in 1998 and 2002, the PACE called on 
Belgium to ensure access to French-speaking schools of children of French-speakers 
who do not reside in communes with linguistic facilities, in line with the ECtHR 
                                                 
961 PACE, ‘Resolution on Situation of the French-speaking population living in the Brussels periphery’ 
(1998) Res 1172 <http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta98/ERES1172 
.htm> accessed 15 January 2008. 
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decision.962 Likewise, in its thematic comment on minority rights, the EU Network of 
Independent Experts criticised Belgium for its failure to implement the Belgian 
Linguistics case.963 Furthermore, the PACE adopted a number of resolutions 
condemning the attempts of the Flemish authorities to assimilate French-speakers into 
the regional language.964 In the 1998 Resolution, the PACE recommended that the 
Flemish Government should “seek to integrate, but not assimilate”965 French-
speaking Belgian citizens in Flanders, and also to recognise the rights of the French-
speaking minority in Flanders to keep their own identity and language.966 This, 
however, has not led to any action in Belgium or at the EU level.  
                                                
 
The following section evaluates whether EU law could assist the French-speakers’ 
demands for mother-tongue education in Flanders.  
 
3. ‘Testing’ EU rules 
 
To evaluate the right of minorities to education in a minority language in the context 
of EU law, it may be useful to discuss the EU’s relevant competences on education 
(3.1) and languages (3.2). Moreover, the reach of EU action in internal situations need 
 
 
962 PACE, ‘Resolution on Protection of minorities in Belgium’ (2002) Res 1301, para 23 
<http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta02/ERES1301.htm> accessed 15 
January 2008; PACE, Resolution 1172(1998) (n 961) para 7.  
 
963 EU Network of Independent Experts, ‘Thematic Comment No 3…’ (n 15) 107-108. 
 
964 PACE, Report on Protection of minorities in Belgium (n 512); Resolution 1301(2002) (n 962); 
Resolution 1172(1998) (n 961). 
 
965 PACE, ‘Resolution 1172(1998)’ (n 961) para 8(i). 
 
966 PACE, ‘Resolution 1172(1998)’ (n 961) para 8(ii). 
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to be assessed in order to determine the extent of the EU’s support for the educational 
rights of minorities in its Member States (3.3).   
 
3.1. EU competence in education 
 
Prior to 1992, the matter of access to education was mainly dealt through the medium 
of free movement regimes. Even before the TEU amended the EC Treaty to include 
an explicit reference to education, the ECJ established that, although educational 
policies remain within the competence of Member States, this does not mean that the 
“exercise of powers transferred to the Community is in some way restricted if it is of 
such a nature as to affect the measures taken in the execution of a policy such as that 
of education and training.”967 This finding allowed the ECJ to interpret extensively 
Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68,968 which provides for the educational rights of 
migrant workers’ children in the context of the free movement of workers. For 
example, the Court established that, under Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68, access to 
education extends to all forms of education, whether primarily vocational or not.969 
The ECJ applied this inclusive definition to courses such as university courses in 
veterinary medicine,970 gunsmithing971 and economics and advanced vocational 
                                                 
 
967 Case 9-74 Donato Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt München [1974] ECR I-9713. 
 
968 Council (EEC) Regulation No 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community 
[1968] OJ L 257/2, Article 12: 
The children of a national of a Member State who is or has been employed in the 
territory of another Member State shall be admitted to that State's general 
educational, apprenticeship and vocational training courses under the same 
conditions as the nationals of that State, if such children are residing in its territory. 
Member States shall encourage all efforts to enable such children to attend these 
courses under the best possible conditions. 
 
969 Echternach and Moritz v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen (n 940) para 29. 
 
970 Case 24/86 Blaizot v University of Liège [1989] 1 CMLR 57.  
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training at a technical college.972 Furthermore, the ECJ has generously construed the 
concept of ‘child’ under Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68. Although Article 10 of the 
Regulation stipulated973 the right of a worker’s descendants under the age of 21 years 
to live in a host State, the ECJ ruled in Gaal that access to education under Article 12 
does not vary with age or dependency.974  
 
To facilitate free movement regimes further, the Council adopted Directive 77/486 on 
the education of the children of migrant workers.975 The instrument requires Member 
States to ensure that the children of migrant workers attend schools and have an 
opportunity to learn the official language(s) of their host State. The innovative feature 
of the Directive is the duty of Member States to promote the “teaching of the mother 
tongue and culture of the country of origin for the children.”976 Thus, the link 
“between the principle of equality on the one hand and the need for special measures 
on the other is the key to Directive 77/486…”977 Indeed, the instrument does not 
extend “existing national rules on multicultural education to Community nationals, 
but imposes on all States the adoption of a specified policy of multicultural 
                                                                                                                                            
 
971 Case 309/85 Barra v Belgium [1988] 2 CMLR 409. 
 
972 Echternach and Moritz v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen (n 940) para 30. 
 
973 Article 10 of Regulation No 1612/68 (n 968) was repealed by Article 38(1) of Directive 2004/38 
with the effect from 30 April 2006. See, European Parliament and Council (EC) Directive 2004/38 on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States [2004] OJ L 158 (Citizenship Directive).  
 
974 Case C-7/94 Landesamt für Ausbildungsförderung Nordrhein-Westfalen v Lubor Gaal [1995] ECR 
I-1031, para 31.  
 
975 Directive 77/486 on the education of the children of migrant workers (n 421). 
 
976 Directive 77/486 on the education of the children of migrant workers (n 421) Article 3. 
 
977 Bruno de Witte, ‘Educational Equality for Community Workers and their families’ in B de Witte 
(ed) European Community Law of Education (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1989) 74 
(emphasis in original). 
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education.”978 Although the primary purpose of the instrument is to promote the intra-
Community mobility of the workers,979 it is significant that the instrument moves 
“beyond formal non-discrimination, and imposes an obligation on Member States to 
take ‘affirmative action’”980 to grant special benefits to children of migrant workers. 
 
Regrettably, the resistance of States to providing for education in non-official 
languages is evident from the attitude of Member States that has made “this directive 
… one of the most underenforced Acts of Community law.”981 Nevertheless, despite 
its limited implementation and application to ‘new’ minorities from other Member 
States, the Directive shows that it is possible and desirable for Member States to 
accommodate, at the very least, the learning of minority languages. 
 
With the acquisition of a limited competence in education under Article 149 EC (now 
Article 165 TFEU)982 in 1992, the EC (and now the EU) can supplement the Member 
States’ action in this field, ‘while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member 
States for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems and their 
cultural and linguistic diversity.’ Accordingly, Member States retain their 
competences in dealing with education in minority languages. EU action in the field 
of education is limited to developing the European dimension in education, 
                                                 
 
978 de Witte, ‘Educational Equality for Community Workers and their families’ (n 977) 75. 
 
979 Bruno de Witte, ‘Surviving in Babel? Language Rights and European Integration’ in Y Dinstein and 
M Tabory (eds) The Protection of Minorities and Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht 1992) 291. 
 
980 de Witte, ‘Educational Equality for Community Workers and their families’ (n 977) 75. 
 
981 de Witte, ‘The European Communities and its Minorities’ (n 418) 182. 
 
982 The limited powers of the EU in education are in stark contrast with its more extensive competence 
in vocational training under Article 166 TFEU (ex-Article 150 EC), which indicates that the EU has 
stronger interest in vocational training than in the general right to education. See, Fredriksson, 
‘Changes of Education Policies within the European Union…’ (n 942) 525. 
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particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member 
States, encouraging student and teacher mobility, promoting cooperation between 
educational establishments, and so on.983 The lists of EU incentive measures in 
Articles 165 and 166 TFEU, in the European Parliament’s view, are not exhaustive, 
“but are rather in the nature of examples.”984 However, it is debatable “whether these 
measures can be regarded as sources of Community law.”985 The recommendations 
that EU institutions issue in the field of education are not legally binding986 and may 
only influence Member States’ actions indirectly.  
 
As a result of this limited competence, Article 149 EC (now Article 165 TFEU) has 
played a marginal role in the ECJ’s interpretation of the EU right to education. In 
formulating EU law on access to education and vocational training, the ECJ has relied 
on rules governing the free movement regimes, such as Articles 7 and 12 of 
Regulation 1612/68 on the free movement of workers,987 Article 12 EC (Article 18 
TFEU) on equal treatment based on nationality, Article 18 EC (now Article 21 TFEU) 
on EU citizenship and Article 150 EC (now Article 166 TFEU) on vocational training. 
In its interpretation of these instruments, the ECJ used various techniques to ensure 
broad access to education and training988 and overcome the EU’s jurisdictional 
handicaps in the field of education.989 
                                                 
983 Article 165(2) TFEU (ex-Article 149(2) EC). 
 
984 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on education and training policy in the run-up to 1993’ [1992] OJ 
C150/366, 368. 
 
985 S O’Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: From the Free Movement of Persons 
to Union Citizenship (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1996) 180. 
 
986 Article 249 EC (now Article 288 TFEU); Case C-322/88 Grimaldi v Fonds des Maladies 
Professionelles [1990] ECR I-4402. 
 
987 Regulation No 1612/68 (n 968). 
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 So far, the ECJ’s case law has contributed greatly to satisfying three requirements of 
access to education, i.e., physical accessibility, economic accessibility and non-
discriminatory treatment. Thus, the ECJ’s case law made some demands on Member 
States in relation to physical accessibility of education. It is argued, for example, that 
Gravier established an independent right to residence in a host State; if students were 
to enjoy rights of access to vocational training, a right to residence would be 
necessary to enjoy such rights, at least for the duration of their studies,990 a 
proposition that was subsequently confirmed in Raulin and European Parliament v 
Council.991 The ECJ ruled that under Articles 12 EC (now Article 18 TFEU) and 150 
EC (now Article 166 TFEU) there is a limited residence right for a student 
undertaking a vocational training course in the host State, “for otherwise the right to 
equal treatment would be illusory.”992  
 
Furthermore, in Echternach and Moritz993 the Court held that a child retains the status 
of a worker’s family (within the meaning of Regulation 1612/68) even when that 
child’s family returns to their home State and the child remains in the host State to 
                                                                                                                                            
988 For example, the ECJ interpreted broadly the definition of ‘child’ as a beneficiary of educational 
rights in Landesamt für Ausbildungsförderung Nordrhein-Westfalen v Lubor Gaal (n 974) para 31; 
Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen [2004] ECR I-9925 para 20); and the right to residence for the purposes 
of access to education in another Member State in Case C-357/89 Raulin v Minister van Onderwijs en 
Wetenschappen [1992] ECR I-1027; Echternach and Moritz v Minister van Onderwijs en 
Wetenschappen (n 940) para 23. 
 
989 Julian Lonbay, ‘Towards Educational Rights’ in R Blackburn (ed) Rights of Citizenship (Mansell 
Publishing Limited, London 1993) 226. 
 
990 O’Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship… (n 985) 161. 
 
991 Raulin v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen (n 988). 
 
992 Jo Shaw, ‘From the Margin to the Centre: Education and Training Law and Policy’ in P Craig and G 
de Búrca (eds) The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999) 570. 
 
993 Echternach and Moritz v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen (n 940) para 23. 
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continue their studies. Thus, a child of a worker does not even have to live with their 
parents in order to benefit from access to all forms of education in a host State. 
Moreover, since the inception of EU citizenship, “even a young child may make use 
of the rights of free movement and residence guaranteed by Community law.”994 
 
The ECJ took this finding a step further in Baumbast and R,995 where it ruled that a 
migrant worker’s children retain their right to continue their education in a host State:  
[t]he fact that the parents of the children concerned have meanwhile 
divorced, the fact that only one parent is a citizen of the Union and that 
parent has ceased to be a migrant worker in the host Member State and 
the fact that the children are not themselves citizens of the Union are 
irrelevant in this regard.996 
 
Thus, the ECJ interpreted the residence rights broadly and permitted children to 
continue their courses, even after a parent had ceased to be a worker in the host State, 
and ruled that the State should permit the parent to receive a residence permit to 
ensure the successful continuation of the children’s studies. This finding was 
confirmed and further strengthened in Teixeira,997 where the ECJ ruled that additional 
residence requirements, introduced by Article 7 of Directive 2004/38, such as 
sufficient resources for the parent not to become a burden on the social assistance of a 
host Member State, did not affect the application of Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68 
independent of other EU rules;998 furthermore, the travaux préparatoires to Directive 
                                                 
 
994 Case C-76/05 Herbert Schwarz and Marga Gootjes-Schwarz v Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach 
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995 C-413/99 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091. 
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2004/38999 showed that it was intended to be consistent with the decision in 
Baumbast.1000 In the ECJ’s view, Article 12 of Directive 2004/381001 also confirmed 
the right to residence in the host Member State both of children who are installed in 
the host State and enrolled at an educational establishment, and the parent who has 
actual custody over the children. Although children who have reached the age of 
majority can in principle meet their own needs, the parents’ right to residence in the 
host Member State may extend beyond that age, if the child continues to need the 
parent’s presence in order to complete their education.1002 Accordingly, where access 
to education is concerned, in order to create the best possible conditions for their 
education, the ECJ requires Member States to guarantee both physical accessibility of 
education to children and the residence rights of the parent who is the child’s primary 
caregiver.   
 
As to economic accessibility, the ECJ’s initial jurisprudence, mainly in the context of 
the free movement of workers, saw the development of strong principles. Thus, the 
ECJ generously interpreted workers’ right to economic accessibility of education on 
the presumption that “a worker will be deterred from moving into another country if 
that country denies educational facilities, either to himself or to his family.”1003 
Therefore, Articles 7(2) and (3) of the Regulation 1612/68 give equal access for 
                                                                                                                                            
998 Maria Teixeira (n 997) paras 53 and 61. 
 
999 COM(2003) 1999 final 7. 
 
1000 Maria Teixeira (n 997) paras 36 and 58.  
 
1001 Directive 2004/38 (Citizenship Directive) (n 973). 
 
1002 Maria Teixeira (n 997) paras 86-87. 
 
1003 de Witte, ‘Educational Equality for Community Workers and their families’ (n 977) 71. 
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workers both to vocational training and university education,1004 because migrant 
workers are entitled to “the same social advantages as national workers.”1005 
Furthermore, these social advantages cover not only workers’ study fees, but also 
maintenance and training grants.1006  
 
The ECJ has subsequently extended this reading to Article 12 of Regulation 1612/68, 
which refers to access to education of migrant workers’ children ‘under the same 
conditions as the nationals of that State’. In Casagrande,1007 the Court held that this 
phrase refers “not only to rules relating to admission, but also to general measures 
intended to facilitate educational attendance.”1008 This allowed a migrant worker’s 
child attending secondary school to take “advantage of benefits provided by the laws 
of the host country relating to educational grants, under the same conditions as 
nationals who are in a similar position.”1009 Furthermore, the ECJ considered 
enrolment fees as an integral part of access to education. It ruled in Forcheri1010 that 
requiring a national of another Member State to pay an enrolment fee that is not paid 
by nationals of a host State in order to take part in educational courses contravenes the 
terms of Article 12 EC (Article 18 TFEU) on non-discrimination based on nationality 
and Article 150 EC (Article 166 TFEU) on vocational training. Similarly, in 
Echternach and Moritz the ECJ ruled that “it is recognised in Community law that … 
                                                 
 
1004 Case 197/86 Steven Malcolm Brown v Secretary of State for Scotland [1988] ECR 3205. 
 
1005 K Beiter, The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden 2006) 190. 
 
1006 Case 39/86 Sylvie Lair v Universitat Hannover [1988] ECR 3161. 
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[migrant worker’s] children must be eligible for study assistance from the State in 
order to make it possible for them to achieve integration in the society of the host 
country.”1011  
 
These findings were further strengthened in Schwarz,1012 where a German national 
court enquired from the ECJ whether the treatment of school fees payable to certain 
German schools (but not payments of school fees to schools in the rest of the EC) 
under the heading of special expenditure leading to a reduction of income tax is 
compatible with EU citizenship and free movement rights.1013 The German 
Government argued that the freedom to provide services does not oblige it to provide 
tax relief for school fees in other Member States, because it would have the effect of 
giving a tax advantage to educational establishments in other Member States.1014 The 
ECJ held that tax relief was not a subsidy to schools, but a tax advantage to parents. In 
order to avoid an excessive burden, Germany could limit the amount of deductible 
school fees to a certain level, which would be a less stringent measure than a total 
refusal of relief.1015 Because any private school established in another Member State 
                                                 
 
1011 Echternach and Moritz v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen (n 940) para 35.  
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1014 Herbert Schwarz and Marga Gootjes-Schwarz v Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach (n 994) para 50. 
Moreover, since the Government does not exercise any influence over the form and content of a private 
school education in another Member State, it should not be required to subsidise the functioning of 
such a school through tax benefits (para 52). Otherwise, such a subsidy might become an unreasonable 
burden on a Member State’s tax system. In addition, the private school in Scotland was not comparable 
with the private schools in Germany.  
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Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach, 21 September 2006, para 62. 
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was automatically excluded by the reason of its not being established in or by 
Germany,1016 the ECJ ruled that the domestic legislation in question has the “effect of 
deterring taxpayers resident in Germany from sending their children to schools 
established in another Member State.”1017 Furthermore, it discouraged private schools 
in other Member States from offering education to the children of taxpayers resident 
in Germany.1018 Consequently, this legislation constitutes an obstacle to the freedom 
to provide services.1019 Thus, through tying the educational rights to free movement 
regimes, the ECJ strengthened EU guarantees on equal access to education. 
 
Regrettably, the ECJ’s most recent case seems to partially abandon this generous 
approach. In Förster v IB-Groep,1020 a German national in the Netherlands, who 
worked to support herself during her studies, obtained a maintenance grant to support 
her studies. Because the applicant did not engage in gainful employment between July 
and December 2003, the funding body required her to re-pay excess sums. At the 
material time, only Directive 93/96 applied to the applicant, who could reside in the 
Netherlands but was not entitled to receive a maintenance grant. Nor did Regulations 
1251/70 and 1612/68 support the applicant’s claims. This was because only a worker 
can benefit from social advantages. The ECJ did not accept the applicant’s arguments 
that, for the purposes of Article 39 EC (Article 45 TFEU) and Regulation 1612/68, 
she should be regarded as a worker at the material time. Furthermore, even though 
Directive 2004/38 (Citizenship Directive) had introduced the right to finance the 
                                                 
1016 Herbert Schwarz and Marga Gootjes-Schwarz v Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach (n 994) para 73; 
Opinion of the Advocate General (n 1015) para 43. 
 
1017 Herbert Schwarz and Marga Gootjes-Schwarz v Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach (n 994) para 66. 
 
1018 Herbert Schwarz and Marga Gootjes-Schwarz v Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach (n 994) para 66. 
 
1019 Herbert Schwarz and Marga Gootjes-Schwarz v Finanzamt Bergisch Gladbach (n 994) para 67. 
 
1020 Case C-158/07 Förster v IB-Groep [2008] ECR I-4323. 
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studies of EU citizens, relevant provisions apply only after five years of residence in 
the host Member State, and the applicant did not satisfy this requirement either. The 
applicant therefore relied on Article 12 EC (Article 18 TFEU) and the ECJ’s decision 
in Bidar.1021  
 
In Bidar, a French national was refused financial assistance towards his maintenance 
costs because he did not satisfy the residence requirements in the UK. The ECJ found 
that residence conditions may be indirectly discriminatory, because fewer students 
from other Member States may meet them. However, the Court also emphasised that 
Member States could grant assistance only to those students who are sufficiently 
integrated in a host State. Such requirements can be satisfied through a period of 
residence.1022 
 
Both Advocate General Mazak and the ECJ agreed that the five-year residence 
requirement was legitimate, because it aimed to ensure sufficient integration of 
students receiving financial assistance. However, in the Advocate General’s view, this 
requirement was disproportionate. The ECJ did not accept this view. Instead, it ruled 
that because the Citizenship Directive imposes five-year residence requirement to 
qualify for permanent residence, the same length of time may apply to study grants. 
This line of argument is unfortunate as it detracts from the potential of Bidar. The 
Advocate General’s approach is preferable, as it could make it possible to uphold both 
the Citizenship Directive and Bidar. Thus, the five-year requirement could apply in all 
                                                 
 
1021 Case C-209/03 R (on the application of Danny Bidar) v London Borough of Ealing, Secretary of 
State for Education and Skills [2005] ECR I-2119. 
 
1022 C Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms (2nd edition Oxford University 
Press, 2007) 434. 
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cases; however, if there were additional circumstances demonstrating sufficient 
integration, then Bidar could apply as well. Regrettably, it appears that applicants 
may not able to pursue the second line of argument after Förster.1023  
 
As to non-discriminatory treatment in access to education, the ECJ’s case law on 
equality of treatment in education based on nationality has been significantly 
strengthened since the inception of EU citizenship.1024 This trend began in 
Grzelczyk1025 where a student, who supported his studies during the first three years, 
applied for the Belgian minimum income guarantee to finance the final year of his 
studies. This possibility was open to students of Belgian nationality, but not to 
migrant students. The ECJ ruled that, by virtue of his EU citizenship and because he 
was exercising free movement rights, Grzelczyk was entitled to protection under 
Article 12 EC (Article 18 TFEU) on non-discrimination based on nationality, and thus 
could claim financial assistance. A similar conclusion was reached in Bidar, discussed 
above.  
 
In Bressol,1026 concerning limitations on access to medical and paramedical courses at 
higher educational establishments based on the residence requirement in the French 
communes of Belgium, the ECJ ruled that the principle of non-discrimination 
                                                 
1023 Mislav Mataija, ‘Case C-158/07, Jacqueline Förster v IB-Groep – Student Aid and Discrimination 
of Non-Nationals: Clarifying or Emaciating Bidar?’ (2009) 15 Columbia Journal of European Law 
Online 59-64, 63. 
 
1024 Case C-184/99 Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR 
I-6193, para 31: “Union citizenship is destined to be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member 
States, enabling those who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in law 
irrespective of their nationality, subject to such exceptions as are expressly provided for.” 
 
1025 Grzelczyk v Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve (n 1024). 
 
1026 Case C-73/08 Nicholas Bressol and others, Céline Chaverot and others v Gouvernement de la 
Communauté française, 13 April 2010; see also Case Comment, ‘Limit on Non-Resident Students must 
be Justified’ (2010) 271 EU Focus 7-8. 
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prohibits not only direct discrimination based on nationality, but also indirect 
discrimination which, through the application of other criteria of differentiation, leads 
in fact to the same result.1027 The ECJ was not convinced that the difference in 
treatment between Belgian nationals and nationals of other Member States in access 
to education could be objectively justified based on the fear of the Belgian 
government that an increase in the number of students could lead to an excessive 
burden on the financing of higher education. However, indirect discrimination based 
on nationality could be justified on the ground of public health. It was for the national 
court to assess the appropriateness of domestic legislation to attain the legitimate aims 
of the limitation. Accordingly, the ECJ has established high standards in guaranteeing 
non-discriminatory access to education, comparable to the UN standards.1028 
 
Non-discriminatory treatment in access to education is further strengthened through 
EU citizenship rights. Thus, not only a host State, but also a home State is obliged to 
treat equally its nationals who choose to exercise EU citizenship rights, by granting 
them educational grants for the purposes of education abroad. The ECJ established 
this requirement in Morgan and Bucher.1029 In Morgan, after the completion of her 
secondary education in Germany, Ms Morgan worked in the UK for a year and then 
began her studies in applied genetics in the UK. When she applied for a grant in 
Germany, she was refused because she did not satisfy the conditions in the national 
law: to qualify, she had to study in Germany for one year and then continue the same 
                                                 
1027 Nicholas Bressol and others  (n 1026) para 40. 
 
1028 The ECJ has also confirmed that Articles 18 and 21 TFEU pursue in essence the same objective as 
Articles 13(2)(c) on access to higher education and 2(2) ICCPR on non-discrimination in the exercise 
of the rights enunciated in the Covenant: Nicholas Bressol and others (n 1026) para 86. 
 
1029 Case C-11/06 Rhiannon Morgan v Bezirksregierung Köln and C-12/06 Iris Bucher v Landrat des 
Krelses Düren [2007] ECR I-9161. 
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course in another Member State (first-stage studies condition).1030 The German 
national court asked the ECJ to interpret the compatibility of the conditions on the 
award of an educational or training grant in order to study in a higher education 
establishment in another Member State with EU citizenship rights under Articles 17 
EC (20 TFEU) and 18 EC (21 TFEU).1031 The ECJ ruled that the two-fold obligations 
under the German Federal Law on the Encouragement of Education and Training 
Students discouraged EU citizens from leaving Germany and from exercising their 
freedom to move under Articles 17 EC (20 TFEU) and 18 EC (21 TFEU).1032 
Germany was obliged to ensure equal treatment of its nationals who exercised EU 
citizenship rights by allowing them access to educational grants. Thus, EU citizenship 
rights have become another driving force for educational rights, particularly in 
ensuring non-discriminatory treatment in access to education and associated financial 
assistance.  
 
In addition to EU citizenship, the Race Directive may become a similarly powerful 
instrument for advancing the rights of racial and ethnic minorities. The Race Directive 
applies to all persons in both public and private spheres, including public bodies,1033 
                                                 
 
1030 Similarly, in Bucher (n 1029), Ms Bucher, who studied ergotherapy in the Netherlands, did not 
satisfy these conditions. 
 
1031 Morgan and Bucher (n 1029). 
 
1032 Morgan and Bucher (n 1029) paras 30 and 51. 
Germany argued that the first-stage studies condition was justified because it allowed students to show 
their willingness to pursue their studies successfully and without delay and to determine that they had 
made ‘the right choice’ in choosing a particular course of study. The ECJ disagreed. It established that 
the first-stage studies condition in itself did not guarantee successful completion of studies, and 
therefore, was disproportionate to the aim pursued (Morgan and Bucher (n 1029) para 36). 
Furthermore, the continuity between the courses contradicted the very aim of ensuring that the 
students’ choice was right, because it could discourage students from abandoning their initial course of 
study at the risk of losing the possibility of obtaining a grant (para 38). This condition was particularly 
stringent in respect of courses which had no equivalent in Germany, as in the case of the applicants to 
these proceedings (para 39). 
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in relation to inter alia education, and “thereby follows the model of Regulation 
1612/68…”1034 Article 3(1)(g) does not specify the level of education to which it 
applies,1035 nor is it limited to access to education. Bearing in mind the reference to 
the ICESCR in the Preamble of the Directive,1036 arguably, education under the 
Directive should be available, accessible, acceptable and adaptable (discussed on page 
92), particularly in light of Article 5, which permits positive State action.1037  
 
Despite the potentially broad reach of the Race Directive, the instrument does not 
define the concepts ‘racial or ethnic origin’, nor does it include discrimination based 
on language. However, it is argued that  
[m]inority languages could be protected by this Directive indirectly. 
After all, demanding in an unreasonable or disproportionate way that 
minorities speak the official language of the state instead of the 
minority language, could lead to a form of indirect discrimination on 
the grounds of ethnic origin as prohibited under the Race Equality 
Directive.1038  
 
                                                                                                                                            
1033 Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41) Article 3(1)(g). 
 
1034 Bruno de Witte, ‘The Protection of linguistic diversity through provisions of the EU Charter other 
than Article 22’ in X Arzoz, Respecting Linguistic diversity in the European Union (John Benjamins 
B.V., Amsterdam 2008) 182. 
 
1035 Lilla Farkas, ‘Segragation of Roma Children in Education: Addressing Structural Discrimination 
through the Race Equality Directive’ (European Commission, Brussels 2007) 23. 
 
1036 Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41) Preamble (Recital 3). 
 
1037 Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41). 
 
1038 Anneleen Van Bossuyt, ‘Is there an effective European Legal Framework for the Protection of 
Minority Languages? The European Union and the Council of Europe screened’ (2007) 32(6) ELR 
860-877. 
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Besides, although racial and ethnic origin does not automatically implicate minority 
protection standards, the general wording of the Directive can preclude discrimination 
against, for example, Roma.1039 Farkas argues that under the Directive 
… the lack of correct information in the general curriculum about 
Roma as a racial and ethnic group amounts to direct discrimination, 
given of course that information about the majority population is 
included in the curriculum and it is correct.1040 
 
Therefore, the Race Directive may become a tool for enhancing non-discriminatory 
access of racial and ethnic minorities to wider educational rights. 
 
Another provision which could be useful to minorities wishing to challenge EU acts 
and Member States’ implementing measures in education is the carefully phrased 
Article 14 CFR,1041 modelled on P1-2 ECHR and Article 13(2) ICESCR. It provides 
for the right to education and access to vocational and continuing training for all.1042 
This right includes the possibility to receive free compulsory education1043 and the 
freedom to establish private schools.1044 In addition, similar to P1-2 ECHR, Article 
14(3) CFR provides for respect for the religious and philosophical beliefs of parents. 
Significantly, Article 14(3) CFR also guarantees a parental right to ensure that the 
                                                 
1039 de Witte ‘The Constitutional Resources for an EU Minority Protection Policy’ (n 18) 116; 
Dimitrina Petrova ‘Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Minority Cultures’ in S Fredman (ed) 
Discrimination and Human Rights – The Case of Racism (OUP, Oxford 2001) 45; Gabriel Toggenburg 
‘The Race Directive: A New Dimension in the Fight against Ethnic Discrimination in Europe’ (2002) 1 
European Yearbook of Minority Issues 231. 
 
1040 Farkas, ‘Segragation of Roma Children in Education…’ (n 1035) 33; see also, Patrick Thornberry 
and Dianne Gibbons, ‘Education and Minority Rights: A Short Survey of International Standards’ 
(1997) 4 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 115-152, 141. 
 
1041 For criticism see Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, ‘The Right to Mother Tongue Medium Education – the 
Hot Potato in Human Rights Instruments’ (2004) Paper presented at II Mercator International 
Symposium Europe 2003: A New Framework for all Languages?, 4.  
 
1042 Charter of Fundamental Rights (n 9) Article 14(1). 
 
1043 Charter of Fundamental Rights (n 9) Article 14(2).  
 
1044 Charter of Fundamental Rights (n 9) Article 14(3). 
 305
education and teaching of their children is in line with their pedagogical convictions. 
It is argued that such wording can be interpreted more favourably and encompass 
linguistic requirements.1045 However, Article 14(3) emphasises that the exercise of 
such right will be ‘in accordance with national law’, which may potentially limit the 
utility of this wording.1046 Because the meaning and scope of CFR rights are the same 
as those of the corresponding provisions of the ECHR,1047 educational rights of 
minorities as interpreted by the ECtHR will serve as a guide in the application of the 
Charter. It may, therefore, be useful to overview the general principles of EU law to 
ascertain the level of protection offered by both the CFR and the general principles of 
EU law.  
 
As the analysis in Chapter I on pages 100-101 illustrated, the limited wording of P1-2 
may not lead to the establishment of a general right to mother-tongue education, while 
the potential of Article 27 ICCPR has not yet been fully explored. Therefore, as in 
Cyprus v Turkey, the ECtHR is likely to continue finding exceptions on a case-by-
case basis. Were a case come before the the ECtHR now, would the Court apply 
Cyprus v Turkey to allow access to a mother-tongue education of the French-speaking 
minority in Flanders? It is noteworthy that, similar to Cyprus v Turkey, the applicants 
in Belgian Linguistics claimed that the lack of access to mother-tongue education 
interfered with their family life under Article 8 ECHR. However, unlike in Cyprus v 
Turkey, the ECtHR ruled that parents who chose to send their children to be educated 
                                                 
 
1045 Nic Shuibhne, EC law and Minority Language Policy…(n 951) 243. 
 
1046 Dick Mentink and Flora Goudappel, ‘The Education Provision in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union: A Bleak Perspective’ [2000] 4 European Journal for Education Law and 
Policy 145-148, 146. 
 
1047 Charter of Fundamental Rights (n 9) Articles 52(3) and 53. Admittedly, these provisions do not 
prevent the EU from offering more extensive protection.  
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in French language schools in Brussels, Wallonia or abroad could not claim a 
violation of their family life, because their separation from their children was not 
imposed by legislation, but was through the exercise of their free will. Moreover, the 
right to family life did not guarantee the right to be educated in the parents’ language 
by the public authorities or with their financial support.1048  
 
Undoubtedly, Cyprus v Turkey was a context-specific judgment, more in the nature of 
an exception than a general rule. Therefore, it is not entirely clear which of these 
precedents would prevail, were a similar claim brought before the ECtHR now. 
Accordingly, the application of the general principles of EU law and the CFR may be 
only context specific and, therefore, does not entail a general State duty to guarantee 
education in a minority language.  
 
Whether there is a State obligation to offer teaching of, or instruction in, a minority 
language in State schools is not entirely clear even under the FCNM. Where access to 
education without a linguistic component is concerned, Article 12(3) obliges States to 
promote “equal opportunities for access to education at all levels to persons belonging 
to national minorities.” The clear wording of the provision allowed the ACFC “to be 
rather bold under Article 12 in relation to equal access to and equal standards of 
education and curricular reviews…”1049 In contrast, Article 14 FCNM has very timid 
wording:1050 paragraph 1 refers to the right to learn a minority language; paragraph 2 
                                                 
1048 Belgian Linguistics (n 63) para 7. 
 
1049 Kristin Henrard, ‘The Impact of International Non-discrimination Norms in combination with 
General Human Rights for the Protection of National Minorities: The European Convention on Human 
Rights’ (2006) DH-MIN(2006)020. 
 
1050 Article 14 FCNM (n 3) stipulates: 
1. The Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national minority has 
the right to learn his or her minority language.  
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obliges States to take measures for the teaching of, or instruction in, a minority 
language. Regrettably, Article 14(1) FCNM is passive in character and refers only to 
the right to learn a minority language,1051 as opposed to an active form, like the 
phraseology indicating a right to be taught in a minority language in Article 14(2).1052 
However, where Article 14(1) is “straightforward in its wording”,1053 Article 14(2) is 
qualified by a number of clauses, such as ‘in areas inhabited … traditionally or in 
substantial numbers’, ‘if there is sufficient demand’, ‘the Parties shall endeavour to 
ensure’, ‘as far as possible’, ‘within the framework of their education systems’ and 
‘adequate opportunities’. These hedges allow States a broad margin of discretion and 
require them only to make an effort where they can.1054 Moreover, Article 14(3) 
FCNM requires that minorities learn the official language of a State because they may 
otherwise be segregated or lack equal opportunities in access to employment.1055 
Thus, the right to learn a minority language is subject to the conditions in paragraphs 
                                                                                                                                            
2. In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in substantial 
numbers, if there is sufficient demand, the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as possible 
and within the framework of their education systems, that persons belonging to those 
minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught the minority language or for receiving 
instruction in this language.  
3. Paragraph 2 of this article shall be implemented without prejudice to the learning of the 
official language or the teaching in this language.  
 
1051 The ACFC interpreted Article 14(1) broadly to extend this right to the majority who constitute a 
local minority in areas which are predominantly populated by a minority group, such as the Finnish-
speaking population in the Swedish-speaking province of Ǻland: ACFC, ‘First Opinion on Finland’ (n 
370) para 46. 
 
1052 ACFC, ‘Commentary on Education…’ (n 265) 24.  
 
1053 Fernand de Varennes and Patrick Thornberry, ‘Article 14’ in M Weller (ed) The Rights of 
Minorities in Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005) 413. 
 
1054 The obligation stemming from Article 14(2) requires States to recognise this right in their legal 
systems, even though such recognition does not “automatically entail an economic responsibility for 
the provision of such education in all circumstances”: ACFC, ‘Commentary on Education…’ (n 265) 
24. 
 
1055 Fernand de Varennes, ‘The Existing Rights of Minorities in International Law’ in M Kontra et al 
(eds) Language: A Right and a Resource: Approaching Linguistic Human Rights (CEU Press, 
Budapest 1999) 131. 
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2 and 3.1056 The Explanatory Report does not elaborate on these paragraphs, “though 
it conceded that bilingual education may be a means of fulfilling Convention 
requirements.”1057 Similarly, the Advisory Committee indicated that “it considered a 
truly bilingual education to be a most appropriate way to implement the obligations 
flowing from Article 14 of the Framework Convention.”1058 Because the provision is 
already minimalist enough, States should abstain from imposing further conditions on 
the right to education in a minority language.1059  
 
At present, these provisions have no legal effects in EU law. As stated in the previous 
chapters, the FCNM is not yet an integral part of the general principles of EU law.  
 
 
3.2. EU competence on languages 
 
As with education, the EU has a limited competence as to languages. It deals mainly 
with 23 official languages.1060 However, there are recent encouraging developments. 
In 2005, the Council decided that some EU documents will be translated into certain 
additional languages, which have official status in all or some part of a Member State. 
Although the Council approves the additional languages, it is the obligation of the 
                                                 
1056 de Varennes and Thornberry, ‘Article 14’ (n 1053) 423. 
 
1057 Ad Hoc Committee for the Protection of National Minorities (CAHMIN) Explanatory Report on 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) H(1995)010, Article 14, 
para 2(77); see also de Varennes and Thornberry, ‘Article 14’ (n 1053) 423. 
 
1058 Rainer Hofmann, ‘The Impact of International Norms on the Protection of National Minorities in 
Europe: The Added Value and Essential Role of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities’ (2006) DH-MIN(2006)018, 20. 
 
1059 de Varennes and Thornberry, ‘Article 14’ (n 1053) 423. 
 
1060 Article 55(1) TEU (ex-Article 53 TEU, as well as now repealed Article 314 EC) establishes the 
authenticity of EU official languages. Article 342 TFEU (ex-Article 290 EC) provides that the Council 
will determine the rules governing the languages of the institutions.  
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individual Member State to cover translation costs and to bear all the responsibility 
for this process. Some Member States have already put this arrangement into practice. 
Thus, Spain made an agreement with EU institutions and bodies to allow the use of 
Basque, Catalan and Galician before them.1061 Moreover, Article 55(2) TEU now 
specifies that, as determined by Member States, the founding EU Treaties may also be 
translated into any other languages which enjoy official status in their territory.1062 
Despite these positive developments, regional and minority languages are not 
included in Regulation 1/58,1063 and thus speakers of these languages are excluded 
from the full benefit of the guarantees which official languages have under primary 
EU law.1064  
 
Another provision that may be of indirect relevance to minorities is Article 167 
TFEU, which explicitly articulates the EU’s commitment to protect the cultural 
diversity of Europe. Authors who interpret this provision broadly claim that one of the 
elements of cultural diversity is language.1065 Arguably, minority cultures, including 
                                                 
1061 Xabier Arzoz, ‘Introduction: Respecting Linguistic diversity in the European Union’ in X Arzoz 
(ed) Respecting Linguistic diversity in the European Union (John Benjamins B.V., Amsterdam 2008) 7. 
 
1062 This provision can be regarded as a result of 20 year struggle of Catalonia to convince the EU to 
recognise the Catalan as an official EU language. For detailed discussion see, Antoni Milian Massana, 
‘Languages that are official in part of the territory of the Member States’ in X Arzoz (ed) Respecting 
Linguistic diversity in the European Union (John Benjamins B.V., Amsterdam 2008) 200-209. 
 
1063 Regulation 1/58 as last amended by Council (EC) Regulation No 1791/2006, 20 November 2006. 
 
1064 Bruno de Witte, ‘Language Law of the European Union: Protecting or Eroding Linguistic 
Diversity?’ in R Craufurd Smith (ed) Culture and European Law (OUP, Oxford 2004) 205-241, 224. 
 
1065 A Loman et al, Culture and Community Law: Before and After Maastricht (Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers, Deventer 1992) 194; Nic Shuibhne, EC law and Minority Language Policy…(n 
951) 107-154. Similarly, in an annulment procedure under Article 230 TEC (now Article 263 TFEU) in 
Case C-42/97 European Parliament v Council of the European Union [1999] ECR I-869, the European 
Parliament argued that the legal basis of a Council decision on a multiannual programme to promote 
the linguistic diversity of the EC in the information society should have been not only Article 157(3) 
TEC (now Article 173(3) TFEU), but also Article 151 TEC (now Article 167 TFEU). The Parliament 
argued that the aim of the programme was the promotion of cultural and linguistic diversity, which 
triggered the application of both Article 151(4) and 151(2). The Council and the Commission 
disagreed. In its assessment the ECJ focused on the centre of gravity of the decision and found that the 
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sixty indigenous regional or minority languages,1066 are a significant part of European 
cultural heritage. Regrettably, respect for cultural diversity couched in vague terms is 
insufficient to guarantee the right to education in a minority language.  
 
Article 22 CFR, on the EU’s commitment to respect linguistic and cultural diversity, 
may also be relevant to minorities wishing to challenge an EU act or a Member 
State’s implementing measure. Could such challenge be based on the argument that 
linguistic and cultural diversity includes minority languages and cultures? Originally, 
proposed drafts of Article 22 CFR were intended to protect and respect the identity 
and the rights of minorities.1067 The final version of the provision does not, however, 
include such references, and represents a compromise between Member States willing 
to promote a coherent minority protection scheme and those opposing such a 
development. Therefore, some degree of minority protection may be read into this 
Article. However, the extent of such protection will depend on the ECJ’s reading of 
the wording of Article 22. For example, the term ‘respect’ is much weaker than 
‘fulfil’ or ‘promote’;1068 therefore, it is not clear what degree of positive duties may 
be imposed on the EU institutions and Member States. Arguably, ‘respect’ entails 
equal treatment of EU citizens regardless of their cultural identities; this may entail 
                                                                                                                                            
Council was correct in regarding the cultural aspects of the measure as incidental. The decision was 
criticised for wavering “between pragmatism and a potentially restrictive understanding of culture”: 
Niamh Nic Shuibhne, ‘Minority Languages, Law and Politics: Tracing EC Action’ in D Castiglione 
and C Longman (eds) The Language Question in Europe and Diverse Societies: Political, Legal and 
Social Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 136.  
 
1066 Commission, ‘Regional and minority languages of the European Union’ <http://ec.europa.eu/ 
education/policies/lang/languages/langmin/regmin_en.html> accessed 12 April 2008. 
 
1067 Arzoz, ‘Article 22 of the EU Charter’ (n 16) 147-150; see also, Guido Schwellnus, ‘Reasons for 
Constitutionalization: Non-discrimination, Minority Rights and Social Rights in the Convention on the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2006) 13(8) Journal of European Public Policy 1265-1283, 1273-
1274. 
 
1068 Ahmed, ‘A Critical Appraisal of EU Governance…’ (n 20) 267. 
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EU action that varies according to the linguistic needs in question.1069 Furthermore, 
the phrase ‘linguistic diversity’ could be interpreted broadly to include not only the 23 
EU official languages, but also any other languages which enjoy official status in all 
or some part of a Member State under Article 55(2) TEU; minority and regional 
languages in the EU irrespective of their legal status; and potentially even the 
languages of immigrant groups.1070 Such broad interpretation, however, is unlikely 
without Treaty revisions, because the EU is bound to respect the national identities1071 
and regional diversity1072 of its Member States, which may limit its action to official 
languages.1073 Moreover, the EU’s action under Article 22 CFR is further limited by 
virtue of Article 51(2), which does not allow the Charter to extend, establish or 
modify existing EU competences (as noted in the Introduction to the thesis on page 
7). As the EU does not have a competence in the field of minority education, a 
generous interpretation of Article 22 is unlikely without relevant Treaty revisions. 
 
Where free movement regimes boosted the development of an EU right to education, 
the ECJ’s jurisprudence on minority languages suggests that, depending on the 
context, the requirements as to the knowledge of a minority language might be 
considered unfavourably by the ECJ, as it may raise further barriers within the 
                                                 
1069 Miquel Strubell, ‘The Political Discourse on Multilingualism in the European Union’ in D 
Castiglione and C Longman (eds) The Language Question in Europe and Diverse Societies: Political, 
Legal and Social Perspectives (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 158. 
 
1070 Arzoz, ‘Article 22 of the EU Charter’ (n 16) 153. 
 
1071 Article 4(2) TEU (ex-Article 6(3) TEU). 
 
1072 Article 167 TFEU (ex-Article 151(1) TEC).  
 
1073 Based on pragmatic considerations, certain differences of treatment may be allowed even in 
relation to official EU languages, as the decisions in Kik demonstrate: Case T-107/94 Kik v Council 
and Commission [1995] ECR II-1717 and Case T-120/99 Kik v Office for Harmonisation in the 
Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) [2001] ECR II-2235, but cf Case T-185/05 Re 
Commission Recruitment Notices: Italy (Spain and Latvia, intervening) v Commission of the European 
Communities [2009] 1 CMLR 34. 
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internal market.1074 Therefore, the ECJ and national courts may assess the effect of 
Member States’ language regulations on the enjoyment of EU rights as, for instance, a 
language criterion for employment may be indirectly discriminatory against EU 
citizens. The ECJ asserted this jurisdiction in Gröener.1075 In order to be employed on 
a permanent basis in Ireland, a Dutch national had to demonstrate proficiency in the 
Irish language, despite the fact that she was a teacher of painting. The ECJ expressed 
a certain sensitivity towards the national identity of Ireland and found that it was not 
unreasonable to expect a teacher to speak the first official language of the State.1076  
 
Furthermore, depending on the context, internal market freedoms could have a 
detrimental effect on minority languages where the ECJ opens up linguistic facilities 
granted by Member States to protect minorities to all EU citizens. Thus, in 
Mutsch,1077 a Luxembourg national residing in a German-speaking commune of 
Belgium claimed the right to use German in criminal proceedings. The right to use 
German before the authorities was a linguistic privilege granted to Belgian nationals 
residing in the German-speaking communes and aimed to protect the rights of 
minorities.1078 Advocate General Lenz argued that the fact that the advantages are 
designed to promote the rights of minorities does not mean that they may not apply to 
the nationals of other Member States, because the principle of equal treatment applies 
                                                 
 
1074 de Witte, ‘Surviving in Babel?...’ (n 979) 295; R Creech, Law and Language in the European 
Union: The Paradox of a Babel “United in Diversity” (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen 2005) 140. 
 
1075 Gröener (n 420). 
 
1076 Gröener (n 420) para 19 and 20. 
 
1077 Ministere Public v Robert Heinrich Maria Mutsch (n 579). 
 
1078 Gabriel Toggenburg, ‘Minority Protection in a Supranational Context: Limits and Opportunities’ in 
G Toggenburg (ed) Minority protection and the enlarged European Union: the way forward (OSI/LGI, 
Budapest 2004) 28. 
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also “in areas which are not primarily governed by Community law.”1079 The ECJ did 
not base its reasoning on minority languages per se; instead, it relied on the free 
movement of workers. In the ECJ’s view, it was essential for migrant workers’ 
integration into the host State to use his language in the criminal proceedings.1080  
 
Similar to Mutsch, the case of Bickel and Franz1081 concerned the choice of language 
in criminal proceedings in Bolzano, Italy. The applicants in this case wanted to use a 
minority language that was available to German-speaking nationals of Italy. Unlike 
Mutsch, Bickel and Franz were not migrant workers in the host State, but rather 
tourists. The ECJ tied their rights to EU citizenship and ruled that, although the 
protection of minorities is a legitimate aim of the State, this aim would not be 
“undermined if the rules in issue were extended to cover German-speaking nationals 
of other Member States exercising their right to freedom of movement.”1082 Thus, the 
ECJ made a “clear connection between two rapidly evolving sets of rights within EU 
law: Union citizenship on the one hand and language rights (or, respectively, minority 
rights) on the other.”1083 Thus, from Mutsch and Bickel/Franz it can be concluded that 
national norms providing residents of certain regions with special 
language rights have to be extended to all EU citizens who find 
themselves ‘in the same circumstances,’ [reference omitted] i.e., whose 
‘language is the same.’1084 
 
                                                 
1079 Ministere Public v Robert Heinrich Maria Mutsch (n 579); Opinion of the Advocate General Lenz 
in Case 137/84 Ministere Public v Robert Heinrich Maria Mutsch, 2685 and 2686. 
 
1080 Shuibhne, EC law and Minority Language Policy…(n 951) 79. 
 
1081 Bickel and Franz (n 34). 
 
1082 Bickel and Franz (n 34) para 29. 
 
1083 Peter Hilpold, ‘Union Citizenship and Language Rights’ in X Arzoz, Respecting Linguistic 
diversity in the European Union (John Benjamins B.V., Amsterdam 2008) 107. 
 
1084 Toggenburg, ‘Minority Protection in a Supranational Context…’ (n 1078) 29. 
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Accordingly, in its jurisprudence involving minority languages, the ECJ tended to 
extend the privileges available to minorities to other EU citizens. This jurisprudence 
has significant practical implications. On the one hand, the ECJ’s case law may allow 
some ‘new’ minorities to claim special language rights in other Member States, for 
example, by Slovene citizens in Austria and Italy and by Hungarian citizens in 
Romania and Slovakia. Moreover, such claims may not necessarily be limited to 
criminal proceedings, but may also apply in other contexts, such as education.  
 
On the other hand, while this case law is beneficial to ‘new’ minorities, it reveals a 
gap in EU law, which does not currently have in place any guarantees for mother-
tongue education of ‘traditional’ minorities. This lack of action in the field of minority 
education has been strongly criticised by commentators, particularly because the UN 
and CoE instruments and jurisprudence seem to form “an emerging norm of 
international language law, particularly with regards to the obligation of states to take 
positive steps to promote minority languages.”1085 Furthermore, it is argued that  
if the EU as a whole continues to avoid making difficult macro-level 
decisions, and if individual [M]ember [S]tates continue to be reluctant 
to pass legislation on minority languages, this may well result in 
damage to currently endangered languages in the EU.1086 
 
However, for the EU to offer protection to minority languages, it needs to acquire a 
relevant competence. Furthermore, EU law has limited impact on internal situations, 
as discussed next. 
 
                                                 
1085 Creech, Law and Language in the European Union (n 1074) 143. 
 
1086 Juaristi, Reagan and Tonkin, ‘Language Diversity in the European Union…’ (n 506) 68; see also, 
Nancy Hornberger, ‘Language Policy, Language Education, Language Rights: Indigenous, Immigrant 
and International Perspective’ (1998) 27 Language in Society 439-458, 441. 
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3.3. The impact of EU law on internal situations 
 
Although the ECJ criticised restrictive Belgian laws on access to education and 
virtually reversed Belgian educational policy in a number of cases,1087 this was done 
largely to further the free movement of persons and had no impact on the rights of 
minorities within the country. Government of the French Community and Walloon 
Government v Flemish Government1088 is informative about what impact EU law 
could have on Belgium’s education system. Although this case does not concern 
education specifically, it suggests by analogy that Belgium is not immune from EU 
rules. It is noteworthy that, as with education, the communes in Belgium have 
competence to legislate in the area of care insurance. Therefore, some guidance can 
be derived from the judgment as to the interrelation of EU law and the communes’ 
policies in Belgium. 
 
In this case, the French Community and the Walloon Government questioned the 
compatibility of a care insurance scheme established by the Flemish Community of 
Belgium, with EC rules on citizenship, free movement and establishment. The 
insurance scheme applied to persons residing in the Flemish communes and to 
persons pursuing an activity in that territory and residing in another Member State. 
However, it explicitly excluded persons working in Flanders, but residing in the 
French communes of Belgium.  
                                                 
1087 Gravier v City of Liège (n 940); Case 42/87 Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR 5445; Blaizot v 
University of Liège (n 970); Barra v Belgium (n 971); Forcheri v Belgium (n 1010); Case C-47/93 
Commission v Belgium [1988] ECR 5445; Case 235/87 Matteucci v Communauté Française de 
Belgique [1988] ECR 5589. For discussion see, O’Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community 
Citizenship… (n 985) 164. 
 
1088 Case C-212/06 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government v Flemish 
Government [2008] ECR I–1683. 
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 The ECJ firstly established that EC rules did not apply to persons who reside within a 
national territory and have not exercised free movement rights, even if they were 
excluded from the scheme. EU citizenship did not remedy this situation, because it 
was not “intended to extend the material scope of the Treaty to internal situations 
which have no link with Community law.”1089 However, because the care insurance 
scheme depended on residence in a limited part of Belgium,1090 it might have 
discouraged migrant workers from moving to other parts of Belgium as that would 
cause them to lose “the opportunity of eligibility for the benefits which they might 
otherwise have claimed.”1091 Consequently, domestic legislation that may result in a 
loss of eligibility or a limitation on the place of residence entailed an obstacle to the 
exercise of the rights under Articles 39 EC (45 TFEU) and 43 EC (49 TFEU). 
Moreover, Belgium could not plead its constitutional organisation and practices in its 
domestic legal order to justify a failure to observe EC rules.1092  
 
By analogy, the Flemish communes’ legislative acts on education could infringe upon 
the rights of French-speakers residing in Wallonia, if they hinder the exercise of free 
movement regimes in the EU. However, it is unlikely that EU rules would 
fundamentally affect a rigid application of the territoriality principle in Belgium and 
ensure access to mother-tongue education of French-speakers in Flanders. At best, 
under Article 7 TEU, the EU could sanction Belgium for non-implementation of 
                                                 
1089 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government (n 1088) para 39. 
 
1090 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government (n 1088) para 47. 
 
1091 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government (n 1088) para 48. 
 
1092 Government of the French Community and Walloon Government (n 1088) para 58. 
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Belgian Linguistics for over forty years. Regrettably, the political sensitivity of both 
the language question and the mechanism of Article 7 TEU are likely to prevent such 
a development.   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 
The case study of Belgium revealed how political controversy between the French- 
and the Dutch-speaking populations of Belgium impacts on the choice of language in 
education. Based on this example, the chapter aimed to illustrate how the lack of 
mother-tongue education may lead to the assimilation of a minority group. 
 
Despite limited competences in education and minority protection, EU rules on access 
to education have certain strengths which could greatly enhance the educational rights 
of minorities. Whilst international law mainly emphasises non-discrimination in 
access to education, the ECJ has also placed a strong emphasis on physical and 
economic accessibility, although Förster is an unfortunate setback. In addition, the 
ECJ established strong guarantees on non-discriminatory treatment based on 
nationality. Thus, in access to education, both direct and indirect discrimination on the 
ground of nationality is prohibited. Furthermore, both host and home Member States 
must ensure equal treatment of nationals who choose to exercise their EU citizenship 
rights. Arguably, equally high standards should apply in relation to non-
discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnic origin under the Race Directive. 
Moreover, EU law has in place effective means for individuals to claim EU 
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educational rights in their national courts.1093 Furthermore, despite a low 
implementation rate in some Member States, Directive 77/486 contains an explicit 
provision on mother-tongue education of migrant workers’ children.1094 In addition, a 
case-by-case finding of the right to mother-tongue education can also be argued based 
on the general principles of EU law. One way in which the EU could advance the 
educational rights of minorities in Belgium is through insisting on the State’s 
implementation of Belgian Linguistics based on Articles 2 and 7 TEU. 
 
Coming back to the Belgian dilemma, it appears that EU law may have only a limited 
impact on the internal organisation of education in Member States. For example, it 
appears that in Belgium, with official languages which are also languages in the 
neighbouring countries (French, German and Dutch), there is a possibility for 
minorities to move to another country and claim EU educational rights. However, 
they are not entitled to this treatment while remaining in their home State (unless they 
have already exercised their EU citizenship rights). Unlike in Belgium, not all 
minority languages are present in other Member States. As a result, not all groups can 
benefit from access to education through free movement regimes. 
 
Because of this cross-border context, it appears that the effects of the ECJ’s case law 
on access to education are felt mainly by ‘new’ minorities, i.e., migrants from other 
Member States. EU law does not offer any protection to traditional minorities in 
Member States, unless they choose to exercise their EU citizenship rights. Even then, 
                                                 
1093 Julian Lonbay, ‘Towards Educational Rights’ (n 989) 227. 
 
1094 In contrast, children of ‘old’ minorities in Member States or asylum seekers will still need positive 
State action guaranteeing access to mother-tongue education: Lidija Basta Fleiner, Report on The 
Principle of Equality and Non-discrimination under the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities: Also a Tool Fostering the Integration of Migrants’ Children in the Field of 
Education? (2009) CFL-UDT(2009)002, para 6.  
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the right of access would be limited to existing educational establishments and would 
not guarantee a choice of language of instruction. Therefore, although the EP argued 
that “Article 149 TEC in improving access to education could contribute, through 
furthering the integration of minorities into society, as provided for in Article 12 and 
14 of the FCNM”,1095 EU law is unlikely to offer protection equivalent to the FCNM 
without explicitly endorsing the educational rights of minorities. To do so, the EU 
needs a stronger competence in education and minority rights; only then could it 
prevent States from assimilating their minorities. A broad EU definition of ‘minority’, 
which includes ‘regional’ minorities, could also have beneficial impact on the 
protection of such groups. Were ‘regional’ minorities to be entitled to the same 
protection as ‘traditional’ minorities, they could demand that their home State stops 
assimilating them into the dominant language.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1095 European Parliament, Resolution 2005/2008(INI) (n 584) para 49 (g). 
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CHAPTER V. BRIDGING THE GAP:                           
TERRITORIAL MINORITIES AND THE EU 
 
1. Introduction   
 
 
 
As the EU supranational institutions strengthen and expand their competences, EU 
Member States are experiencing demands for devolution from their constituent 
regions.1096 This process of simultaneous upward and downward redistribution of 
state functions from a centralised State1097 has complex reasons. The first reason 
stems from a growing list of EU competences. To ensure an ever-closer Union, EU 
Member States tend to relinquish some of their powers in favour of the EU. 
Concurrently, the process of decentralisation in Member States has attempted both to 
ensure efficiency of the State’s performance as a whole,1098 and to address demands 
for greater control by the regional governments, in areas such as culture and 
education. When the competences of the EU and regional governments coincide, one 
of the concerns of regional governments, such as the German Länder, was that the EU 
and the home State’s competences would prevail over theirs.1099 In the view of 
regions, to reduce the chances of the EU’s encroaching upon their competences, direct 
representation of regions within the sphere of EU decision-making should be allowed. 
                                                 
1096 Kelly, ‘Political Downsizing…’ (n 474) 237. 
 
1097 Kelly, ‘Political Downsizing…’ (n 474) 237; see also Roht-Arriaza, ‘The Committee on the 
Regions…’ (n 469) 413-4; Keating, ‘Regions and the Convention on the Future of Europe’ (n 470) 
193. 
 
1098 Francesco Palermo and Alessandro Santini, ‘From NUTS to Constitutional Regions: Addressing 
EU Regions in the EU Framework’ in R Toniatti et al (eds) An Ever More Complex Union: The 
Regional Variable as a Missing Link in the EU Constitution? (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004) 6. 
 
1099 Roht-Arriaza, ‘The Committee on the Regions…’ (n 469) 423; Keating, ‘Regions and the 
Convention on the Future of Europe’ (n 470) 192. 
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Thus, on the insistence of the German Länder, a regional minister may represent his 
State in the Council, “where matters of regional competence [are] at stake.”1100 Such 
representation takes different forms and is at the discretion of a Member State. 
Overall, the stronger representation of regional governments moves the EU towards 
‘multilevel governance’, where the “regions of Europe are increasingly finding their 
voices on the supranational plane.”1101  
 
Finding a voice at the supranational level is particularly relevant to territorial 
minorities (the term is defined on pages 151-155). The participation of regions, 
populated by territorial minorities in EU affairs raises their profiles as distinct nations 
but at the same time reduces the need for them to form a State of their own; 
“[s]tateless national movements have thus embraced Europe not as something that 
threatens their sovereignty but as something that enlarges their scope to become 
significant actors in a multi-level system.”1102 The erosion of the traditional concept 
of ‘State’ in the EU significantly contributes to this process. Thus, because Member 
States have limited their sovereignty and divide and share many competences with the 
EU, some territorial minorities, such as Catalans and Basques, have embraced this 
opportunity as the means of increasing their role as a third level of government 
without seceding from a home State.1103  
 
                                                 
 
1100 Keating, ‘Regions and the Convention on the Future of Europe’ (n 470) 192; The Lisbon Treaty 
repealed Article 203 TEC and replaced it in substance by Article 16 (2) and (9) TEU. 
 
1101 Kelly, ‘Political Downsizing…’ (n 474) 238; see also Susana Borrás-Alomar et al, ‘Towards a 
“Europe of the Regions”?: Visions and Reality from a Critical Perspective’ (1994) 4(2) Regional 
Politics and Policy 1-27, 1. 
 
1102 Keating, ‘Federalism and the Balance of Power in European States’ (n 472) 15-6. 
 
1103 Keating, ‘Federalism and the Balance of Power in European States’ (n 472) 15-6. 
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To gain access to the EU level by means of internal self-government, minority groups 
have to achieve greater autonomy at the domestic level to ensure “partial 
independence from the influence of the national or central government.”1104 The 
implications of such internal self-governance are two-fold. First, it strengthens the 
distinct cultural identity of a minority group, which may justify the need for autonomy 
arrangements to preserve the group’s language, culture and/or religion.1105 Where a 
certain territory is compactly inhabited by a minority group, a State may of course 
grant it territorial autonomy, i.e., a special status, aimed at serving the interests of this 
group.1106 The scope of such autonomy arrangements may range from basic 
administrative duties performed by local authorities to full autonomy, where a part of 
a State’s territory enjoys a special status with independent legislative, executive and 
judicial functions and competences over a variety of issues, including education and 
culture.1107 Hence, under autonomy arrangements, a territorial minority may acquire 
the right to make laws which are of particular concern to a group, based on their 
cultural or territorial association.1108 Second, a territorial minority’s acquisition of 
competences over various social and economic issues in domestic affairs may 
strengthen its claims to participate in EU decision-making, particularly in the areas 
                                                 
 
1104 Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘Implementation of Minority Rights through the Devolution of Powers – 
the Concept of Autonomy Reconsidered’ (2002) 9 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
325-343, 338. 
 
1105 Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy’ in M Suksi (ed) Autonomy: 
Applications and Implications (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1998) 9. 
 
1106 Georg Brunner and Herbert Küpper, ‘European Options of Autonomy: A Typology of Autonomy 
Models of Minority self-governance’ in K Gál (ed) Minority Governance in Europe (LGI Publications, 
Budapest 2002); Kristin Henrard, ‘The Interrelationship between Individual Human Rights, Minority 
Rights and the Right to Self-Determination and Its Importance for the Adequate Protection of 
Linguistic Minorities’ (2001) 1(1) The Global Review of Ethnopolitics 41-61, 48. 
 
1107 Hurst Hannum and Richard Lillich, ‘The Concept of Autonomy in International law’ (1980) 74 
American Journal of International Law 858-889, 887. 
 
1108 Heintze, ‘On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy’ (n 1105) 7. 
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which also fall within the sphere of EU competences. This opportunity to voice their 
concerns at the supranational level may in turn mobilise the efforts of territorial 
minorities to gain greater recognition of their identity at domestic level; this means 
giving them voice through participation and influence,1109 rather than their exit 
through independence and separation.  
 
However, as discussed in Chapter I, there is limited support for the collective rights of 
minorities and their right to autonomy in international law. This is apparent from the 
wording of Article 27 ICCPR referring to ‘persons belonging to minorities’. 
Regrettably, Article 2 TEU follows the same formulation, which suggests that the EU 
too prefers an individualistic approach to minority protection.1110 However, arguably, 
States’ fears that the right to autonomy may lead to secession are fed by certain 
misconceptions about the collective rights of minorities. This chapter begins by 
assessing the collective rights of minorities (2.1). It then overviews the EU’s approach 
to collective rights (2.2). The assessment of collective rights in the EU continues with 
Scotland’s experience (2.3). Then relevant provisions of EU law are analysed to 
ascertain whether there are any rules in place closing the gap between the EU and 
territorial minorities in Member States (3).  
 
                                                 
1109 Klaus-Jürgen Nagel, ‘Transcending the National / asserting the National: How Stateless Nations 
like Scotland, Wales and Catalonia react to European integration’ (2004) 50(1) Australian Journal of 
Politics and history 58-75. 
 
1110 It is noteworthy that there were significant (non-binding) initiatives to accord group rights to 
minorities in EU Member States. For example, as early as in 1988, Article 3 of the draft EC Charter of 
Rights for Ethnic groups proposed to secure the protection of ethnic groups. Furthermore, Article 5 of 
this Charter proposed to accord locus standi to 100 members of an ethnic group before “supreme 
national courts and, in the last instance, to the European Court of Justice”: (Nowak, ‘The Evolution of 
Minority Rights in International Law, Comments’ (n 440) 113. Regrettably, these proposals did not 
receive sufficient political support from Member States.  
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2. Collective Rights  
 
2.1. Why do minorities need collective rights? 
 
 
This sub-section assesses the significance of collective rights for effective protection 
of minority rights. The wording of Article 27 ICCPR suggests that minorities are 
entitled only to individual rights, which they enjoy ‘in community with the other 
members of their groups’. Such exercise of rights is not equivalent, however, to 
enjoying collective rights. This is so because of State concern that the acquisition of 
collective rights may lead to claims of international legal personality by minority 
groups, and subsequently to self-determination and secession.1111  
 
These political considerations are strongly present in Capotorti’s four arguments 
opposing collective rights of minorities and insisting that minority rights should 
remain individual rights enjoyed in community with others. In his first argument, 
Capotorti links Articles 2(1) and 26 ICCPR on non-discrimination to Article 27 
ICCPR on preservation of collective values of minorities. These two aspects of 
protection are equally important, and the emphasis on collective rights of minorities 
may weaken the significance of individual rights under the principle of non-
discrimination. Secondly, the choice of belonging to a minority group should remain 
with an individual. Perceiving collective rights as the main goal of minority protection 
may lead to oppression by members of a group towards individuals who choose not to 
be treated as a minority. Thirdly, the recognition of collective rights of minorities may 
lead to claims of a right to self-determination. From a political point of view this may 
                                                 
1111 Van Den Bosch and Van Genugten, ‘International Legal Protection…’ (n 410) 217. 
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result in States’ opposition, because “they fear that minorities could pretend to 
exercise that right as soon as they are considered the holders of collective rights.”1112  
Fourthly, the recognition of collective rights may lead to an assumption that “each 
minority group is invested with authority to represent the interests of the 
corresponding community within the State”.1113 This may clash with a State’s 
interests as a representative of the interests of the entire population. Therefore, 
treatment of minorities as a political or legal entity may lead to hostility of States 
towards these groups.   
 
It appears that Capotorti discusses an exclusive emphasis on collective rights, such as 
in the former communist countries, where individuals’ rights were generally 
subordinated to the “interests of the collectivity.”1114 Moreover, a restrictive approach 
to collective rights is usually advocated as the result of misconceptions surrounding 
the concepts of ‘group’ and ‘individual’ rights. Rather, it is a combination of 
collective and individual rights which can ensure meaningful protection of minorities. 
On their own, both the collective and the individual conceptions of rights are flawed.   
 
Thus, the individual rights approach is reactive by nature, i.e., an individual complaint 
is addressed after a violation has occurred; it may not prevent discriminatory acts 
from happening again.1115 Moreover, the individual rights approach may not be 
                                                 
1112 Francesco Capotorti, ‘Are minorities entitled to collective international rights?’ in Y Dinstein and 
M Tabory (eds) The protection of minorities and Human Rights (Kluwer Academic Publishers, The 
Hague 1992) 510. 
 
1113 Capotorti, ‘Are minorities entitled to collective international rights?’ (n 1112) 510.  
 
1114 Van Den Bosch and Van Genugten, ‘International Legal Protection…’ (n 410) 233. 
 
1115 Valentine, ‘Toward a Definition of National Minority’ (n 384) 445. 
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sufficient to protect a group from forced assimilation.1116 For example, an educational 
policy formulated on the basis of an individual’s needs “in a climate of formal 
equality fails to consider the importance of cultural identity in formulating and 
developing personality.”1117 Moreover, the interests of the majority are engrained in 
the fabrics of the society and state policies. Indeed, an individualist approach 
promotes the incorrect assumption that blindness to group difference results in 
homogeneous societies; in its turn, this approach may mask serious inequalities.1118 
 
Second, there is confusion between the collective and corporate conceptions of the 
notion of ‘group rights’. Thus, in the collective conception, a group right is a “right 
held jointly by those who make up the group.”1119 This right cannot be equated to the 
sum of rights held by separate individuals who form a group;1120 rather such a group 
right is held jointly by the individuals belonging to a group. For example, fishing 
rights granted to an indigenous group are held individually by all members of the 
group, as well as by the group as a whole.1121 Conversely, the ‘corporate’ conception 
of group rights “ascribes moral standing to the group as such.”1122 Accordingly, the 
right-bearer is a group and not the individuals belonging to the group.1123 Where 
minority rights are concerned, the corporate approach to group rights is undesirable 
                                                 
1116 Preece, ‘National minority rights vs. state sovereignty in …’ (n 479) 352. 
 
1117 O’Nions, Minority Rights Protection in International Law… (n 491) 266. 
 
1118 O’Nions, Minority Rights Protection in International Law… (n 491) 266. 
 
1119 Peter Jones, ‘Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights’ (1999) 21 Human Rights 
Quarterly 80-107, 85. 
 
1120 Jones, ‘Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 1119) 82. 
 
1121 Robert Weber, ‘Individual Rights and Group Rights in the European Community’s approach to 
minority languages’ (2007) 17 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 361-413, 388. 
 
1122 Jones, ‘Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 1119) 86. 
 
1123 Jones, ‘Human Rights, Group Rights, and Peoples’ Rights’ (n 1119) 86. 
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because it does not leave room for the personal autonomy of individual members of a 
group.  
 
Conversely, the complementarity between collective and individual rights may prove 
beneficial for the protection of minority rights.1124 This is so because, even though 
individual rights are essential for majorities and minorities alike, the collective 
exercise of rights is central to the protection of a minority; some of the rights would 
be meaningless without other members of an ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minority.1125 Indeed, individual rights  
… cannot take into account the basic truth that minority identity can 
only be lived and maintained in a group. There is no point in talking 
Frisian or dressing in Sorb costume while sitting alone in one’s room. 
This is unsatisfactory both for the individual and for the Frisian or Sorb 
community respectively. Only when Frisian is spoken or Sorb costume 
is worn in the community can it serve as an expression of the identity 
of a minority group.1126 
 
Thus, the collective element, supplementing individual human rights and minority 
rights, is essential for meaningful enjoyment of minority rights, because, for example, 
“cultural traditions, as well as educational and religious institutions are – and can be –
maintained by a community only on a collective basis.”1127 
 
Regrettably, international instruments deny collective rights to minorities, because 
States fear that collective exercise of, for example, the right to autonomy may lead to 
                                                 
 
1124 Weber, ‘Individual Rights and Group Rights…’ (n 1121) 386; see also Fernand de Varennes, ‘The 
Linguistic Rights of Minorities in Europe’ in S Trifunovska and F de Varennes (eds) Minority Rights in 
Europe: European Minorities and Languages (TMC Asser Press, The Hague 2001) 29. 
 
1125 Douglas Sanders, ‘Collective Rights’ (1991) 13(3) Human Rights Quarterly 368-386, 374. 
 
1126 Brunner and Küpper, ‘European Options of Autonomy…’ (n 1106) 18-19. 
 
1127 Jelena Pejic, ‘Minority Rights in International Law’ (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly 666-685. 
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secession. This view is not supported by evidence from State practice. To the 
contrary, studies show that autonomy arrangements and federal systems have served 
as effective conflict resolution mechanisms in a number of cases.1128 Nevertheless, 
attempts to read the concept of ‘people’ inclusively, to incorporate ‘minority’ in order 
to advance their collective rights through an entitlement to self-determination, 
remains controversial.1129 However, as the example of Catalonia (discussed in 
Chapter I on pages 151-154) demonstrates, because autonomy allows a minority 
group to self-determine within a State, i.e., to govern matters of particular concern to 
a group, it can render secession superfluous.1130 Moreover, internal self-determination 
through autonomy may also prove an effective mechanism for resolving “deep-seeded 
disputes among ethnic, national and religious group.”1131  
 
Accordingly, even though the notion of collective rights is controversial, adequate 
protection of a group’s identity, which includes distinct ethnic, cultural, religious or 
linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population, can be 
                                                 
1128 Margaret Moore, ‘Sub-State Nationalism and International Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of 
International Law 1319-1340, 1337; John McGarry, ‘Federal Political Systems and the 
Accommodation of National Minorities’ in A Griffiths (ed) The Handbook of Federal Countries 
(McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal 2002) 416-447; T Gurr, Peoples Versus States: Minorities 
at Risk in the New Century (U.S. Institute of Peace Press, Washington 2000). 
 
1129 R Higgins, Problems and Process (Clarendon, Oxford 1994) 124; Patrick Thornberry, ‘Self-
determination, Minorities and Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments’ (1989) 38 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 867-889, 887; Alain Pellet, ‘The Opinions of the 
Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples’ (1992) 3 
EJIL 178, 179; Geoff Gilbert, ‘Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law?’ (2002) 
35 Cornell International Law Journal 307-353, 336; Hurst Hannum, ‘Self-Determination, Yugoslavia, 
and Europe: Old Wine in New Bottles?’ (1993) 3 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 57-
69, 66. 
 
1130 Heintze, ‘On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy’ (n 1105) 29. 
 
1131 Steven Roach, ‘Minority Rights and an Emergent International Right to Autonomy: A Historical 
and Normative Assessment’ (2004) 11 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 411-432, 
430; see also, Gaetano Pentassuglia, ‘State Sovereignty, Minorities and Self-Determination: A 
Comprehensive Legal View’ (2002) 9 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 303-324, 
319-324. 
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ideally achieved through the combination of individual human rights, special minority 
rights and the right to (internal) self-determination.1132  
 
2.2. The EU approach to collective rights  
 
 
As discussed in Chapter I on page 104, in international law discretion to grant an 
autonomy regime firmly remains with individual States. The same approach can be 
observed in EU law. The EU does not object if Member States decentralise and grant 
a special status to certain territories within national borders. Equally, nor does the EU 
actively encourage the devolution of State powers to territorial minorities. As EU law 
stands, there is no State obligation to grant autonomy aimed at the accommodation of 
minority cultures and identities.  
 
Initially, the EC founding Treaties largely left the question of sub-state authorities 
within the Member States’ discretion.1133 Later, during the accession negotiations 
with new Member States, such as the UK and Finland, the EC showed some deference 
to island autonomies. For example, the EC granted special status to Åland Islands;1134 
furthermore, it excluded the application of the EC Treaty to the Faeroe Islands1135 and 
                                                 
 
1132 Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection… (n 449) 321.  
 
1133 Sören Silverström, ‘The Competence of Autonomous Entities in the International Arena – With 
Special Reference to the Åland Islands in the European Union’ (2008) 15 International Journal on 
Minority and Group Rights 259-271, 266. 
 
1134 Article 355(4) TFEU (ex-Article 299(5) EC). This special status is based on Protocol No 2 annexed 
to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Finland 
and the Kingdom of Sweden and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is 
founded [1994] OJ C241.  
 
1135 Article 355(5)(a) TFEU (ex-Article 299(6)(a) TEC). 
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allowed Greenland to leave the EC after it acquired a status of autonomy.1136 Special 
status was also granted to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man (although they 
were not legally part of the UK).1137 The EC consented to these special arrangements 
based on Member States’ initiative. Significantly, special status does not imply a 
privileged position of these autonomies in EU affairs, but refers mainly to derogations 
from application of the Treaties. By way of example, Åland is exempted from EU 
rules on the harmonisation of Member States’ laws on indirect taxation, aimed at 
“maintaining the viability of the Islands’ economy.”1138 On the other hand, although 
Åland requested a permanent derogation on the exercise of the right to vote and stand 
for elections in municipal elections, on Finland’s insistence such an exemption was 
denied.1139 Accordingly, the EU leaves the question of autonomies to its Member 
States. Based on the initiative of a Member State, special derogations may be 
accorded to an autonomous island, although the same is not true of component units 
of federal states,1140 such as Flanders in Belgium or Catalonia in Spain.  
 
Arguably, there should be closer EU involvement with autonomies in its Member 
States, as the lack of a direct link between the EU and territorial minorities may 
negatively impact on the effectiveness of EU law. This is so because, as EU law 
                                                 
 
1136 Frederik Harhoff, ‘Greenland’s Withdrawal from the European Communities’ (1983) 20 Common 
Market Law Review 13-33; see also Silverström, ‘The Competence of Autonomous Entities…’ (n 
1133) 265. 
 
1137 Article 355(5)(c) TFEU (ex-Article 299(6)(c) EC). 
 
1138 Claudio Scarpulla, ‘The Constitutional Framework for the Autonomy of Åland: A Survey of the 
Status of an Autonomous Region in the throes of European Integration’ (2002) 14 Meddelanden från 
Ålands högskola 87. 
 
1139 Niklas Fagerlund, ‘Autonomous European Island Regions Enjoying a Special Relationship with the 
European Union’ in L Lyck (ed) Constitutional and Economic Space of the Small Nordic Jurisdictions 
(NordREFO, Copenhagen 1996) 90-112, 108.  
 
1140 Silverström, ‘The Competence of Autonomous Entities…’ (n 1133) 266. 
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stands, while authorities of autonomous regions remain responsible for 
implementation of EU legislation, such as directives,1141 their input into law-making 
may be limited. In addition, supremacy and the direct effect of EU law1142 require 
every public authority to ensure the application and enforcement of directly effective 
EU law. Although a lack of implementation may result in EU enforcement measures 
towards Member States only,1143 an inclusive approach to autonomous regions may 
be more conducive for ensuring the effectiveness of EU law.  
                                                
 
2.3. Collective rights in the EU: the example of Scotland 
 
 
Scotland is one of the four constituent parts of the United Kingdom, in addition to 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland. The means of group accommodation in the UK 
constitutional legal order is devolution, which means the “delegation of governmental 
powers from the centre without the relinquishment of sovereignty.”1144 Thus, 
devolution is a “weaker form of divided government.”1145 As in Spain (briefly 
discussed in Chapter I on pages 151-154), there are different degrees of autonomous 
 
 
1141 Article 288 TFEU (ex-Article 249 EC). 
 
1142 Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1; Case 6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585. 
See also Declaration No 17 concerning primacy and Opinion of the Council Legal Service on the 
primacy of EC law as set out in 11197/07 (JUR 260) [2010] OJ C 83/344.  
 
1143 C-69/81 Commission v Belgium [1982] ECR 153; C-107/05 Commission v Finland [2006] ECR I-
10. For discussion see, Peter Bubjäger, ‘Implementing and Enforcing EU Law at Regional Level’ in R 
Toniatti et al (eds) An Ever More Complex Union: The Regional Variable as a Missing Link in the EU 
Constitution? (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004) 159-179. 
 
1144 Colin Munro, ‘Scottish Devolution: Accommodating a Restless Nation’ (1999) 6 International 
Journal on Minority and Group Rights 97-119, 99. 
 
1145 Keating, ‘Federalism and the Balance of Power in European States’ (n 472) 7. 
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powers granted to the constituent parts of the UK,1146 although there has been no rush 
to “regionalise England in order to match Scotland and Wales.”1147 The UK has 
practiced this form of group accommodation since the 1707 political union between 
Scotland and England.1148 The 1707 Act of Union gave Scotland autonomy with 
respect to the “legal system, the Church and the education system.”1149 The 1998 
Scotland Devolution Act devolved Scotland’s autonomous rights further; for the first 
time since 1707, Scotland was entitled to have a Scottish Parliament and to form a 
Scottish Executive. The Scottish Parliament has extensive legislative powers over 
matters which are not explicitly reserved to the centre.1150  
 
Accordingly, the Scotland Devolution Act can be regarded as an act of internal self-
determination, where a territorial minority decided on how they wish to govern 
themselves. However, Section 28 of the Scotland Act specifies the continuing 
competence of the UK Parliament to legislate for Scotland:  
[t]his serves as a reminder that the scheme is not federal and the 
Scottish Parliament is merely a devolved institution. There is no 
reason, legally, why the Scottish Parliament could not be abolished by 
a later Act of the Parliament at Westminster.1151  
 
                                                 
1146 Scotland Act (1998) c.46, Northern Ireland Act (1998) c.47, Wales Act (1998) c.38. 
 
1147 Keating, ‘Federalism and the Balance of Power in European States’ (n 472). 
 
1148 Patricia Leopold, ‘Autonomy and the British Consitution’ in M Suksi (ed) Autonomy: Applications 
and Implications (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1998) 224. 
 
1149 Geoff Gilbert, ‘Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law?’ (2002) 35 Cornell 
International Law Journal 307-353, 344-5. 
 
1150 Keating, ‘Federalism and the Balance of Power in European States’ (n 472). 
 
1151 Munro, ‘Scottish Devolution…’ (n 1144) 114-115; see also, Michael Keating, ‘Devolution and 
Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy’ (2009) 15 LEQS Paper 1-26, 5. 
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This hypothetical possibility of revoking devolution raises criticism among those who 
prefer a federalist route. Thus Olowofoyeku advocates the federal system as the most 
sound form of government and maintains that  
[t]he old unitary centralist system is archaic, undemocratic, inefficient, 
and does nothing to satisfy the demands and aspirations of parts of the 
union for local participation and (at least some level of) self-
determination.1152 
 
Furthermore, McCarvey warns that Scottish devolution may have limited success 
because it was built on the existing system of government and “in many ways it has 
merely added a thick layer of democratic gloss to those institutions.”1153 Indeed, the 
limited nature of devolution makes it clear that Scotland is one of “enclaves of self-
government within a system in which the dominant actors do not feel that their role 
has changed radically.”1154 
 
Despite these criticisms, the above brief overview illustrates that, as a type of 
territorial autonomy, Scotland enjoys the benefits of delegated governance “based on 
a long held, clear and uncontested geographical border.”1155 The recently built 
institutional system allows Scotland to make decisions closer to the people and take 
the needs of this territorial minority into account.1156 Moreover, this example 
                                                 
1152 Abimbola Olowofoyeku, ‘Decentralising the UK: the Federal Argument’ (1999) Edinburgh Law 
Review 57-84, 83. 
 
1153 Neil McCarvey, ‘Devolution in Scotland: Change and Continuity’ in J Bradbury (ed) Devolution, 
Regionalism and Regional Development (Routledge, London 2008) 42. 
 
1154 Keating, ‘Federalism and the Balance of Power in European States’ (n 472). 
 
1155 Douglas Chalmers, ‘Scotland Year Zero – From Words to Action’ in K Gál (ed) Minority 
Governance in Europe (LGI Publications, Budapest 2002) 125-150. 
 
1156 Matthew Denton and Matthew Flinders, ‘Democracy, devolution and delegated governance in 
Scotland’ (2006) 16(1) Regional & Federal Studies 63-82, 80. 
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demonstrates that the combination of individual, minority and collective rights to 
internal self-determination are essential to preserve a minority group’s identity.  
 
Significantly, Scotland’s strong domestic status permits it to participate in EU affairs.  
Even though devolution failed to increase the regional authorities’ influence over EU 
law-making, it has altered the nature of Scotland’s participation, by creating a higher 
profile through the Scottish Parliament and Executive, which can liaise with the 
domestic, EU and other sub-national authorities.1157 For example, in the UK, the 
central government can invite a Scottish minister to attend the Council.1158 Such an 
involvement is based on flexible and informal procedures.1159 Another 
‘institutionalised’ channel that allows the Scottish authorities to access the EU level is 
the Committee of the Regions (CoR),1160 an advisory body to the EP, the Council and 
the Commission.1161 Furthermore, the Scottish Parliament can now be involved in the 
monitoring of the principle of subsidiarity (discussed below on page 340); under 
Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality, where appropriate, it is for each national Parliament to consult 
regional parliaments with legislative powers. Accordingly, a strong domestic status of 
a territorial minority may allow it to access the EU fora.  
 
                                                 
1157 Sloat, ‘Scotland in the European Union…’ (n 1160) 18. 
 
1158 See, for example, Concordat on Co-ordination of EU, International and Policy Issues on Public 
Procurement, 25 November 1999, para 6.3; see also Keating, ‘Federalism and the Balance of Power in 
European States’ (n 472) 15-6. 
 
1159 Jens Woelk, ‘A Place at the Window: Regional Ministers in the Council’ in R Toniatti et al (eds) 
An Ever More Complex Union: The Regional Variable as a Missing Link in the EU Constitution? 
(Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004) 137. 
 
1160 Amanda Sloat, ‘Scotland in the European Union: Expectations of the Scottish Parliament’s 
Architects, Builders, and Tenants’ (2001) 22 Scotland Europa Paper 1-31, 18. 
 
1161 Article 300 TFEU. 
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The next section assesses the quality of such participation and evaluates the role of the 
CoR, the principle of subsidiarity and the jurisprudence of the ECJ in supporting the 
aspirations of territorial minorities to greater participation in EU affairs.  
 
3. ‘Testing’ EU rules 
 
 
The most obvious forum for representation of territorial minorities is the CoR, which 
was established under the TEU in 1992.1162 As a result of the CoR’s creation, “some 
degree of meaningful input on the supranational plane of governance has been 
achieved by regions independent from their respective nation-states.”1163 The CoR 
provides advisory opinions to the EU legislative institutions in areas such as culture, 
education, socio-economic cohesion, and so on.  
 
However, the CoR fails to represent the interests of territorial minorities in 
autonomous regions for several reasons. First, a real opportunity for sub-State 
authorities to be represented at the EU level has been undermined by the Member 
States’ ‘gatekeeping’ power in appointing the representatives of the CoR.1164 
                                                 
1162 Even though there is no formal recognition of sub-national autonomy in EU law, this idea is by no 
means new in the EC/EU. Thus, as early as 1988, the European Parliament proposed a Community 
Charter for the Regions, subsequently clarified in the ‘Resolution on Community regional policy and 
the role of the regions’. The Parliament first emphasised that as the Community’s responsibilities 
strengthen, there is the need for decentralisation at the State level of certain tasks to regional authorities 
which represent the will of the people: ‘Resolution on Community Regional Policy and the role of the 
regions’, 18 November 1988, para 21. 
 
1163 Kelly, ‘Political Downsizing…’ (n 474) 238. 
 
1164 Article 305(3) TFEU (ex-Article 263(4) TEC) states: ‘The Council shall adopt the list of members 
and alternate members drawn up in accordance with the proposals made by each Member State’ 
(emphasis added). For criticism see, Adam Biscoe, ‘The European Union and Minority Nations’ in P 
Cumper and S Wheatley (eds) Minority Rights in the ‘New’ Europe (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague 1999) 94-95.  
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Furthermore, where the structure is concerned, the CoR suffers from the fact that it is 
represented by local authorities, metropolitan areas, capital cities, coordinating 
authorities, etc., at the local level, and economic regions, administrative regions and 
regions with legislative powers at the regional level.1165 All these units have differing 
origins and functions, and often represent diverse interests which detract from 
enhancing the interests of minority groups. This deficiency in the CoR structure has 
resulted in stronger claims for a political role within the CoR by so-called ‘regions 
with legislative powers’, which at times refuse to bargain with municipal 
authorities.1166 Although these regions do not have any official status at the 
supranational level, their influence within the CoR may threaten the body’s already 
weak political role. Therefore, restructuring the CoR, which could contain a chamber 
composed of representatives of territorial minorities in autonomous regions, could 
meet their need for stronger representation at the EU level and stop the fragmentation 
within the CoR. Indeed, the EP has long advocated a differentiated approach to 
autonomous units of a regional character, which could become a first step in 
enhancing the role of minority groups in the EU.1167 
 
                                                 
 
1165 CoR, Opinion on ‘Devolution in the European Union and the place of local and regional self-
government in the draft Constitutional Treaty’ [2006] C 31/01, 1.3; see also Adam Biscoe, ‘European 
Integration and the Maintenance of Regional Cultural Diversity: Symbiosis or Symbolism?’ (2001) 
35(1) Regional Studies 57-64, 61. 
 
1166 Guiseppe Avolio and Alessandro Santini, ‘The Committee of the Regions in the EU Policy-making 
Process: Actor or Spectator?’ in R Toniatti et al (eds) An Ever More Complex Union: The Regional 
Variable as a Missing Link in the EU Constitution? (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004) 85-115, 92. 
 
1167 To achieve this, in its 2003 resolution, the EP insisted that a clear recognition of diverse State 
structures should result in some recognition of minority needs. This argument is even more explicit in 
the EP’s 2008 motion for resolution on minority rights, where the EP called on the Commission to 
create partnership with the European regions, by utilising a “differentiated approach for regions from 
the federal Member States, the regionalised Member States, the decentralised Member States and the 
unitary Member States…”: European Parliament, Motion for a ‘Resolution on the protection of 
traditional national and ethnic minorities…’ (n 382) para 5(a). 
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The above-mentioned deficiency in the structure of the CoR can be explained by the 
omissions in the EU’s approach to the regions. First, until recently, the EU did not 
recognise the role of the regions, provinces, communes or regional or local 
organisations which form part of the Member States.1168 The Lisbon Treaty 
incorporated only a limited acknowledgement of the existence of the sub-State units 
in Member States. In particular, Article 4(2) TEU stipulates that  
[t]he Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the 
Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of 
regional and local self-government.1169  
 
A similar acknowledgment can be found in the Preamble of the CFR, which states 
that the EU contributes to preserving and developing common values  
while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the 
peoples of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member 
States and the organisation of their public authorities at national, 
regional and local levels…1170  
 
These provisions signal that the EU is no longer  
blind as regards the existence and interests of the sub-state components 
of some Member States … and underlines the fact that the regions are 
indeed considered to be a part of the European multilevel 
construction.1171  
 
However, this acknowledgment of respect for the internal make-up of Member States 
is somewhat passive and aims to protect Member States from the EU’s attempts to 
influence the organisation of their public authorities.  
                                                 
 
1168 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on the role of regional and local authorities in European 
integration’ [2003] 2002/2141(INI), para 2. 
 
1169 Emphasis added. 
 
1170 Emphasis added.  
 
1171 Ingolf Pernice, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action’ (2009) 15 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 349-407, 394.  
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 The second reason why the CoR structure is deficient is that the objective of creating 
this body was not to “institutionalise the representation of the regional political 
power, but to link the exercise of supra-state administration with administrations at a 
sub-state level.”1172 The EU’s limited interest in regions is evident from other regional 
policies developed since the 1980s, which have never aimed to foster cultural 
diversity. For example, the Regional Development Fund was established to 
compensate the new Member States for subsidies in the field of agriculture, which 
they were not otherwise entitled to receive, and to support poorer States like Greece, 
Portugal and Spain.1173 As a result of this lack of interest in the cultural diversity of 
the regions, neither the composition nor the powers of the CoR can be regarded as an 
institutionalisation of the autonomous sub-State units of the EU.1174  
 
Although the Lisbon Treaty does not address the structural deficiencies of the CoR, 
the amended TEU may increase the significance and visibility of the CoR in the EU. 
Thus, Article 263 TFEU stipulates that the CoR now has locus standi before the ECJ 
to defend its prerogatives. In addition, Article 8(2) of Protocol No 2 on the 
Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality provides that, in 
accordance with the rules in Article 263 TFEU, the CoR can now monitor the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity by bringing actions against legislative acts 
it should be consulted about before their adoption by the EU legislature.1175 Arguably, 
                                                 
 
1172 Iňigo Bullain, ‘Autonomy and the European Union’ in M Suksi (ed) Autonomy: Applications and 
Implications (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1998) 347. 
 
1173 Reetta Toivanen, ‘Saami in The European Union’ (2001) 8 International Journal on Minority and 
Group Rights 303-323, 313. 
 
1174 Iňigo Bullain, ‘Autonomy and the European Union’ (n 1172) 347. 
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the CoR’s monitoring of this principle, which requires that decisions be taken as close 
to the citizens as possible, may prevent the EU from encroaching upon the 
competences of sub-national authorities in autonomous regions. 
 
Unfortunately, the utility of the CoR’s monitoring role is undermined by the fact that, 
so far, subsidiarity has been used mainly between the Member States and the EU to 
delimit their competences and to prevent the EU from acting outside of its powers. 
Overall, the principle has failed to facilitate the involvement of sub-state authorities in 
the decision-making process in the EU.1176 Therefore, the application of the principle 
is criticised for not truly serving to “mitigate the ‘decentralization deficit’”1177 in 
some Member States. The current limited application of subsidiarity between the EU 
and Member States results from the lack of a clear division of powers among the EU, 
Member States and regional authorities.1178 Articles 2-6 TFEU focus on the division 
                                                                                                                                            
1175 During the negotiations of the Draft Constitutional Treaty, the CoR insisted that the EU must give 
it a more active monitoring role (see CoR, Opinion on ‘A better division and definition of powers in the 
European Union’ [2003] C73/16, Preamble). The EP strongly supported this proposal and suggested 
that the CoR should be given the right to bring claims before the ECJ to protect its prerogatives and 
challenge presumed violations of subsidiarity (‘Resolution on the role of regional and local authorities 
in European integration’ (n 1168) para 8-10). Article III-270 of the Draft Constitutional Treaty 
incorporated this proposal in full and could be regarded as a “substantial empowerment of European 
regions”: Tove Malloy, ‘National Minority ‘Regions’ in the Enlarged European Union: Mobilizing for 
Third Level Politics?’ (2005) ECMI Working Paper No 24, 5. 
 
1176 Commentators identify four potential uses of this term: 
1) a principle to help determine the extent of Community competences in new and 
existing policy domains[;] 2) a mechanism for the firm limitation of EC 
competencies to protect national sovereignty; 3) a principle to assist in the creation 
and entrenchment of federal European union; 4) a principle with which to advance 
and defend sub-national autonomy and interests. 
S Roach, Cultural Autonomy, Minority Rights, and Globalization (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot 2005) 
64. 
 
1177 Bruno Frey, ‘A New Concept of European Federalism’ (2009) 3 LEQS Papers 1-23, 2; see also, 
Gabriel Toggenburg, ‘The Debate on European Values and the Case of Cultural Diversity’ (2004) 1 
European Diversity and Autonomy Papers 5-24, 15. 
 
1178 Malloy, ‘National Minority ‘Regions’ in the Enlarged European Union…’ (n 1175) 18. 
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of competences between the EU and Member States only, without even mentioning 
the sub-State units.1179  
 
Furthermore, despite the significance of the CoR’s involvement in monitoring of 
subsidiarity, its role is significantly limited compared to the role of national 
Parliaments. Under Article 6 of Protocol No 2 on the Application of the Principles of 
Subsidiarity and Proportionality, any national Parliament may send a reasoned 
opinion to the EU legislative institutions, if it considers that a piece of draft legislation 
does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. If, in a national Parliament’s view, 
an adopted act remains incompatible with the principle of subsidiarity, it has the right 
to bring a case before the ECJ. Although these new powers do not envision 
substantive input into EU legislation, they may develop into a powerful mechanism 
for protecting the competencies of national (and where appropriate, regional) 
legislators, which can now oppose a potentially excessive use of competences by the 
EU legislative institutions.1180 It is regrettable that the Lisbon Treaty did not confer 
similarly wide powers on the CoR. 
 
Likewise, opening EU decision-making to the participation of regional ministers 
through direct representation in the Council has proved to have mainly symbolic 
significance. This is so because regions cannot genuinely promote their interests in 
EU law-making, because they can only represent their State as whole. Moreover, 
                                                 
 
1179 The CoR addressed this issue in its Opinion on ‘A better division and definition of powers in the 
European Union’ (n 1175). In particular, in para 1.6 of the Opinion, the CoR emphasised the 
significance of supplementing the principle with provisions guaranteeing respect for the competence of 
regions and local authorities. This proposal did not find its way either into the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty or the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
1180 Pernice, ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel Constitutionalism in Action’ (n 1171) 393. 
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States allow only “selective and partial direct access to consultative and negotiating 
fora at European level”1181 and the success of such access largely depends on the 
relationship between regions and central government at the domestic level. Therefore, 
for the EU to establish a truly multilevel governance and to address the ‘democratic 
deficit’, which arises because the “increasing power of EU institutions is not matched 
by concomitant accountability to the citizenry”1182, further institutional reforms are 
needed that foster a direct link between regions and the supranational level.  
 
Let us now turn to the ECJ’s jurisprudence involving autonomies. We will continue 
assessing cases involving linguistic minorities,1183 discussed in Chapter IV on 
mother-tongue education on pages 313-314. So far, the ECJ’s approach to autonomies 
involving the protection of minority rights seems to be implicitly sympathetic. Let us 
take Angonese1184 as an example of the ECJ’s approach to autonomy arrangements. 
Having failed to prove his proficiency in German by producing a certificate issued by 
local authorities in South Tyrol, the applicant was denied a job in a bank. Mr 
Angonese relied on EC law to challenge the restricted ways to prove language 
proficiency imposed by the regional authorities. The ECJ considered that the rule was 
disproportionate and, hence, violated EC law. Significantly, the language requirement 
itself was not contested in this case. Accordingly, the mere fact that the ECJ “stuck to 
                                                 
 
1181 Woelk, ‘A Place at the Window…’ (n 1159) 140 (emphasis in original). 
 
1182 Roht-Arriaza, ‘The Committee on the Regions…’ (n 469) 420; see also, Stijn Smismans, ‘Vertical 
and Horizontal Decentralism in European Governance: Discourse, Reality and Strategy’ in R Toniatti 
et al (eds) An Ever More Complex Union: The Regional Variable as a Missing Link in the EU 
Constitution? (Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004) 58-60. 
 
1183 Other cases concerning autonomies include Case C-88/03 Portugal v Commission (Azores) [2006] 
ECR I-07115 and Joined Cases C-428/06 to C-434/06 Unión General de Trabajadores de la Rioja 
(UGT-Rioja) et al [2008] ECR I-06747. 
 
1184 Angonese v Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA (n 34). 
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this limited radius of examination can be read as a silent approval of policies which 
foster a regional minority language at the cost of the Common Market.”1185 
 
So far, the ECJ’s decisions to prevent regional authorities from maintaining a 
monopoly over issuing certificates of language proficiency and to extend the right to 
use minority languages before national courts, coupled with the recognition of the 
legitimacy of minority protection in Mutsch1186 and Bickel and Franz1187 (discussed 
on pages 313-314), have had the positive outcome of re-balancing existing 
arrangements which “impose legal restrictions that are not (or no more) proportional 
in view of the factual and political situation at hand.”1188 However, a more minority-
friendly approach could be adopted in the future based on Article 2 TEU, which may 
give the ECJ some backing to adopt an explicitly pro-minority approach. Following 
the HRC approach, under Article 27 ICCPR as a part of the general principles of EU 
law (discussed on pages 168-169), according to which a State “must not deny a 
migrant worker or a visitor membership in an existing minority merely on the basis of 
the temporary nature of his or her visit”,1189 may allow the ECJ to be more selective 
in extending benefits granted to territorial minorities to other EU citizens. Otherwise, 
testing privileges in autonomy regimes enacted for minority protection against 
                                                 
 
1185 Toggenburg, ‘Minority Protection in a Supranational Context…’ (n 1078) 27. 
 
1186 Ministere Public v Robert Heinrich Maria Mutsch (n 579). 
 
1187 Bickel and Franz (n 34). 
 
1188 Toggenburg, ‘Minority Protection in a Supranational Context…’ (n 1078) 31. Cf, Weber, 
‘Individual Rights and Group Rights…’ (n 1121). 
 
1189 Scheinin, ‘The United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights…’ (n 17) 26. 
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internal market rights may result in “a gradual erosion of the competences of 
autonomous entities”1190 and a watering down of the benefits available to minorities.  
 
Therefore, greater sensitivity is required from the ECJ in dealing with privileges 
accorded to minority groups through autonomy arrangements, depending on the rights 
at stake and, more significantly, the personal scope of their application. If, as in 
Mutsch and Bickel/Franz, the issue concerns use of a minority language before a 
court, extending this right to other EU citizens may not necessarily impact minorities 
in a negative way. Although provision of a bilingual court is costly, if it already 
exists, the increased number of users will raise “neither the political nor financial 
costs of such a ‘privilege’”.1191  Conversely, where, for example, access to quotas for 
minority representation in public bodies is at stake, weighting them against a potential 
effect on market freedoms may put minority protection regimes at risk. In particular, 
changing the personal scope of such rules means  
first, that the financial cost for the public authorities involved rises 
significantly (e.g., more persons entitled to privileged social housing 
means more costs for the respective authority); second, that political 
costs might be involved (e.g., opening the labor market to new groups 
of persons can alter the social structure and political outlook of a 
region); and, third, that the rule at stake might sooner or later, through 
an expansion of its personal scope, be led ad absurdum and lose its 
raison d’etre (e.g., the reservation of quotas in the public 
administration for a certain linguistic minority group resident in a 
specific region might lose its meaning if these quotas were opened to 
all EU citizens). 1192  
 
Hilpold argues that there is a danger that a dramatic increase in the number of 
beneficiaries of special rights may result in the withdrawal of a regime granted by 
                                                 
 
1190 Silverström, ‘The Competence of Autonomous Entities…’ (n 1133) 271. 
 
1191 Toggenburg, ‘Minority Protection in a Supranational Context…’ (n 1078) 30. 
 
1192 Toggenburg, ‘Minority Protection in a Supranational Context…’ (n 1078) 29-30. 
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States.1193 However, as discussed in Chapter I on page 108, States can neither 
unilaterally withdraw nor worsen existing autonomy arrangements. However, an 
increased number of beneficiaries could discourage States from expanding and 
strengthening existing autonomy arrangements or granting special rights to other 
minority groups. Therefore, the ECJ needs to take into consideration the personal 
scope and the rights at stake while opening minority rights systems to EU citizens in 
general.1194  
 
Would these cases have a different outcome were the ECJ to decide them based on the 
relatively new provisions affirming EU respect for cultural diversity in Member 
States? Given that Article 167(1) TFEU (ex-Article 151(1) TEC) on cultural policy 
and Article 22 CFR on the EU commitment to respect cultural diversity seem to be 
targeted at protecting Member States’ cultures, it seems unlikely, however. For 
example, even though Article 167(2) TFEU (ex-Article 151(2)) aims to encourage 
cooperation between Member States in inter alia ‘improvement of the knowledge and 
dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples’, given the EU’s 
commitment to respect the national identities and regional diversity of its Member 
States, it seems that the application of this provision is limited to States. Likewise, the 
explanatory report to the CFR clarifies that Article 22 is based on Article 167 TFEU, 
so its scope too may be limited to protecting Member States’ cultures.1195 In applying 
                                                 
 
1193 Hilpold, ‘Union Citizenship and Language Rights’ (n 1083) 119. 
 
1194 Toggenburg, ‘Minority Protection in a Supranational Context…’ (n 1078) 30. 
 
1195 For example, in Re Commission Recruitment Notices: Italy (Spain and Latvia, intervening) (n 
1073), Italy argued that by failing to publish vacancy notices for senior management posts in Italian, 
the Commission has infringed not only Articles 1, 3, 4 & 5 of Regulation 1/58 and Article 12 EC, but 
also Article 22 CFR. The ECJ, without relying on Article 22 CFR, annulled the Commission’s 
Decision to publish the vacancy notices for senior management posts in English, French and German 
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these provisions, there is a risk that the EU may focus unduly on cultural diversity at 
the Member State level, and not include the sub-national level. However, a broad 
reading of the above provisions does not exclude, for example, financial or technical 
support by the EU to minority cultural projects.1196  
 
Nor do the general principles of EU law fill this gap. The discretion to grant 
autonomy remains firmly with the Member States, a power they relatively rarely 
exercise out of fears of secessionist trends. The main State obligations are not to 
worsen or unilaterally abolish existing autonomy arrangements, as well as to allow 
minorities to peacefully demand greater autonomy. Nor do minority-specific 
instruments contain an explicit right to autonomy; however, because the collective 
exercise of rights cannot be easily divorced from minority protection, some implicit 
support for the exercise of these rights may be read in Articles 15 and 16 FCNM, as 
well as Articles 1 and 27 ICCPR.  
 
Given that international instruments are silent on the right to autonomy, it is 
remarkable that as early as 1988, the EP advocated minimum basic principles of an 
effective autonomy regime, such as the highest possible institutional status within the 
national legal order; institutions democratically elected by the people; powers to 
organise their own institutions and to promote and manage the preservation of their 
cultural and linguistic traditions; financial autonomy; trans-frontier cooperation; and 
                                                                                                                                            
for the period ending 1 January 2007, as well as vacancy notice COM(2005)335 for the post of 
Director-General of the European Anti-Fraud Office [2005] OJ C34A/3. 
 
1196 Rachael Craufurd Smith, ‘From Heritage Conservation to European Identity: Article 151 EC and 
the Multi-Faceted Nature of Community Cultural Policy’ (2007) 32(1) European Law Review 48-69, 
57. 
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participation in EU law-making in matters affecting their interests.1197 Regrettably, 
due to the political sensitivity of minority protection, the proposals have not been 
supported by other EU institutions or Member States.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 
The above discussion suggested that the movement towards strengthening the powers 
of the EU is being accompanied by the process of decentralisation in many Member 
States. This process is partly driven by territorial minorities aiming to preserve their 
identity and to be heard at the supranational level without seceding from their home 
State. The Scottish devolution illustrates how autonomy arrangements can allow a 
group to decide on matters of a particular concern to it at both national and 
supranational levels. This example1198 suggests that a group’s identity is best 
protected through a combination of individual and collective rights.  
 
                                                 
 
1197 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on Community Regional Policy…’ (n 1162) para 31 (a-g). 
In addition, the EP emphasised that the effective participation of regions inhabited by minorities in 
political, economic and cultural affairs should be in line with Article 15 FCNM; such participation  
may entail stronger autonomy claims by minorities. The EP also proposed that the EU incorporate the 
Council of Europe’s European Charter of Local Self-Government into the acquis communautaire, to 
ensure that the EU is constructed based on the principles of democracy and transparency, dialogue and 
cooperation. Such an incorporation would seal the EU’s commitment to regionalisation in its Member 
States. 
 
1198 For discussion of other successful examples of autonomy arrangements in EU Member States see 
Susanna Mancini and Bruno de Witte, ‘Language Rights as Cultural Rights: A European Perspective’ 
in F Francioni and M Scheinin (eds) Cultural Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden/Boston 2008) 257-263; see also, Anthony Alcock, ‘The Protection of Regional Cultural 
Minorities and the Process of European Integration: The Example of South Tyrol’ (1992) 11 
International Relations 17-36; Jan Clement, ‘Territoriality versus Personality’ in A Verstichel et al 
(eds) The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: A Useful Pan-European 
Instrument? (Intersentia, Oxford 2008) 51-68; K Azopardi, Sovereignty and the Stateless Nation: 
Guibraltar in the Modern European Legal Context (Hart, Oxford 2010).  
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The creation of the CoR gave some impetus for participation of autonomous regions 
in EU affairs, although the link between the EU and sub-state authorities is still weak. 
Nevertheless, the new powers of the CoR to protect its prerogatives before the ECJ 
and partially monitor the application of the principle of subsidiarity are significant 
developments. Moreover, the EU’s recent recognition of respect for the constitutional 
make-up of Member States is an important step in building multilevel governance. 
 
However, the CoR’s monitoring of the principle of subsidiarity could be further 
strengthened through a clearer division of competences among the EU, Member 
States and the regions. Furthermore, the CoR should be accorded a stronger say in the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity, comparable to that of national Parliaments.  
To make territorial minorities’ presence in the EU more visible and allow them to 
voice their needs at the supranational level, the CoR should be restructured and 
include a new chamber. In addition, EU rules on culture should be tailored, not only 
to the protection of Member States’ identities, but also to the preservation of regional 
characteristics. Moreover, the ECJ should show greater sensitivity in dealing with the 
special rights accorded to minorities in autonomous regions. While the extension of 
existing privileges to other EU citizens has so far only supported the viability of, for 
example, court proceedings in a minority language, the ECJ may need to be more 
selective in opening access to special rights to persons not belonging to a minority. 
Where the ECJ allows access by other EU citizens to existing privileges for 
minorities, based on Article 2 TEU and the general principles of EU law, an explicitly 
pro-minority approach could be adopted through endorsement of the HRC’s generous 
approach to the definition of ‘minority’, which encourages migrants and even visitors 
to access existing special rights.     
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Arguably, a greater recognition and involvement of sub-state authorities in EU 
decision-making, both through formulating EU laws of particular concern to them and 
monitoring the application of subsidiarity, would benefit both minority groups and the 
EU. Those stronger links between the EU and territorial minorities could positively 
impact the implementation of EU rules, because sub-state authorities that had a 
greater input into policy-making would have a “greater sense of ownership of the final 
product.”1199 The idea of shared sovereignty could satisfy the aspirations of territorial 
minorities for recognition of their roles in shaping the EU.  
 
Furthermore, institutionalisation of minority participation in EU law-making, at least 
in matters of particular concern to them, could be instrumental in addressing the 
‘democratic deficit’ in the EU. Even though the Lisbon Treaty has increased the role 
of national Parliaments in EU law-making,1200 as the EP convincingly argues, 
European political unity “must also be based on regional communities and on the 
recognition and enhancement of their autonomy.”1201 Therefore, greater political 
endorsement of the EP’s proposals could significantly enhance protection of minority 
rights in the EU, including the right to autonomy. The stronger a minority group’s 
domestic legal status, the better its voice may be heard at the EU level. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
1199 Roht-Arriaza, ‘The Committee on the Regions…’ (n 469) 464. 
 
1200 Protocol (No 1) on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union [2010] OJ C 83/203. 
 
1201 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on Community Regional Policy…’ (n 1162) para 21. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 
REINVENTING THE WHEEL OR JOINING FORCES? 
 
 
This thesis sets out to address several interlinked research questions through four case 
studies on some of the most problematic aspects of minority protection. The case 
studies assess issues concerning political participation, freedom to manifest religion, 
access to mother-tongue education and autonomy arrangements in several EU 
Member States. The aim of the case studies is to ascertain the EU’s current 
contribution to minority protection and whether its role in this field should increase 
further.  
 
The approach of the conclusions and recommendations to this thesis is based on two 
arguments. First, based on the conclusions of the case-studies, Section 1 analyses the 
capacity of the EU to protect minority rights using existing resources in EU law. The 
analysis also evaluates the possibility for the development of an EU regime of 
minority protection, which is a possibility in the long run. As EU law stands, a 
generous reading of Article 2 TEU, Articles 21 and 22 CFR, and the Race Directive 
may be laying a foundation for a future EU regime of minority protection. However, 
even the combined reading of all these provisions does not confer on the EU an 
adequate competence. Consequently, without Treaty revisions, the EU cannot develop 
a coherent system of minority protection comparable to that under the FCNM.  
 
Second, Section 2 suggests a simpler option, although not the easiest course of action, 
that the EU could undertake. It reviews the increasing significance of the FCNM as a 
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benchmark of minority protection in the EP’s non-binding resolutions, and the EU’s 
pre-accession conditionality towards countries aspiring to EU membership. Having 
demonstrated this penetration of the FCNM into the EU legal order, this section 
explores the pros and cons of EU monitoring of Member States’ compliance with the 
FCNM, and even the possibility of EU accession to this instrument. 
  
1. Reinventing the wheel? 
 
 
This section aims to evaluate the extent of the EU’s current contribution to minority 
protection and its capacity to construct a coherent regime that could adequately 
protect minority rights. As Chapter I highlighted, there are two key features of 
minority protection: non-discrimination and special rights. This section begins with 
the principle of non-discrimination in EU law as compared with international 
standards (1.1). It then evaluates to what extent EU law contributes to the protection 
of special rights of minorities in its Member States (1.2). Based on this assessment, 
the possibility of an EU regime of minority protection is discussed (1.3). 
 
1.1. The principle of non-discrimination  
 
The principle of non-discrimination is one of the essential aspects of minority 
protection. The principle is well established in international and regional treaties on 
human rights in general, and on minority rights in particular.1202 It is noteworthy that 
international treaties do not explicitly differentiate between direct and indirect 
                                                 
1202 For discussion see pages 26-28. 
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discrimination. The jurisprudence of international courts and quasi-judicial bodies has 
not always drawn a distinction between direct and indirect discrimination.1203 For 
example, only relatively recently, the ECtHR started to use statistics in cases 
involving indirect discrimination, and highlighted the possibility of shifting the 
burden of proof onto a State.1204 Significantly, in elaborating these principles, the 
ECtHR has extensively relied on the ECJ’s case law and the EU Equality 
Directives.1205 
 
In contrast, the Race and Employment Directives are welcome exceptions. Both 
instruments define the terms ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ discrimination, partly based on the 
ECJ’s role in shaping these definitions in its case law on anti-discrimination on the 
grounds of sex and nationality.1206 The ECJ’s progressive reading of the principle of 
non-discrimination has made an important contribution to the development of anti-
discrimination laws in the EU. Accordingly, where the principle of non-discrimination 
is concerned, EU anti-discrimination law seems much stronger than that found in 
international and regional standards. 
 
Where the grounds of non-discrimination are concerned, the jurisprudence of 
international courts and quasi-judicial bodies is limited and relatively weak regarding 
‘membership of a national minority’ or ‘religion’.1207 Conversely, the grounds of race 
                                                 
1203 For analysis see pages 32-35. 
 
1204 For analysis see pages 36, 42-45. 
 
1205 For analysis see page 36. 
 
1206 For discussion see page 32. 
 
1207 For analysis see pages 37-42. 
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or ethnic origin receive much stronger protection.1208 A similar hierarchy can be 
observed in EU law. Currently, the EU Equality Directives offer strong guarantees on 
non-discrimination based on racial or ethnic origin, and (to a lesser degree) on 
religion. In contrast, other grounds, such as ‘membership of a national minority’ or 
‘language’ receive less protection. These grounds are integral parts of EU law through 
its general principles and the CFR, and may be used only to challenge an EU act or a 
Member State’s implementing measures.    
 
In principle, were the EU to create a regime of minority protection, it already has in 
place strong guarantees to meet one of the essential requirements of minority 
protection, i.e., the principle of non-discrimination. It would need to include explicit 
grounds of non-discrimination based on association with a minority in Article 19 
TFEU. To avoid a hierarchy of grounds, the scope of the future Equality Directives 
should match that of the Race Directive.   
 
1.2. ‘Special’ rights 
 
To construct a coherent system of minority protection, EU law would also need to 
introduce special minority rights (discussed in Section 2 of Chapter I on pages 53-
127). Admittedly, with a view to ensuring full equality in practice, Article 5 of the 
Race Directive and Article 7 of the Employment Directive permit Member States to 
maintain or adopt specific measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages 
linked to racial or ethnic origin and religion.1209 Because the requirements in these 
                                                 
 
1208 For analysis see pages 42-49. 
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provisions are permissive and not mandatory,1210 they are not enough on their own to 
create an effective regime of minority protection. Indeed, true substantive equality 
cannot be effectively achieved in practice without positive State action, ranging from 
the creation of equality of opportunities to ensuring equality of results,1211 aimed at 
creating the conditions necessary for the preservation of a minority’s unique identity.  
 
The discussion below evaluates the potential of EU rules, including the general 
principles of EU law, to guarantee special rights of minorities in Member States.  
 
1.2.1. The right of minorities to political participation  
 
As discussed in Chapter II, EU law does not contain the positive duties necessary to 
guarantee the right of minorities to political participation. For example, the Long-
Term Residents Directive fails to remedy the situation of Russian-speaking non-
citizens in Latvia, because it lacks provisions on political participation.1212 Moreover, 
                                                                                                                                            
1209 See also Directive 2000/43 (Race Directive) (n 41) Preamble (Recital 17), which states that 
measures intended to prevent or compensate for disadvantages suffered by members of a racial or 
ethnic group may include organisations of persons of a particular racial or ethnic origin where their 
main object is the promotion of the special needs of those persons.  
 
1210 Timothy Jones, ‘The Race Directive: Redefining Protection from Discrimination in EU Law’ 
(2003) 5 EHRLR 515-526, 522.  
 
1211 The requirement of equal opportunity may have different meanings. For example, it may be limited 
to removal of barriers to access of minorities to education. This in itself may not necessarily guarantee 
the right of minority children to education. A broader reading of this term may require States to provide 
resources to ensure that members of a disadvantaged minority group have access to education. 
Monitoring equality of results may be also appropriate in some contexts to, for example, measure the 
average attainment of minority children at school. For discussion see, Sandra Fredman and Sarah 
Spencer, ‘Beyond Discrimination: It’s Time for Enforceable Duties on Public Bodies to Promote 
Equality Outcomes’ (2006) 6 EHRLR 598-606, 601. See also, Henrard, ‘Equal Rights versus Special 
Rights?...’ (n 909) 48-50.  
 
1212 For analysis see pages 208-209. 
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even the strong guarantee on non-discrimination in the Race Directive is unlikely to 
help, because the scope of the instrument does not extend to political participation.1213 
 
The case study highlighted that the main route to EU political rights of Russian-
speaking non-citizens in Latvia is currently through the acquisition of Latvian 
nationality. Potentially, a broad interpretation of the term ‘national’/‘nationality’ in 
Articles 9 TEU and 20(1) TFEU, coupled with Micheletti and the interpretation by the 
Constitutional Court of Latvia of the concept of ‘national’ under the ECHR, could 
remedy the restrictive citizenship laws in Latvia and lead to the acquisition of EU 
citizenship by Russian-speaking non-citizens, allowing their political participation at 
the EU level.1214 However, this might be the solution only to the particular problem of 
Russian-speaking non-citizens in Latvia, excluded from political participation through 
the citizenship requirement. The exclusion of minorities from political participation 
may take different forms and persist in other countries aspiring to the EU 
membership.1215 
 
The question is, then, do the general principles of EU law fill this gap by requiring 
positive State action? Let us consider international and European standards to 
establish the extent of positive State action required to guarantee the right of 
minorities to political participation. As to the right to vote, States have to organise 
genuine elections and must respect the will of people expressed through them.1216 In 
addition, positive State duties include an obligation to introduce legislative changes to 
                                                 
1213 For analysis see page 207. 
 
1214 For analysis see pages 211-216. 
 
1215 For analysis see page 229. 
 
1216 For analysis see page 58. 
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ensure political participation of minorities.1217 States may also be obliged to take 
account of the special position of minorities in their electoral systems.1218 However, 
the introduction of a differentiated electoral system, necessary to accommodate 
political participation of minorities in certain regions, remains at States’ discretion.  
 
Where the right to stand for elections is concerned, States have a duty to avoid 
disadvantaging minorities in their electoral systems. Drawing electoral boundaries and 
allocating votes must not act to discriminate against minorities.1219 In addition, States 
must ensure that, in administering any language tests that may be required by electoral 
law, procedural safeguards are guaranteed.1220 However, because, unlike the right to 
vote, the right to stand for elections is an active right, there are more limitations on its 
exercise. For example, historic and political factors may be decisive in the assessment 
of State compliance with the ECHR.1221 Moreover, international courts have not 
supported the claims of minorities wishing to exercise their political rights through the 
medium of a minority language.1222 In addition, there is no requirement of a specific 
electoral system. As a result, international courts have tended to grant a wide margin 
of discretion to States in matters of political participation.  
 
Consequently, even though international courts sometimes read in positive State 
action in their interpretation of international treaties, there are only limited duties to 
                                                 
 
1217 For analysis see pages 58-59. 
 
1218 For analysis see page 59. 
 
1219 For analysis see pages 60-61. 
 
1220 For analysis see pages 61-62. 
 
1221 For analysis see pages 63-64. 
 
1222 For analysis see pages 62-63. 
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offer special rights. In guaranteeing the right to political participation, the main 
emphasis remains on the principle of non-discrimination. Thus, with the more 
confident application of Article 14 and Protocol 12 ECHR, it appears that the ECtHR 
grants a narrower margin of discretion, by recently suggesting, for example, that 
States should use mechanisms of power-sharing that do not automatically deprive 
minorities of their right to political participation.1223 However, even these 
encouraging developments are not sufficient to guarantee minority rights effectively. 
Currently, the only instrument that explicitly requires positive State action is the 
FCNM,1224 which has not yet been recognised as a part of the general principles of 
U law.  
 Latvia’s 
xclusionary practices as a serious and persistent breach of Article 2 TEU.  
                                                
E
 
Therefore, to construct a regime of minority protection, the EU may need to adopt an 
explicit provision on the political participation of minorities. As the experience of 
Latvia’s accession to the EU illustrates, such a provision would need to be applied 
uniformly and consistently both to current Member States and to candidate countries 
prior to and post accession.1225 To be able to do this, the EU would need to initiate 
further Treaty revisions to acquire an explicit competence to protect minorities and an 
appropriate legal basis to adopt norms facilitating the political participation of 
minorities. Even though such a development is possible, it is highly unlikely to take 
place in the short term. At present, the EU’s action in this field may be mainly 
reactive. For example, under Article 7 TEU, the EU could condemn
e
 
 
1223 For analysis see pages 64-67. 
 
1224 For analysis see pages 67-68. 
 
1225 For analysis see pages 188-201. 
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 1.2.2. Freedom to manifest religion   
1226
1227
 
Chapter III explained that EU law does not contain any special rights of minorities 
which could guarantee their right to manifest their religion in publicly-funded schools. 
However, Articles 10 and 14 CFR contain guarantees on the freedom to manifest 
religion comparable to the ECHR standards in Articles 9 and P1-2.  Given that the 
CFR provisions on freedom of religion will be interpreted in line with the ECHR,  
it may be useful to consider the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, which also constitutes a part 
of the general principles of EU law. 
 
In its jurisprudence, the ECtHR has inferred only limited positive State duties in 
relation to freedom of religion. First, States must be neutral towards various 
religions.  They do not have the power to assess minorities’ beliefs.  However, 
in matters relating to the manifestation of religion, the ECtHR grants States a broad 
margin of discretion, largely because there is no consensus on the scope of religion in 
Europe.  A particularly broad margin of discretion is granted in headscarf case-law, 
where the ECtHR has accepted political, cultural and historic arguments of States 
with little apparent scrutiny.  Moreover, based on the experience of secular States, 
such as France and Turkey, which generally attach great significance to the “citizen-
1228 1229
1230
1231
                                                 
1226 For analysis see pages 276-278. 
27 Article 52(3) CFR. 
28 For analysis see page 75. 
29 For analysis see page 75. 
30 For analysis see page 76. 
31 For analysis see pages 76-83. 
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state concept of nation and are reluctant to recognise ethnic diversity”,1232 the ECtHR 
set a very high bar for the freedom to manifest religion in the 47 Contracting Parties 
to the CoE. The recent jurisprudence suggests that the ECtHR is likely to maintain its 
restrictive reading of Article 9.1233 Because the ECHR features strongly in the ECJ’s 
jurisprudence on fundamental rights, it is unlikely that the Court would follow the less 
strictive approach of the HRC in Hudoyberganova.1234  
                                                
re
 
As the ECtHR’s jurisprudence does not offer much hope of a right for minorities 
wishing to wear religious dress in educational establishments, the matter of the 
manifestation of religion in EU law may be addressed through EU anti-discrimination 
rules. Thus, religious minorities may claim indirect discrimination under the Race and 
Employment Directives. Regrettably, the Employment Directive has limited scope, 
which does not yet extend to education.1235 Were it to be extended to education, the 
proposed amendments to the Employment Directive1236 suggest that the EU might 
attempt to remove itself from dealing with this matter altogether. In addition, the 
Employment Directive contains clauses that could limit the manifestation of 
religion.1237 Consequently, even though more claims of indirect discrimination may 
come before national courts, the outcome of these cases will depend on a correct 
 
e Protection of National Minorities: A Useful Pan-European Instrument? (Intersentia, 
xford 2008) 7. 
33 For analysis see pages 81-83. 
ation was partially due to the State’s failure to provide justifications under Article 
8(3) ICCPR.    
35 For analysis see pages 150, 268. 
36 For analysis see pages 274-275. 
37 For analysis see pages 278-279. 
 
1232 Asbjørn Eide, ‘Towards a Pan-European Instrument?’ in A Verstichel et al (eds) Framework 
Convention for th
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1234 As discussed on pages 84-87, the precedential value of this case is questionable, however, because 
finding of a viol
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choice of a comparator and the justifications presented by States.1238 However, were 
the Race Directive, which applies to education, to be interpreted in line with the 
jurisprudence of English courts, some groups, which share both a common ethnic 
origin and a common religion, might be able to prove indirect discrimination and thus 
cceed in exercising the right to wear religious dress in publicly-funded schools.1239  
y racial and ethnic 
inorities to claim equal treatment in educational establishments.  
 
3. The right to access education in a minority language 
                                                
su
 
In theory, the EU could be legitimately involved in the matter, because the limitations 
on manifesting religious dress have already acquired a trans-European character. 
However, an EU-wide rule permitting religious dress in schools is highly unlikely due 
to the lack of a legal basis and the relevant competences, as well as the opposition 
arising in some EU Member States.1240 Nevertheless, the EU might fail to avoid the 
matter, because, inevitably, the Race Directive could be invoked b
m
1.2.
 
As Chapter IV illustrated, overall, the EU right to access to education satisfies three 
requirements: physical accessibility, economic accessibility and non-discriminatory 
treatment.1241 Equal treatment in physical and economic accessibility has a higher 
prominence in EU law than under international and European instruments, even 
though Förster has slightly detracted from the previously established guarantees on 
 
38 For analysis see pages 270-272, 280. 
39 For analysis see pages 146-147 and 263-265. 
40 For analysis see pages 238-243. 
41 For analysis see pages 289-303. 
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economic accessibility.1242 Equally, the ECJ has developed a strong body of case-law 
on non-discriminatory treatment in access to education through its generous 
interpretation of provisions on vocational training, non-discrimination based on 
nationality, free movement regimes and, more recently, EU citizenship rights.1243 
Furthermore, the Race Directive may serve as a new impetus to guarantee equal 
eatment of racial and ethnic minorities in education.1244  
convictions 
ight also contain some scope to protect minority rights to education.1248  
                                                
tr
 
Significantly, some limited positive duties to guarantee mother-tongue education can 
be found in Directive 77/486, which could have a beneficial impact on the educational 
rights of ‘new’ minorities, even though the implementation of this instrument remains 
weak in many Member States.1245 Likewise, further special rights to education in a 
minority language could be inferred from the general principles of EU law. Thus, an 
obligation to ensure mother-tongue education may exist where a State chooses to 
provide primary education in a minority language.1246 This State duty is likely to 
apply in contexts where major limitations exist on the physical accessibility of 
education.1247 Another relevant factor may be a significant number of families who 
wish that their children continue education in a minority language. In addition, the 
parental right to educate their children in line with their pedagogical 
m
 
42 For analysis see pages 296-301. 
43 For analysis see pages 301-303. 
44 For analysis see pages 303-305. 
45 For analysis see pages 291-292. 
46 For analysis see page 306. 
47 For analysis see page 306-307. 
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 Despite strong guarantees on access to education, EU rules are not specifically 
tailored to the needs of minorities. Provisions on the right to mother-tongue education 
in EU law have limited potential and could mainly benefit the children of migrant 
workers from other Member States. Significantly, equal treatment of racial and ethnic 
minorities under the Race Directive may include some linguistic component.1249 This 
would largely depend on the context of a case and the ECJ’s willingness to be 
creative. Similarly, any application of a positive State duty to guarantee mother-
tongue education under the general principles of EU law is likely to be context 
cific.1250 
ty years of non-implementation of the ECtHR’s judgment in Belgian 
inguistics.1252  
 
                                                                                                                                           
spe
   
Moreover, as the case study of Belgium demonstrated, the EU is unlikely to require its 
Member States to guarantee access to mother-tongue education due to the limited EU 
competences in education, as well as to its limited powers to deal with internal 
situations and minority languages.1251 Therefore, for the EU to have a fully-fledged 
system of minority protection, further Treaty revisions are needed. As with political 
participation, current EU action in this field may be mainly reactive. For example, 
under the Article 7 TEU mechanism, the EU could impose sanctions on Belgium in 
relation to its for
L
 
1248 For analysis see page 306. 
 
1249 For analysis see page 304. 
 
1250 For analysis see page 307. 
 
1251 For analysis see pages 309-317. 
 
1252 For analysis see pages 317-318. 
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 1.2.4. The right to autonomy  
ience of many 
estern European States illustrates, these fears are largely unfounded.  
                                              
 
It is not surprising that EU law does not contain any special right of minorities to 
autonomy, as there is no explicit right to autonomy as such in international law.1253 
Even though autonomy arrangements have proved to be invaluable to guarantee 
effective participation of minorities and to preserve their unique identity, States often 
equate autonomy arrangements with possible secession. As the exper
w
 
Despite the lack of explicit rules on the right to autonomy in EU law, some guidance 
on State duties can be derived from the general principles of EU law, based on the 
jurisprudence of international courts. Thus, although the discretion to grant autonomy 
remains with individual States, they do not possess similarly broad powers to 
unilaterally revoke or worsen existing autonomy arrangements.1254 Moreover, States 
are obliged to respect peaceful calls by a minority for autonomy arrangements and 
recognition of its identity, provided that the means employed and the proposed 
changes are in line with democratic principles.1255 Furthermore, there is notable 
support of international courts for special arrangements introduced to protect 
minorities. These special arrangements may include a differential electoral system or 
residence requirements limiting voting rights of persons not belonging to a 
minority.1256 In addition, the right of minorities to cultural autonomy has received 
   
53 For analysis see page 104. 
54 For analysis see pages 108-112. 
55 For analysis see pages 112-115. 
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strong protection through a combined reading of freedom of religion and freedom of 
association.1257 Regrettably, the support of international courts for existing 
arrangements does not amount to a requirement of a positive State duty to grant 
autonomy. A similar lack of a positive State obligation can be observed in minority 
rights’ instruments. Nevertheless, despite the lack of explicit provisions on the right to 
autonomy, both the ICCPR and the FCNM contain provisions favouring a collective 
imension to minority rights.1258   
                                                                                                                                           
d
 
The lack of explicit rules on the right of minorities to autonomy is further 
compounded in the EU, where the link between the supranational level and sub-state 
authorities remains very weak.1259 At the very least, the structure of the CoR should 
reflect the presence of territorial minorities in the Member States and allow them to 
voice their needs.1260 Equally, the CoR’s role in monitoring the application of 
subsidiarity should be increased to match the role of national Parliaments.1261 
Furthermore, greater endorsement of the EP’s proposals could eventually lead to the 
recognition of the right to autonomy in Member States.1262 Were the EU to acquire 
the necessary competence, it must address four deficiencies in its current approach to 
autonomies: (1) the EU places an emphasis on the individual rights of persons 
belonging to minorities, but does not recognise collective rights; (2) it does not 
 
1256 For analysis see pages 107-108. 
 
1257 For analysis see pages 108-112. 
 
1258 For analysis see pages 115-126. 
 
1259 For analysis see pages 337-339. 
 
1260 For analysis see page 348. 
 
1261 For analysis see page 341. 
 
1262 For analysis see pages 346-347. 
 364
meddle in questions of internal government in Member States; (3) it is reluctant to 
advocate territorial autonomy as a conflict-resolution mechanism; and last, but not 
ast, (4) it generally limits the issue of minority protection to CEECs.1263 
 
t be highly 
ontroversial and create political resistance from some Member States.  
iscussed in Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter I) have their 
own strengths 
 mechanisms, 
le
1.3. An EU regime of minority protection? 
 
In light of the above overview, let us consider the key research questions posed in this 
thesis: should the EU take these developments any further and play a more prominent 
role in protecting minorities in its Member States? Overall, as EU law stands, it has 
some potential to contribute to minority protection. It has a strong framework on non-
discrimination and some provisions that could have limited and often indirect impact 
on the protection of special rights. However, to design a fully-fledged regime of 
minority protection, the EU must acquire the necessary competences and revise the 
Treaties to include a relevant legal basis. Such an attempt migh
c
 
Significantly, were the necessary political consensus achieved, EU law contains a 
number of instruments and mechanisms that could lead to the establishment of an 
effective system of minority protection. Indeed, although each of the regimes under 
the ICCPR, ECHR and FCNM (d
and weaknesses,  
none of them enjoys the combination of regularity and frequency of 
monitoring, the relative degree of institutional and political closeness 
and trust between participating States, and the established
                                                 
 
1263 Michael Keating, ‘Federalism and the Balance of Power in European States’ (OECD, 2007) 16. 
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institutions and array of instruments for policy coordination and 
mutual learning as does the European Union system.1264 
uire a 
ompetence in minority rights, the FRA could be accorded that monitoring role. 
 
Let us consider some of the benefits offered by the EU legal system. Where 
monitoring is concerned, the recently established EU Fundamental Rights Agency 
(FRA)1265 has several major functions, namely, to collect data on fundamental rights 
in the EU, to produce expert opinions, and to promote dialogue with civil society to 
raise public awareness. The FRA’s functions at present do not include monitoring 
Member States’ compliance with human or minority rights. Were the EU to acq
c
 
Furthermore, the institutional and political closeness of EU Member States, based on 
their duty of sincere cooperation and mutual respect under Article 4(3) TEU,1266 has 
proved invaluable in ensuring the effectiveness and uniform application of EU law in 
Member States.1267 These obligations make the EU system far more effective than 
those of the UN or the CoE. Therefore, if the EU had the necessary competence to 
                                                 
 
1264 de Búrca, ‘Beyond the Charter…’ (n 677). 
 
1265 Council (EC) Regulation No 168/2007 establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights [2007] OJ L 53/2. 
 
1266 Article 4(3) TEU stipulates:  
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States 
shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from 
the Treaties.  
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the 
acts of the institutions of the Union.  
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.  
 
1267 See, for example, Case C-106/89 Marleasing Sa v La Comercial Internacional [1990] ECR I-4135; 
Case C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg (Inland Waterways Agreement) [2005] ECR I-4805. See 
also, John Temple Lang, ‘Developments, Issues, and New Remedies - The Duties of National 
Authorities and Courts under Article 10 of the EC Treaty’ (2004) 27 Fordham International Law 
Journal 1904-1939. 
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protect the rights of minorities, Member States would be under the legal obligation to 
perform their duties in good faith. Failure of a Member State to fulfil its obligations 
nder the TEU may result in infringement proceedings before the ECJ1268 and lead to 
st practices from other Member 
   
u
imposition of a penalty.1269  
 
As to the range of instruments and mechanisms, EU law often effectively combines 
hard law and soft law mechanisms.1270 For example, the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) has been used to strengthen the provisions of EU Treaties by 
fostering permanent dialogue and mutual learning among Member States. The OMC 
is a framework for the Member States that allows convergence of national policies 
towards the main EU goals, and the spreading of best practices amongst Member 
States.1271 Accordingly, it is ‘soft’ policy co-ordination, “whose very innovation rests 
in its distance from ‘law’ traditionally understood.”1272 Convergence of policies may 
signify the wide identification of certain objectives, the definition of yardsticks to 
measure progress related to the objectives, and the creation of tools to achieve the 
objectives.1273 For example, if and when the EU has the competence to protect 
minority rights, this mechanism could be employed to further the right of minorities to 
access education in a minority language. Thus, be
                                              
68 Articles 258 and 259 TEU. 
Emergence, 
unction and Form of Europe’s Post-National Constellation (Hart, Oxford 2010). 
ving policies vis-a-vis minorities…’ (n 36)  17.  
9) 
4(1) European Law Review 55-79, 56. 
n 942) 526-527. 
12
 
1269 Article 260 (2) and (3) TEU. 
 
1270 For detailed analysis see, P Kjaer, Between Governing and Governance: On the 
F
 
1271 Gabriel Toggenburg, ‘The EU’s evol
 
1272 Mark Dawson, ‘The Ambiguity of Social Europe in the Open Method of Coordination’ (200
3
 
1273 Fredriksson, ‘Changes of Education Policies within the European Union…’ (
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States and peer review mechanisms could induce governments to promote this right 
, by 
                                              
while preserving some discretion on the matter.1274  
 
However, all these mechanisms can be used only if and when the EU acquires the 
necessary competence. At present, the EU could adopt a broad definition of ‘minority’ 
under Article 2 TEU. As argued in Chapter I on pages 130-155, such a definition 
should focus on the needs of minority groups, not labels. For example, Chapter II 
showed how States can use labels to evade their international obligations. Thus, 
Latvia introduced the artificially created label of ‘non-citizen’ to obfuscate the fact 
that, in effect, it has created statelessness, explicitly prohibited by a number of 
international agreements. The labels ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’, as highlighted in Chapter III, 
guarantee a higher level of protection to some groups, by, for instance, prohibiting 
indirect discrimination in the manifestation of religion in education, as compared to 
the protection available to ‘religious’ minorities. Similarly, opposition to the term 
‘regional’ minorities in Belgium leads to the denial of special rights in education to 
French-speakers in Flanders, as discussed in Chapter IV. Therefore, for the purposes 
of EU law, it is desirable to adopt a broad definition of ‘minority’, applied uniformly 
to current and future Member States, in order to ensure consistency in the EU’s 
approach to minorities (both internally and externally). Indeed, the Copenhagen 
criteria are silent on what types of minorities are protected; in its accession 
monitoring, the Commission too has adopted a broad approach to the definition
   
in Europe 16. 
 
1274 Martin Brusis, ‘The European Union and Interethnic Power-sharing Arrangements in Accession 
Countries’ (2003) 1 Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues 
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including, for example, migrants.1275 The required level of protection, then, should be 
based on a sliding scale of rights stemming from the particular needs of a group.   
 
Overall, the EU could undoubtedly play a greater role in minority protection. 
However, although it may be tempting to suggest that the EU should build on the 
existing framework and enact its own rules on the protection of minorities, 
reinventing the wheel would be counterproductive for both the EU and the CoE.1276 
Besides, developing a comprehensive regime of minority protection may be time-
 
The next section assesses whether the EU should combine its efforts with those of the 
M as an internal and external yardstick of minority protection. 
 
echanisms 
ith the FCNM? 
                                                
consuming. Therefore, a more practical contribution of the EU to minority protection 
could be through supporting the implementation of the FCNM by Member States.1277  
CoE, and use the FCN
2
w
. Joining Forces: Convergence of EU monitoring m
 
2.1. The FCNM’s penetration into EU law and policy 
 
 
1275 For discussion, see pages 179-180; see also, Kristin Henrard and Robert Dunbar, ‘Introduction’ in 
 Rainer Hofmann, ‘Implementation of the FCNM: Substantive Challenges’ in A Verstichel et al 
an 
 Similarly, in her recent book, Ahmed argues that the EU may be better placed to be a promoter, 
K Henrard and R Dunbar (eds) Synergies in Minority Protection: European and International Law 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008) 12. 
  
7612
(eds) The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: A Useful Pan-Europe
Instrument? (Intersentia, Oxford 2008) 162. 
 
7712
rather than a protector of minority rights. T Ahmed, The Impact of EU Law on Minority Rights (Heart, 
Oxford 2010).  
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The question of EU involvement in minority protection is not new and has been 
addressed by the EP since the 1980s. However, if the initial resolutions of the EP 
suggested a preference for development of minority standards at the supranational 
level,1278 recent resolutions suggest that the EP prefers the FCNM as an EU 
yardstick.1279 Thus, in 2003, the EP issued a report with recommendations to the 
Commission regarding the languages of minorities in the EU.1280 In this document, 
the EP strongly advocated coordinating action with the relevant CoE bodies, in 
particular the monitoring bodies of the FCNM.1281 In another recent resolution, the EP 
called on the Commission and Member States to treat linguistic minorities in the EU 
in accordance with the principles laid down in the FCNM.1282 The EP has also 
encouraged Member States to ensure effective participation of national minorities in 
public life as stipulated in Article 15 FCNM.1283 In addition, the EP urged the 
Commission to “establish a policy standard for the protection of national minorities, 
aving due regard to Article 4(2) [FCNM]”,1284 requiring full and effective equality 
                                                
h
between persons belonging to a national minority and those belonging to the majority. 
Accordingly, it appears that the EP increasingly treats the FCNM as the benchmark 
for minority protection in the EU. 
 
1278 European Parliament (EC), ‘Resolution on measures in favour of minority languages and cultures’ 
[1983] OJ C68/103; ‘Resolution on a Community charter of regional languages and cultures and on a 
7; ‘Resolution on 
nguistic and cultural minorities in the European Community’ [1994] OJ C061/110. 
nd 
ultural diversity’ [2003] 2003/2057(INI)) final A5-0271/2003; Resolution 2005/2008(INI) (n 584). 
80 European Parliament, Report 2003/2057(INI)) (n 1279).  
81 European Parliament, Report 2003/2057(INI)) (n 1279) paras 6, 7, 27 and 28. 
82 European Parliament, Resolution 2005/2008(INI) (n 584) para 44.  
83 European Parliament, Resolution 2005/2008(INI) (n 584) para 48.  
84 European Parliament, Resolution 2005/2008(INI) (n 584) para 6. 
charter of rights of ethnic minorities’ [1984] OJ C287/106; ‘Resolution on the languages and cultures 
of regional and ethnic minorities in the European Community’ [1987] Doc.A2-150/8
li
 
1279 European Parliament, ‘Report with recommendations to the Commission on European regional and 
lesser used languages—the languages of minorities in the EU—in the context of enlargement a
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 Likewise, in EU pre-accession policies and instruments, minority rights as stipulated 
in the FCNM have firmly entered EU political conditionality and EU membership 
obligations in several sets of EU instruments.1285 For example, in the 1997 Opinions 
on the candidate countries’ observance of the requirement of respect for and 
protection of minority rights under the Copenhagen criteria, the Commission based its 
assessments on the principles in the FCNM.1286 Failure to comply with these rules 
resulted in the postponement of opening accession negotiations, as Slovakia 
experienced.1287 Another instrument where the FCNM features strongly is the 
Accession Partnerships (APs) with the candidate countries, adopted by the Council on 
the Commission’s proposal. The APs set the targets in areas where States aspiring to 
EU membership are encouraged to improve their performance. Although the early 
APs did not refer to the FCNM consistently, recent APs explicitly use this instrument 
as the yardstick to assess candidate countries’ compliance with minority protection 
under the Copenhagen political criteria. By way of example, the 2008 Accession 
Partnership with Turkey insisted that the State should guarantee cultural diversity and 
ensure respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with the ECHR and the 
FCNM, and in line with best practice in Member States.1288 It is remarkable that 
                                                 
 
1285 Christophe Hillion, Report on The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
and the European Union (2008) Conference on Enhancing the Impact of the Framework Convention. 
 
1286 See, for example, Commission, ‘Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Romania’s Application 
for Membership of the European Union’ [1997] DOC/97/18, 15; ‘Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion 
n Estonia’s Application for Membership of the European Union’ [1997] DOC/97/12, 18. The 
ranteeing the educational rights of minorities in 
ne with the principles contained in the FCNM: Commission, ‘Opinion on Croatia’s Application for 
ssion, ‘Agenda 2000 - Commission Opinion on Slovakia’s Application for Membership of 
e European Union’ [1997] DOC/97/20, 23 and 126.  
o
Commission continues this practice in recent enlargements as well. Thus, the Opinion on Croatia’s 
application for membership commends Croatia for gua
li
Membership of the European Union’ [2004] COM/2004/0257final, 25-27.  
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candidate countries’ compliance with the ECHR and the FCNM are placed on an 
equal footing.1289  Likewise, increasing emphasis is placed on the FCNM in the 
Commission’s regular Progress Reports, which assess the candidates’ compliance 
with the Copenhagen criteria and the objectives of the APs. Thus, in the 2001 
Progress Report on Cyprus, the Commission criticised the country on the basis of the 
incompatibility between Article 2 of its Constitution, which imposes a certain identity 
(a minority group member has to choose to belong either to the ‘Greek’ or to the 
‘Turkish’ community, irrespective of their actual ethnic origin), and Article 3 FCNM, 
which leaves such choices with the persons belonging to a minority, as discussed in 
Chapter I on page 181.1290 Thus, the Commission has increasingly relied on the 
on negotiation phase.1291 For example, in the accession negotiations 
with Croatia, i
Judiciary’, the
communautair
                       
FCNM standards in the enlargement process as the benchmark to measure candidate 
countries’ compliance with the requirement of minority protection.  
 
The penetration of the FCNM into the EU legal order is not, however, limited to the 
pre-accession conditionality requirements, which candidates have to meet before the 
Commission opens accession negotiations. The Commission has also relied on the 
FCNM while assessing whether candidate countries meet the membership conditions 
during the accessi
n the screening report on a new Chapter 23 on ‘Fundamental Rights and 
 Commission explicitly referred to minority rights in EU acquis 
e:  
                                                                                                                     
) Decision 2008/157 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
rship with the Republic of Turkey and repealing Decision 20
1288 Council (EC
Accession Partne 06/35/EC [2008] OJ L 
051, 4-18. 
 
89 Hillion, Report on The Framework Convention… (n 1285) 7. 
2001 Regular Report on Cyprus’ Progress towards Accession’ [2001] 
EC(2001)1745, 18. 
91 Hillion, Report on The Framework Convention… (n 1285) 10. 
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According to Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU, members of national minorities shall not be discriminated against. 
tion for the Protection of National 
Minorities confirms that human rights include minority rights. The 
fairs.  
Although the argument is somewhat circular, i.e.,  
[s]ince minority rights are included in human rights as provided in 
Article 1 of the FCNM, and given that human rights are part of the EU 
acquis, then minority rights as articulated in the FCNM can also be 
 
ets of obligations of the 
candidate countries and existing EU Member States? One possible solution is for the 
EU to internalise explicitly the FCNM. This can be done either through monitoring 
Article 1 of the Framework Conven
latter include the right to non-discrimination of a person belonging to a 
national minority; the freedom of association, [of] assembly, of 
expression; the freedom of religion; the right to use one’s language; 
and the effective participation in public af 1292
  
viewed as belonging to the acquis[,]1293  
in effect, the Commission implicitly acknowledges the significance of minority rights 
as an integral part of EU acquis. 
 
The above examples aim to illustrate that the FCNM features strongly in non-binding 
resolutions of the EP and EU enlargement policy. This is not to say that the 
Commission has always been consistent in its approach to candidate countries, nor to 
claim that its efforts have all been successful.1294 The key argument here is that the 
FCNM has been utilised as an EU yardstick in the enlargement process. There is, 
however, no corresponding requirement relating to existing EU Member States. What, 
then, can the EU do to close the gap created by different s
                                                 
 
9212  Commission, ‘Screening report: Croatia, Chapter 23 – Judiciary and fundamental rights’ [2007] 3 
ening_report_23_hr_ 
ternet_en.pdf> accessed 12 July 2009. 
93 Hillion, Report on The Framework Convention… (n 1285) 12. 
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1294 For discussion see pages 193-194. 
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Member States’ compliance with the FCNM or by the EU acceding to the 
ent.1295 Let us consider each of these options in turn. 
 
EU monitoring of Member States’ compliance with the FCNM could help to ensure 
consistency of standards towards candidate States in the accession process to the EU, 
resolve remaining issues relating to minorities within the EU post-accession, and 
eliminate double standards between ‘new’ and ‘old’ Member States. In addition, EU 
monitoring could strengthen the FCNM because of the strong EU enforcement 
mechanisms, such as the imposition of political sanctions on a Member State under 
Article 7 (2) and (3) TEU if there is a clear risk of a serious and persistent breach of 
Article 2 TEU (for discussion see page 207). However, the possibility that this 
provision could entail some form of permanent monitoring of Member States, for 
example, based on the FCNM principles, has been rejected even by the EP, which 
correctly stated that Article 7 TEU could not “be invoked in support of any right to, or 
policy of, permanent monitoring of the Member States by the Union”.   
 
The sensitivity of Member States towards EU monitoring of their performance in the 
field of human rights is also evident from the limited mandate given to the recently 
established FRA. 7 Significantly, the FRA’s tasks do not include monitoring 
                                                
instrum
 
2.2. EU monitoring of Member States’ compliance with the FCNM 
1296
129
 
019, 23. 
respect for and promotion of values on which the Union is 
ased’ [2004] OJ C104E/408, para 11(a). 
68/2007 (n 1265). 
 
1295 Oliver de Schutter, ‘European Union Legislation and the Norms of the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities’ (2006) DH-MIN 
 
1296 European Parliament, ‘Resolution on 
b
 
1297 Regulation No 1
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Member States’ protection of fundamental rights; nor will the FRA submit regular 
country reports on the state of fundamental rights protection while Member States 
implement EU law.1298 This is not to say that the role of the FRA could not evolve in 
the future to include monitoring Member States’ compliance with the FCNM, were 
the EU to acquire the necessary political consensus. This could represent an important 
contribution, since the EU’s strong institutional machinery could improve the 
plementation of the FCNM. In its pre-accession monitoring reports, the 
                                                
im
Commission has already set an important precedent: the convergence of EU 
monitoring with CoE rules on minority protection has proved effective, at least in 
those states that had ratified the FCNM. 
 
The downside of such a development could be the substitution of CoE monitoring by 
EU monitoring, or the duplication of effort. In the worst case scenario, “this could 
lead to diverging interpretations of the requirements of the relevant standards, and to 
the authority of the monitoring by the Council of Europe being undermined.”1299 
Closer inter-organisational cooperation seems to be the main solution. Thus, as far as 
EU monitoring of Member States’ compliance with the FCNM is concerned, the EU 
should not reinvent minority rights by supplying its own reading of the FCNM 
principles; rather, “any country-specific follow-up should be based, equally explicitly, 
on the findings of the monitoring bodies of the Council of Europe.”1300 Since 2001, 
the Commission has already followed this practice to a certain extent in the context of 
 
 Gabriel Toggenburg, ‘The EU Fundamental Rights Agency: Satellite or Guiding Star?’ (2007) 5 
SWP Comments 3. 
 
1298
 
1299 de Schutter, ‘European Union Legislation…’ (n 1295) 23; see also Oliver De Schutter, ‘The 
Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities and the Law of the European Union’ 
in A Verstichel et al (eds) Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: A Useful 
Pan-European Instrument? (Intersentia, Oxford 2008) 268. 
 
1300 de Schutter, ‘European Union Legislation…’ (n 1295) 23. 
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EU enlargement policy. For example, as mentioned above, in its Regular Reports on 
Cyprus’s progress towards accession, the Commission criticised the discrepancy 
between Article 2 of the Constitution, whereby all Cypriots are deemed to belong 
either to the Greek Community or to the Turkish Community, and Article 3 FCNM, 
hich allows persons belonging to minorities to choose how they wish to be 
ignificantly, the ground for strengthening inter-institutional cooperation between the 
ignificance in EU pre-accession policies, accession conditionality in the context of 
w
identified.1301 To substantiate this criticism, the Commission relied on the Opinion of 
the ACFC and the Resolution of the Committee of Ministers calling on Cyprus to 
address this issue.1302 This model of interaction between the EU and the FCNM 
monitoring bodies could serve as a guide for closer cooperation in future.1303  
 
S
EU and the CoE has been already laid. The recent Agreement between the EC and the 
CoE on cooperation between the FRA and the CoE envisions the FRA’s cooperation 
inter alia with the ACFC,1304 aimed at avoiding duplication and ensuring the FRA 
and CoE monitoring bodies’ activities complement each other.1305  
 
Accordingly, there is a possibility that the EU monitoring mechanism could be 
combined with the FCNM principles. However, despite the FCNM’s increased 
s
                                                 
 
0113  Commission, ‘2001 Regular Report on Cyprus’s Progress towards Accession’ (n 1290) 18; ‘2002 
, 23. 
 However, as with the ECHR, the EU might expect its Member States to meet higher standards 
and the Council of Europe [2008] OJ L 186/7, 
rticle 1(b); see also, Memorandum of Understanding between the Council of Europe and the 
f Europe (n 1304) Article 2. 
Regular Report on Cyprus’s Progress towards Accession’ [2002] SEC(2002) 1401
 
1302 2002 Regular Report on Cyprus’s Progress towards Accession (n 1301) 23. 
 
0313
under the FCNM than those expected of other members of the CoE. 
 
1304 Agreement between the European Community and the Council of Europe on cooperation between 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
A
European Union [2007] CM (2007)74, paras 9-12, 21. 
 
1305 Agreement between the European Community and the Council o
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the 2004-2007 enlargements did not include compliance with the FCNM, nor its 
ratification.1306 For example, Latvia ratified the FCNM in 2005, i.e., one year after it 
ined the EU. Would, then, formal institutionalisation of the FCNM by the EU 
through its accession to the instrument have added value for the protection of 
inorities in EU Member States and candidate countries? The next section elaborates 
. First, it might 
ring consistency as to the EU’s internal and external protection of minorities. 
unresolved minority issues in some Member States could mobilise the necessary 
                                                
jo
m
on the benefits and disadvantages of such a move. 
 
2.3. EU accession to the FCNM 
 
Internalisation of the FCNM would have several advantages for the EU
b
Secondly, it could require the EU institutions to take account of the FCNM when they 
legislate, as well as to enable an independent expert body to review EU acts “in 
relation to their impact on interethnic relations under the FCNM.”1307 
 
This proposal could raise various objections, such as the argument that the EU is not a 
human rights organisation; it is outside its mandate to protect minorities internally; 
and there may be procedural difficulties in acceding to the FCNM. However, first, 
until twenty years ago, the EU had not promoted the rights of minorities externally 
either. The necessity of ensuring smooth enlargement induced the EU to initiate its 
own monitoring process in the candidate countries, despite the fact that both the CoE 
and the OSCE were already involved in minority protection. The aggravation of 
 
 
1306 Hillion, Report on The Framework Convention… (n 1285) 14. 
  
1307 Hofmann and Friberg, ‘The Enlarged EU and the Council of Europe…’ (n 35) 138. 
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political will within the EU to establish internal standards on minority protection. In 
addition, some of the new EU member states could “tilt the balance towards pushing 
for minority related components to enter into the legal texts of the EU, underpinning 
both its internal and external policies…”1308 For example, during the drafting of the 
U Constitutional Treaty, a Hungarian MEP proposed to insert a provision on EU 
indirectly relevant to the issue of the EU’s possible accession to the FCNM. Overall, 
E
accession to the FCNM; even though the proposal failed to gain sufficient support,1309 
it may be indicative of future developments. 
 
As to the procedural aspects of such accession, as with the ECHR,1310 the CoE may be 
willing to accommodate the EU’s legal status and amend Article 29 FCNM to allow 
its accession. Concerns regarding various technical issues in the texts were raised in 
relation to the possible accession of the EU to the ECHR as well. This, however, did 
not stop Member States from incorporating a provision, first into the draft 
Constitutional Treaty, and later into the Lisbon Treaty, specifying the EU’s accession 
to the ECHR.1311 The Venice Commission addressed concerns in relation to such 
accession, particularly in the light of the legally-binding CFR.1312 Its findings may be 
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09 Hofmann and Friberg, ‘The Enlarged EU and the Council of Europe…’ (n 35) 138. 
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1310 See, Additional Protocol No 14 to the ECHR amending the control system of the Convention 
(2004) CETS 204, which entered into force on 06 January 2010. Article 59(2) ECHR as amened by 
Article 17 of Protocol 14 allows the EU to accede to the ECHR. See also, European Parliament, 
Institutional aspects of accession by the European Union to the European Convention
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1311 Article 6(2) TEU. See also Protocol Relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on 
the Accession of the Union to the European Con
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1312 Venice Commission, ‘Opinion on the Implications of a Legally-binding EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights on Human Rights Protection in Europe’ (2003) Opinion no 256/2003; See also, 
‘Comments on the Accession of the European Un
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the Venice Commission evaluated positively the co-existence of two legally binding 
instruments on human rights in Europe.1313 However, it acknowledged that certain 
divergences of interpretation could ensue due to differences in the wording, structure 
and scope of the ECHR (including the ECtHR’s case law) and the CFR.1314 The 
solutions proposed were clearer division of competences between the ECtHR, the ECJ 
and national courts,1315 and closer inter-organisational dialogue.1316 As to duplication 
of efforts by the EU and the CoE, the Venice Commission noted that the EU’s 
accession to the ECHR “would maintain and even reinforce the ECHR mechanism, 
avoid the creation of new dividing lines within Europe and enhance the credibility of 
the EU’s policies in the field of human rights.”1317 Accordingly, the EU’s 
involvement in minority protection would not necessarily conflict with the CoE’s 
ve to 
be less useful 
not applicable  
applicability of Article 12(1) FCNM to the EU.1318 The provision specifies that  
[t]he Parties shall, where appropriate, take measures in the fields of 
the culture, history, 
language and religion of their national minorities and of the majority.  
                                              
efforts, provided that it is based on close institutional cooperation and a clear division 
of competences.  
 
However, it is argued that the EU’s potential accession to the FCNM could pro
than one may think, because some of the provisions of the FCNM are 
 in the context of EU law. For example, Toggenburg questions the
education and research to foster knowledge of 
   
1313 Venice Commission, Opinion no 256/2003 (n 1312) para 39. 
 
1314 Venice Commission, Opinion no 256/2003 (n 1312) para 43. 
 
1315 Venice Commission, Opinion no 256/2003 (n 1312) para 41. 
 
1316 Venice Commission, Opinion no 256/2003 (n 1312) para 74. 
 
1317 Venice Commission, Opinion no 256/2003 (n 1312) para 86. 
 
1318 Toggenburg, ‘Minority Protection in a Supranational Context…’ (n 1078) 16. 
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 In his view, the main stumbling block is the term ‘their national minorities’, which 
might create an impression that the EU has its own minorities.    
 
As discussed in Chapter I on pages 131-133, the concept of ‘national minority’ 
remains undefined in Europe. The lack of a definition, however, has not prevented the 
development of rules on minority protection, such as in the FCNM. Given that the 
concept of ‘minority’ appears in EU primary law, namely Article 2 TEU and Article 
21 CFR, it is likely to be only a matter of time before the ECJ will have to interpret 
the term in the EU context. Furthermore, the EU could follow State practice and adopt 
an interpretative declaration upon accession to the instrument to clarify the scope of 
the FCNM’s application in the EU context. In practice, such a declaration could 
specify which groups would benefit from the EU’s compliance with the FCNM. A 
road approach to the definition, as suggested on page 186, is preferable, although, 
 
b
realistically, considering the opposition from some Member States to the broad 
definition of ‘minority’ suggested by the ACFC,1319 the EU may not be able to 
fashion new categories that fit in with the demands of EU law.  
Nevertheless, the highly criticised framework nature of the FCNM and its vague 
wording,1320 as some argue, might allow for its flexible application and should be 
                                                 
1913  For example, to the suggestions of the Advisory Committee to expand the scope of FCNM 
event that the Italian Parliament decides, under appropriate draft legislation, to 
cognise the existence of any additional minority language groups”: ‘Comments of the Government of 
application (First Opinion on Italy (n 283) 19), the Italian government commented that “the possible 
extension of the safeguards provided by the Framework Convention to include other minorities can 
only be examined in the 
re
Italy on the Opinion of the Advisory Committee on the implementation of the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities in Italy’ (2002) GVT/COM/INF/OP/I(2002)007, 2.  
 
1320 Alfredsson, ‘A Frame an Incomplete Painting…’ (n 13); Stefan Troebst, ‘From paper to practice: 
The Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the protection of national minorities’ (1999) 1 
Helsinki Monitor 1-27. 
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viewed as strengths of the instrument.1321 Besides, not all the provisions of the FCNM 
are complicated. As Steketee indicates, for example, Articles 1, 3, 4 and 15 FCNM 
are fairly straightforward.1322 It is true that the jurisprudence of the HRC1323 and the 
ECtHR1324 cover most of these provisions, and hence constitute an integral part of the 
general principles of EU law. However, some of the ECtHR’s case law is context-
specific and led the Court to adopt a different approach in seemingly similar 
situations.1325 Moreover, neither the ICCPR nor the ECHR contain an explicit 
catalogue of minority rights. Therefore, EU accession to the FCNM could have both 
mbolic and practical significance. 
                                                
sy
 
Overall, EU internalisation of the FCNM through consistent references to the 
instrument in EU enlargement policy, monitoring of Member States’ compliance with 
the instrument, or even future accession, could bring consistency to EU internal and 
external actions involving minority rights. However, EU accession to the FCNM is 
not an easy option for developing a system of minority protection in the EU and has 
its own drawbacks. For example, there may be strong objections from EU Member 
 
Protection of National Minorities: On the Judicial Implementation of the (Soft?) Law of Integration’ in 
A Verstichel et al (eds) The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities: A Useful 
Pan-European Instrument? (Intersentia, Oxford 2008) 212. 
 
1321 Kinga Gál, ‘The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities and its Impact on Central and Eastern Europe’ (2000) European Centre for Minority Issues 
3; Francesco Palermo, ‘Domestic Enforcement and Direct Effect of the Framework Convention for the 
 
1322 Frank Steketee, ‘The Framework Convention: A Piece of Art or a Tool for Action?’ 8 International 
Journal on Minority and Group Rights (2001) 1-15, 5. 
 
1323 Sandra Lovelace (n 337) (self-identification); and Ilmari Länsman (n 150); Jouni Länsman (n 150) 
and Apirana Mahuika (n 150) (participation rights), etc.   
 
1324 Sejdić and Finci (n 55) (non-discrimination in political participation); D H and others v the Czech 
Republic (n 71) and Cyprus v Turkey (n 290) (educational rights of minorities). 
 
1325 Görzelik (n 102) with Sidiropoulos and others v Greece  (n 31) (the freedom of association to 
protect separate identity of a minority group). For analysis see Pentassuglia, ‘Minority Issues as a 
Challenge in the European Court of Human Rights…’ (n 31) 5-7. 
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States that have not signed the FCNM (i.e., France) or have signed but not ratified 
(i.e., Belgium, Greece and Luxembourg). Surely, ratification by all Member States 
must be an essential prerequisite for accession. Given the political opposition from the 
above mentioned States, however, this may be difficult to achieve in practice. 
Furthermore, procedural difficulties are to be expected. As noted above, Article 29 
FCNM stipulates that the instrument is open to States only. In addition, accession to 
e FCNM would not in itself widen the EU’s powers, so some Treaty amendments 
 focus on developing implementation strategies 
r existing norms developed by the CoE. This can be achieved through closer 
th
might be necessary to expand its competence in this field. Moreover, accession to the 
FCNM itself requires a valid legal basis; Article 2 TEU may not be sufficient in this 
respect.1326  
 
To conclude, because the protection of minorities in individual Member States largely 
depends on States’ political will, arguably, it would be useful if, instead of creating 
another layer of rules, the EU could
fo
cooperation of the Commission and the FRA with the supervisory bodies of the 
FCNM, and reinforcement of the FCNM by the EU. Such cooperation could include 
both short- and long-term strategies. 
 
The short-term strategies could involve using the FCNM as a yardstick in EU 
enlargement policy, because the application of double standards in minority 
                                                 
1326 The lack of a specific legal basis and competence on human rights prevented the EC from acceding 
to the ECHR: see, Opinion 2/94 on Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights [1996] 
ECR I-1759. Likewise, the ECJ confirmed that budget line B3-1006, used for promotion of regional or 
minority languages, had to be suspended due to the lack of an appropriate legal basis: Case C-106/96 
 
nd by Kingdom of Denmark) v Commission of the European Communities, supported by the European 
the United Kingdom (supported by Federal Republic of Germany, by Council of the European Union
a
Parliament) [1998] 98/C 234/07. 
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protection could encourage current1327 and future candidate countries1328 not to 
comply fully with accession criteria. Consequently, the Commission should insist that 
ratification and compliance with the FCNM becomes an accession condition. 
Moreover, the Commission itself must use the FCNM more consistently. Admitting 
candidates that do not fully meet the Copenhagen political criteria sends the wrong 
signal to States which have not resolved minority issues prior to accession, allowing 
them to feel at liberty to continue exclusionary practices against minorities post-
accession. To address the unresolved issues post-accession, it is desirable for the EU 
to expand the powers of the FRA to monitor Member States’ compliance with human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. It would be particularly 
beneficial if such monitoring was based on the FCNM principles and the ACFC’s 
ading of the instrument to avoid contradictions in its application. The added value of 
eding to the FCNM, the EU could 
                                                
re
FRA monitoring would also be apparent where relevant existing EU rules that could 
contribute to minority protection, such as the Equality Directives and Articles 21 and 
22 CFR, are interpreted in a minority-friendly fashion. 
 
The long-term EU strategy in relation to the FCNM could involve formal accession to 
the instrument. One of the main obstacles to such a development is the lack of EU 
competences to protect minorities, which can be remedied through future Treaty 
revisions.1329 Once the political momentum is achieved, procedural and technical 
obstacles might be negotiated fairly easily. By acc
 
1327 Current candidate countries are Turkey, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
 
1328 Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo and Iceland. 
1329 Toggenburg, ‘Minority Protection in a Supranational Context…’ (n 1078) 10. However, further 
treaty revisions are unlikely to take place in the near future, largely because even a small country can 
block any proposed changes: Petr Kratochvil and Mats Braun, ‘The Lisbon Treaty and the Czech 
Republic: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain’ (2009) 5(3) Journal of Contemporary European Research 
498-504, 504. 
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help to ensure consistency of standards in its enlargement policy and resolve 
the EU post-accession. Despite technical 
ifficulties and political opposition from some Member States, such an accession 
symbolic and practical value. 
outstanding issues of minorities within 
d
could have an added 
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